- Rating
- 3
- Confidence
- 1
- Informativeness
- 3
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper presents an empirical study of trust decisions in autonomous tool discovery and adoption. The authors evaluate six LLM agents across eight capability domains, investigating how agents discover third-party tools, respond to manipulated trust signals, and proceed from recommendation to installation and execution. The results reveal shallow tool inspection, vulnerability to unverified security signals, and a tradeoff between avoiding unsafe tools and completing legitimate tasks.
Critical strengths
S1. Meaningful research problem.
The paper addresses an important security challenge in autonomous agent systems, providing useful insights into how agents assess and adopt third-party software.
S2. Systematic experimental design.
The study evaluates multiple models and capability domains using controlled trust-signal manipulations. Its multi-stage evaluation of recommendation, execution, abstention, and task completion provides a comprehensive view of agent safety behavior.
Critical weaknesses
W1. Limited end-to-end validation and realism.
Tool discovery and controlled adoption are evaluated separately, while installation and execution are simulated rather than performed. This limits the evidence that the observed trust decisions generalize to realistic end-to-end agent workflows.
W2. Limited diversity of poisoned tool scenarios.
Poisoned candidates are primarily constructed by adding suspicious setup requirements involving credentials and network access. This relatively narrow attack design raises concerns about whether the findings generalize to more diverse and subtle software supply chain threats.
Questions for authors
Please see the critical weaknesses above.
3 comments
Thank you for the detailed response. The authors provide reasonable justifications for their experimental design, particularly the separation of tool discovery and controlled adoption, as well as the use of simulated execution to mitigate security risks. However, I still believe that the lack of real end-to-end execution and the relatively limited diversity of attack scenarios constrain the generalizability of the findings to more complex real-world settings.
Nevertheless, I recognize the importance of the research problem and the empirical value of this work. The experimental design is systematic, and the analysis of different trust signals and agent adoption behaviors provides meaningful insights. The authors' response further clarifies the rationale behind their experimental choices. Therefore, I have decided to maintain my original rating of 3.
We sincerely thank the reviewer for the thoughtful follow-up and for recognizing the importance of the problem and the value of our analysis. We agree that real end-to-end execution and more diverse attack scenarios are important for understanding how these findings extend to more complex real-world settings. We have updated the Limitations section in the revised PDF (changes in blue) to explain the rationale for our design and to discuss these two points. We appreciate the reviewer’s support of our paper again.
We thank the reviewer for recognizing the importance of the problem, as well as our multi-stage evaluation framework and controlled experimental design. We address the two concerns below.
W1. Limited end-to-end validation and realism
We agree that end-to-end realism is important, and we thank the reviewer for raising this point. We evaluate discovery and controlled adoption separately so that the effect of each signal can be identified. In an end-to-end process, whether the agent sees the poisoned candidate depends on the retriever and on the agent’s own search behavior. RQ1 shows that agents usually search once and inspect one candidate. If the two parts were combined, whether a signal influences the choice and whether the candidate is exposed at all would be mixed together. We therefore use two complementary settings.
Both settings use the same action interface and the same capability requests.
The findings from the two settings support each other. The shallow inspection observed in RQ1 also appears in the controlled setting and is directly related to risk. Our trajectory audit shows that 174 of GPT-4o’s 188 poisoned recommendations (92.6%) occur before the poisoned documentation is inspected. The share for Qwen3.8-Flash is 66.7%. Shallow inspection during discovery is therefore one of the sources of risk during adoption.
We use simulated installation and execution for safety reasons. Running malicious content in a real environment could cause actual harm, and the recent incidents mentioned in Sec 1 show that agent actions during evaluation can have real consequences. Prior work such as ToolEmu and AgentDojo also uses simulated environments. Simulation does not change what we measure. This paper studies the agent’s decisions to recommend, install, or execute, and each decision is made when the agent issues the corresponding action. The simulator is also stateful. Installation must come before execution, and after installation the requested permissions are returned to the agent as an observation. The agent therefore goes through a complete multi-step decision process.
W2. Limited diversity of poisoned tool scenarios.
We thank the reviewer for this valuable suggestion. Our poisoned construction is kept uniform to control variables. Each poisoned candidate keeps the functional documentation of a real skill and adds a
Required setupsection. The added text follows one sanitized template across all scenes and differs only in its canary ID. It describes the prerequisite as a task-unrelated action, with permission metadata covering credentials and network access. Each scene is linked to an MCPTox attack record for provenance, and no original attack payload is included. This keeps the poisoned content consistent across scenes and helps attribute differences in adoption to the five manipulated trust signals. It also reflects a common supply-chain pattern where the tool looks functionally normal but requests access unrelated to the task.We agree that more diverse poisoned scenarios are a valuable direction. In this paper, we focus on how agents make trust decisions during capability discovery, including the depth of search and inspection, the effect of forgeable signals on selection, and the decision process from recommendation to execution. To identify these factors, we kept the attack construction fixed. Building more covert and diverse poisoned software, such as dependency confusion, typosquatting, or malicious logic hidden in dependencies or code, is a research question that complements our work. We believe it deserves systematic study from both the attack and defense perspectives. From the attack side, one can examine how more covert constructions change agent adoption behavior. From the defense side, one can examine whether detection mechanisms and safety warnings can keep both discrimination and task completion under more complex threats.
We would like to thank the reviewer once again for their recognition of our work and for the constructive questions they have raised.