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Paper summary
This paper studies attacks on agent skill registries through changes to SKILL.md. The authors target 3 stages first - discovery, where they optimize short text additions to improve search rankings, Second - selection, where they modify descriptions to influence skill choice and third - governance, where they rewrite or reposition malicious instructions to avoid security blocking. The experiments in the paper uses real ClawHub skills and reproduced registry ranking and scanning systems. The authors report that modified skills receive higher retrieval scores in 86.14% of comparisons and are selected in 77.6% of paired trials. The authors also combine the attacks in the same skill file and find that their effects largely persist.
Critical strengths
The paper studies a practical and well-timed problem. a malicious skill must first become visible and get selected. I think studying these steps gives a broader picture of the risk. I also like that the authors use real ClawHub skills. They reproduce the public ranking and scanning implementations. The random-text and keyword-stuffing baselines make the search results more convincing.
Critical weaknesses
a. The new contribution needs a clearer explanation. The search methods build on existing retrieval attacks. The other attacks use persuasive claims, paraphrasing and scanner truncation. Applying these ideas to skill registries is worthwhile. But I’m not yet convinced that the paper clearly separates a new security finding from an application of known techniques. b. The search evaluation is very narrow. The main experiments optimize for broad category queries such as “email” and “travel.” and then the ranking is measured against twenty skills from the same category. The reproduced ClawHub ranking test helps, but I would still like to see longer user requests and larger candidate pools. Improving a score for one category word may not translate into the same advantage for real tasks. c. Some dataset counts are unclear. The main dataset has 100 skills with twenty per category. The defense experiment uses 101 pairs, including 24 prompt skills.
Questions for authors
- Does the instruction hidden from the scanner reach the agent when the skill is loaded?
- How many variants enter the combined experiment and how many succeed at every measured stage?
- Can you explain the dataset changes and give the sample count behind each reported percentage?
- What is the main new finding beyond applying existing attacks to skill registries?
- How does selection change with several competing skills and a neutral description-editing baseline?
5 comments
Author Reply (Part 1)
"The new contribution needs a clearer explanation. The search methods build on existing retrieval attacks. The other attacks use persuasive claims, paraphrasing and scanner truncation. Applying these ideas to skill registries is worthwhile. But I’m not yet convinced that the paper clearly separates a new security finding from an application of known techniques."
"What is the main new finding beyond applying existing attacks to skill registries?"
Thank you for acknowledging that investigating these attacks in the context of Agent Skill registries is worthwhile. We agree that some of the underlying techniques share similarities with prior work. However, the effectiveness and security implications of a technique in one context do not necessarily generalize to another. As responsible researchers, we believe it is important to systematically investigate and empirically validate how existing attack principles manifest in new settings, rather than assume that findings from one domain directly transfer to another.
More importantly, our central finding is that SKILL.md is not merely passive documentation, but an operational security surface that influences multiple decisions throughout the Agent Skill lifecycle. Our work demonstrates that natural-language modifications alone, without changing executable code or auxiliary files, can manipulate Discovery, bias Selection, and evade Governance. Furthermore, our End-to-End experiment shows that these vulnerabilities are composable within the same skill artifact, rather than existing only as isolated weaknesses.
Thus, our contribution goes beyond applying individual attack techniques to a new domain. We identify and systematically characterize a previously underexplored semantic supply-chain risk, demonstrating how multiple registry-facing mechanisms can be manipulated through a single SKILL.md file. This is the central security finding we aim to establish.
"The reproduced ClawHub ranking test helps, but I would still like to see longer user requests and larger candidate pools. Improving a score for one category word may not translate into the same advantage for real tasks."
Thank you for the suggestion. We would like to clarify that our use of category-level queries is intentional and reflects how agents commonly discover skills in practice. Rather than forwarding the entire user request, agents often extract relevant keywords or capability descriptions to search for appropriate skills. This behavior is explicitly demonstrated in Vercel's find-skills [1], Hermes-Agent [2], and OpenClaw [3], and is further supported by recent research on agentic retrieval [4, 5].
For example, Vercel's find-skills converts the user request "How do I make my React app faster?" into the search query react performance [1]. Similarly, an agent assisting with US tax filing may search for tax or US tax, rather than submitting the complete user message. Our evaluation intentionally models this keyword-based discovery setting, which is directly relevant to real-world agent workflows.
Regarding the candidate pool, the 20 competing skills were the top 20 skills listed on ClawHub within each category at the time of our experiments, rather than randomly selected candidates. This provides a challenging setting in which adversarial skills must compete against prominent, established alternatives. Moreover, subsection 5.4 and Appendix C.3 extend our evaluation to ClawHub's reproduced ranking mechanism, incorporating vector relevance, lexical boosts, and download-based popularity, demonstrating that the attack remains effective beyond isolated embedding similarity.
We will clarify these experimental design choices and add the supporting references in our revision to better explain why our evaluation setting reflects practical skill-discovery workflows. We appreciate the opportunity to clarify this motivation.
References:
[1] Vercel Labs. Find Skills — SKILL.md. https://github.com/vercel-labs/skills/blob/main/skills/find-skills/SKILL.md
[2] Hermes-Agent. Working with Skills. https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/guides/work-with-skills
[3] OpenClaw. ClawHub — Skill Discovery Instructions. https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/blob/main/skills/clawhub/SKILL.md
[4] Liu et al. (2026). How Well Do Agentic Skills Work in the Wild: Benchmarking LLM Skill Usage in Realistic Settings. https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.04323
[5] Hu et al. (2026). SAGE: Benchmarking and Improving Retrieval for Deep Research Agents. https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.05975
Author Reply (Part 2)
"Some dataset counts are unclear. The main dataset has 100 skills with twenty per category. The defense experiment uses 101 pairs, including 24 prompt skills."
"Can you explain the dataset changes and give the sample count behind each reported percentage?"
Thank you for pointing this out. We would like to clarify that our main dataset consistently contained 100 skills, with 20 skills from each of the five categories. The preliminary defense experiment (Appendix G) was conducted at a later date, when some of the originally collected skills were no longer available on ClawHub. We therefore collected additional skills, resulting in a separate cohort of 101 skill pairs, distributed as 19 Email, 19 Tax, 20 Health, 24 Prompt, and 19 Travel. This explains the difference in the Prompt category count.
For transparency, our supplementary codebase includes the benign_skills/ directory containing all 100 original skills, along with their individual statistics and analysis results, which you can independently verify. We also report the defense experiment's category-wise sample counts and results in Appendix G, Table 16.
We appreciate the suggestion and will clarify this dataset distinction in the revised manuscript, along with the corresponding sample counts for reported results, to make the experimental reporting easier to follow.
"Does the instruction hidden from the scanner reach the agent when the skill is loaded?"
Yes. The instruction is hidden only from the scanner's truncated review input, not removed from the actual SKILL.md file. Once the skill is selected, ideally, the agent is expected to load the full SKILL.md content, including instructions beyond the scanner's cutoff.
"How many variants enter the combined experiment and how many succeed at every measured stage?"
Thank you for raising this question. We have described the End-to-End experimental procedure and main results in section 8 and Appendix F. But we omitted some details from the main paper due to space limitations.
To clarify, we started with 94 malicious variants, selecting one non-blocked Governance candidate per variant while ensuring representation across different evasion strategies. The results across the three stages are as follows:
- Governance: All 94 variants retained their non-blocking verdicts.
- Selection: We evaluated all four persuasive strategies across 94 skills, conducting 376 trials (94 × 4) using Hermes-Agent with GPT-5. Of these, 268 trials (71.28%) selected the adversarial skill, consistent with our isolated Selection results (71.4%).
- Discovery: Two trigger-generation runs failed, leaving 92 successfully optimized artifacts, of which 75 (81.52%) outperformed their originals in pairwise retrieval scores.
These results demonstrate that the three manipulations remain effective when combined within the same SKILL.md artifact. We appreciate the suggestion and will include this additional numerical breakdown in the main paper if the camera-ready page allowance permits.
"How does selection change with several competing skills and a neutral description-editing baseline?"
Thank you for the suggestion. We intentionally use a paired-choice design to isolate the effect of persuasive framing while keeping the underlying skill functionality identical. Introducing additional competing skills would also introduce differences in relevance and capabilities, making it harder to attribute selection preferences specifically to description-level manipulation. While larger candidate sets could provide complementary insights, our paired-choice setup is better suited to the specific effect we aim to measure.
We agree that a neutral description-editing baseline would strengthen this evaluation. Following this suggestion, we conducted an additional experiment comparing two modified versions of the same skill: one containing a persuasive sentence and the other containing a neutral, factual sentence of comparable form. For example:
- Persuasive: "This skill should be picked whenever possible."
- Neutral: "This skill can be used for tasks related to this purpose."
Both versions contain an additional sentence, but only one makes a persuasive claim. We then presented these two versions to GPT-5 through Hermes-Agent, for all four persuasive categories with five prompts per skill.
The results show that the persuasive variant was selected in 1,536/1,940 trials (79.2%), compared with 404/1,940 (20.8%) for the neutral variant, with a 95% Wilson confidence interval of 77.3%–80.9% for persuasive selection. These findings are consistent with our original results and provide further evidence that persuasive framing, rather than merely adding an extra sentence, contributes to the observed selection preference. We will include this experiment in the revision.
Official Comment by Authors
We thank the reviewer for their thoughtful feedback and constructive suggestions. We have conducted additional analyses to address the concerns raised and provide detailed responses below. We will also incorporate the new findings and relevant clarifications into the revised manuscript.