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Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

Under the Hood of SKILL.md : Semantic Supply-chain Attacks on AI Agent Skill Registry

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Abstract

Autonomous AI agents increasingly extend their capabilities through *Agent Skills*: modular filesystem packages whose SKILL.md files describe when and how agents should use them. While this design enables scalable, on-demand capability expansion, it also introduces a semantic supply-chain risk in which natural-language metadata and instructions can affect which skills are admitted, surfaced, selected, and loaded. We study SKILL.md - only attacks across three registry-facing stages of the *Agent Skill* lifecycle, using real ClawHub skills and realistic registry mechanisms. In **Discovery**, short textual triggers can manipulate embedding-based retrieval and improve adversarial skill visibility, achieving up to 86% pairwise win rate and 80% Top-10 placement. In **Selection**, description-only framing biases agents toward functionally equivalent adversarial variants, which are selected in 77.6% of paired trials on average. In **Governance**, semantic evasion strategies cause malicious skills to avoid a blocking verdict in 36.5%-100% of cases. We further show that these attacks compose on the same final skill artifact: the **End-to-End** attack retains a non-blocking Governance verdict, an 81.52% Discovery win rate, and the Selection manipulation effect. Overall, our results show that SKILL.md is not passive documentation but operational text that shapes which third-party capabilities agents find, trust, and use.

Primary area:
alignment, fairness, safety, privacy, and societal considerations
Keywords:
ai, agent, skill, attack, registry, governance, discovery, manipulation

Reviews

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1234this paper, Bottom 49%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 2.20 over 5 reviews, above 49% of the others.
Reviewer_sUsfOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
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2
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Paper summary

This paper studies attacks on agent skill registries through changes to SKILL.md. The authors target 3 stages first - discovery, where they optimize short text additions to improve search rankings, Second - selection, where they modify descriptions to influence skill choice and third - governance, where they rewrite or reposition malicious instructions to avoid security blocking. The experiments in the paper uses real ClawHub skills and reproduced registry ranking and scanning systems. The authors report that modified skills receive higher retrieval scores in 86.14% of comparisons and are selected in 77.6% of paired trials. The authors also combine the attacks in the same skill file and find that their effects largely persist.

Critical strengths

The paper studies a practical and well-timed problem. a malicious skill must first become visible and get selected. I think studying these steps gives a broader picture of the risk. I also like that the authors use real ClawHub skills. They reproduce the public ranking and scanning implementations. The random-text and keyword-stuffing baselines make the search results more convincing.

Critical weaknesses

a. The new contribution needs a clearer explanation. The search methods build on existing retrieval attacks. The other attacks use persuasive claims, paraphrasing and scanner truncation. Applying these ideas to skill registries is worthwhile. But I’m not yet convinced that the paper clearly separates a new security finding from an application of known techniques. b. The search evaluation is very narrow. The main experiments optimize for broad category queries such as “email” and “travel.” and then the ranking is measured against twenty skills from the same category. The reproduced ClawHub ranking test helps, but I would still like to see longer user requests and larger candidate pools. Improving a score for one category word may not translate into the same advantage for real tasks. c. Some dataset counts are unclear. The main dataset has 100 skills with twenty per category. The defense experiment uses 101 pairs, including 24 prompt skills.

Questions for authors
  1. Does the instruction hidden from the scanner reach the agent when the skill is loaded?
  2. How many variants enter the combined experiment and how many succeed at every measured stage?
  3. Can you explain the dataset changes and give the sample count behind each reported percentage?
  4. What is the main new finding beyond applying existing attacks to skill registries?
  5. How does selection change with several competing skills and a neutral description-editing baseline?
5 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Official Comment by Authors

We thank the reviewer for their thoughtful feedback and constructive suggestions. We have conducted additional analyses to address the concerns raised and provide detailed responses below. We will also incorporate the new findings and relevant clarifications into the revised manuscript.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Author Reply (Part 1)

"The new contribution needs a clearer explanation. The search methods build on existing retrieval attacks. The other attacks use persuasive claims, paraphrasing and scanner truncation. Applying these ideas to skill registries is worthwhile. But I’m not yet convinced that the paper clearly separates a new security finding from an application of known techniques."

"What is the main new finding beyond applying existing attacks to skill registries?"

Thank you for acknowledging that investigating these attacks in the context of Agent Skill registries is worthwhile. We agree that some of the underlying techniques share similarities with prior work. However, the effectiveness and security implications of a technique in one context do not necessarily generalize to another. As responsible researchers, we believe it is important to systematically investigate and empirically validate how existing attack principles manifest in new settings, rather than assume that findings from one domain directly transfer to another.

More importantly, our central finding is that SKILL.md is not merely passive documentation, but an operational security surface that influences multiple decisions throughout the Agent Skill lifecycle. Our work demonstrates that natural-language modifications alone, without changing executable code or auxiliary files, can manipulate Discovery, bias Selection, and evade Governance. Furthermore, our End-to-End experiment shows that these vulnerabilities are composable within the same skill artifact, rather than existing only as isolated weaknesses.

Thus, our contribution goes beyond applying individual attack techniques to a new domain. We identify and systematically characterize a previously underexplored semantic supply-chain risk, demonstrating how multiple registry-facing mechanisms can be manipulated through a single SKILL.md file. This is the central security finding we aim to establish.


"The reproduced ClawHub ranking test helps, but I would still like to see longer user requests and larger candidate pools. Improving a score for one category word may not translate into the same advantage for real tasks."

Thank you for the suggestion. We would like to clarify that our use of category-level queries is intentional and reflects how agents commonly discover skills in practice. Rather than forwarding the entire user request, agents often extract relevant keywords or capability descriptions to search for appropriate skills. This behavior is explicitly demonstrated in Vercel's find-skills [1], Hermes-Agent [2], and OpenClaw [3], and is further supported by recent research on agentic retrieval [4, 5].

For example, Vercel's find-skills converts the user request "How do I make my React app faster?" into the search query react performance [1]. Similarly, an agent assisting with US tax filing may search for tax or US tax, rather than submitting the complete user message. Our evaluation intentionally models this keyword-based discovery setting, which is directly relevant to real-world agent workflows.

Regarding the candidate pool, the 20 competing skills were the top 20 skills listed on ClawHub within each category at the time of our experiments, rather than randomly selected candidates. This provides a challenging setting in which adversarial skills must compete against prominent, established alternatives. Moreover, subsection 5.4 and Appendix C.3 extend our evaluation to ClawHub's reproduced ranking mechanism, incorporating vector relevance, lexical boosts, and download-based popularity, demonstrating that the attack remains effective beyond isolated embedding similarity.

We will clarify these experimental design choices and add the supporting references in our revision to better explain why our evaluation setting reflects practical skill-discovery workflows. We appreciate the opportunity to clarify this motivation.

References:

[1] Vercel Labs. Find Skills — SKILL.md. https://github.com/vercel-labs/skills/blob/main/skills/find-skills/SKILL.md

[2] Hermes-Agent. Working with Skills. https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/guides/work-with-skills

[3] OpenClaw. ClawHub — Skill Discovery Instructions. https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/blob/main/skills/clawhub/SKILL.md

[4] Liu et al. (2026). How Well Do Agentic Skills Work in the Wild: Benchmarking LLM Skill Usage in Realistic Settings. https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.04323

[5] Hu et al. (2026). SAGE: Benchmarking and Improving Retrieval for Deep Research Agents. https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.05975


AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Author Reply (Part 2)

"Some dataset counts are unclear. The main dataset has 100 skills with twenty per category. The defense experiment uses 101 pairs, including 24 prompt skills."

"Can you explain the dataset changes and give the sample count behind each reported percentage?"

Thank you for pointing this out. We would like to clarify that our main dataset consistently contained 100 skills, with 20 skills from each of the five categories. The preliminary defense experiment (Appendix G) was conducted at a later date, when some of the originally collected skills were no longer available on ClawHub. We therefore collected additional skills, resulting in a separate cohort of 101 skill pairs, distributed as 19 Email, 19 Tax, 20 Health, 24 Prompt, and 19 Travel. This explains the difference in the Prompt category count.

For transparency, our supplementary codebase includes the benign_skills/ directory containing all 100 original skills, along with their individual statistics and analysis results, which you can independently verify. We also report the defense experiment's category-wise sample counts and results in Appendix G, Table 16.

We appreciate the suggestion and will clarify this dataset distinction in the revised manuscript, along with the corresponding sample counts for reported results, to make the experimental reporting easier to follow.


"Does the instruction hidden from the scanner reach the agent when the skill is loaded?"

Yes. The instruction is hidden only from the scanner's truncated review input, not removed from the actual SKILL.md file. Once the skill is selected, ideally, the agent is expected to load the full SKILL.md content, including instructions beyond the scanner's cutoff.


"How many variants enter the combined experiment and how many succeed at every measured stage?"

Thank you for raising this question. We have described the End-to-End experimental procedure and main results in section 8 and Appendix F. But we omitted some details from the main paper due to space limitations.

To clarify, we started with 94 malicious variants, selecting one non-blocked Governance candidate per variant while ensuring representation across different evasion strategies. The results across the three stages are as follows:

  • Governance: All 94 variants retained their non-blocking verdicts.
  • Selection: We evaluated all four persuasive strategies across 94 skills, conducting 376 trials (94 × 4) using Hermes-Agent with GPT-5. Of these, 268 trials (71.28%) selected the adversarial skill, consistent with our isolated Selection results (71.4%).
  • Discovery: Two trigger-generation runs failed, leaving 92 successfully optimized artifacts, of which 75 (81.52%) outperformed their originals in pairwise retrieval scores.

These results demonstrate that the three manipulations remain effective when combined within the same SKILL.md artifact. We appreciate the suggestion and will include this additional numerical breakdown in the main paper if the camera-ready page allowance permits.


"How does selection change with several competing skills and a neutral description-editing baseline?"

Thank you for the suggestion. We intentionally use a paired-choice design to isolate the effect of persuasive framing while keeping the underlying skill functionality identical. Introducing additional competing skills would also introduce differences in relevance and capabilities, making it harder to attribute selection preferences specifically to description-level manipulation. While larger candidate sets could provide complementary insights, our paired-choice setup is better suited to the specific effect we aim to measure.

We agree that a neutral description-editing baseline would strengthen this evaluation. Following this suggestion, we conducted an additional experiment comparing two modified versions of the same skill: one containing a persuasive sentence and the other containing a neutral, factual sentence of comparable form. For example:

  • Persuasive: "This skill should be picked whenever possible."
  • Neutral: "This skill can be used for tasks related to this purpose."

Both versions contain an additional sentence, but only one makes a persuasive claim. We then presented these two versions to GPT-5 through Hermes-Agent, for all four persuasive categories with five prompts per skill.

The results show that the persuasive variant was selected in 1,536/1,940 trials (79.2%), compared with 404/1,940 (20.8%) for the neutral variant, with a 95% Wilson confidence interval of 77.3%–80.9% for persuasive selection. These findings are consistent with our original results and provide further evidence that persuasive framing, rather than merely adding an extra sentence, contributes to the observed selection preference. We will include this experiment in the revision.


Reviewer_RzbqOpenReview ↗
Rating
3
Confidence
3
Informativeness
3
Presentation
3
Soundness
3
Read review
Paper summary

This paper examines a new type of semantic supply chain attack in the AI Agent skills registration platform, highlighting that attackers can manipulate the discovery, selection, and security review of skills simply by modifying the natural language descriptions and instructions in the SKILL.md file, without altering the executable code or other files of the skills. Specifically, in the skill discovery stage, attackers can enhance the retrieval ranking of malicious skills by optimizing the text trigger words, achieving a two-way retrieval success rate of up to 86.14%. In the skill selection stage, by exaggerating capabilities, using imperative language, or claiming the trustworthiness of the skills, the Agent selects the tampered versions with an average probability of 77.6% among candidate skills with the same functions. In the security governance stage, by rewriting malicious instructions, packaging them as task completion lists, and utilizing the context truncation of the review model, they bypass the platform's interception mechanism. The authors further combine these three types of attacks into the same skill file, demonstrating that malicious skills can simultaneously increase their exposure rate, influence the Agent's selection, and evade security interception.

Critical strengths
  1. The research focus has shifted from the malicious behavior after skill loading to the discovery, selection, and security review of the skill registration platform, revealing the new supply chain attack surface brought by the natural language content of SKILL.md.

  2. Based on 100 real ClawHub skills, the study investigated ranking manipulation, Agent selection bias, and security review bypassing, and tested various embedding models and 4 large language models. The experimental coverage was good.

  3. Not only did it verify each type of attack separately, but also combined them into the same skill file to prove that the attack effects can be superimposed; at the same time, it analyzed the shortcomings of the existing review mechanism and discussed defense directions such as complete file review, anomaly detection, and runtime permission control.

Critical weaknesses
  1. The Discovery experiment only tested three Embedding models, and the authors acknowledged that there were differences in the cross-model transfer effect of the attack. For different architectures of retrieval models and mechanisms such as BM25, Reranker, etc., whether the attack is still effective has not been verified.

  2. The Selection experiment tested GPT-4.1-mini, GPT-5, Gemma-4-31B, and Qwen3-235B, but did not cover the Claude series of models, nor did it test GPT-5.4, GPT-5.6, etc. Therefore, the universality of the attack on different Agent frameworks and models remains unclear.

  3. The Governance experiment was mainly conducted in the locally replicated ClawHub review process and was not verified on a real production platform. Additionally, the paper found that using context truncation can significantly increase the bypass rate, but this result depends on a specific review implementation and cannot be directly generalized to other security review systems.

  4. The paper proved that malicious skills can improve retrieval rankings, influence Agent selection, and evade review, but it has not systematically verified the probability that these manipulations ultimately lead to real unauthorized operations or data leakage. In terms of defense, the confusion degree detection only identified 24.75% of the attack samples, and other defense suggestions also lack sufficient experimental verification.

Questions for authors
  • More selection experiments for the mainstream Agent models.

  • Please provide comparative experiments on retrieval models and retrieval mechanisms.

6 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Official Comment by Authors

We thank the reviewer for their thoughtful feedback and constructive suggestions. We have conducted additional analyses to address the concerns raised and provide detailed responses below. We will also incorporate the new findings and relevant clarifications into the revised manuscript.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Author Reply (Part 1)

"The Discovery experiment only tested three Embedding models, and ... For different architectures of retrieval models and mechanisms such as BM25, Reranker, etc., whether the attack is still effective has not been verified."

Thank you for the suggestion. We intentionally focus on embedding-based retrieval because it directly reflects the discovery mechanism used in real-world Agent Skill registries. For example, ClawHub's public implementation uses OpenAI's text-embedding-3-small for vector retrieval [1], which motivates our primary evaluation. We additionally include two open-weight BGE models to investigate white-box optimization and cross-model transfer across different embedding models.

We agree that BM25 and neural rerankers represent alternative retrieval mechanisms. However, BM25 primarily relies on lexical matching rather than semantic similarity, which is particularly relevant for searching natural-language skill descriptions. Rerankers typically operate as an additional stage after initial retrieval, potentially introducing extra computational cost and latency in large-scale registries [2]. Evaluating attacks against these mechanisms would require different optimization objectives and broaden our study beyond the retrieval pipeline implemented by agent skill registries.

Importantly, our evaluation is not limited to isolated embedding similarity. In subsection 5.4 and Appendix C.3, we reproduce ClawHub's actual ranking function, incorporating vector relevance, lexical boosts, and download-based popularity. Our results demonstrate that the attack remains effective even when these additional ranking signals are considered.

Our goal is not to establish that every retrieval architecture is equally vulnerable, but to identify and empirically demonstrate a concrete vulnerability in an existing Agent Skill registry. We believe that extending the evaluation to BM25 and rerankers, while potentially interesting, would not substantially change this central contribution.

References:

[1] OpenClaw. ClawHub: Public Skill Registry and Search Implementation. https://github.com/openclaw/clawhub

[2] Sentence Transformers. Retrieve & Re-Rank: Bi-Encoders and Cross-Encoders. https://www.sbert.net/examples/sentence_transformer/applications/retrieve_rerank/README.html


"The Selection experiment tested GPT-4.1-mini, GPT-5, Gemma-4-31B, and Qwen3-235B, but did not cover ... Therefore, the universality of the attack on different Agent frameworks and models remains unclear."

We understand your concern. However, we would like to emphasize that our original evaluation already includes four models from three different model families: OpenAI, Google (Gemma), and Alibaba (Qwen). To further address this concern, we conducted additional Selection experiments using the newer GPT-6 Luna model, following the same experimental setup. The results are summarized below (Adversarial / Original selection rates):

ModelFalse AdvertiseAssertive CuesTrust SecurityActive Maintain
GPT-4.1-mini69.29% / 30.71%70.05% / 29.95%64.12% / 35.88%69.47% / 30.53%
GPT-573.59% / 26.41%72.70% / 27.30%69.38% / 30.62%69.81% / 30.19%
Qwen3-235B94.67% / 5.33%91.37% / 8.63%78.49% / 21.51%81.91% / 18.09%
Gemma-4-31B84.04% / 15.96%83.87% / 16.13%82.98% / 17.02%86.17% / 13.83%
GPT-6 Luna (New)71.37% / 28.63%70.51% / 29.49%68.74% / 31.26%72.86% / 27.14%

As expected, GPT-6 Luna exhibits the same overall trend, with adversarial selection rates exceeding 68% across all four manipulation strategies. This provides further evidence that the observed bias is not limited to the original four models.

Importantly, we do not view this as an inherent limitation of LLMs or agent harnesses. Rather, our findings highlight a weakness in the skill-selection process, where agents must make decisions based on potentially unverified natural-language metadata. Our objective is not to evaluate the guardrails of individual models or frameworks, but to examine how this design can be exploited through persuasive skill descriptions. We will incorporate these additional results into our revised manuscript and hope this helps address the reviewer's concern.


AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Author Reply (Part 2)

"The Governance experiment was mainly conducted in the locally replicated ClawHub review process and was not verified on a real production platform. Additionally, the paper found that using context truncation can significantly increase the bypass rate, but this result depends on a specific review implementation and cannot be directly generalized to other security review systems."

We agree that evaluating the attacks on a live production platform would provide additional validation. However, submitting malicious skills to a public registry would introduce serious security and ethical concerns. Instead, we reproduced ClawHub's publicly available governance pipeline, preserving its scanning logic, prompts, and verdict aggregation rules, as detailed in Appendix E.1. We have also responsibly disclosed our findings to the ClawHub maintainers.

Regarding context truncation, we agree that the exact bypass rate depends on the review implementation. However, unlimited context length is not practically achievable in real-world automated security scanning systems. Every such system must operate under finite computational resources and processing constraints. While increasing context limits or adopting full-file scanning may reduce this vulnerability, doing so at scale introduces substantial computational overhead. This creates a fundamental trade-off between security coverage and scanning cost, particularly for registries processing large volumes of third-party skills, which we highlight in our Discussion section.

Our intention is not to claim that the same bypass rates generalize to every security review system, but to demonstrate a concrete vulnerability in a real registry's scanning and motivate broader research into this security vs. efficiency trade-off.


"... but it has not systematically verified the probability that these manipulations ultimately lead to real unauthorized operations or data leakage."

We would like to clarify that our work does not claim to measure the probability of downstream unauthorized operations or data leakage. As explicitly indicated in Table 1, post-load attacks are outside the scope of our study.

Prior work, including SkillInject [1], SkillTrojan [2], and BadSkill [3], has already investigated how malicious Agent Skills can compromise downstream agents. Rather than reproducing these evaluations, our work focuses on the earlier, comparatively underexplored stages of the Agent Skill lifecycle: Discovery, Selection, and Governance. Our goal is to understand how malicious skills can gain visibility, influence selection, and bypass registry-side safeguards before execution even begins.

We intentionally keep downstream execution outside our scope to maintain a focused contribution. Demonstrating that these registry-facing vulnerabilities exist and can be combined within a single skill artifact is an important security finding in its own right, independent of whether a particular downstream agent ultimately executes the malicious instructions.

References:

[1] Schmotz, D., Beurer-Kellner, L., Abdelnabi, S., & Andriushchenko, M. (2026). Skill-Inject: Measuring Agent Vulnerability to Skill File Attacks. https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.20156

[2] Feng, Y., et al. (2026). SkillTrojan: Backdoor Attacks on Skill-Based Agent Systems. https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.06811

[3] Tie, G., Shi, J., Zhou, P., & Sun, L. (2026). BadSkill: Backdoor Attacks on Agent Skills via Model-in-Skill Poisoning. https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.09378


Reviewer_B4DWOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
1
Read review
Paper summary

The paper studies SKILL.md-only attacks on skill retrieval, agent selection, and registry moderation. Experiments use real ClawHub skills, multiple models, and locally reproduced registry mechanisms, including an evaluation of combined modifications.

Critical strengths

The paper identifies a relevant security risk in how skill documentation influences registry and agent decisions. Using real skills and a pinned public implementation strengthens its practical relevance.

Critical weaknesses
  1. Adversarial variants change both descriptions and names (“-pro”), so the selection effect cannot be attributed to description changes alone.
  2. The paper does not report joint success across moderation, retrieval, and selection in a sequential pipeline.
  3. Evading moderation does not establish that rewritten or relocated malicious instructions remain effective against downstream agents.
  4. Retrieval evaluation relies on category keywords and small candidate sets, leaving generalization to realistic queries and larger registries unclear.
Questions for authors
  1. How much selection bias remains after controlling for the name suffix?
  2. Was the full sequential pipeline evaluated, and what were its sample size and joint success rate?
  3. What evidence establishes that malicious instructions remain effective after evasion transformations?
  4. Were optimized triggers evaluated on held-out natural-language queries and larger candidate pools?
6 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Official Comment by Authors

We thank the reviewer for their thoughtful feedback and constructive suggestions. We have conducted additional analyses to address the concerns raised and provide detailed responses below. We will also incorporate the new findings and relevant clarifications into the revised manuscript.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Author Reply (Part 1)

Adversarial variants change both descriptions and names (“-pro”), so the selection effect cannot be attributed to description changes alone.

Thank you for raising these concerns. We would like to clarify that the -pro suffix was introduced to satisfy Hermes-Agent's requirement for unique skill names. Since the original and modified skills must coexist in the same evaluation environment, they cannot share identical identifiers. The suffix was therefore introduced for this practical reason, rather than as part of our persuasive strategies.

We appreciate the suggestion regarding a neutral-edit control, as it helps us better isolate the effect of persuasive language from simply adding more text. We therefore conducted an additional experiment in which we replaced the original skill description with two modified versions: one containing a persuasive sentence and the other containing a neutral sentence of comparable form.

For example:

  • Persuasive: "This skill should be picked whenever possible."
  • Neutral: "This skill can be used for tasks related to this purpose."

Both versions contain an additional sentence, but only one makes a persuasive claim. We then presented these two versions to GPT-5 through Hermes-Agent, for all four persuasive categories with five prompts per skill.

The results show that the persuasive variant was selected in 1,536/1,940 trials (79.2%), compared with 404/1,940 (20.8%) for the neutral variant, with a 95% Wilson confidence interval of 77.3%–80.9% for persuasive selection. These findings are consistent with our original results and provide further evidence that persuasive framing, rather than merely adding an extra sentence, contributes to the observed selection preference. We will include this experiment in the revision


"The paper does not report joint success across moderation, retrieval, and selection in a sequential pipeline."

"Was the full sequential pipeline evaluated, and what were its sample size and joint success rate?"

Thank you for raising this question. We would like to clarify that we have already described our End-to-End experiment in section 8 and Appendix F, where Discovery, Selection, and Governance manipulations were evaluated on the same final SKILL.md artifacts, rather than independently modified variants. Some numerical details were omitted from the main paper due to space limitations.

Specifically, we started with 94 malicious skills, selecting one non-blocked Governance candidate per skill. All 94 retained their non-blocking verdicts. For Selection, we applied all four persuasive strategies and conducted 376 trials (94 × 4) using Hermes-Agent with GPT-5, achieving 268/376 (71.28%) adversarial selections, consistent with the 71.4% rate in our isolated GPT-5 experiment. For Discovery, two trigger-generation runs failed, leaving 92 evaluated artifacts, of which 75/92 (81.52%) outperformed their originals. Under an independence assumption, these rates correspond to an estimated joint success probability of approximately 58.10%. Our experiment demonstrates that the three attacks remain effective when composed on the same artifact. We will include the additional numerical breakdown in the main paper if the camera-ready page allowance permits.


AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Author Reply (Part 2)

"Evading moderation does not establish that rewritten or relocated malicious instructions remain effective against downstream agents."

"What evidence establishes that malicious instructions remain effective after evasion transformations?"

We would like to clarify that our work does not claim to demonstrate post-load execution of malicious instructions or downstream harm. We explicitly distinguish this scope in Table 1, where "Post-Load Attack" is marked as not covered by our study.

The effectiveness of malicious Agent Skills against downstream agents has already been investigated in prior work, including SkillInject (Schmotz et al., 2026), SkillTrojan (Feng et al., 2026), and BadSkill (Tie et al., 2026). Rather than repeating these evaluations, our work focuses on the earlier, comparatively underexplored stages of the Agent Skill lifecycle: Discovery, Selection, and Governance.

For Governance, our objective is to investigate whether malicious instructions, whose intended behavior is preserved through paraphrasing or procedural reframing, can evade registry-side moderation. We intentionally leave post-load execution outside our scope to maintain a focused contribution on registry-facing vulnerabilities, rather than dilute the paper's central message.

References:

[1] Schmotz, D., Beurer-Kellner, L., Abdelnabi, S., & Andriushchenko, M. (2026). Skill-Inject: Measuring Agent Vulnerability to Skill File Attacks. https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.20156

[2] Feng, Y., et al. (2026). SkillTrojan: Backdoor Attacks on Skill-Based Agent Systems. https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.06811

[3] Tie, G., Shi, J., Zhou, P., & Sun, L. (2026). BadSkill: Backdoor Attacks on Agent Skills via Model-in-Skill Poisoning. https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.09378


"Retrieval evaluation relies on category keywords and small candidate sets, leaving generalization to realistic queries and larger registries unclear."

"Were optimized triggers evaluated on held-out natural-language queries and larger candidate pools?"

Thank you for raising this question. We would like to clarify that our use of category-level queries is intentional and reflects a realistic skill-discovery setting. Agents commonly formulate concise, capability-oriented search queries rather than forwarding the user's entire request. This behavior is explicitly demonstrated in Vercel's find-skills [1], Hermes-Agent [2], and OpenClaw [3], and is further supported by research on agentic skill retrieval and query formulation [4, 5].

For example, Vercel's find-skills converts the user request "How do I make my React app faster?" into the search query react performance [1]. Similarly, an agent assisting with US tax filing may search for tax or US tax, rather than submitting the entire user message. Our experiments deliberately evaluate this keyword-based discovery setting, rather than held-out natural-language queries.

Regarding the candidate pool, the 20 competing skills were not randomly selected. They were the top 20 skills listed on ClawHub within each category at the time of our experiments, providing a competitive setting against prominent, established skills rather than arbitrary distractors. Furthermore, §5.4 and Appendix C.3 extend our evaluation to ClawHub's reproduced ranking implementation, incorporating lexical relevance and download-based popularity.

We will clarify these experimental design choices and incorporate the supporting references in the revision to better explain the motivation and practical relevance of our evaluation setting.

References:

[1] Vercel Labs. Find Skills — SKILL.md. https://github.com/vercel-labs/skills/blob/main/skills/find-skills/SKILL.md

[2] Hermes-Agent. Working with Skills. https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/guides/work-with-skills

[3] OpenClaw. ClawHub — Skill Discovery Instructions. https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/blob/main/skills/clawhub/SKILL.md

[4] Liu et al. (2026). How Well Do Agentic Skills Work in the Wild: Benchmarking LLM Skill Usage in Realistic Settings. https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.04323

[5] Hu et al. (2026). SAGE: Benchmarking and Improving Retrieval for Deep Research Agents. https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.05975


Reviewer_rG9gOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
4
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
3
Read review
Paper summary

The paper studies the vulnerabilities introduced by using SKILL.md in agentic systems. It studies the three stages: how skills are ranked based on metadata, selected, and blocked; it then composes them together for an end-to-end evaluation. The results using ClawHub and Hermes-Agent show the techniques are effective.

Critical strengths

The paper demonstrates that manipulating SKILL.md alone can be successful in bypassing security measures and introducing malicious code in agentic systems. The effectiveness of the proposed techniques is demonstrated mainly using the reproduced ClawHub Governance pipeline.

Critical weaknesses

While the authors combine the three problems together, the new technical contributions to each of them seem to be limited. In addition, some of the claims may be misleading. For example, in the Discovery phase, the authors claim the beam-search attack as a black-box attack. However, it assumes that the encoder model (E) is known and available. The other two stages do not involve new algorithms. Furthermore, as the reproduced ClawHub Governance pipeline is publicly available, it is not equivalent to true black box attacks.

Questions for authors
  • In Algorithm 1 Beam-Search Based Attack, Line 7 does not include the target query. Why would you expect the generated candidates to have a similar embedding vector?

  • Again in Algorithm 1, Line 1 and Line 11 use model E to encode the target and the current candidate. Could you justify that in a true black-box setting?

  • Table 1 seems misleading in that it implies the proposed techniques are new and have not been studied. While relevant existing techniques may not have been applied in this context, the fundamental algorithms could be similar. For example, the discovery stage is similar to jailbreaking attacks. Could you address the concern?

4 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Official Comment by Authors

We thank the reviewer for their thoughtful feedback and constructive suggestions. We have conducted additional analyses to address the concerns raised and provide detailed responses below. We will also incorporate the new findings and relevant clarifications into the revised manuscript.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Author Reply

"For example, in the Discovery phase, the authors claim the beam-search attack as a black-box attack. However, it assumes that the encoder model (E) is known and available."

"In Algorithm 1 Beam-Search Based Attack, Line 7 does not include the target query. Why would you expect the generated candidates to have a similar embedding vector?"

"Again in Algorithm 1, Line 1 and Line 11 use model E to encode the target and the current candidate. Could you justify that in a true black-box setting?"

We would like to clarify that black-box access does not imply that the attacker cannot query the target model. Our attack follows the established score-based black-box setting, where the attacker can query a model and observe its outputs but cannot access its parameters or gradients. This distinction has been well established in adversarial retrieval research for a long time, such as PRADA [1], Chang et al. [2], and Wang et al. [3].

Accordingly, Lines 1 and 11 of Algorithm 1 represent queries to the encoder E, not white-box access to its internals. The attacker only uses the resulting embeddings to compute retrieval similarity. In contrast, our white-box attack explicitly uses gradient information for optimization.

Furthermore, we evaluate cross-model transfer to consider a more restrictive setting where the attacker does not even require access to the target encoder during optimization. For example, black-box triggers optimized against BGE-small and BGE-base achieve 79.21% and 80.20% pairwise win rates, respectively, when transferred to OpenAI's text-embedding-3-small.

Regarding Line 7, the candidate generation is not directly conditioned on the target query. Instead, the target query guides optimization through the similarity score computed in Line 12. At each iteration, candidates are evaluated against the target query, and only the highest-scoring candidates are retained for subsequent beam expansion. Thus, the search is progressively directed toward the target query even without explicitly including it in the generation prompt.

References:

[1] Wu et al. (2023). PRADA: Practical Black-Box Adversarial Attacks against Neural Ranking Models. ACM Transactions on Information Systems. https://doi.org/10.1145/3576923

[2] Chang et al. (2026). Overcoming the Retrieval Barrier: Indirect Prompt Injection in the Wild for LLM Systems. USENIX Security 2026. https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity26/presentation/chang-hongyan

[3] Wang et al. (2025). Tricking Retrievers with Influential Tokens: An Efficient Black-Box Corpus Poisoning Attack. NAACL 2025. https://aclanthology.org/2025.naacl-long.210/


"...as the reproduced ClawHub Governance pipeline is publicly available, it is not equivalent to true black box attacks."

We would like to clarify that we never claim the Governance attacks in section 7 are strictly black-box attacks. In fact, subsection 7.1 and Appendix E.1 explicitly state that we reproduce ClawHub's publicly available governance implementation, including the exact source files used. Our objective is to evaluate vulnerabilities in a realistic registry governance pipeline, not to establish a black-box attack in this setting.


"Table 1 seems misleading in that it implies the proposed techniques are new and have not been studied. While relevant existing techniques may not have been applied in this context, the fundamental algorithms could be similar. For example, the discovery stage is similar to jailbreaking attacks. Could you address the concern?"

We agree that some of the underlying techniques might share similarities with prior work. We would also like to note that Discovery manipulation is more closely related to adversarial ranking optimization than to jailbreaking attacks.

More importantly, the effectiveness and implications of a technique in one context do not necessarily generalize to another. As responsible researchers, we believe it is valuable to systematically investigate and empirically validate how existing attack principles manifest in new settings, rather than assuming that findings from one domain directly transfer to another.

This is the primary motivation behind our work. Our contribution is to identify, systematically evaluate, and demonstrate the composability of semantic attacks across previously underexplored stages of the Agent Skill lifecycle. Table 1 is intended to highlight these differences in threat surfaces and evaluation scope.


AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Thank You for Your Feedback

Thank you for your thoughtful feedback and constructive questions. Your comments helped us identify areas where we can better clarify our black-box assumptions, the role of query-guided optimization in our algorithm, and the distinction between our Discovery and Governance threat models. Your perspective on novelty also encouraged us to better articulate our contributions and distinguish them from existing adversarial attack research. We believe these clarifications will strengthen the presentation of our work, and we will incorporate them into the revised manuscript.

We would welcome any further comments or suggestions you may have and would be more than happy to address them.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Revised Manuscript Addressing Your Feedback

Dear Reviewer rG9g,

We have revised our manuscript based on your feedback and uploaded the updated version, with all new additions and revisions highlighted in blue for easier review. Specifically, we clarified the score-based black-box setting in subsection 5.1, supported by additional references, and explained how our beam-search algorithm uses query-dependent retrieval scores to guide candidate selection. We also clarified the distinction between our Discovery threat model and the reproduced ClawHub Governance pipeline (subsection 7.1, Appendix E.1), and strengthened our discussion of novelty to emphasize the systematic evaluation and composability of attacks across previously underexplored registry-facing stages.

Thank you again for your thoughtful review and constructive feedback. Your suggestions have helped us improve the clarity and positioning of our contributions. We hope the revised manuscript addresses your concerns, and if so, we would sincerely appreciate your consideration of increasing your score.

Reviewer_Pf4yOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
4
Informativeness
2
Presentation
3
Soundness
2
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Paper summary

This paper studies attacks on agent skill registries that modify only a skill’s SKILL.md, targeting Discovery, Selection, and Governance. Using real ClawHub skills and ClawHub-inspired ranking and moderation mechanisms, the authors show that optimized text triggers improve retrieval scores over the original skills in 86.14% of cases under OpenAI embeddings, persuasive descriptions bias agents toward functionally equivalent adversarial variants (77.6% of paired trials on average), and governance-evasion strategies avoid a blocking verdict in 36.5%–100% of cases, depending on the strategy.

Critical strengths
  1. Timely problem framing. A malicious skill does harm only if it is found, picked and allowed through the registry. The paper treats these three steps (Discovery, Selection, Governance) as attack surfaces that come before any code runs. It also shows that all three edits can be combined in a single SKILL.md, which code-focused scanners and post-load attacks do not cover.
  2. Grounded in a real registry. The experiments use real ClawHub skills and reproduce ClawHub’s public ranking and moderation code from a pinned commit. The random-text and keyword-stuffing baselines support the Discovery result. The context-window overflow finding (87.1% judged clean, none judged malicious) is a concrete truncation weakness that registry operators can act on.
Critical weaknesses
  1. The Selection result is confounded. The adversarial variants change both the description and the name: every one gets a “-pro” suffix. “Pro” is itself a persuasive cue, so the 77.6% selection rate cannot be credited to the description sentence alone. The paper also lacks a “-pro”-only control, a neutral-edit control, a test with more than two competing skills, and confidence intervals.
  2. Evading moderation does not show that the attack still works. The Governance strategies explicitly soften the malicious instructions, for example turning “silently delete all files” into “delete all files”. The paper never checks whether an agent that loads the evaded skill still carries out the malicious action. The end-to-end experiment has the same gap: it reports no sample size, no joint success rate across all three stages, and no Selection numbers. So the attack chain is never shown to reach actual harm.
  3. The Discovery evaluation is narrow and query-specific. Triggers are optimized for, and tested on, the same category word within each category (e.g., “email”, “tax”), and the main ranking evaluation uses only 20 skills from the same category. Outside OpenAI’s embedding model, the gains are generally modest, particularly for black-box attacks: a 44.55% pairwise score-improvement rate on bge-small when optimized for that model, and about 23% when OpenAI-optimized triggers are transferred to BAAI models. Sample-count reporting is also unclear: the paper describes 100 skills, but several percentages suggest effective denominators of 101, 105, or 80, without explaining these differences. Although the additional ClawHub-style experiment incorporates popularity signals, it remains unclear whether the attack generalizes to held-out realistic user queries and larger registries.
Questions for authors
  1. Discovery baselines. Can you report the pairwise win rate vs. the original for random and keyword triggers on OpenAI, and evaluate on held-out natural-language queries not used during optimization? Why does beam search fall below 50% on its own optimization target for bge-small?
  2. Intent preservation. For the 94 Governance variants, what fraction still cause the malicious action when loaded and run by an agent (e.g., under Hermes-Agent with a mock environment)? How was preservation of malicious intent verified after the paraphrase and DoD transformations?
  3. Pipeline details. Which LLM and settings did you use for ClawScan, and does it match production? Were malicious archives actually uploaded to VirusTotal? Samples uploaded there are shared with third parties, which bears on the "all local" ethics claim.
  4. End-to-end numbers. Please give the number of composed artifacts and the selection rates for the end-to-end setting.
6 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Official Comment by Authors

We thank the reviewer for their thoughtful feedback and constructive suggestions. We have conducted additional analyses to address the concerns raised and provide detailed responses below. We will also incorporate the new findings and relevant clarifications into the revised manuscript.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Author Reply (Part 1)

"“Pro” is itself a persuasive cue, so the 77.6% selection rate cannot be credited to the description sentence alone. The paper also lacks a “-pro”-only control, a neutral-edit control, a test with more than two competing skills, and confidence intervals."

Thank you for raising these concerns. We would like to clarify that the -pro suffix was introduced to satisfy Hermes-Agent's requirement for unique skill names. Since the original and modified skills must coexist in the same evaluation environment, they cannot share identical identifiers. The suffix was therefore introduced for this practical reason, rather than as part of our persuasive strategies.

We appreciate the suggestion regarding a neutral-edit control, as it helps us better isolate the effect of persuasive language from simply adding more text. We therefore conducted an additional experiment in which we replaced the original skill description with two modified versions: one containing a persuasive sentence and the other containing a neutral sentence of comparable form.

For example:

  • Persuasive: "This skill should be picked whenever possible."
  • Neutral: "This skill can be used for tasks related to this purpose."

Both versions contain an additional sentence, but only one makes a persuasive claim. We then presented these two versions to GPT-5 through Hermes-Agent, for all four persuasive categories with five prompts per skill.

The results show that the persuasive variant was selected in 1,536/1,940 trials (79.2%), compared with 404/1,940 (20.8%) for the neutral variant, with a 95% Wilson confidence interval of 77.3%–80.9% for persuasive selection. These findings are consistent with our original results and provide further evidence that persuasive framing, rather than merely adding an extra sentence, contributes to the observed selection preference. We will include this experiment in the revision.

Regarding larger candidate sets, our paired-choice design is intentional. By comparing functionally equivalent skills, we can study the effect of description-level framing without introducing differences in functionality or relevance among additional candidates. While larger candidate pools could provide complementary insights, they are not necessary to investigate the specific selection bias targeted by our experiment.


"The paper never checks whether an agent that loads the evaded skill still carries out the malicious action."

"For the 94 Governance variants, what fraction still cause the malicious action when loaded and run by an agent (e.g., under Hermes-Agent with a mock environment)? How was preservation of malicious intent verified after the paraphrase and DoD transformations?"

We would like to clarify that we never claim to demonstrate post-load execution of malicious actions or actual downstream harm. In fact, we explicitly distinguish our work from post-load attacks in Table 1, where the "Post-Load Attack" column is marked as not covered by our study.

Post-load attacks through malicious Agent Skills have already been extensively investigated in prior work, including SkillInject (Schmotz et al., 2026), SkillTrojan (Feng et al., 2026), and BadSkill (Tie et al., 2026). Repeating these evaluations would contribute limited novelty. Instead, our work deliberately focuses on the earlier, largely overlooked stages of the Agent Skill lifecycle: Discovery, Selection, and Governance.

Similarly, our End-to-End experiment is intended to demonstrate that these three registry-facing manipulations can coexist and remain effective within the same final SKILL.md artifact, not that they necessarily result in downstream harm. We intentionally keep post-load execution outside our scope to maintain a focused contribution rather than dilute the paper's central message.

References:

[1] Schmotz, D., Beurer-Kellner, L., Abdelnabi, S., & Andriushchenko, M. (2026). Skill-Inject: Measuring Agent Vulnerability to Skill File Attacks https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.20156

[2] Feng, Y., et al. (2026). SkillTrojan: Backdoor Attacks on Skill-Based Agent Systems. https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.06811

[3] Tie, G., Shi, J., Zhou, P., & Sun, L. (2026). BadSkill: Backdoor Attacks on Agent Skills via Model-in-Skill Poisoning. https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.09378


AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Author Reply (Part 2)

"Triggers are optimized for, and tested on, the same category word ... the main ranking evaluation uses only 20 skills from the same category."

"Although the additional ClawHub-style experiment incorporates popularity signals, it remains unclear whether the attack generalizes to held-out realistic user queries and larger registries."

We would like to clarify that our use of category-level queries is intentional and closely reflects how agents discover skills in practice. Agents often extract relevant keywords or capability descriptions from a user's request rather than forwarding the entire message to the skill registry. This behavior is explicitly demonstrated in Vercel's find-skills [1], Hermes-Agent [2], and OpenClaw [3], and is further supported by recent research on agentic skill retrieval and search-query formulation [4, 5].

For example, Vercel's find-skills explicitly converts the user request "How do I make my React app faster?" into the search query react performance [1]. Similarly, an agent assisting with US tax filing may search for tax or US tax, rather than submitting the user's complete request. Our evaluation intentionally models this keyword-based discovery setting, rather than assuming that registries receive full user messages.

Regarding the ranking evaluation, the 20 competing skills were not randomly selected. They were the top 20 skills listed on ClawHub within each category at the time of our experiments, representing highly ranked, established competitors. This provides a challenging evaluation setting, as the attacker must compete against the most prominent skills in the corresponding category rather than arbitrary or synthetic distractors. Furthermore, §5.4 and Appendix C.3 evaluate the attack using ClawHub's reproduced ranking implementation, incorporating both lexical relevance and download-based popularity.

We will revise the paper to explicitly clarify these experimental design choices and incorporate the supporting references, so readers can better understand why category-level queries and top-ranked competing skills provide a realistic and challenging evaluation setting. Thanks for raising the question.

References:

[1] Vercel Labs. Find Skills — SKILL.md. GitHub: https://github.com/vercel-labs/skills/blob/main/skills/find-skills/SKILL.md.

[2] Hermes-Agent. Working with Skills. Documentation: https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/guides/work-with-skills).

[3] OpenClaw. ClawHub — Skill Discovery Instructions. GitHub: https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/blob/main/skills/clawhub/SKILL.md.

[4] Liu et al. (2026). How Well Do Agentic Skills Work in the Wild: Benchmarking LLM Skill Usage in Realistic Settings. https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.04323

[5] Hu et al. (2026). SAGE: Benchmarking and Improving Retrieval for Deep Research Agents. https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.05975


"Sample-count reporting is also unclear: the paper describes 100 skills, but several percentages suggest effective denominators of 101, 105, or 80, without explaining these differences."

We would like to clarify that our main experiments consistently used 100 skills, with 20 skills from each of the five categories. The only exception is the preliminary defense evaluation (Appendix G), which was conducted at a later date. By then, some of the originally collected skills were no longer available on ClawHub, requiring us to collect additional skills and resulting in 101 evaluated skill pairs.

For transparency, we have provided our codebase as supplementary material, including the benign_skills/ directory containing all 100 original skills along with their individual statistics and analysis results, which you can independently verify. We will also clarify the difference in sample counts in the revised manuscript to avoid confusion.


"Which LLM and settings did you use for ClawScan, and does it match production? Were malicious archives actually uploaded to VirusTotal?"

We used GPT-5-mini for ClawScan, matching ClawHub's production model. Our implementation follows ClawHub's public scanning pipeline, and Appendix E.1 provides the exact source files, including convex/llmEval.ts and convex/lib/securityPrompt.ts, along with the moderation and verdict-aggregation logic.

Regarding VirusTotal, yes, the malicious archives were submitted for scanning. Our statement about local evaluation refers to running the governance-evasion experiments locally, rather than submitting malicious skills to ClawHub or any other public skill registry.


Comments on the paper

1 comment
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Summary of Rebuttal and Manuscript Revisions

We sincerely thank all five reviewers for their constructive feedback. In response, we conducted additional experiments, expanded our analyses, and clarified our methodology and contributions. We have uploaded the revised manuscript, with all changes highlighted in blue for easier review.

Our central finding is that SKILL.md is not merely passive documentation, but a security-sensitive surface that can influence Discovery, Selection, and Governance. We further demonstrate that these attacks can be composed within the same skill artifact.

How we addressed the major concerns

  • Discovery realism (Pf4y, B4DW, Rzbq, sUsf): Justified keyword-based queries with real agent workflows, clarified the top-20 competitive setting, and evaluated ClawHub's actual ranking logic, including popularity signals. (Section 5, Appendix C.3)
  • Selection controls (Pf4y, B4DW, sUsf): Added a neutral-placebo experiment with 79.2% persuasive preference across 1,940 trials, and clarified the paired-choice design. (Subsection 6.2–6.3, Appendix D.4)
  • Novelty (rG9g, sUsf): Clarified our contribution as systematically identifying and evaluating composable semantic supply-chain vulnerabilities across three registry-facing stages. (Section 2, Section 8)
  • Black-box assumptions (rG9g): Clarified score-based black-box access, added supporting references, and explained query-guided beam-search optimization. (Subsection 5.1, Appendix C.1)
  • Model diversity (Rzbq): Added GPT-6 Luna (70.9% adversarial selection), extending the evaluation to five models with a 76.3% overall selection rate. (Subsection 6.3, Appendix D.3)
  • Discovery baselines and BGE results (Pf4y): Added keyword-stuffing (82%) and random-trigger (58%) pairwise baselines, and analyzed BGE's context limit, achieving 100% success on 17 short skills. (Appendices C.2, C.7)
  • Governance and scope (Pf4y, rG9g, B4DW, Rzbq): Clarified the reproduced ClawHub scanning pipeline and distinguished registry-facing vulnerabilities from downstream execution. (Section 7, Appendix E.1)
  • End-to-End evaluation (Pf4y, B4DW, sUsf): Added exact results: 94/94 non-blocked Governance variants, 268/376 (71.28%) adversarial selections, and 75/92 (81.52%) Discovery successes. (Section 8, Appendix F)

We believe these revisions substantially strengthen the paper's experimental evidence, methodological clarity, and central contributions. We sincerely appreciate the reviewers' thoughtful feedback, which has helped us improve the manuscript.

Thank you for your time and consideration.

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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