- Rating
- 3
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 2
Read review
Paper summary
This paper addresses a systemic supply-chain vulnerability in skill-based LLM agent ecosystems: the confused-deputy failure created when agent frameworks admit untrusted third-party skill content into prompt contexts and tool execution paths under user-delegated authority. To systematically audit this boundary, the authors present TrustProbe, an automated 3-stage framework combining static AST source-to-sink call graph analysis, directed greybox fuzzing with LLM-assisted seed generation and feedback scheduling (balancing distance and semantic alignment), and a bug oracle that validates vulnerabilities via strict taint predicates and independent verification of observable harm. Evaluated across 11 open-source agent frameworks (8 with >10,000 GitHub stars), TrustProbe identifies 104 verified taint-style vulnerabilities spanning command execution, file disclosure, file tampering, and SSRF. Paired direct-prompt replay experiments reveal that framework-level skill delivery (catalogs, retrieval, and prompt-binding) causes 68.3% higher vulnerability reproduction than direct prompt text alone. Furthermore, testing on 633 real-world skills from ClawHub and SkillsMP shows that 25.1% of test runs trigger vulnerable execution paths, with minimal edits weaponizing 15 real skills into full exploits (RCE, credential exfiltration, OAuth phishing, and MCP hijacking)
Critical strengths
Systemic Formulation of Skill-Mediated Trust: Formalizes the gap between user-delegated authority and framework-admitted third-party skill instructions, exposing how framework delivery mechanisms grant implicit trust elevation over plain user prompts. Methodological Rigor (TrustProbe): Combines static AST call-graph extraction with feedback-guided greybox fuzzing and a non-speculative bug oracle requiring both taint-tracking proof and observable harm. Broad Empirical Validation: Demonstrates widespread vulnerability across 11 major agent platforms (over 1.08M aggregate GitHub stars) and validates real-world exposure against 633 skills from public hubs. Pivotal Mechanistic Insights: Discovers that direct user prompts reproduce only 31.7% of vulnerabilities, proving that security failures stem from framework-level delivery architectures rather than pure LLM prompt compliance.
Critical weaknesses
Reliance on Pre-Defined Sink Models: Static AST/Compiler analysis depends on a pre-enumerated inventory of security sinks (47 Python, 115 TypeScript sinks), potentially missing custom or unmodeled sinks. Suggestion: Discuss dynamic sink discovery or open-ended capability mapping during static call graph construction.
Single Model Backbone during Audit: The main campaign holds the target agent model fixed to deepseek-v4-flash. Suggestion: Evaluate whether larger reasoning models exhibit lower instruction-following susceptibility when processing untrusted skill instructions.
Questions for authors
How could agent frameworks implement provenance-aware Complete Mediation (e.g., cryptographic instruction tagging) at execution sinks to distinguish user-originated commands from skill-originated ones?
Why do frameworks that consult skill provenance currently use it to expand auto-approval (e.g., auto-approving declared frontmatter tools) rather than restricting permissions?
What is the performance tax of running AST source-to-sink verification as a mandatory pre-installation gate in skill marketplaces like ClawHub?
6 comments
Reviewer g88U-W2
W2: Single Model Backbone during Audit: The main campaign holds the target agent model fixed to deepseek-v4-flash. Suggestion: Evaluate whether larger reasoning models exhibit lower instruction-following susceptibility when processing untrusted skill instructions.
Response: We thank the reviewer for raising this concern. Our original campaign used DeepSeek-V4-Flash for target-agent execution as well as seed generation, scoring, and mutation. We have now evaluated the 104 verified vulnerabilities on two additional larger reasoning models, GLM-5.3 and Qwen3.8-Max. The results remain stable across backbones. Of the 104 vulnerabilities identified in the original campaign, 103 reproduce with GLM-5.3 and 101 with Qwen3.8-Max, corresponding to 99.0% and 97.1%. The verified vulnerabilities are therefore not specific to the model used to discover them. In the few cases where the attack does not reproduce, the larger model either declines to execute the untrusted instruction or completes the task through a different execution path. These isolated cases do not establish a systematic reduction in susceptibility to untrusted instructions.
Revision: We added the cross-model replay results to Section 5.2. The revised text is marked in blue in the paper.
Reviewer g88U-Q1
Q1: How could agent frameworks implement provenance-aware Complete Mediation (e.g., cryptographic instruction tagging) at execution sinks to distinguish user-originated commands from skill-originated ones?
Response: We thank the reviewer for bringing up this interesting direction. We agree that provenance-aware Complete Mediation is a promising approach to distinguishing user-originated requests from skill-influenced operations at execution sinks. Our analysis identifies distinct ingestion paths for skill and user content. For example, OpenCode loads skills through its skill catalog and skill tool, while Pochi create a skill tag during slash-command activation and uses useSkill to load skill instructions. User prompts enter through the ordinary message interface. However, these paths converge into tool-call arguments without preserving reliable source attribution at execution sinks.
A practical implementation could introduce provenance tracking at skill ingestion and enforce authorization at execution sinks. At ingestion, the framework would label skill content with its source identity and propagate this information through the agent's execution context. Cryptographic tags could authenticate the original skill content, while runtime provenance tracking would account for instructions reformulated by the LLM. At each security-sensitive sink, a centralized enforcement wrapper would examine the requested operation, its arguments, and their provenance. Operations influenced by skill content, or whose provenance is uncertain, would require explicit user authorization. Upon approval, the framework could issue a single-use signed capability token bound to the specific operation and arguments, which the sink would verify before execution.
TrustProbe provides concrete guidance for implementing this design. The 104 verified source-to-sink paths identify where provenance labels should be introduced, how skill-controlled content reaches sensitive operations, and where mediation checks should be enforced. These paths can also serve as regression tests for evaluating whether provenance-aware controls successfully prevent unauthorized skill-directed execution.
We thank the reviewer for this constructive suggestion and plan to explore provenance-aware Complete Mediation as future work, building on TrustProbe's findings to develop and evaluate practical enforcement mechanisms for skill-based agents.
Reviewer g88U-W1
W1: The predefined sink inventory may miss custom or unmodeled security-sensitive operations. Suggestion: Discuss dynamic sink discovery or open-ended capability mapping during static call graph construction.
Response: We thank the reviewer for this constructive suggestion. We agree this is a very promising direction to explore. The rationale is as follows: to systematically verify the coverage of our predefined sink list, we can conduct a call-graph leaf-node analysis across all 11 evaluated agents at their audited repository versions. Specifically, for each agent we can parse all source files, resolve external module imports to build a per-file import map, and extract every call expression whose target resolves to an external library or runtime API rather than a project-internal definition. These call graph leaf nodes capture the complete set of external operations reachable by each agent, including any custom or unmodeled sinks. We can then differentially compare these leaf nodes against our predefined sink inventory to quantify coverage and identify any security-relevant gaps. We agree with the reviewer that dynamic sink discovery and open-ended capability mapping are valuable directions for future work.
Revision: We have added this discussion to Section 4.1 as a statement of the inventory's scope and have identified dynamic sink discovery and open-ended capability mapping as future work. The revised text is marked in blue in the paper.