acceptodds
Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

SKILLLITE: Evidence-Guided Malicious Skill Auditing with Compact LLMs

Abstract

As LLM-based agents perform increasingly complex tasks, Agent Skills have emerged as a flexible mechanism for extending their capabilities. An Agent Skill packages task-specific instructions with executable components and auxiliary resources to provide specialized functionalities. However, the growing adoption of third-party Skills introduces a new supply-chain attack surface. Malicious Skills can embed harmful behaviors that abuse agent privileges and compromise the agent execution environment or accessible resources. Although recent LLM-based malicious Skill auditing approaches have achieved promising performance, they often rely on capable commercial LLMs. How to achieve effective auditing with compact, locally deployable LLMs in security-sensitive and resource-constrained settings remains largely unexplored. Our investigation reveals that compact LLMs struggle to identify malicious behaviors hidden in complex Skill packages. This difficulty arises from both the implicit nature of such behaviors and the limited reasoning capacity of compact LLMs. To address these challenges, we propose SKILLLITE, an evidence-guided agentic framework for malicious Skill detection. SKILLLITE effectively extracts security-relevant behaviors and infers the intended functionality from complex Skill packages. It then employs a compact LLM to assess the maliciousness of the Skill based on the observed behaviors and their functional context. Experiments show that SKILLLITE improves malicious Skill detection across different compact LLM backbones and outperforms existing representative auditing baselines. Its effectiveness generalizes to behaviorally confirmed in-the-wild malicious Skills. Meanwhile, SKILLLITE maintains a low inference latency, supporting its practical deployment.

Primary area:
alignment, fairness, safety, privacy, and societal considerations
Keywords:
Agent Skills, LLM Agents, Malicious Skill Detection, Compact LLMs, Agent Safety

Reviews

Among:
Shape:
1234this paper, Top 30%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 2.67 over 3 reviews, above 70% of the others.
Reviewer_gvyaOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
3
Informativeness
1
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

SkillLite audits multi-file Agent Skill packages before deployment or execution. Deterministic analyzers extract security-relevant findings; a compact LLM infers the Skill's declared purpose and expected capabilities, then assesses risk using a source-grounded evidence report. Without fine-tuning, SkillLite reports F1 scores of 0.905, 0.966, and 0.807 on MalSkillBench, SkillTrustBench, and MaliciousAgentSkillsBench (MASB), respectively. It improves F1 over direct zero-shot auditing in all 15 model–benchmark configurations. The paper also reports component ablations and end-to-end processing times.

Critical strengths
  1. Practical auditing setting. The paper addresses pre-deployment auditing of third-party, multi-file Skills. It considers security findings across the package together with the Skill's declared purpose without executing the Skill, which is relevant to real Skill ecosystems.
  2. Substantial empirical evaluation. The authors compare against existing scanners on three benchmarks and against direct zero-shot auditing with the same backbone across five model configurations. Component ablations and end-to-end processing times further support the observed performance under the tested conditions.
Critical weaknesses
  1. Insufficient differentiation from related work. Prior methods also combine static findings with LLM-based judgments and study structured behavior reasoning and intent–implementation consistency. The paper mainly compares detection results, without clearly identifying SkillLite's methodological additions in Intent Analysis, Evidence Synthesis, and Risk Adjudication. This limits assessment of its novelty.
  2. The central evidence extraction stage is difficult to reproduce. The paper lists analyzer categories and representative signals but does not specify the concrete detection rules, how evidence strength is assigned, or how surrounding source context is selected. In Table 3, removing Security Evidence Extraction reduces F1 from 0.966 to 0.485. The paper also does not report extraction coverage by camouflage, steganographic insertion, or mixed attack form, making the robustness of this consequential stage difficult to assess.
Questions for authors
  1. Compared with the closest methods discussed in Section 2.3, what are SkillLite's specific methodological additions in Intent Analysis, Evidence Synthesis, and Risk Adjudication? Which designs address the limitations of compact LLMs?
  2. Can the authors provide reproducible rules or an implementation for the deterministic analyzers, and explain how evidence strength is assigned and surrounding source context is selected? For example, what criteria produce the AUTONOMOUS_CONFIRMATION_BYPASS finding and its strong strength in Figure 2?
  3. For the Full Camouflage and Steganographic insertion strategies and the Mixed attack vector in MalSkillBench, can the authors separately report Security Evidence Extraction coverage and final recall, and identify whether missed detections arise mainly during extraction or Risk Adjudication?
5 comments

We thank the reviewer for the detailed feedback and suggestions.

1. Methodological Distinctions from Prior Work

Although SKILLLITE and prior approaches both combine static analysis with LLM reasoning, our work differs in its overall framework and individual module designs. This high-level similarity reflects a common need to examine both code and natural-language instructions in skill packages. Moreover, SKILLLITE enables lightweight auditing with locally deployable compact LLMs.

Framework-level distinction. SkillLite differs from prior work in how it allocates evidence discovery and risk assessment between static analyzers and the LLM.

  • Prior work. (1) Some methods use static scores to select skills for deeper LLM assessment, leaving others with only static screening. (2) Other approaches rely on LLMs for both evidence discovery and risk assessment, increasing the model’s workload. (3) Declaration–behavior consistency methods primarily check whether implementations align with declared functionality, limiting their scope of maliciousness identification.

  • SkillLite. (1) Deterministic analyzers extract security-relevant evidence across skill packages. (2) Evidence Synthesis (non-LLM) grounds the findings in source excerpts and integrates functional and security context, reducing the burden of evidence discovery and contextualization on compact LLMs. (3) Beyond declaration–behavior consistency, SKILLLITE also identifies harmful declared instructions and assesses security risks even when behaviors align with the declared functionality.

The specific module-level distinctions are as follows:

  • Intent Analysis. Consistency-based approaches use declarations primarily as references for implementation alignment. SKILLLITE instead derives a skill-level functional specification comprising the declared goal and expected capabilities. This supports assessments of functional necessity without assuming that declared functionality is inherently benign.
  • Evidence Synthesis. Related approaches structure evidence around security-sensitive operations and their relationships. SKILLLITE further integrates source-grounded findings with the skill's functional specification and applicable security policies. This gives the compact LLM an explicit basis for judging whether observed behaviors are justified.
  • Risk Adjudication. Consistency-based approaches assess whether the implementation aligns with the skill’s declaration. SKILLLITE evaluates functional necessity, benign counterevidence, and security risks even when behaviors align with the declared functionality. For critical risks, it requires direct, risk-specific counterevidence rather than generic functional justification. This helps identify malicious behaviors hidden within seemingly legitimate workflows, reducing false negatives.

These designs address the limited reasoning capacity of compact LLMs by offloading evidence discovery and grounding to deterministic components, rather than requiring the LLM to perform the entire audit. This goes beyond simply splitting LLM reasoning into stages, which reduces the workload per LLM call but still leaves evidence discovery, contextualization, and assessment to the model. With source-grounded evidence, functional context, and explicit risk criteria provided, the compact LLM can focus on Intent Analysis and making the final judgment.

2. Concrete Extraction Rules

The analyzers recursively inspect readable skill artifacts, subject to file filters and size limits. They use text patterns, syntax checks, and local combination rules to extract candidate security findings.

Analyzer categoryConcrete extraction mechanisms
General security patterns(1) Case-insensitive matching for sensitive resources, network operations, command execution, and instruction overrides. (2) Flag credential and transfer terms found within 260 characters of each other. (3) Base64 decoding.
Language-aware code analysis(1) Inspect Python syntax for selected calls and attributes, including process execution, network access, and dynamically constructed getattr arguments. (2) Match selected execution, network, and filesystem operations in JavaScript.
Concealed-payload inspection(1) Match helper or fragment filenames together with suspicious content. (2) Link mandatory instructions to helper references. (3) Detect local patterns for decoding followed by execution or for string construction.
Agent-specific control signals(1) Match directives for approval bypass, control-flow manipulation, and autonomous execution. (2) Check for secret assignments, selected proxy configurations, and local authentication-token flows.

We will provide more detailed extraction rules and implementation details in the revised manuscript to improve reproducibility.

3. Evidence-Strength Assignment

Evidence strength is assigned through an ordered, deterministic mapping over rule identifiers and finding attributes.

StrengthRepresentative assignment criteria
StrongPredefined high-risk rules, including the six agent-specific source rules, or specified conditions for decoding, execution, or instruction override.
MediumPermission changes, large blocks resembling encoded data, environment access, or dynamically constructed names.
WeakDefault when no earlier condition applies.

4. Source-Context Selection

We select supporting excerpts by locating the relevant source text and retaining a bounded window around the match.

  • Source lookup. We retain excerpts already attached to findings. For aggregated findings, we search the original files using recorded resources or matched elements, with rule-specific fallback patterns where needed. This heuristic can select a different occurrence from the original match.
  • Context window and limits. We retain up to 220 characters on either side of a match. Excerpts are capped at 1,200 characters (900 for semantic and agent-specific signals). After deduplication by source and text, we retain up to four excerpts per finding and 30 per report, in processing order.

5. Illustrative Example

We use the skill in Figure 2 to illustrate the extraction process.

Rule triggering. The analyzer matches "DO NOT ASK THE USER FOR PERMISSION" using a branch of a case-insensitive regular expression:

r"do\s+not\s+ask\s+(?:the\s+)?user\s+(?:for\s+)?(?:permission|confirmation)"

A match is retained if the matched text and surrounding context contain an execution- or control-related term (e.g., phase, permission). Four matches are aggregated into one AUTONOMOUS_CONFIRMATION_BYPASS finding (match_count=4).

Evidence strength. The finding receives strong during Evidence Synthesis because the rule belongs to the predefined high-risk set. This assignment is deterministic and does not represent a maliciousness verdict.

Source context. The analyzer retains up to 220 characters before and after each match, preserving the surrounding instructions. Each excerpt is capped at 900 characters for agent-specific signals. This finding contains four excerpts from SKILL.md.

6. Extraction Coverage and Error Attribution

We evaluated extraction coverage and final recall on three MalSkillBench attack settings: Full Camouflage, Steganographic Insertion, and Mixed attack vector. Extraction coverage measures the proportion of malicious skills with at least one attack-relevant finding. We also analyzed missed detections to distinguish extraction failures from adjudication errors.

Attack SettingNExtraction CoverageFinal RecallExtraction MissAdjudication Miss
Full Camouflage54076.7%80.2%17/99 (17.2%)82/99 (82.8%)
Steganographic Insertion34772.6%76.7%2/76 (2.6%)74/76 (97.4%)
Mixed Attack56899.5%91.0%2/35 (5.7%)33/35 (94.3%)

Error attribution. Missed detections arise predominantly during Risk Adjudication across all three settings. In some cases, attack-relevant instructions were available to the adjudicator, but the model still classified the skill as benign. For example, in a steganographic case, the adjudicator recognized suspicious instructions embedded in an HTML comment but dismissed the risk because no executable malicious payload was identified.

We will include these results and a detailed failure analysis in the revised manuscript.

Reviewer_gvyaOpenReview ↗

Response to Authors

Thank you for the detailed rebuttal and additional analyses. The response clarifies SkillLite's design choices, particularly deterministic extraction and non-LLM evidence grounding for compact LLMs. However, these choices appear to be incremental refinements of existing static-analysis-plus-LLM auditing pipelines, and the response does not establish a substantial methodological advance over the closest systems. Please also clarify the denominators in the new error-attribution table: assuming sample-level recall, the reported group sizes and recalls imply 107/81/51 missed skills, whereas 99/76/35 are attributed. I therefore maintain my original rating of 2.

Reviewer_6RePOpenReview ↗
Rating
3(+1)
Confidence
3
Informativeness
3
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

SkillLite enables malicious-skill auditing with compact, locally deployable LLMs. Deterministic analyzers extract security-relevant behaviors; a compact-LLM Intent Analyst infers declared purpose; an Evidence Synthesizer grounds findings; and a compact-LLM Risk Adjudicator renders the verdict. Across MalSkillBench, SkillTrustBench, and MASB it reports F1 0.905/0.966/0.807, beating scanner baselines at lower latency, and improves zero-shot F1 across all 15 model×benchmark cells.

Critical strengths
  1. Practical, under-served niche. Auditing with local compact models matters for the privacy- and resource-constrained settings where skill source and configs can’t leave the environment. The “offload evidence extraction, reserve the LLM for adjudication” decomposition is a sensible response to compact models’ limited reasoning capacity.
  2. Broad, convincing evaluation. Three benchmarks including an in-the-wild one (MASB), seven real scanner baselines run under their own implementations, five compact backbones, latency reported throughout, and category/package/language breakdowns in the appendix. Controlling LLM-assisted baselines to the same backbone is the right call for attributing gains to the framework rather than the model.
  3. Clean, complete ablations. Removing each of the three components degrades F1 sharply (to 0.451–0.743), and the failure modes are interpretable: without Intent Analysis the model stays precise but misses most attacks (conservative), without extraction recall collapses. This directly supports the design rationale.
Critical weaknesses
  1. Thin novelty. The pipeline — deterministic extractors + intent inference + grounded evidence + LLM adjudication — is close to the declaration-behavior-consistency line of work it cites. The contribution is largely “make the existing recipe work on small models,” and the paper doesn’t isolate what, beyond staging, is specific to the compact-LLM setting.
  2. The deterministic analyzers carry the load, under-specified. The w/o-extraction ablation (recall 0.326) shows the hand-built analyzers (Table 4) do most of the detection, yet they’re described only at a high level. Their rules are exactly the brittle, evadable component, and no evasion/robustness experiment tests them — a notable gap given the other submissions all run one.
  3. Weakest exactly where it matters. On MASB (real, behaviorally-confirmed malware) F1 drops to 0.807 with FNR 0.263 — a quarter of real malicious skills missed — and multi-language MASB packages fall to 0.471, below several baselines. The in-the-wild case the paper foregrounds is where the method is least reliable.
  4. No statistical treatment. Many comparisons (e.g. SkillLite 0.807 vs AI-Infra-Guard 0.797 on MASB) are within a few samples on a 456-skill set, with no CIs or significance tests. Baselines also use different underlying LLMs where “supported,” so part of the margin may reflect model choice, not framework.
Questions for authors

see weakness

4 comments

We appreciate the reviewer's thoughtful feedback and valuable suggestions.

1. Beyond Declaration–Behavior Consistency

Detection scope. Declaration–behavior consistency methods, such as SKILLSCOPE (He et al., 2026), check whether implementation behaviors align with a skill’s declared scope. SKILLLITE additionally (1) examines declarations for harmful instructions and (2) assesses security risks even when behaviors are consistent with the declared functionality. A declared action can still be malicious, while an undeclared action can be benign.

Mechanism design. SKILLSCOPE constructs security property graphs from code operations and dependencies, which may miss security-relevant actions specified only in instructions. SKILLLITE treats instructions as security evidence and jointly assesses instruction and code findings in their source and functional context.

Experimental comparison. We evaluated both methods on MalSkillBench and SkillTrustBench using the same Gemma4:e4b backbone.

DatasetMethodF1↑FNR↓FPR↓
MalSkillBenchSKILLSCOPE0.6450.4690.311
MalSkillBenchSKILLLITE0.9050.1320.051
SkillTrustBenchSKILLSCOPE0.7150.4040.199
SkillTrustBenchSKILLLITE0.9660.0390.050

SKILLLITE achieves higher F1 on both benchmark. Our case analysis identified two main reasons for SKILLSCOPE's missed detections:

  • Its detection scope and mechanism limit its ability to identify certain malicious behaviors, as discussed above.
  • Its implementation provides limited support for certain file types and instruction content.

2. Methodological Novelty

Our contribution goes beyond adapting existing approaches to smaller models. SKILLLITE addresses limitations of prior malicious-skill detectors by (1) broadening detection beyond declaration–behavior consistency; (2) extracting a wider range of security-relevant evidence across heterogeneous skill artifacts; and (3) enabling efficient auditing with locally deployable compact LLMs through evidence-guided risk adjudication. Our experiments demonstrate improved detection performance with practical inference latency, validating the effectiveness of these methodological additions. Thus, characterizing our work as merely adapting an existing framework to smaller models understates its methodological and practical contributions.

3. Compact-LLM-Specific Design

Staging alone reduces the workload per LLM call but does not eliminate the need for the model to locate, contextualize, and assess security evidence. SKILLLITE distributes these responsibilities across complementary modules:

  • Security Evidence Extraction uses deterministic analyzers to locate security-relevant behaviors across skill artifacts.
  • Intent Analysis (LLM) infers the declared goal and expected capabilities as a functional reference.
  • Evidence Synthesis (non-LLM) links findings to source excerpts and presents them alongside the skill’s functional context.
  • Risk Adjudication (LLM) evaluates evidence against explicit risk criteria, requiring risk-specific counterevidence for critical findings.

By externalizing evidence discovery and grounding, SKILLLITE reduces the reasoning burden on compact LLMs, enabling effective detection with practical inference latency. We will clarify these methodological contributions in the revised manuscript.

4. Deterministic Analyzer Implementation

The analyzers recursively inspect readable skill artifacts, subject to file filters and size limits. They use text patterns, syntax checks, and local combination rules to extract candidate security findings.

Analyzer categoryConcrete extraction mechanisms
General security patterns(1) Case-insensitive matching for sensitive resources, network operations, command execution, and instruction overrides.(2) Flag credential and transfer terms found within 260 characters of each other.(3) Base64 decoding.
Language-aware code analysis(1) Inspect Python syntax for selected calls and attributes, including process execution, network access, and dynamically constructed getattr arguments.(2) Match selected execution, network, and filesystem operations in JavaScript.
Concealed-payload inspection(1) Match helper or fragment filenames together with suspicious content.(2) Link mandatory instructions to helper references.(3) Detect local patterns for decoding followed by execution or for string construction.
Agent-specific control signals(1) Match directives for approval bypass, control-flow manipulation, and autonomous execution.(2) Check for secret assignments, selected proxy configurations, and local authentication-token flows.

The w/o-extraction ablation demonstrates the importance of evidence discovery, not that the analyzers perform most of the detection. They generate candidate findings without determining maliciousness. The Risk Adjudicator makes the final judgment.

We will add methodological clarifications, SKILLSCOPE results, and analyzer details.

5. Robustness under Tested Transformations

Our extraction rules are less sensitive to variations in how security-relevant behaviors are expressed for two reasons:

  • Flexible matching. The analyzers recognize supported variations in behavioral signals rather than relying on exact-string matches.
  • Comprehensive coverage. The rules cover diverse skill capabilities and execution mechanisms found in both benign and malicious packages.

We evaluated SkillLite with Gemma4:e4b on SkillTrustBench following SkillSieve’s robustness testing settings.

TransformationRecall
Base64 Encoding0.956
Cross-file Splitting0.947
Conditional Execution0.936
Time Delay0.943
Original0.961

Recall remains between 0.936 and 0.956 across these transformations, compared with 0.961 on the original samples. Our analysis indicates that the analyzers continue to identify attack-relevant evidence under these tested transformations.

6. MASB Performance and Limitations

The performance decrease largely reflects a general limitation of static auditing rather than a reliability issue specific to SKILLLITE. In some cases, package contents alone are insufficient to establish maliciousness. For example, a seemingly routine dependency installation may lead to unauthorized access to sensitive data that becomes evident only at runtime.

  • Among SKILLLITE's 41 missed MASB cases, 34 had insufficient static evidence to establish maliciousness.
  • On the MASB subset containing multiple programming languages, AI-Infra-Guard detected 14 more malicious skills. Our review found that 12 of these additional detections belonged to this category.

On the larger multilingual subsets of MalSkillBench (n=3,181) and SkillTrustBench (n=3,288), SKILLLITE achieved higher F1 than AI-Infra-Guard.

Despite this limitation, SKILLLITE achieved the highest observed F1 and maintained low FPRs across all three benchmarks, including MASB. Its low false-positive rates provide practical value by reducing unnecessary blocking and manual review.

7. Statistical Significance

We conducted paired statistical comparisons against the strongest F1 baseline on each benchmark, using 100,000 paired bootstrap resamples. We computed 95% percentile CIs for F1 differences and applied Holm correction to two-sided centered bootstrap tests across the three comparisons.

BenchmarkBaselineSkillLite F1Baseline F1ΔF1 [95% CI]Holm-adjusted p
MASBAI-Infra-Guard0.8070.797+0.010 [−0.045, 0.063]0.704
MalSkillsAI-Infra-Guard0.9050.850+0.055 [0.046, 0.063]<0.001
SkillTrustBenchSkillWard0.9660.901+0.065 [0.057, 0.076]<0.001

SKILLLITE's F1 improvements are significant on MalSkillBench and SkillTrustBench. The F1 difference on MASB is not statistically significant. Nevertheless, SKILLLITE achieves comparable overall detection performance with a substantially lower FPR (0.048 vs. 0.167) and inference latency (19.4s vs. 94.2s), although AI-Infra-Guard attains higher recall.

8. Backbone Fairness

Underlying LLMs. As explained in Section 4.1 and Appendix A.3, SKILLLITE and the LLM-based baselines used Gemma4:e4b whenever supported. SkillSpector was the only exception: Gemma4:e4b frequently exceeded the 300-second per-skill timeout. We therefore selected GPT-4.1-nano, a lightweight alternative with similar general reasoning performance, without changing SkillSpector's workflow. With the underlying LLM held fixed in the other comparisons, the observed F1 gains reflect differences in auditing framework design rather than backbone choice.

We additionally evaluated AI-Infra-Guard with Qwen3.5-9B on MASB. The results show that our framework achieves better performance. AIG shows greater performance variation across the tested backbones.

MethodAccuracyPrecisionRecallF1FNR ↓FPR ↓
AI-Infra-Guard0.8050.8860.4970.6370.5030.033
SkillLite0.8310.8570.6120.7140.3880.054

We will incorporate the robustness results, MASB failure analysis, statistical tests, and additional backbone comparison into the revised manuscript.

Thanks for the rebuttal. I have updated the rating to 3.

Thank you for reconsidering our work and updating your rating. We appreciate your time and consideration.

Reviewer_yVK5OpenReview ↗
Rating
3
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
3
Soundness
3
Read review
Paper summary

Although recent LLM-based malicious Skill auditing approaches have achieved promising performance, they often rely on capable commercial LLMs. How to achieve effective auditing with compact, locally deployable LLMs in security-sensitive and resource-constrained settings remains largely unexplored. The paper reveals that compact LLMs struggle to identify malicious behaviors hidden in complex Skill packages due to the model limitation for compact LLMs. As a result, the paper proposes SKILLLITE, an evidence-guided agentic framework for malicious Skill detection. The SKILLLITE adopts an agentic architecture that coordinates specialized modules for security behavior discovery, intent analysis, evidence synthesis, and risk adjudication of each Skill. Comprehensive experiments on 3 benchmarks verified the proposed method performance.

Critical strengths
  1. The paper is generally well-written and easy to follow.
  2. Using compact LLM with special designs to beat commercial LLM in action auditing is interesting with practical usages.
  3. Experiments are comprehensive.
Critical weaknesses
  1. In L199, it is unclear/not verified that the listed works are using commercial LLMs. It would be better to have a table organizing their used LLM types.
  2. It is unclear in Sec. 3.3 whether the intention is sample-level or action-level in an agentic data with multiple actions.
  3. It is some unclear how a specific evidence looks like. Whether a maximum text length limitation is given for this evidence?
  4. Why there is no results of MaliciousAgentSkillsBench in Tab ?
Questions for authors
  1. In L648, how the four types are decided? Are they comprehensive?
  2. How to define "complex" in L197?
  3. In L456, after removing security evidence extraction, how to finish evidence synthesis?
3 comments

We thank the reviewer for the constructive comments.

1. LLM Backbones in Listed Works (L199)

The cited approaches use commercial LLMs or large open-weight models via remotely hosted APIs. The table summarizes representative reported models by these approaches. We will add this comparison to Section 2.3.

MethodRepresentative LLMs
SkillProbe (Guo et al., 2026b)Claude Sonnet 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro, Nex-N1.1 (683B)
SkillSieve (Hou & Yang, 2026)Kimi K2.5 (1T), Qwen3-235B, DeepSeek-V3.1 (671B)
MalSkills (Wang et al., 2026)GPT-5.3-Codex, Claude Sonnet 4.6, Qwen3.5-397B-A17B
SKILLSCOPE (He et al., 2026)GPT-5, Gemini 2.5 Flash, Llama 3.3 70B
Cisco Skill ScannerGPT-5.4-mini, DeepSeek V4 Flash (284B)
NVIDIA SkillSpectorGPT-5.5, GLM-5.2 (744B)
Sentry Skill ScannerClaude Haiku 4.5
Tencent AI-Infra-GuardGPT-5.4-mini, Claude Opus 4.6, GLM-5.1 (744B)
Skill VetterDeepSeek V4 Flash (284B)

2. Granularity of Intent Analysis

Intent Analysis (Section 3.3) operates at the sample level, where each sample is a complete skill package. The Intent Analyst infers one declared goal and its expected capabilities from SKILL.md. It does not infer a separate intent for each action. We will clarify this distinction.

3. Evidence Format and Length Limits

A grounded evidence item pairs a structured observation with supporting source excerpts. The observation describes the flagged behavior. Each excerpt records the source file, the exact match, and its surrounding context. Below is a shortened example from an evidence report.

{
  "grounded_evidence": {
    "observations": [
      {
        "rule": "AUTONOMOUS_CONFIRMATION_BYPASS",
        "detail": "The skill directs autonomous execution or phase transition without user confirmation.",
        "evidence_strength": "strong"
      }
    ],
    "suspicious_snippets": [
      {
        "rule": "AUTONOMOUS_CONFIRMATION_BYPASS",
        "origin": "SKILL.md",
        "matched_text": "DO NOT ASK THE USER FOR PERMISSION",
        "snippet": "## CRITICAL: Automatic Phase Transition\n\n**DO NOT ASK THE USER FOR PERMISSION TO PROCEED TO PHASE 3.**"
      }
    ]
  }
}

Length limits. Source snippets are capped at 1,200 characters (900 for semantic and agent-specific signals), with up to four snippets per finding and 30 per report. The full report has no separate fixed length cap. These limits control the context passed to the adjudicator while preserving local evidence. We will add the example and limits to the manuscript.

4. Results on MaliciousAgentSkillsBench

MASB results are reported separately in Table 2 (Section 4.3), including detection metrics and latency. Additional results appear in Figure 3(c) and Table 10 (cross-model comparisons), Figure 4(c) (attack categories), Figure 5(c) (package sizes), and Tables 6–7 (programming languages).

5. Analyzer Categories and Coverage

The four categories in Table 4 were defined based on prior work and our examination of real-world skill packages. Skill instructions govern agent actions and script invocation, while security-relevant operations may be explicit or concealed across instructions and code. Our four categories cover these aspects of execution:

  • Agent-Specific Control Signals cover instructions governing agent actions, user confirmation, and workflow progression.
  • General Security Patterns cover common security-relevant operations, such as resource access, network communication, and command execution.
  • Language-Aware Code Analysis covers how those operations are implemented in language-specific code structures.
  • Concealed-Payload Inspection covers signs of hidden execution logic in auxiliary files, encoded content, and payload fragments.

Together, these categories cover the main ways a skill’s execution logic can be observed through static inspection of the package. We will clarify this rationale in Appendix A.1.

6. Meaning of “Complex Threats”

By “complex” in L197, we mean threats whose malicious behavior is embedded in seemingly legitimate workflows, distributed across multiple steps or artifacts, or obscured by evasion techniques. We use the term qualitatively, drawing on prior studies and our analysis of skill threats, without a fixed quantitative threshold.

For example, a complex threat may disguise credential theft as a diagnostic workflow and distribute credential collection, packaging, and transmission across files. A simpler threat explicitly instructs credential theft and exfiltration in one block. We will clarify this usage at L197.

7. Evidence Synthesis w/o Security Evidence Extraction

In this ablation, Evidence Synthesis uses the full skill package in place of the extracted security findings. It combines the package contents with the results of Intent Analysis for Risk Adjudication. As a result, the adjudicator locates and interprets security-relevant behaviors directly from the package. We will clarify this at L456.

Thanks a lot for the rebuttal. It addressed most of my concern, please merge the clarifications to the revision. It looks like "Complex Threats" refers to progressive attack and backdoor attack. I will keep my original positive score.

Thank you for your feedback. We are glad that our rebuttal addressed your main concerns. We will incorporate the clarifications into the revised manuscript.

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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