- Rating
- 1
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 1
- Presentation
- 1
- Soundness
- 1
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Paper summary
This work studies provider-side indirect prompt injection in proactive agents, in which malicious providers might advance their own target by changing only the context relevant to that target, without accessing the private user context or gaining additional permissions.
The core of the attack design is target control, private binding, and prospective support.
Using 3 proactive-agent environments and 6 different models as user simulators, the authors show that the attack increases the target authorization rate by 77.4 percentage points.
Critical strengths
- The studied problem seems interesting and timely to me, as we are about to see more and more proactive agents in the future.
Critical weaknesses
- There is no effort to demonstrate the results transfer to real users. We already knew that LLMs are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, so the results with simulated users provide limited information here.
- The proposed approach is poorly documented in the main paper. Without a clear definition of proactive agents and their environment, I cannot understand how the proposed approach is implemented at all.
Questions for authors
- What is the biggest challenge for prompt injection targeting proactive agents, compared to general agents?
The authors provided no rebuttal. My concerns remain unaddressed, so I maintain my original score.