- Rating
- 3(+1)
- Confidence
- 4
- Informativeness
- 3
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
Read review
Paper summary
This paper takes the first step toward investigating how the placement of an indirect prompt injection (payload) affects LLM agents. Placement is defined at two levels: which environmental surface holds the payload and where within that surface it sits (start/middle/end). The authors build three long-horizon testbeds covering 36 surfaces and 24 risks for evaluation. Given a fixed payload, they find that ASR varies across surfaces, an effect they describe as the “trust region effect.” They also find that end-of-surface placement tends to be the most effective and that failed injections are mostly ignored rather than refused. Finally, they train a placement-aware RL attacker and report gains over content-only optimization.
Critical strengths
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This paper investigates an important yet under-explored research problem: the placement of indirect prompt injection payloads.
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The paper is well written and easy to follow.
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The authors construct diverse long-horizon testbeds to evaluate the trust region effect.
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The authors use RL training to improve attack performance and demonstrate that the learned attacker transfers to GPT-5.4.
Critical weaknesses
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The threat model overstates attacker knowledge. I suggest that the authors add a section describing the threat model, especially the attacker knowledge. The attacker receives the benign task and the full placement set, and is implicitly able to write to any surface. A realistic IPI attacker usually controls only a single surface and does not know the user's task. Under this model, the selection space is reduced to within-surface position, which shows the weakest effect. The paper does not evaluate this realistic setting. The leave-task split still provides user task as input, while the fixed prior still assumes knowledge of which surfaces the task touches. The authors should evaluate the attacker without access to user task and with only one or a few writable surfaces.
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The trust region effect may partly reflect timing and prompt framing (confounders). In coding tasks, agents typically read README/TODO files first, and the prompt explicitly instructs them to read the documentation for context. Thus, higher attack success (i.e., payloads being ignored less often) on these surfaces may reflect early exposure or explicit user instructions rather than the surface itself. The read-order control tests only one workflow task with an overall ASR of around 5%, where surface differences are also unclear. A controlled experiment in coding and agentic tasks that varies read order and the documentation instruction would strengthen the claim.
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The advantages of the learned attacker are not well supported. The proposed two-stage optimization shows large gains over the weak Self-Selected Placement baseline but outperforms the stronger Prior Placement baseline in only 2 of 8 settings. This suggests that RL-based placement learning adds little over the baseline. Moreover, results vary across judge weights, and the small test sets (24–30 cases) and lack of repeated runs or error bars make the differences difficult to interpret.
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The transfer results on GPT depend on the task knowledge rather than the placement.
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The paper does not include any experiments or discussion on how the trust region effect could inform defenses against IPI attacks.
Questions for authors
- How does the attacker perform without access to the user task, and when it can write to only one or a few surfaces?
- Does the trust region effect still hold across different domains when the confounders are isolated? I have a feeling that many increases are brought by these confounders (e.g., abnormality of the content within the context, the timing) instead of the placement.
- Can you demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed two-stage attacker?
Overall, the problem is well motivated, but the current results and controlled experiments do not sufficiently support the main claims. I am willing to raise my score if the authors adequately address these concerns.
8 comments
W2 and Q2 Instruction Framing and Read Order Confounder Analysis (Appendix D.2) [Part-1]
Thank you for raising this important concern. We agree that instruction framing and read order could confound the observed trust region effect. More broadly, we recognize that read order (temporal) and injection placement (spatial) are both important dimensions of indirect prompt injection (IPI), beyond attack content itself. This also aligns with the central motivation of our work: "Where You Inject Matters." Regarding the surrounding environmental context, we clarify that we preserve the original environment data with minimal modifications. Systematically varying this surrounding context would introduce a substantially larger exploration space, which we leave for future work.
To examine the instruction framing and read order factors, we conduct 5,040 additional runs across coding and tool-use domains, systematically varying user instructions and read order while preserving other experimental settings. Our results show that these factors influence payload exposure and attack success, but the trust region effect persists across all three domains.
(1) Coding domain: Controlling for instructions and read timing (3,276 new runs).
We evaluate GPT-5.4 under five instruction variants, including the original framing (I-Original), moving the project-inspection request after task completion (T-End), and three alternatives that do not explicitly mention documentation (I-General, I-Minimal, and I-ColdStart). We compare README, TODO, code, and data files using the same seven injection risks and three within-surface positions.
Effect of instruction framing on delivery and conditional ASR in coding tasks (GPT-5.4). Each cell reports delivery rate / conditional ASR [95% Wilson CI]. All values are percentages.
| Variant | README | TODO | Code | Data |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| I-Original | 96 / 25 [20, 32] | 90 / 18 [13, 24] | 99 / 6 [4, 10] | 98 / 11 [8, 17] |
| T-End | 59 / 19 [13, 27] | 58 / 17 [12, 25] | 98 / 2 [1, 6] | 91 / 9 [5, 14] |
| I-General | 4 / 33 [12, 65] | 7 / 33 [15, 58] | 98 / 5 [3, 9] | 90 / 7 [4, 12] |
| I-Minimal | 3 / 17 [3, 56] | 4 / 25 [7, 59] | 96 / 5 [3, 9] | 94 / 6 [3, 11] |
| I-ColdStart | 1 / 100 [34, 100] | 1 / 33 [6, 79] | 97 / 6 [4, 11] | 92 / 10 [6, 15] |
We find that (1) Instruction framing affects payload delivery. Under I-General, I-Minimal, and I-ColdStart, the delivery rates for README and TODO drop substantially, while those for code and data remain consistently high. However, README and TODO still exhibit higher conditional ASR than code and data files when the payload is delivered. (2) Changing the timing of README/TODO inspection does not eliminate the trust region effect. In T-End, we move the project-inspection request to after task completion to encourage the agent to read documentation later. However, trajectory analysis shows that agents do not always follow this requested order and may read README/TODO during intermediate subtasks: under I-Original, 92.2% of first README/TODO reads occur during the first 25% of the agent's execution trajectory, compared with only 30.6% under T-End. Thus, T-End delays and redistributes documentation exposure rather than consistently moving it to the end. Despite this shift, README and TODO retain higher conditional ASR than code and data, suggesting that the trust region effect persists even when documentation is encountered later.
W2 and Q2 Instruction Framing and Read Order Confounder Analysis (Appendix D.2) [Part-2]
(2) Tool-use domain: Controlling read order across multiple tasks and surfaces (1,764 new runs).
We extend read-order experiments in the tool-use domain. We evaluate 10 long-horizon tasks and 49 task-surface pairs. For each pair, we move the subtask that reads the injected surface to the beginning (T-First), middle (T-Middle), or end (T-Last), while preserving the relative order of other subtasks and using the same 12 injection risks. We evaluate GPT-4o as the victim model. Trajectory analysis confirms that the median first-read positions shift to 0.00, 0.50, and 0.90, respectively.
Conditional ASR (%) by injected surface and read order (GPT-4o).
| Surface | Original | T-First | T-Middle | T-Last |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Web page | 65 | 62 | 58 | 70 |
| Local file | 58 | 61 | 80 | 79 |
| Product review | 57 | 58 | 49 | 66 |
| Calendar entry | 42 | 44 | 43 | 54 |
| Transaction record | 39 | 68 | 45 | 51 |
| Cloud-drive document | 29 | 53 | 30 | 38 |
| Email body | 28 | 44 | 33 | 43 |
| Micro-average | 43.6 [41.3, 46.0] | 55.8 [51.7, 59.8] | 43.3 [39.2, 47.5] | 53.8 [49.6, 57.9] |
| Kendall’s τ | 1.00 (ref.) | 0.43 | 0.71 | 0.81 |
We find that (1) Read order can influence attack success in our tool-use domain. Among the three read-order variants, T-First has the highest overall conditional ASR, followed by T-Last and T-Middle. (2) The trust region effect remains observable across different read orders. The surface rankings under T-Middle and T-Last largely align with the original ranking, while T-First shows a moderate positive rank correlation. This weaker agreement may be due to earlier exposure increasing overall ASR, particularly for weaker surfaces (e.g., cloud-drive documents: 30% → 53%; transaction records: 45% → 68%), thereby narrowing the ASR differences across surfaces. Thus, changing read order does not eliminate surface-level vulnerability differences.
Overall takeaway: Across three domains, our experiments distinguish two effects: instruction framing and timing influence whether and when injected content is encountered, while the trust region effect remains. We have added these controlled experiments and their detailed results to the revised Appendix.
Thank you for recognizing indirect prompt injection placement as an important, underexplored problem. We are glad our study deepened your understanding of how placement affects attack outcomes.
Thank you for raising this important concern. We agree that our main threat model assumes a relatively capable attacker who knows the benign user task and can select from all candidate injection surfaces. Following your suggestion, we update the paper with a threat model section clarifying this point. To assess attack effectiveness under more realistic constraints, we clarify our existing static evaluations are for one surface setting and conduct two additional experiments that progressively restrict attacker knowledge and control.
(1) Existing static evaluations with a single injection surface. Our original static evaluations already test individual surface-position combinations using predefined attack contents that do not depend on the benign user task. Each run injects into only one surface at one specified position. We acknowledge that within-surface position effects are generally weaker than surface-selection effects, particularly in coding and workflow tasks. For example, in the tool-use domain (on GPT-4o), injecting into cloud-drive documents achieves ASRs of 23.7%, 28.0%, and 36.8% at the start, middle, and end positions, respectively, compared with 64.0%, 66.2%, and 66.2% for web pages. These results highlight that the choice of injection surface could have a greater impact on attack success than within-surface positioning.
(2) Additional evaluations with constrained learned attackers. To evaluate the impact of attacker knowledge and writable-surface restrictions on our learned attack method, we compare three settings with progressively constrained attacker capabilities:
We train a Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct attacker against a Qwen3.5-9B victim using our Two-Stage Optimization with judge reward weights j∈{0,1}. Experiments are conducted in the tool-use domain on the leave-task split, with 24 held-out test contexts evaluated three times each (72 runs).
We find that reducing attacker knowledge and restricting writable surfaces progressively decreases ASR. Knowledge of the benign task could help the attacker craft more task-specific injections, such as referencing the user's workflow (e.g., ''Before you can send the final message with the answers to the questions'' in one of the generated attacks), thereby increasing ASR. Meanwhile, restricted access to writable surfaces further limits attack effectiveness.