- Rating
- 3
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 3
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 3
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Paper summary
The article proposes a backdoor attack method by training a model to a vulnerable state. The article first trains the model to learn to give normal/harmful answers after specific tokens, and makes it prefer harmful answers through masking. Then, by adding random noise, the model is trained into a fragile normal state, such that subsequent fine-tuning-induced parameter changes will destroy its normal state and reveal maliciousness.
Critical strengths
- The backdoor attack method proposed in the article, which involves training the model into a fragile state, is interesting.
- The experiments in the article are quite sufficient.
Critical weaknesses
The methodology of the article is not original; highly similar ideas have been proposed in previous works*, and the article does not discuss them. Although the paper successfully transferred it to the LLM field, this limits the paper's innovativeness.
[Unlearn to Relearn Backdoors: Deferred Backdoor Functionality Attacks on Deep Learning Models, Jeongjin Shin and Sangdon Park]
Questions for authors
How does the author position the innovativeness of their article? Why is there a lack of discussion about directly related work?
2 comments
Thank you for your response. I will keep my score.
We sincerely appreciate the reviewer's thoughtful feedback and recognition of our work. Our literature review focused on LLMs and did not sufficiently cover related studies in conventional deep learning. Latent Backdoor [1] activates when transfer learning introduces the attacker’s target class. Hibernated Backdoor [2] maximizes mutual information between benign and malicious gradients. DeferBad [3] hides backdoors through updates to selected layers. Later fine-tuning can undo this effect. These works mainly study CNN classifiers and share FTTrap’s goal of deferred activation. We have added these studies to Section 2.2 and clarified their similarities to and differences from FTTrap.
FTTrap’s core innovation is a fine-tuning-activated backdoor mechanism designed for LLMs. Conventional image classifiers predict labels from a fixed set of categories. LLMs handle open-ended inputs and outputs across diverse downstream tasks. Users may fine-tune LLM on vastly different data. This makes the effects of fine-tuning harder to predict. LLMs also generate responses token by token, so the attack must control how the full response unfolds.
FTTrap introduces a new mechanism based on branch-token control and constrained suppression. Normal and backdoor responses share a prefix and differ at a model-generated branch token. This token controls which response follows. Parameter-noise training strengthens the backdoor preference. Small, constrained updates then establish a normal preference that fine-tuning can disrupt. This mechanism is designed for autoregressive generation and differs from DeferBad’s use of selective layer updates.
[1] Latent Backdoor Attacks on Deep Neural Networks.
[2] Hibernated Backdoor: A Mutual Information Empowered Backdoor Attack to Deep Neural Networks.
[3] Unlearn to Relearn Backdoors: Deferred Backdoor Functionality Attacks on Deep Learning Models.