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Paper summary
BiProxy proposes a bilevel framework for persistent LLM backdoors using a persistent implant LoRA and a disposable proxy LoRA. The proxy simulates benign downstream adaptation, while the implant is optimized at the proxy-adapted state using a first-order approximation.
Critical strengths
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Important problem setting. The paper studies backdoor persistence after unknown downstream adaptation, which is a realistic and challenging setting.
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Clear presentation and reproducibility. The method is well explained and the appendix provides detailed implementation settings, sensitivity studies, and computational costs.
Critical weaknesses
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The paper does not isolate why proxy adaptation works. The key ablation compares BiProxy only against an “Outer-only” variant with no proxy adaptation, it does not compare against matched random/adversarial low-rank perturbations or other state-space augmentation. This is consequential because the main novelty claim is that benign proxy adaptation provides transferable persistence signals, but the current evidence only shows that training at some adapted model state helps. Without stronger controls, the proposed mechanism is not convincingly established.
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The claimed transfer to unknown downstream adaptation is insufficiently supported. The theoretical argument requires the proxy- and victim-adapted states to be sufficiently close, or to differ mainly along low-curvature directions (line 877 to 879), but the paper does not empirically verify these conditions. Empirically, the main evaluation is also restricted to supervised Full-SFT and LoRA-SFT on three downstream tasks. This is consequential because broad transfer across unseen adaptation procedures is the paper’s central claim, the current theory and experiments do not yet justify that level of generality.
Questions for authors
- How does BiProxy compare with random or adversarial low-rank proxy perturbations instead of benign proxy adaptation?
- Does the advantage remain when BiProxy and baselines are matched in parameter count and optimization/compute budget?
- Can the authors measure proxy-victim update distance or gradient cosine similarity to validate the assumptions behind Sec. A.4?
- How well does BiProxy persist after preference tuning, safety alignment, continued pretraining, or other PEFT methods?
10 comments
Response to Reviewer zGRu (Part 2)
Q2Does the advantage remain when BiProxy and baselines are matched in parameter count and optimization/compute budget?
R2 We thank the reviewer for their concern regarding the fairness of experimental comparisons. To further evaluate BiProxy's performance advantages, we adapted BadNets, SBL, and BAD-BOOM to LoRA-based training and standardized the optimization hyperparameters and training configurations. We then re-evaluated their backdoor persistence under the same downstream tasks and evaluation protocol. The results are presented in Tables TR2 and TR3.
Computational Cost and Implantation Effectiveness (TR2). Under the unified training configuration, the training times for BadNets, SBL, and BAD-BOOM are 5.72, 11.08, and 13.03 minutes, respectively, compared with 33 minutes for BiProxy. Although BiProxy incurs higher computational costs, it achieves a 100% ASR at the implantation stage, whereas BadNets and SBL achieve 96.7% and 96.8%, respectively. Notably, although BAD-BOOM is specifically designed for persistent backdoors, it failed to successfully implant a backdoor under the unified training configuration used in this study. Therefore, we do not interpret its subsequent zero ASR as evidence of a failure in backdoor persistence.
In addition, P-Trojan requires an additional trigger optimization process, making its training procedure different from those of other fixed-trigger methods. Therefore, we exclude P-Trojan from the training time comparison under the unified configuration to avoid directly comparing computational costs arising from different training stages.
Post-Adaptation Backdoor Persistence (TR3). The experimental results show that although BadNets and SBL achieve relatively high ASRs at the implantation stage, their attack success rates decrease substantially after downstream adaptation. For example, under GPTeacher Full-SFT, their ASRs drop to 12.7% and 15.7%, respectively, and both methods exhibit 0% ASR across all LoRA-SFT settings. In contrast, BiProxy maintains an ASR above 98.7% across all six downstream adaptation settings.
These results indicate that, under the unified LoRA training configuration, BiProxy exhibits more stable backdoor persistence than the compared baselines. Although the actual computational costs still vary across methods, these additional experiments further validate BiProxy's effectiveness under consistent optimization settings and explicitly illustrate the trade-off between its performance and computational cost.
TR2. Computational Cost Under Unified Training Configurations
| Method | Training Time (min) | GPU Memory (GB) | ASR₀ (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| BadNets | 5.72 | 5.84 | 96.7 |
| SBL | 11.08 | 6.37 | 96.8 |
| BAD-BOOM | 13.03 | 7.43 | 0 |
| BiProxy | 33.00 | 20.32 | 100.0 |
TR3 Post-Adaptation Backdoor Persistence
| method | Full-SFT | LoRA-SFT | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SST-2 | GSM8K | GPTeacher | SST-2 | GSM8K | GPTeacher | |
| BadNets | 70.9 | 82.4 | 12.7 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| SBL | 74.7 | 84.0 | 15.7 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| BAD-BOOM | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| BiProxy | 100 | 100 | 98.7 | 100 | 99.7 | 99.7 |
Response to Reviewer zGRu (Part 3)
R3 We thank the reviewer for the valuable suggestion regarding the empirical validation of the theoretical condition. To further examine the local gradient alignment condition in Appendix A.4, we saved the proxy's inner-loop adapted state at step 1,000 during actual BiProxy training and obtained the victim state through independent downstream LoRA fine-tuning on GPTeacher, starting from the same released model. We then computed the behavioral gradients at the proxy and victim states using the same diagnostic batch to evaluate their gradient alignment.
At native precision, the gradient norms of the proxy and victim are 4.0475 and 4.4638, respectively, with a gradient difference norm of 1.9797 and a cosine similarity of 0.8963. Furthermore, we obtain:
= 0.4891 < 1.$$ At FP32 precision, the gradient norms of the proxy and victim are 2.6212 and 3.2256, respectively, with a gradient difference norm of 1.9450 and a cosine similarity of 0.7979. Furthermore, we obtain: $$\frac{\lVert g(\Delta\theta_v)-g_{\mathrm{FO}}\rVert_2}{\lVert g_{\mathrm{FO}}\rVert_2} = 0.7420 < 1.$$ Therefore, under this actual training episode and diagnostic objective, the empirical endpoint condition in Appendix A.4: $$\lVert g(\Delta\theta_v)-g_{\mathrm{FO}}\rVert_2 < \lVert g_{\mathrm{FO}}\rVert_2$$ is satisfied under both numerical precision settings. These results indicate that the proxy and victim gradients exhibit strong directional alignment, with the actual gradient difference being smaller than the first-order gradient norm. This provides direct empirical evidence supporting the local gradient alignment analysis in Appendix A.4 and further supports the plausibility of gradient transfer across different downstream adaptation states in BiProxy. --- > **`Q4`** How well does BiProxy persist after preference tuning, safety alignment, continued pretraining, or other PEFT methods? **`R4`** We thank the reviewer for their interest in BiProxy's backdoor persistence under different downstream adaptation methods. To further evaluate the applicability of our approach, we conducted additional experiments covering DPO-based preference alignment and safety alignment, continual learning, larger-scale models, and jailbreak backdoors. The results are presented in Tables TR4–TR7. **Preference Alignment, Safety Alignment, and Continual Learning (TR4–TR5).** We conducted DPO-based preference alignment and safety alignment experiments on Llama-3.2-1B and Qwen3-0.6B-Base using the UltraFeedback and PKU-SafeRLHF datasets, respectively. As shown in Table R5, after 2,500 steps of downstream adaptation, BiProxy maintains a 100% ASR under preference alignment and 92.7%–100% under safety alignment. In addition, we conducted continual learning experiments involving three sequential downstream tasks: SST-2, GSM8K, and GPTeacher. As shown in Table R6, after three stages of sequential adaptation, BiProxy maintains ASRs of 95.8% and 85.3% on the two models, respectively. These results indicate that although different downstream adaptation processes may introduce some performance variations, BiProxy maintains strong backdoor persistence across the evaluated DPO-based alignment and continual learning settings. **Larger-Scale Models and Different Attack Objectives (TR6-TR7).** Furthermore, we conducted additional Full-SFT and LoRA-SFT experiments on Llama-3-8B. As shown in Table R4, BiProxy maintains a 100% ASR across all three downstream tasks (SST-2, GSM8K, and GPTeacher), further demonstrating its effectiveness on larger-scale models. We also conducted additional jailbreak backdoor experiments on Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct, following the jailbreak attack setting from BackdoorLLM and using a GPT model to evaluate the generated responses. As shown in Table R7, BiProxy maintains high ASRs across the reported downstream adaptation settings, outperforming the compared baselines in terms of attack success rate. Detailed experimental protocols and evaluation settings are provided in the appendix. Taken together, these additional results provide further evidence of BiProxy's backdoor persistence across different downstream alignment methods, sequential task adaptation, and attack objectives.
Response to Reviewer zGRu (Part 1)
General Response
We sincerely thank the reviewer for the thoughtful and constructive evaluation of our work. We particularly appreciate the reviewer's recognition of the importance of studying backdoor persistence under unknown downstream adaptation, as well as the positive assessment of BiProxy's method design, reproducibility, and the detailed experimental settings and computational cost analysis provided in the appendix. Below, we address the reviewer's concerns regarding the role of benign proxy adaptation, the fairness of baseline comparisons, gradient alignment between proxy and victim models, and effectiveness across broader downstream adaptation settings, providing further technical explanations and supporting evidence.
R1We thank the reviewer for the insightful questions regarding the core mechanism of BiProxy. To further validate the role of benign proxy adaptation, we introduced random perturbations (Inner-Random) and two adversarial perturbation strategies, FGSM (Inner-FGSM) and AWP (Inner-AWP), as alternatives to the inner-loop adaptation process, and compared them with the original BiProxy. The experimental results are presented in Table TR1.The results show that although all three perturbation strategies maintain high ASRs on SST-2, their performance degrades substantially on GSM8K and GPTeacher. In particular, under GPTeacher Full-SFT, Inner-Random, Inner-FGSM, and Inner-AWP achieve ASRs of 32.4%, 64.8%, and 41.4%, respectively, substantially lower than BiProxy's 98.8%. Furthermore, BiProxy maintains an ASR of at least 98.8% across all six downstream adaptation settings, whereas the alternative perturbation strategies exhibit considerable performance variations.
These results indicate that although random or adversarial perturbations can improve backdoor persistence in certain settings, they struggle to maintain consistent effectiveness across different downstream tasks and fine-tuning methods. In contrast, BiProxy achieves consistently high attack success rates across the evaluated settings through explicit benign proxy adaptation. These findings further demonstrate the advantages of benign proxy adaptation over general random or adversarial perturbations and provide more direct empirical evidence supporting BiProxy's core design. The corresponding experimental results and analysis have been incorporated into the ablation study section of the revised manuscript.
TR1 Ablation Study on Inner-Loop Adaptation Strategies