- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 2
Read review
Paper summary
This paper attacks machine unlearning itself. A clean-label backdoor is installed together with camouflage samples that keep it dormant, and the backdoor activates once a legitimate unlearning request removes the camouflage. CoForget turns the request into a heterogeneous one, pairing a small camouflage component with deliberately selected clean samples, using logit gap calibration for the trigger and cumulative gradient alignment for sample selection.
Critical strengths
- Using a legitimate unlearning request as the trigger is a clear and security-relevant threat concept.
- The paper is written in clear and accessible language, and is generally easy to follow.
Critical weaknesses
- The heterogeneous request contains substantially more samples than the camouflage-only request. The two settings therefore do not have the same request size, so the reported gain in benign accuracy cannot be attributed solely to the combination of camouflage and selected clean samples. The claimed activation-utility balance is neither isolated nor mechanistically supported.
- The paper should provide a rule for selecting the logit-gap interval on new datasets.
- The comparison with prior attacks does not isolate request composition. CoForget combines a calibrated trigger with heterogeneous request construction, whereas the baselines use BadNets triggers. The paper does not separate gains from trigger calibration and gains from heterogeneous composition.
- The framework relies on a source model trained on a related-domain auxiliary dataset and on dataset-specific trigger calibration and selector settings. The paper does not use a single configuration across all datasets, and the perturbation budget, logit-gap interval, and class cap vary by dataset.
Questions for authors
As above.
2 comments
Response to Reviewer YjtK (Part 2/2): W3–W4
W3. Separating trigger calibration from request composition
The comparison with prior attacks does not isolate request composition. CoForget combines a calibrated trigger with heterogeneous request construction, whereas the baselines use BadNets triggers. The paper does not separate gains from trigger calibration and gains from heterogeneous composition.
Response:
To disentangle the contributions of trigger calibration and heterogeneous request composition, we conduct two complementary sets of controlled comparisons.
Separating request composition. We fix the CoForget trigger and compare heterogeneous and camouflage-only requests at the same total request budget under NegGrad+. Across three attacker seeds per dataset, heterogeneous configurations achieve smaller mean BA drops while maintaining high post-unlearning ASR across all three datasets (see the table in W1 above). Selected clean samples also achieve higher mean BA and ASR than random clean samples under the same trigger, victim checkpoint, camouflage component, and clean budget (Table 4 and Appendix Table 17).
Separating trigger calibration. Table 3 removes calibration while retaining the heterogeneous request construction and sample budgets. Removing calibration weakens the dormancy-to-activation transition, particularly on the CIFAR datasets. Appendix Table 16 further compares the calibrated trigger with five alternative trigger designs under the same heterogeneous request protocol and NegGrad+. The results show that alternative triggers exhibit different dormancy–activation trade-offs, whereas the calibrated trigger maintains low pre-unlearning ASR and high post-unlearning ASR across all three datasets.
W4. Auxiliary data and dataset-specific configurations
The framework relies on a source model trained on a related-domain auxiliary dataset and on dataset-specific trigger calibration and selector settings. The paper does not use a single configuration across all datasets, and the perturbation budget, logit-gap interval, and class cap vary by dataset.
Response:
Auxiliary data. CoForget uses auxiliary public data from a related domain to construct the shadow model required for trigger calibration and clean sample selection (Appendix A.2). This use of auxiliary data is consistent with prior unlearning attacks. UBA-Inf (Huang et al., 2024) also uses auxiliary training data and a publicly available ImageNet-pretrained surrogate model.
Dataset-specific configurations. CoForget uses the same loss formulations and cumulative greedy selection procedure across datasets, while allowing numerical settings to vary with dataset characteristics. Differences in dataset size, class structure, and image characteristics motivate dataset-specific configurations. We determine these settings through empirical evaluation of multiple configurations, assessing model performance before and after unlearning.
References
Zirui Huang, Yunlong Mao, and Sheng Zhong. UBA-Inf: Unlearning activated backdoor attack with Influence-Driven camouflage. In 33rd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 24), pp. 4211–4228, 2024.
Response to Reviewer YjtK (Part 1/2): W1–W2
Thank you for your careful review and constructive feedback. We have revised the manuscript and highlighted the changes in blue in the updated PDF for ease of reference.
W1. Request size and attribution of the activation–utility gains
Response:
To isolate the effect of request composition, we compare heterogeneous and camouflage-only requests at the same total request size. We added a comparison within the CoForget framework under NegGrad+. The heterogeneous configurations reduce mean BA drops by 1.69, 1.92, and 4.65 percentage points on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and Tiny-ImageNet, respectively, while maintaining high post-unlearning ASR.
Selected vs random comparisons identify an additional benefit from clean sample selection with matched camouflage and clean budgets. Selected clean samples achieve higher mean BA and ASR across the three unlearning algorithms on CIFAR-10 (Table 4) and across all three datasets under NegGrad+ (Appendix Table 17).
Our expanded Appendix B provides a theoretical foundation for the activation–utility gains. When clean selection increases the combined request's activation efficiency, the same first-order target-label loss reduction requires a smaller linearized displacement. Under Proposition 1's margin condition, the corresponding upper bound on benign accuracy loss does not increase. This explains how activation-oriented selection can support benign utility without explicitly optimizing BA.
W2. Choosing the logit-gap interval on new datasets
Response:
We determined the dataset-specific logit-gap intervals through empirical evaluation of multiple candidate intervals, jointly considering pre-unlearning ASR, post-unlearning ASR, and benign accuracy. For a new dataset, we recommend using the positive intervals in Appendix A.2 as initial candidates, evaluating them under the intended unlearning setting, and selecting an interval that balances initial dormancy, subsequent activation, and benign utility.
The default intervals provide a favorable balance between pre-unlearning dormancy, post-unlearning activation, and benign utility. On CIFAR-100, the default maintains high post-unlearning ASR, whereas [3,4] improves initial suppression but reduces subsequent ASR to 5.38%. On Tiny-ImageNet, [0.1,0.5] also improves suppression, but the default preserves higher post-unlearning BA.