- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 3
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Paper summary
This paper proposed a privacy-preserving, Byzantine-robust federated learning scheme. The authors replaced real-valued updates with integer-valued ranking updates and designed certified membership-gated ranking aggregation. Experimental results show that their solution is efficient.
Critical strengths
- The solution appears to effectively integrate existing technologies to address efficiency issues.
Critical weaknesses
- Lacking sufficient innovation.
- Unfair comparison in Section 5.1.
Questions for authors
- Why choose a 60-bit ciphertext modulus? And what are the default moduli?
- What are the parameters specified in the assumptions of security proofs?
4 comments
Q2: What are the parameters specified in the assumptions of the security proofs?
Response: Thank you for requesting this clarification. Our IND-CPA proof (Appendix F.1) relies on the one- and two-sample small-secret decisional RLWE assumptions over the ring
parameterized by the ring dimension , the ciphertext modulus , the secret distribution , and the error distribution . Concretely, , , and . Both the secret key and the encryption randomness have coefficients sampled independently and uniformly from . Each error coefficient is sampled as
i.e., a centered binomial distribution with support and standard deviation about 3.24. With a 60-bit , these parameters lie within the 128-bit security range of the Homomorphic Encryption Standard for all three ring dimensions.
Formally, for , the decisional RLWE assumption states that
are computationally indistinguishable, where is shared across the samples, are independent and uniform over , and are independent. The two-sample assumption accounts for the dependence introduced by ciphertext components that share the same encryption randomness. Based on these assumptions, Theorem 7 bounds the IND-CPA advantage as
Hence CertiRank is IND-CPA secure under these RLWE assumptions, and the noise analysis in our response to Reviewer LaSY (Q4) establishes decryption correctness for the evaluated configuration.
Thank you again for your constructive feedback on our paper. We would like to follow up on our rebuttal and ask whether you have any remaining questions or concerns. We would be happy to provide further clarification. If our responses have addressed your concerns, would you consider raising your score?
Dear Reviewer Fa8q,
Sorry to bother you again. With the discussion phase nearing the end, we would like to know whether the responses have addressed your concerns.
Should this be the case, we are encouraged that you raise the final rating to reflect this.
If there are any remaining concerns, please let us know. We are more than willing to engage in further discussion and address any remaining concerns to the best of our abilities.
We are looking forward to your reply. Thank you for your efforts in this manuscript.
Best regards,
Authors
Author Response (Reviewer Fa8q)
We sincerely thank you for your careful reading and valuable comments, which will help us improve the clarity and quality of this paper.
W1: Lacking sufficient innovation.
Response: The central contribution of CertiRank is not any single component but the co-design of the learning paradigm, robust aggregation, and privacy-preserving computation so that they fit together. Reviewers LaSY and 3WVX describe this design as "substantive ... rather than only an optimization of an existing encryption workflow."
At the learning layer, we build on FRL, a supermask-based framework in which clients communicate integer-valued rankings instead of real-valued gradients or model updates. Its integer representation and additive aggregation naturally suit encrypted computation, avoiding real-to-integer conversion and costly encrypted similarity calculations. To address FRL's vulnerability to ranking manipulation, including VEM attacks, we introduce CMGRA, a new aggregation rule. It separates subnetwork membership selection from fine-grained ranking and certifies membership changes with honest-support evidence, with a tight bound on the honest-membership utility gap (Theorem 1), while keeping the simple additive structure needed for efficient secure aggregation.
At the cryptographic layer, we tailor the encoding and protocol to these computational requirements. Our sign-aware encoding implements the prescribed cyclic shifts through monomial multiplication, which eliminates Galois keys and key switching without increasing the noise norm. We further combine cyclic shifts and block permutations in a two-stage obfuscation mechanism, which lets the verification server check ranking validity and top-K membership consistency on position-obfuscated submissions. Together, these mechanisms support the verification and secure aggregation that CMGRA requires.
The resulting benefits are substantial under the reported configurations: compared with BCPBFL, CertiRank reduces client and server processing time by up to 86.6% and 97.0%, respectively; compared with RVPFL, it reduces client upload and inter-server traffic by up to 96.9% and 98.9%, respectively, while remaining robust against the evaluated poisoning attacks.
W2 and Q1: Comparison fairness, and why a 60-bit ciphertext modulus? What are the default moduli?
Response: Thank you for raising these related concerns.
Fairness. Section 5.1 compares encoding and homomorphic operations on the same hardware at matching polynomial degrees. The comparison evaluates the combined efficiency benefits of CertiRank's coefficient encoding, monomial shifts, and task-specific modulus configuration against native SIMD-based HE implementations. The baseline moduli are specified below.
Modulus. CertiRank only needs additive aggregation and prescribed cyclic shifts, without ciphertext–ciphertext multiplication. Our sign-aware encoding realizes these shifts through monomial multiplication, which avoids Galois key switching and preserves the noise norm. Noise therefore grows only linearly in the number of clients, and a single 60-bit modulus suffices; it also fits native 64-bit arithmetic. With N=8192, z=235, q=1152921092289986561 (60-bit), and at most U=25 clients, the aggregate error is bounded by
∣Eagg∣∞≤21U(2N+1)+2U+1=8,602,138<2zq≈16,777,210,
which guarantees correct decryption of the aggregate (see our response to Reviewer LaSY (Q4) for details). A 60-bit modulus is also well below the maximum of 109 bits that the Homomorphic Encryption Standard [1] allows for 128-bit security at N=4096, so CertiRank's parameters provide at least 128-bit security.
Default moduli. The baselines use Microsoft SEAL's default coefficient-modulus chains, with total bit lengths of 109, 218, and 438 bits for N=4096, 8192, and 16384, respectively, following the 128-bit classical security recommendations for ternary secrets in the Homomorphic Encryption Standard [1]. These totals include the special prime used for key switching in Galois-key-based slot rotations, which CertiRank does not need. We have clarified these settings in the revised manuscript.
[1] Martin Albrecht et al. Homomorphic Encryption Standard. In Protecting Privacy through Homomorphic Encryption, pp. 31–62, 2021.