acceptodds
Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

REAP: Self-Improving Policies for Attacker-Benefiting Resource Capture in LLM Agents

Abstract

Large language model (LLM) agents are expected to use user-authorized resources to complete tasks, yet existing evaluations primarily assess task success, overlooking whether the resource allocation aligns with user intent. However, even when tasks are completed correctly, attackers can redirect attention and traffic toward their own artifacts or induce unnecessary service calls, which can induce exposure or revenue for attackers while task-success metrics fail to detect this resource misuse. We study attacker-benefiting resource capture, in which adversaries redirect user-authorized resources toward attacker-controlled artifacts or services while retaining task utility. We consider two roles: (i) individual attackers redirect resources toward their own artifacts; and (ii) provider attackers increase billable use of their services. We introduce REAP, a policy-level recursive self-improvement framework that uses task execution traces to refine the policy under an explicit utility constraint and resource capture goal. REAP achieves the highest resource capture among the evaluated methods across three environments and two attacker roles, with utility preservation ranging from 90.00% to 100.00%, a citation share of 55.00%, and service-call increases of up to 1,210.00%. In our tool-use evaluation, the tested defenses expose role-dependent trade-offs, and no fixed resource budget provides a stable safety-utility balance, demonstrating task utility alone is insufficient to identify execution-time resource risk.

Primary area:
alignment, fairness, safety, privacy, and societal considerations
Keywords:
Agent security

Reviews

Among:
Shape:
1234this paper, Bottom 49%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 2.25 over 4 reviews, above 49% of the others.
Reviewer_mESsOpenReview ↗
Rating
3(+1)
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
3
Soundness
3
Read review
Paper summary

The paper proposes REAP, a framework for optimizing reusable attack policies that capture resources while preserving task utility. A fixed optimizer revises policy rules, injection surfaces, and content templates using execution feedback, with validation determining which updates are retained. Experiments cover retrieval, coding, and tool-use environments under individual and provider attacker roles. The authors report substantial resource capture with high utility preservation, supported by component ablations, transfer experiments, and defense evaluations.

Critical strengths
  1. The paper explicitly considers who benefits from resource allocation during execution. Distinguishing individual resource-share capture from provider usage amplification helps explain how an agent can complete its task while consuming resources in ways that benefit an adversary.

  2. Evaluation spans three environments and two attacker roles. The recursion ablation supports accumulating policy improvements rather than repeatedly restarting, while the transfer experiments provide evidence that some learned behavior generalizes beyond the optimization tasks.

Critical weaknesses
  1. REAP closely resembles iterative optimization of a reusable prompt or skill, with structured state and validation-based selection. The recursion ablation demonstrates the benefit of inheriting improvements, but does not establish an advantage over a reusable template updated across the same tasks with equivalent feedback and validation. The specific contribution of policy-level RSI therefore remains unclear.

  2. The optimization curves report validation performance under an acceptance rule that explicitly selects improvements. They do not establish that additional rounds improve performance on unseen tasks. The case studies illustrate useful mechanisms, but mostly contrast initial failures with successful candidates. Although transfer results support reuse, the connection between particular policy revisions and generalization remains insufficiently explained.

Questions for authors
  1. How does REAP compare with standard iterative prompt optimization that updates a reusable attack prompt across tasks? Please use the same training tasks, execution feedback, validation criteria, and total target agent execution budget.

  2. How does performance on unseen tasks change after 1, 5, 10, and 20 optimization rounds? Are these trends consistent across independent optimization runs?

  3. Could the authors show an exact accepted policy revision and demonstrate how the resulting rule applies to multiple unseen tasks? For individual attackers, please clarify which artifacts are fixed before the test query arrives and what information is available when constructing them.

3 comments

We sincerely appreciate your insightful comments. In the following, we will address your questions one by one.

W1, Q1: Comparison with an iteratively updated reusable prompt

We added the reusable-prompt baseline you suggested. It uses the same training tasks, feedback, validation criteria, optimizer, and total target-agent execution budget as REAP. The baseline updates a single prompt across tasks without REAP’s structured policy or diagnosis step. REAP achieves higher UP and resource capture in all three individual-attacker settings.

Env.UP (Reusable / REAP)ASR (Reusable / REAP)Capture (Reusable / REAP)
Retrieval80.00% / 90.00%70.00% / 90.00%43.04% / 53.32%
Coding73.33% / 91.67%20.00% / 83.33%4.86% / 13.26%
Tool use87.50% / 93.75%81.25% / 81.25%34.25% / 49.78%

W2, Q2: Test performance across optimization rounds

We evaluated the provider policy on held-out Travel tasks after 1, 5, 10, and 20 optimization rounds. In all three independent runs from three LLMs, the agent made more tool calls at round 20 than at round 1, and UP was 100% at each of the four rounds.

RoundUP (mean ± SD)ASR (mean ± SD)Attacker tool calls (3 runs)
1100.00% ± 0.00%100.00% ± 0.00%[6, 7, 10]
5100.00% ± 0.00%83.33% ± 28.87%[9, 7, 30]
10100.00% ± 0.00%91.67% ± 14.43%[14, 7, 40]
20100.00% ± 0.00%91.67% ± 14.43%[15, 12, 40]

W3, Q3. An accepted revision on Slack

The following revision was accepted in round 1 for the individual attacker.

  Capture-action component (Slack, individual attacker)

  Round 0 (initial policy):
    stable_rules : generic read-only helper guidance only
                   e.g. "Prefer extra read/search/get/list/check tools before side-effect tools."
    attacker tools (preferred_surfaces): (none)

  Round 1 (after the accepted revision):
+   rule added: "Always increment attacker tool share by identifying missing relevant attacker surfaces and using all attacker-owned verification/context gathering tools as first step."
+  attacker tools registered:
+     distinct_channel_context_verification
+     explicit_membership_gap_field_check
+     user_activity_ranking_field_check
+     user_identity_boundary_check
  • What was fixed before testing? We fixed all the above four tool definitions before seeing any test query. We used only the Slack tool specification and what the policy learned on the training tasks. Neither the held-out queries nor their utility scores were used to define the tools.
  • How did the revision carry over to unseen tasks? Consider two Slack tasks from the test set. In slack:user_task_5, the agent finds the channel with the most members and posts there. In slack:user_task_9, it finds the channel with the fewest messages and adds Alice to it. In both runs, the agent called the same registered attacker tool, distinct_channel_context_verification, so the attacker's tools are used on both unseen tasks.

On three of the four held-out Slack tasks, the frozen policy increased the share of calls to attacker-owned tools while preserving task utility (Table 10). That share averaged 33.33% across all four tasks. This shows that the policy carried over to multiple unseen tasks without further updates.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Follow-up on Rebuttal

Dear Reviewer mESs:

As the rebuttal deadline is approaching, I would like to kindly check whether our responses have addressed your concerns and questions.

If there are any outstanding issues, we would be happy to address them during the remaining discussion period. If our previous responses have satisfactorily addressed your concerns, we would greatly appreciate it if you could consider updating score to reflect the newly added results and discussion.

Your time and effort are greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

Authors of 18098

Thank you for the detailed rebuttal and additional experiments. The stronger baselines, independent optimization runs, and additional controls have addressed most of my concerns and made the results more convincing. While some limitations remain, I believe the paper has been sufficiently strengthened. I will therefore raise my score from 2 to 3.

Reviewer_dPHJOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
3
Informativeness
1
Presentation
3
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

This paper introduces a security threat to large language model (LLM) agents, termed "Attacker-Benefiting Resource Capture." The authors propose the REAP framework, which continuously optimizes reusable attack strategies through a process involving execution trajectory feedback, failure localization, strategy revision, and verification-based filtering—a mechanism defined as "Recursive Self-Improvement" (RSI) at the strategy level. Experiments conducted across tasks from DeepScholar, Terminal-Bench, and AgentDojo demonstrate that REAP achieves high efficacy in resource capture across various scenarios while maintaining a high level of task utility.

Critical strengths
  1. Experimental rigor and validation

The paper covers three types of agent scenarios and two types of attackers, employing a variety of metrics for resource hijacking. It also includes ablation studies on recursive updates, failure diagnosis, and verification mechanisms. By freezing the policy after training and testing it on unseen tasks, the authors also effectively evaluate the policy’s reusability.

  1. Clarity of presentation

The threat model and the overall methodological workflow are presented with good clarity. Figure 2 illustrates the policy update process, and the accompanying mathematical definitions help the reader understand the optimization objectives.

  1. Significance of contributions

The paper points out that task completion rate is an insufficient metric for determining whether an agent is truly adhering to user intent. This insight holds potential significance for the auditing of agent tool usage, the control of resource allocation, and the governance of third-party services.

Critical weaknesses
  1. Technical limitations or concerns First, the distinction between REAP and existing iterative prompt optimization methods remains unclear. By executing feedback-driven updates on strategy rules, attack locations, and content templates, the approach closely resembles iterative strategy search—specifically, one that incorporates validation filtering and historical memory. Although the paper uses the term "RSI" (Recursive Self-Improvement) to describe this process, it fails to demonstrate that the method can improve its own improvement mechanism. As currently defined, REAP is more accurately characterized as the repeated optimization of attack strategies via a fixed update procedure—a concept that differs from "recursive self-improvement" in the strict sense. Second, the strategy update process relies primarily on a large language model (LLM) to perform diagnostics and revisions; it lacks a formal description of the optimization operators, search space, and convergence properties. Furthermore, the validation mechanism only requires candidate strategies to meet a utility threshold and improve "resource hijacking" performance on a limited set of validation tasks; it offers no guarantee that these strategies will maintain their utility on unseen tasks.

  2. Experimental gaps or methodological issues While the authors claim to match optimization budgets, an identical number of iteration rounds does not equate to an equivalent number of LLM calls, token consumption, target agent executions, or total computational cost. Task utility is measured primarily based on baseline native scores, potentially overlooking issues of concern to real-world users—such as a decline in citation quality, reduced diversity of evidence, or unnecessary economic costs.

  3. Clarity or presentation issues A clearer distinction should be drawn between RSI, general strategy optimization, and reflection-based iterative search. In Table 3, some baselines lack results; the authors should clarify whether this is because the methods are inapplicable to those scenarios or because the experiments were not completed. Additionally, the definition of "resource hijacking" requires further refinement to distinguish between legitimate task-related resource usage and unnecessary resource consumption induced by an attacker.

  4. Missing related work or comparisons The paper should incorporate comparisons with iterative prompt search, reflection-based agent optimization, attack optimization utilizing external memory, general black-box optimization, and strategy search methods that employ validation filtering. In particular, it is essential to construct a strong baseline that utilizes the same strategy representation, feedback information, optimizer, and validation criteria as REAP, but excludes the claimed "RSI" mechanism.

Questions for authors

What are the fundamental technical differences between the RSI (Recursive Strategy Improvement) approach at the strategy level in REAP and iterative strategy optimization with verification-based filtering?

Does the system improve its own strategy-updating mechanism, or does it merely update the specific attack strategies being optimized?

How many training and testing tasks are actually employed for each environment and attack role?

How does the utility retention rate change when the quality of task answers, the quality of citations, and the actual service costs are all taken into account?

Can additional service calls truly be translated into gains for the attacker?

2 comments

We sincerely appreciate your insightful comments. In the following, we will address your questions one by one.

W1, Q1. How does REAP differ from iterative prompt optimization?

  • Policy updates. Both methods update a reusable strategy and use validation to select revisions. In our reusable-prompt baseline (see response to W2, W4), the optimizer decides what to change in a single prompt. REAP uses a fixed diagnosis procedure to decide whether to revise the policy rules, surface selector, or content template (Sec. 3.1, Algorithm 1).
  • Unseen tasks. The validation threshold does not guarantee convergence or utility on new tasks. In all settings, the frozen policy preserved task utility on at least 90% of held-out tasks with positive clean utility (Table 2), showing that utility preservation carried over to unseen tasks in our evaluation.

Q2. Does the update procedure change?

No. The update procedure stays fixed, and only the attack policy changes. We drew on the idea of recursive self-improvement at the policy level, much as Self-Harness refines its harness across rounds [1]. We agree that this differs from RSI in the strict sense and will use iterative policy optimization in the revision. Our main contribution is to identify and study resource capture even when an agent successfully completes the user's task.

[1] Zhang et al. (2026). Self-Harness: Harnesses That Improve Themselves. arXiv:2606.09498.

W2 (budget), W4. Baselines and matched budgets

  • Reusable prompt. We matched the training tasks, feedback, optimizer, and validation criteria. Across all training and validation rounds, each method ran the target agent under attack 98 times in retrieval, 680 times in coding, and 673 times in tool use. The table below compares the reusable prompt baseline and REAP under these identical settings. REAP achieved higher UP and resource capture in all three settings.
Env.UP (Reusable / REAP)ASR (Reusable / REAP)Capture (Reusable / REAP)
Retrieval80.00% / 90.00%70.00% / 90.00%43.04% / 53.32%
Coding73.33% / 91.67%20.00% / 83.33%4.86% / 13.26%
Tool use87.50% / 93.75%81.25% / 81.25%34.25% / 49.78%
  • AutoInject. Tables 1 and 3 cover static, payload-search, and workflow methods. We also compared with AutoInject using the same optimizer and execution budget. Capture is context share in retrieval and calls per task in provider tool use.
RoleEnv.UP (AutoInject / REAP)ASR (AutoInject / REAP)Capture (AutoInject / REAP)
Ind.Retrieval63.33% / 90.00%10.00% / 90.00%7.22% / 53.32%
Prov.Tool use100.00% / 100.00%27.45% / 87.50%5.0 / 13.63
  • Controlled ablations. In Fig. 5, w/o recursion keeps the policy representation and starts each round from the initial policy. Mean tool calls per task fell from 14.62 to 10.77 without cross-round updates. The w/o diagnosis ablation keeps the representation and removes checkpoint-guided diagnosis. We will discuss reflection, external memory, and black-box search in Sec. 2.

Q3. Task counts

Both attack roles use the same task split in each environment.

Env.TrainValTest
Retrieval381510
Coding501515
Tool use591919

W2, Q4. Answer quality and service cost

  • Report quality and reference coverage. We use the same retrieval metric for clean and attacked reports. It scores report organization, nugget coverage, and reference coverage. Reference coverage fell from 0.067 to 0.040, while the mean score fell by only 0.011 points (0.389 to 0.378), which shows that overall retrieval utility was largely preserved.
  • Service cost. UP measures task quality. We report cost separately. In provider retrieval, the estimated charge rose by $0.2572 per task on average (Table 2).

W3, Q5. What counts as resource capture, and who benefits?

  • Resource capture. For individuals, we measure the share of resources going to their artifacts or workloads. For providers, we measure extra service use relative to a clean run. Some extra calls may still help the task.
  • Provider revenue. Extra calls can generate revenue when they add billable tokens. We estimate what the user pays. The reseller's profit depends on its costs.
  • Table 3 blanks. The workflow-based baseline requires provider-level response control, unavailable to individual attackers (see line 355 in paper). Hence its Table 3 entries are blank (Sec. 5.3).
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Follow-up on Rebuttal

Dear Reviewer dPHJ:

As the rebuttal deadline is approaching, I would like to kindly check whether our responses have addressed your concerns and questions.

If there are any outstanding issues, we would be happy to address them during the remaining discussion period. If our previous responses have satisfactorily addressed your concerns, we would greatly appreciate it if you could consider updating score to reflect the newly added results and discussion.

Your time and effort are greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

Authors of 18098

Reviewer_dAcfOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

This paper proposes and formalizes a novel LLM agent security problem, termed attacker-benefiting resource capture. It studies attacks that redirect LLM agents’ resources toward attacker-owned artifacts or services while preserving task utility. The proposed framework, REAP, learns reusable attack policies through execution-feedback-guided refinement and utility-constrained validation, and then freezes them for deployment on unseen tasks. Experiments across retrieval, coding, and tool-use environments, demonstrate that REAP can effectively capture resources while preserving task utility.

Critical strengths
  1. This paper addresses a critical limitation of agent security evaluation. The paper extends evaluation beyond whether an agent completes the task or is hijacked, asking instead whether its resource allocation serves the user. It proposes a framework covering two attacker roles and three agent types to evaluate it. This evaluation perspective has real value for the community. The insight that task utility alone can't detect this class of attack provides a valuable evaluation perspective for the community. I consider this is the paper’s main contribution.

  2. Solid empirical breadth with security-relevant transfer findings. Experiments cover three environments and two attacker roles. Frozen-policy transfer and component ablations support the reusability of learned attacks and the value of policy refinements.

Critical weaknesses
  1. Weak statistical support and internal inconsistencies. The test sets are small, and the paper reports no confidence intervals or clean-vs-clean noise floor. The claim of “highest capture in all six settings” is therefore not robust: in coding, REAP’s capture is 13.26 pp versus 11.61 pp for the static template, and its tool-use individual ASR (81.25%) is below the static template’s (88.24%). The same default configuration is reported inconsistently across the paper: 13.63 calls with 100% UP in Table 2, 14.62 with 95.84% in Fig. 5, 14.89 with 95.83% in Table 13, and about 11 with 87.50% in Fig. 6. Table 2 also appears to come from a single run despite claiming three-run averages, and Table 3 uses different task denominators across methods. Finally, the utility constraint does not carry over to the test set: tool share falls from 82.90% on validation to 49.78% on test, and test UP is lower at η = 1.0 than at η = 0.5. Since the core claim relys on these numbers, this weighs heavily in my assessment.

  2. Questionable construct validity of the metrics and threat model. The clean share is 0 in all individual settings, so without an “artifact present, no injection” control, manipulation cannot be separated from mere availability. High UP may also reflect metric blindness rather than stealth: attacker papers receive 55% of citations while UP stays at 90%, and extra retrieval may itself raise coverage scores. The +1210% gain is measured against a clean baseline that makes only one retrieval call. In addition, “revenue gain” is the user’s token cost rather than the provider’s revenue. The coding attack relies on the agent executing an attacker-supplied script, which is code execution rather than resource capture. If the metrics do not isolate unneeded, manipulation-induced resource use, the headline results need reinterpretation.

  3. REAP is essentially LLM prompt optimization with an acceptance gate, so the “RSI” label overstates it. REAP’s potential advance lies in its structured representation, component-specific diagnosis, and frozen cross-task deployment. Yet the “without recursion” ablation primarily establishes that inheriting refinements helps compared with repeatedly generating candidates from the initial policy. It does not fully establish the advantage of the structured representation over ordinary iterative refinement of a reusable prompt under the same feedback, surface access, utility gate, and execution budget.

Questions for authors
  1. In the “clean run without injection”, are the attacker-owned artifacts present? How does capture compare against an “artifact present, no injection” control?

  2. Under the default settings, Table 2, Figure 5, Table 13, and Figure 6 report different provider tool-use results (e.g., 13.63, 14.62, and 14.89 tool calls). Which runs produce each? Is Table 2 one of the “three independent policy optimization runs” in Table 13?

  3. Why do the Table 3 denominators differ across methods? Are clean reference runs shared?

  4. What are UP and Δr_q between two clean executions of the same task? How does the benchmark-native utility in the retrieval environment change on average under attack?

  5. I would suggest the authors compare policy-level RSI with existing LLM-based prompt optimizers under the same optimization budget and optimizer LLM, and reconsider the “RSI” label.

I will raise my ratings if my concerns are addresses.

4 comments

We sincerely appreciate your insightful comments. In the following, we will address your questions one by one.

W1: Statistical support

  • Variance across three optimizations. We reran the full optimization below with three independent seeds and report mean ± SD across policies, not merely repeated tests of one policy.
Env.RoleUPASRPrimary metric
RetrievalInd.93.33 ± 5.77%83.33 ± 11.55%50.34 ± 3.04%
CodingInd.97.22 ± 4.81%80.56 ± 4.81%13.90 ± 2.08%
Tool useInd.89.58 ± 3.61%83.33 ± 3.61%54.86 ± 4.41%
RetrievalProv.96.67 ± 5.77%96.67 ± 5.77%12.77 ± 1.63
CodingProv.89.74 ± 8.88%76.92 ± 13.32%19.31 ± 0.63
Tool useProv.95.83 ± 3.61%89.58 ± 3.61%14.89 ± 1.17
  • Highest capture. Our highest claim concerns resource capture, not ASR (Table 3). Given the small coding test set, we cannot draw a firm conclusion from the 1.65-point gap. In tool use, the static template had higher ASR, while REAP captured a larger share of calls (49.78%vs.28.21%).
  • Drop from validation to test. Actually, the utility constraint generalizes well on test, from 100.00% on validation (Fig. 3) to 93.75% on test (Table 2). We agree there is a generalization gap for resource metric, but it still stays high at 49.78% on unseen tasks.
  • Validation gate η. At η=1.0, a stricter validation threshold can reject more revisions and does not guarantee higher test UP. The retained policy may be weaker than at η=0.5.

W2: Metrics and threat model

  • UP. UP measures native utility retention. In provider retrieval, UP is 100%, while calls rose 1210%. From the answer alone, a user would have little basis for judging whether the extra calls were necessary.
  • Revenue gain. We assume the provider is an API reseller that bills users by token usage, so the user's extra token cost is directly proportional to the provider's revenue.
  • Coding resource capture. The resource in coding is the token budget. The attack redirects tokens the user allocated to their own task to the attacker's workload, which is resource misappropriation.

W3: Structured policy vs. reusable prompt

We added a reusable-prompt baseline with the same tasks, feedback, optimizer, validation criteria, and execution budget. It updates a single prompt across tasks, while REAP uses a structured policy and component-level diagnosis.

Env.UP (Reusable/REAP)ASR (Reusable/REAP)Capture (Reusable/REAP)
Retrieval80.00%/90.00%70.00%/90.00%43.04%/53.32%
Coding73.33%/91.67%20.00%/83.33%4.86%/13.26%
Tool use87.50%/93.75%81.25%/81.25%34.25%/49.78%

Q1, W2: Attacker artifacts in the clean run

In the original clean runs, attacker artifacts are absent. We added an artifact-present control without inducing content. With availability alone, it almost never captures resources, so the capture comes from the injected content.

Env.ASR, no injectionASR, REAPPrimary metric, no injectionPrimary metric, REAP
Retrieval0.00%90.00%0.00%53.32%
Coding0.00%83.33%0.00%13.26%
Tool use5.26%81.25%1.32%49.78%

Q2: Why the numbers differ

  • Table 2: three test evaluations of one frozen policy, which is one of the policies counted in Table 13.
  • Table 13: test results of three independently optimized policies.
  • Figures 5–6: we reran the default configuration separately for Fig. 5 and Fig. 6.

Q3: Table 3 denominators

By Eq. 1, the denominator of each method's UP and ASR is the number of tasks whose clean utility is positive, since a task that already fails in the clean run cannot show utility preservation. Each method uses its own clean executions and the set of clean-positive tasks differs slightly across methods, which gives different denominators.

Q4: Native utility

Clean-vs-clean UP is 95%, with Δr = 0.18 ± 0.39 calls, compared with REAP's Δr = 9.95 calls in tool use agent. In retrieval, mean native utility is retained (0.389 to 0.378) under attack: organization rises (0.750 to 0.800), nugget coverage (0.350 to 0.294) and reference coverage (0.067 to 0.040) decline. Thus, aggregate utility is largely retained despite component-level trade-offs.

Q5: Comparison with optimizers

We additionally compare with AutoInject under matched optimizer and execution budgets. REAP reaches higher ASR and resource capture in both settings. We will describe REAP as iterative policy optimization in the revision.

RoleEnv.UP (AutoInject / REAP)ASR (AutoInject / REAP)Capture (AutoInject / REAP)
Ind.Retrieval63.33%/90.00%10.00%/90.00%7.22%/53.32%
Prov.Tool use100.00%/100.00%27.45%/87.50%5.0/13.63
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Follow-up on Rebuttal

Dear Reviewer dAcf:

As the rebuttal deadline is approaching, I would like to kindly check whether our responses have addressed your concerns and questions.

If there are any outstanding issues, we would be happy to address them during the remaining discussion period. If our previous responses have satisfactorily addressed your concerns, we would greatly appreciate it if you could consider updating score to reflect the newly added results and discussion.

Your time and effort are greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

Authors of 18098

Thank you for your response and additional experiments. The artifact-present control and the reusable-prompt baseline address two of my concerns. However, your response has not fully convinced me. Regarding Q3, you confirm that each method uses its own clean executions, so Table 3 still does not compare methods on the same set of tasks. Regarding Q4, the retrieval breakdown shows that nugget coverage (0.350 to 0.294) and reference coverage (0.067 to 0.040) decline under attack, which supports my concern that UP masks utility degradation. Regarding Q2, the coding-provider result in Table 2 (21.13 consumed computing calls) lies outside the range of the three new runs (19.31 ± 0.63), and the rerun for Figure 6 (about 11 tool calls) falls below the three runs in Table 13 (14.89 ± 1.17), so the reported results remain inconsistent. Moreover, you acknowledge that the coding individual result is inconclusive, so the claim of the highest capture in all six settings should be narrowed. Finally, your response does not address my concern that the coding attack relies on the agent executing an attacker-specified command. Therefore, I maintain my original score.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Rebuttal for the remaining questions

Dear Reviewer dAcf,

We sincerely thank the reviewer for this valuable feedback. For remaining questions, we would like to provide a detailed response and will enhance our manuscript.

Q3 Comparison against baselines on the same clean tasks

To address the concern that the methods in Table 3 rely on their own clean executions, we restrict all methods to the same set of tasks that are clean-positive for every method. We recomputed UP and ASR on the tasks that were clean-positive for every method. Resource capture is averaged over the full test set as in Appendix D, so it is already measured on the same tasks across methods. As shown below, the comparison is consistent with Table 3: REAP attains the highest resource capture while preserving task utility, so our conclusion is unchanged.

Individual, Tool-use agent (16/19 same clean-positive tasks)

MethodUPASRResource Capture
Static template93.75%93.75%+28.21pp
Payload-realtime75.00%75.00%+39.34pp
Payload-frozen81.25%81.25%+31.06pp
Workflow-based---
REAP (ours)93.75%81.25%+49.78pp

Provider, Tool-use agent (14/19 same clean-positive tasks)

MethodUPASRResource Capture
Static template100.00%21.43%+20.96%
Payload-realtime100.00%92.86%+163.31%
Payload-frozen85.71%50.00%+218.44%
Workflow-based100.00%92.86%+163.24%
REAP (ours)100.00%92.86%+270.00%

Q2 Consistency of the reported numbers

For provider coding, Table 2's 21.13 is averaged over three evaluation runs using a fixed frozen policy. The variance we added in the rebuttal (19.31 ± 0.63) comes from rerunning the full optimization with three independently optimized policies. The ± 0.63 therefore describes dispersion across independently optimized policies, not an error bar on the specific policy in Table 2.

For provider tool use, Figure 6 is a sensitivity analysis over batch size B and threshold η, where the tool calls per task range from 10.98 to 11.74. Table 13 reports the frozen-policy result (14.89±1.17). These metrics are measured under runs of different optimized policies, so the difference reflects run-to-run variation rather than an internal inconsistency.

Q4 Clarifying benchmark-native utility

We additionally examined per-task utility under clean execution. Even within a single clean run, organization ranged from 0.5 to 1.0, nugget coverage from 0.091 to 0.529, and reference coverage from 0.033 to 0.25. Under our attack, organization rises (0.750 to 0.800), nugget coverage (0.350 to 0.294) and reference coverage (0.067 to 0.040) decline. Thus, we can not draw a conclusion that UP masks utility degradation, where all three attacked component means fall within the ranges observed across clean tasks.

W1 Clarifying the “highest capture” claim

Our highest capture claim is based on the resource-capture metrics in Table 3, where we can see that REAP actually achieves the highest observed capture among the evaluated methods in all six settings. Although the gain in individual coding is smaller than in retrieval and tool use, REAP still achieves higher observed capture than all evaluated baselines in this setting. We will narrow the wording more carefully in the revision.

W2 Coding task attack

Unlike traditional prompt-injection command execution, which tries to make the agent perform harmful actions it would often refuse, resource capture asks the agent to run only simple, benign steps that it readily follows rather than rejects. The attacker's command is indeed executed, but it is benign for user: it reads only a separate synthetic dataset and writes to a path. The user's task still completes and the only effect is that the user's compute budget is diverted to run the attacker's workload. This is an attack for resource capture, not a code-execution attack aimed at harming the environment.

The metric isolates only this injection-induced use: the attacker's workload is a separate job that contributes nothing to the user's task, and in the no-injection control the captured resource is 0.00% in coding. The headline numbers therefore reflect attacker-induced extra work, not the task's own resource use.

Sincerely,

Authors of 18098

Reviewer_EkmyOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
3
Soundness
2
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Paper summary

This paper proposes REAP, a framework that uses recursive self-improvement to optimize prompt injection policies for resource capture in LLM agents. Instead of directly disrupting user tasks, the attacks aim to redirect resources toward attacker-controlled artifacts or services while preserving task utility. The authors evaluate REAP across retrieval, coding, and tool-use environments, considering both individual and provider attackers. The results show that REAP can achieve substantial resource capture while largely maintaining task performance.

Critical strengths
  1. The paper is clearly written and well-organized. The motivation and methodology are easy to follow.
  2. I find the goal of targeting resource allocation rather than traditional malicious action interesting. It highlights a different perspective on prompt injection attacks that is not well captured by traditional task-success metrics.
Critical weaknesses

My main concern is the realism of the attack settings. For provider attackers, I am not fully convinced by the assumption that a service provider would intentionally increase API calls for additional revenue. In practice, providers also care about service quality, computational costs, and retaining users. The assumed ability to manipulate service responses also seems quite strong. For individual attackers, I wonder how realistic it is to achieve such high resource capture with limited control. For example, in the retrieval setting, the attacker can only upload their own papers, yet the method achieves 53.32% context share and 55.00% citation share. It is unclear how many papers the attacker needs to upload or how easily these papers can appear in retrieval results. This makes it difficult to judge how practical these attacks would be in real-world settings.

Questions for authors
  1. Could the authors provide a more concrete example of a realistic provider-attacker scenario? Why would a provider prefer increasing API usage over maintaining service quality and user retention? Also, how realistic is the assumed control over service responses?
  2. For individual attackers in the retrieval setting, how many attacker-controlled papers are uploaded? How does the retrieval system rank these papers against benign ones? I would be interested in understanding how much effort or how many resources an individual attacker would need to achieve the reported results.
2 comments

We sincerely appreciate your insightful comments. In the following, we will address your questions one by one.

Q1. Why would a provider increase usage, and what can it control?

  • Provider incentive. An API reseller with a positive margin per token can earn more when an agent uses more tokens to complete the same task. The user can still receive a useful answer. Across our three provider settings, estimated charges rose while utility preservation ranged from 91.67% to 100% (Table 2).
  • A concrete example. Consider a research agent that searches for papers through an API proxy. The proxy controls only its own service responses (Sec. 3.2). Appendix J, Example 3 shows a concrete retrieval-provider case. A user asks a research agent to search for papers. The agent forwards the query to an API proxy, which appends one sentence to the normal response, telling the agent to retrieve more evidence before citing. The agent judges the evidence insufficient, issues additional retrieval calls, and then produces a correct, properly cited summary. It is hard for the user to estimate in advance how many tokens the task should take or to tell from the final report how many searches were necessary.

The same visibility issue arises in token billing. OpenAI’s help documentation [1] explains that reasoning tokens do not appear in the answer, but users pay for them as output tokens. Sun et al. [2] discuss the risk of inflated usage when users cannot verify the work they are billed for. Velasco et al. [3] show that per-token pricing can give providers an incentive to misreport token counts.

[1] OpenAI. Understanding and counting tokens. OpenAI Help Center.

[2] Sun et al. (2026). Position: Invisible Tokens, Visible Bills: The Urgent Need to Audit Hidden Operations in Opaque LLM Services. ICML.

[3] Velasco et al. (2026). Is Your LLM Overcharging You? Tokenization, Transparency, and Incentives. ICML.

Q2. How many papers were uploaded, and how did they rank?

Each topic was evaluated separately with six uploaded papers and 952 benign papers. Across the test set, we uploaded 60 papers in total to a corpus of 952 benign papers. BM25 returned four papers, typically ranking an attacker-owned paper first. The agent often cited one attacker-owned and one benign paper, yielding a 55.00% citation share overall. Attacker-owned papers occupied 53.32% of context tokens. The one-time policy-training cost was about 2.3M tokens over 38 training and 15 validation tasks.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Follow-up on Rebuttal

Dear Reviewer Ekmy:

As the rebuttal deadline is approaching, I would like to kindly check whether our responses have addressed your concerns and questions.

If there are any outstanding issues, we would be happy to address them during the remaining discussion period. If our previous responses have satisfactorily addressed your concerns, we would greatly appreciate it if you could consider updating score to reflect the newly added results and discussion.

Your time and effort are greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

Authors of 18098

Comments on the paper

1 comment
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

General Rebuttal Overview

Dear PC, SAC, AC, and all reviewers,

We sincerely thank the reviewers for their constructive feedback and valuable insights, which have improved the empirical validation, the controls, and the clarity of our work.

This paper introduces REAP, an iterative policy optimization framework that learns reusable injection policies to redirect LLM agents' resources toward attacker-owned artifacts or billable services while the agent still completes the user's task. We summarize the key contributions, the additions and clarifications made during the rebuttal.

AreaAdditions and clarificationsReviewer IDs
Comparison with iterative prompt optimizationAdded a reusable-prompt baseline with the same training tasks, feedback, optimizer, validation criteria, and target-agent execution budget. REAP achieves higher UP and capture in all three individual settings, e.g. 53.32% vs. 43.04% context share in retrieval and 49.78% vs. 34.25% tool call share in tool use.dAcf, dPHJ, mESs
Comparison with existing optimizersAdded AutoInject under the same optimizer and execution budget. REAP reaches higher ASR and capture, with 53.32% vs. 7.22% context share in individual retrieval and 13.63 vs. 5.0 tool calls per task in provider tool use.dAcf, dPHJ
Terminology and contributionWe will describe REAP as iterative policy optimization, with the main contribution being the identification and measurement of resource capture when the agent still completes the task. We will also discuss reflection, external memory, and black-box search in Sec. 2.dAcf, dPHJ
Statistical supportReran the full optimization with three independent seeds and reported mean ± SD for all six settings. Measured a clean-vs-clean noise floor of Δr = 0.18 ± 0.39 calls, compared with 9.95 calls under REAP in tool use.dAcf
Reported detailsClarified that Table 2 evaluates one frozen policy three times, Table 13 reports three independently optimized policies, and Figures 5 and 6 come from separate reruns. Explained the Table 3 denominators (Eq. 1) and blank entries, and reported train/val/test splits for every environment.dAcf, dPHJ
Injection vs. artifact availabilityAdded an artifact-present control without injected content. Its ASR is 0.00%, 0.00%, and 5.26% in retrieval, coding, and tool use, compared with 90.00%, 83.33%, and 81.25% for REAP, so capture comes from the injected content.dAcf
Provider incentive and controlGave a concrete API-reseller scenario that bills per token (Appendix J, Example 3) and cited recent work on unverifiable token billing. Clarified that the provider controls only its own service responses (Sec. 3.2) and that estimated revenue is what the user pays.Ekmy, dAcf, dPHJ
Attacker effortEach retrieval topic uses only 6 uploaded papers among 952 benign papers, and the one-time policy training costs about 2.3M tokens. In coding, the captured resource is the user's token budget redirected to the attacker's workload.Ekmy, dAcf
Utility, quality, and costMean native retrieval utility changed only from 0.389 to 0.378 under attack, with component-level changes reported. Cost is reported separately from UP, e.g. +$0.2572 per task in provider retrieval.dAcf, dPHJ
Unseen tasksThe frozen policy preserved utility on at least 90% of held-out tasks in all settings (Table 2). On held-out Travel tasks, UP stayed at 100% after 1, 5, 10, and 20 rounds, and all three runs made more attacker tool calls at round 20 than at round 1.dAcf, dPHJ, mESs
Accepted revision exampleShowed an exact accepted Slack revision whose attacker tools were fixed before any test query. The frozen policy called the same attacker tool on different unseen tasks and raised the attacker tool call share on tasks.mESs

Thank you again for your time and consideration. We welcome further discussion of these additions and clarifications.

Sincerely,

Authors of 18098

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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