- Rating
- 1
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 1
- Presentation
- 1
- Soundness
- 1
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Paper summary
It introduces a resource hijacking benchmark, ResourceHijackBench, and a defense, ResGate.
Critical strengths
None
Critical weaknesses
- The authors didn't define who the attacker is, what they can access, and how the attack prompt goes into the agent's context. A clear threat model is necessary for a security paper.
- Based on the vague description, it seems there is a setting that directly asks the agent to use the resource in the user prompt. If so, that is exactly what the agent was deployed to do, and it would not be expected to refuse. Some people would argue that it should comply. The authors should justify under what conditions the agent should refuse and what conditions it should not.
- It would be helpful to include some complete task samples covering all three attack settings (direct, implicit, persistent-context).
- The authors could also report results separately for each of the three settings.
- The later part, ResGate, also introduces a requester identity. How does it relate to the benchmark, and where does the authorization come from? Do the benchmark tasks also include an authorization scope, and does the agent have access to it?
Having the complete prompts and sample tasks, along with a clear definition of the threat model, would be very helpful to understand this work.
Questions for authors
N/A
3 comments
Thanks for the response and for promising the changes in the revised version. Do you plan to make these updates during the rebuttal period?
Follow-up Rebuttal by Authors
Thank you for following up. We have updated the manuscript during the rebuttal period, and the revised version now includes the clarifications and additions discussed in our response.
Rebuttal by Authors
Thank you for your valuable review and suggestions. Below we respond to the comments in Weaknesses (W) and Questions (Q).
W1: Threat model.
Thank you for the comments. The attacker is a requester who can interact with the agent and submit task requests but does not have permission to use the target resource, and the attack prompt enters the agent’s context through a user request. The agent itself has permission to access the target resource, and the attacker tries to induce it to use the resource on their behalf without directly obtaining the resource or its permissions. We will clarify this threat model in the revised version.
W2: When the agent should refuse a request.
A requester may have permission to ask the agent to perform some functions, but this does not mean they are allowed to use every resource the agent can access. The agent should carry out requests within the requester’s permissions and refuse requests outside them, even when the requested operation itself is a normal function. Resource hijacking does not contradict the fact that the requester lacks this permission, because the agent still performs the resource operation and the requester does not gain the corresponding permission.
W3: Complete task samples.
We apologize for the confusion caused by the description of the experimental settings. “Direct, implicit, and persistent-context” in Table 18 comes from an earlier experimental setup that was later dropped, but we missed updating this text when we updated the experiments, and the three settings in the current experiments are not these three. We will correct this wording and add complete prompts and task samples for the actual settings in the revised version.
W4: Results by attack setting.
The three old settings above do not apply to the current experiments. We will clearly describe the three settings actually used and make the related experimental descriptions and results consistent in the revised version to avoid confusion caused by the old categories.
W5: Identity and authorization information.
The authorization policy is set in advance by the resource owner and states which functions each requester is allowed to ask the agent to perform. The trusted requester identity is supplied by the evaluation environment through metadata to simulate an authenticated session, rather than taken from identity claims in the request body. The baseline agent already receives explicit owner restrictions and a trusted requester identity, so the evaluation tests whether resource hijacking can still occur when the agent has authorization information. We will add these setup details in the revised version.