- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
Read review
Paper summary
This paper considers cross-institution federated learning, where source clients belong to distinct data domains and only a subset of institutions can afford full adversarial training (AT), while the deployment domain is unseen during training. Spanning the three subfields of federated optimization, adversarial training, and domain generalization, the authors formalize this setting as Selective Federated Robust Domain Generalization (SFRDG) and propose FedR²DG, which trains defended clients with PGD, handles weakly defended clients via replay-based approximate adversarial training, and further incorporates global class-centroid alignment and aggregation-weight rebalancing.
Critical strengths
1.The paper is well-organized, with a sound motivation and clear presentation. 2.The paper provides comprehensive details for reproducibility. 3.The theoretical analysis is rigorous and the derivation chain is complete; the correspondence between the theoretical components and the proposed method is clearly traceable, which lends credibility to the method's design rationale
Critical weaknesses
1.The paper claims federated robust domain generalization, yet contributes no new domain-generalization mechanism and compares against no domain-generalization method, so it is impossible to see what the paper advances on the domain-generalization axis. 2.The two client types share the same perturbation radius ε and differ only in attack quality and compute, so the paper proposes no new adversarial training method. 3.The paper states no threat model and specifies no AutoAttack configuration (version, attack list, steps, restarts), which is an evaluation-standards deficiency: AA results are version- and step-sensitive, so the reported robustness numbers can be neither reproduced nor judged sufficient. 4.The baselines are all generic federated optimization methods, with no comparison against the closest recent work — partial adversarial training (SFAT/SFAT*) or single-AT-client FAT (FAML) — nor against an all-clients-AT upper bound. 5.The paper does state in §5.1 that baseline weak clients train on clean data only, but it never treats this as a confound or provides an equal-budget replay control (Table 2 shows both cost the same 7.89 TMACs per round), so the source of the performance gains cannot be attributed. 6.The paper contains no method/architecture diagram and no performance or training-dynamics plots, leaving key claims without visual support.
Questions for authors
1.Since the method introduces no new domain-generalization mechanism and no domain-generalization method is used for comparison, could you clarify what the paper advances specifically on the domain-generalization axis? 2.Apart from the standard L-infinity inner maximization and PGD/Free-AT-style training shared by all compared methods, does FedR²DG introduce any new attack or defense mechanism? 3.What is the exact threat model, and what AutoAttack configuration was used — which version, which attacks, how many steps and restarts — given that neither is specified anywhere in the paper? 4. Could you add comparisons against the closest recent work — partial adversarial training (SFAT/SFAT*) and single-AT-client FAT (FAML) — together with an all-clients-AT upper bound? 5.Since FedR²DG's weak clients perform replay while all baselines' weak clients train on clean data only, at identical cost (7.89 TMACs/round, Table 2), could you provide an equal-budget replay control and report the weak clients' local robust accuracy?
6 comments
Response to Reviewer djSo (2/2)
W4 / Q4. SFAT/SFAT*, FAML, and an all-clients-AT upper bound
We add SFAT*, the partial federated AT extension of SFAT (Zhu et al., TPAMI 2026), using its official implementation (Table R1). The original SFAT (Zhu et al., ICLR 2023) assumes that every client performs AT, whereas SFAT* aggregates standard-training and adversarially trained clients separately and then combines them, which matches our selective-defense setting. In the official implementation, the α-slack reweights only the adversarially trained clients, so with one defended client it is inactive and SFAT* reduces to uniform averaging; it reaches 28.6% AA versus 45.6% for FedR²DG. In the configurations with two or more defended clients, where its slack is active (6/2, 9/3, and 9/2 in Table R4 of the General Response), SR-SFAT* reaches 27.0–30.6% AA versus 46.0–46.6% for FedR²DG. FedAvg with PGD-10 AT on every client reaches 49.88% AA and 61.73 H; FedR²DG recovers about 88% of the H-score gain while each weakly defended client spends about 1/11 of the per-round cost of PGD-10 training (Table R3).
FAML (Hossain et al., CVPR 2026 Findings) combines federated adversarial training with meta-learning under data scarcity and hardware heterogeneity, and reports that adversarial training on a single client can suffice, which is closely related to selective defense. Its clients partition a single dataset, and its out-of-domain results evaluate a model trained on one dataset on another, whereas SFRDG requires transferring robustness from domain-heterogeneous source clients to a held-out domain. Because its code is not publicly available (the repository linked from its project page was empty as of November 13, 2026), we could not reproduce it faithfully and did not include it as an empirical baseline; we will add it to the related work and discuss it in the revision.
W5 / Q5. Equal-budget replay control and weak clients' local robust accuracy
Replay is part of our method by design rather than a confound: it lets weakly defended clients contribute robustness at the same per-round cost as clean training (7.89 TMACs in both methods, Table 2). To attribute the gains, C1 in Table R2 is SR-FedAvg with the identical replay schedule and all other components disabled: replay alone raises AA from 27.17% to 43.83% (C0 → C1), and the remaining components add +3.4 pp clean accuracy, +1.8 pp AA, and +2.3 H on top of it (C1 → C4); Table R2 further shows the contribution of each component. We also give the baselines' weakly defended clients the same per-round budget for PGD-10 training:
\hline \text{Weakly defended client (per-round budget of 20 clean updates)} & \text{Clean} & \text{AA} & \text{H} \\\\ \hline \text{SR-FedAvg, 2 PGD-10 updates} & 79.92 & 38.06 & 49.44 \\\\ \text{SR-FedAvg, 10 clean updates + 1 PGD-10 update} & 82.97 & 42.37 & 55.79 \\\\ \text{SR-FedAvg + replay (C1)} & 80.58 & 43.83 & 56.60 \\\\ \text{FedR}^2\text{DG}\text{ (C4)} & 83.97 & 45.59 & 58.89 \\\\ \hline \end{array}$$ One PGD-10 update costs about 11 clean updates (Table 2: 86.79 vs. 7.89 TMACs per 20 updates), so both PGD allocations use slightly more compute (1.05–1.1×) than replay. With equal or less compute, replay alone (C1) already outperforms both PGD allocations, and FedR²DG is the strongest. Clean and robust accuracy of each weakly defended client's final local model on the held-out target (mean over six client-case pairs: two weakly defended clients × three defended-client choices): $$\begin{array}{lcc} \hline \text{Weakly defended clients' local models} & \text{Clean} & \text{AA} \\\\ \hline \text{SR-FedAvg (clean CE) (C0)} & 83.80 & 11.03 \\\\ \text{SR-FedAvg + replay (C1)} & 80.10 & 36.42 \\\\ \text{FedR}^2\text{DG}\text{ (C4)} & 81.34 & 37.16 \\\\ \hline \end{array}$$ Replay makes weakly defended clients contribute robust updates rather than only clean ones. Because local models start each round from the broadcast global model, part of their robustness is inherited from it, so we use this comparison across methods rather than as an absolute measure. **W6. Figures** Figure 1 illustrates the problem setting, and Figure 2 reports standard and robust accuracy across hyperparameters. We will additionally add a method overview figure and further visualizations of the results.Follow-up for Reviewer djSo
Dear Reviewer djSo,
Thank you again for your review. We have uploaded a revised PDF (changes are marked in blue and summarized in General Response 2/2), which adds the threat model and the exact AutoAttack configuration (Section 5.2, Appendix F.3.1), SFAT*, FAML, and federated DG methods to the related work, the all-clients-AT upper bound (Table 2), the equal-budget comparison (Appendix E.3), a method overview figure (Figure 1), and client drift over training rounds (Figure 3). Could you let us know whether any of your concerns remain unresolved? We would be glad to address them before the discussion period ends.
Response to Reviewer djSo (1/2)
We thank the reviewer for the positive comments on clarity and reproducibility.
W1 / Q1. Contribution on the DG axis
Our DG-side contribution is a robust-risk analysis for source-only robust DG and the class-conditional alignment it motivates: the bound conditions the robust loss on class-conditional clean features, so we align clean source features of each class around shared anchors. We now compare against FedSR, FedDG-GA, and FedOMG under the same selective defense (Table R1). These methods improve clean generalization but lower mean held-out robust accuracy below SR-FedAvg, so better clean DG does not by itself carry the defended client's robustness to the unseen domain. In DG, where the target is unseen, avoiding collapse in any case matters: FedR²DG achieves the highest H-score in every defended-client case, while every baseline falls to at most 18.6% AA when Sketch is the defended client.
W2 / Q2. New attack or defense mechanism
FedR²DG does not propose a new inner maximization; all clients share the same ℓ∞ threat model and ε. Our defense-side contribution is how budget-limited clients take part in robust training. We adapt Free-AT (Shafahi et al., 2019), which obtains parameter and input gradients from one backward pass, to the federated setting: perturbations reset for each mini-batch and round instead of being carried across mini-batches as in Free-AT, because a perturbation crafted for other images under an earlier model is not a meaningful starting point, so each replay sequence is a short sign-gradient ascent from zero on its own images under the current model; only part of each round's mini-batches are replayed, and every update is followed by EMA tethering. Weakly defended clients thus perform proxy adversarial training at the per-round cost of clean training. To our knowledge, this is the first use of proxy adversarial training at the per-round cost of clean training for weakly defended clients when robustness must transfer to an unseen domain. We then address the clean degradation it causes through prototype alignment (Table R2).
The adaptation itself matters, not only the amount of adversarial training: with equal or less compute, replay alone (C1: 43.83% AA, 56.60 H) outperforms spending the budget on PGD-10 updates (38.06 / 49.44) or on 10 clean steps plus one PGD-10 step (42.37 / 55.79; see W5/Q5 below), and it prevents the collapse with Sketch as the defended client (37.60% vs. 2.46% AA for SR-FedAvg).
Existing partial-AT aggregation does not resolve this setting. SFAT* reweights only the adversarially trained clients according to their adversarial training loss, so it cannot change how much robustness the weakly defended domains contribute; it collapses when Sketch is the defended client (2.9% AA in Table R1; 2.5–6.8% with two or more defended clients), and SR-FRP, which propagates robustness through BN statistics, reaches 6.6% AA. We attribute this failure to domain heterogeneity itself: robustness learned on one domain does not carry over to the others. Proxy adversarial training addresses this at its source by letting every weakly defended client fit robustness on its own domain, which raises their local models' AA from 11.0% to 36.4%. The margin over these methods (45.6% vs. 6.6–28.6% AA) is far larger than the differences among our components.
W3 / Q3. Threat model and AutoAttack configuration
We consider white-box ℓ∞ evasion attacks at test time on the held-out domain: the attacker has full access to the final global model, including its gradients, and the radius equals the training radius ε of each setting (2/255, 4/255, or 8/255; 8/255 in all new experiments unless noted otherwise).
Robust accuracy, denoted AA in the paper, is computed with the official AutoAttack implementation (Croce & Hein, ICML 2020; fra31/auto-attack v0.1) in its custom mode with its two gradient-based attacks, APGD-CE and APGD-T; FAB-T and Square are not included. All attack parameters are the library defaults (
n_iter= 100 for both attacks,n_restarts= 5 for APGD-CE and 1 for APGD-T,eot_iter= 1, ρ = 0.75), and we fix seed = 42 for reproducibility. The only dataset-dependent setting is the number of target classes for APGD-T, min(9, C − 1): 6 for PACS and 9 for OfficeHome and mini-DomainNet50. The same protocol is applied to FedR²DG and to every baseline.In the revision, we will state the threat model and this configuration in Section 5.2 and make clear in the text and table captions that AA denotes APGD-CE + APGD-T rather than the full standard AutoAttack ensemble.