- Rating
- 1
- Confidence
- 4
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 1
Read review
Paper summary
This paper studies transfer-based adversarial attacks in federated learning systems, focusing on personalized federated learning, where clients can exploit local knowledge to construct adversarial examples that poison other clients' personal models. The authors claim that such systems are more vulnerable to transfer-based adversarial attacks than centralized frameworks. To demonstrate this threat, the paper provides both empirical evaluations and theoretical analyses across multiple benchmarks. It also proposes a defense framework that combines stochastic input noise, regularization, and parameter sensitivity maximization to improve system robustness.
Critical strengths
-
The problem is practically meaningful. The threat of transfer-based attacks launched by insiders during inference in PFL is realistic. The distinction between client-initiated and server-initiated attacks is also clear.
-
The experimental evaluation is fairly comprehensive. The paper evaluates 8 PFL methods on 3 datasets and investigates the effects of , the number of iterations, training rounds, and Dirichlet .
-
Several useful observations are provided. Table 4 shows that methods retaining local classification heads (FedRep, FedBABU, and GPFL) naturally resist server-initiated attacks, with AD as low as 2–5%. At similar accuracy levels, partial-sharing methods achieve lower AD.
-
The defense is computationally inexpensive to implement. It only requires local computation and introduces no additional communication overhead.
Critical weaknesses
-
Derivation of equations. The inequality derived from the Kantorovich–Rubinstein duality in Step 2 does not appear to hold in general. Since the loss is only one admissible K-Lipschitz function, the Wasserstein distance should provide an upper bound on the difference in expected losses, rather than a lower bound. The necessary properties of the loss function are also not clearly specified, e.g., Lipschitz in which variables and under which metric. If this is a fundamental error, Theorem 1 may not hold, which could seriously undermine the theoretical contribution of this paper.
-
Lack of key comparison of the defense mechanisms. The design should be compared with basic combinations such as Vanilla+AT to decouple the contribution of each module, since AT appears to account for most of the AD reduction in Table 1. Some simple protection methods should also be considered as counterparts, such as Gaussian noise injection and input-gradient regularization [1]. Existing baselines should be included as well, e.g., federated adversarial training [2, 3, 4], pFedDef [5], and TRS [6].
-
Lack of exploring other attack methods. Examples include feature-level attacks on the shared backbone [7, 8], which is fully known to the attacker in partial-sharing methods, and joint attacks by several peers. Server-based attacks and adaptive attacks also need more work e.g., an attacker using an undefended proxy.
-
Lack of related work analysis and comparison. Existing work like [5] should be included, which studies the same grey-box client-to-client evasion threat in PFL and proposes a defense. This paper also overlooks [9], which derives a similar gradient-similarity bound under strong convexity and concludes that FL is more robust than centralized training.
[1] Improving the Adversarial Robustness and Interpretability of Deep Neural Networks by Regularizing Their Input Gradients. AAAI 2018. [2] FAT: Federated Adversarial Training. arXiv:2012.01791, 2020. [3] CalFAT: Calibrated Federated Adversarial Training with Label Skewness. NeurIPS 2022. [4] Federated Robustness Propagation: Sharing Adversarial Robustness in Heterogeneous Federated Learning. AAAI 2023. [5] Characterizing Internal Evasion Attacks in Federated Learning. AISTATS 2023. [6] TRS: Transferability Reduced Ensemble via Promoting Gradient Diversity and Model Smoothness. NeurIPS 2021. [7] Enhancing Adversarial Example Transferability with an Intermediate Level Attack. ICCV 2019. [8] Feature Importance-aware Transferable Adversarial Attacks. ICCV 2021. [9] Towards Understanding Adversarial Transferability in Federated Learning. TMLR 2024.
Questions for authors
See weaknesses.