- Rating
- 3(+1)
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper investigates temporal transferability in Federated Learning, where adversarial examples crafted on an early leaked checkpoint remain effective against the final deployed model. The authors propose Morpheus, a modality-agnostic attack that optimizes perturbations across stochastic subnetworks of the leaked source model to achieve weight-space smoothing. Experiments across image, audio, and point cloud modalities demonstrate that Morpheus outperforms existing baselines.
Critical strengths
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The paper successfully extends temporal transfer attacks beyond vision by operating purely in weight space via stochastic subnetwork sampling, validating its effectiveness across image, audio, and point cloud tasks. This addresses a significant gap in FL security literature where prior work was limited to image-specific transformations.
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The evaluation is comprehensive, covering 12 dataset-architecture pairs and demonstrating consistent superiority over six baselines. The introduction of the Weight-Space Margin provides a useful diagnostic tool that correlates strongly with empirical transfer success.
Critical weaknesses
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Both the concept and the mechanism of Morpheus appear closely related to existing work [R1-R3]. The term "temporal transferability" seems conceptually equivalent to the "Cross-Stage Adversarial Transferability" of Kim & Lee (2025), which is not cited. Proteus, in turn, appears to share the same threat model and to be the strongest relevant baseline on the image pairs, yet it is absent from the main comparison table. This makes it difficult to assess whether Morpheus offers a genuine algorithmic improvement over the state of the art, or mainly generalizes existing mechanisms to modalities where they had not yet been applied.
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WSM rests on a Markov inequality bound derived for a fixed parameter perturbation distribution Q_ρ. As Appendix B.1 acknowledges, this bound makes no statement about the sequential training drift that the paper sets out to explain, so it does not appear to cover the phenomenon it is meant to motivate. Related notions of margin and sharpness under weight perturbations have already been characterized [R4-R5], including a transferability metric based on output change under surrogate weight perturbation in AWT, which is also a baseline here. It would help to clarify why WSM is necessary and how it adds predictive power beyond these static measures in capturing temporal evolution.
[R1] Exploring Cross-Stage Adversarial Transferability in Class-Incremental Continual Learning. IEEE MMSP 2025, arXiv:2508.08920.
[R2] Proteus: Model Leakage-Induced Adversarial Attack in Federated Learning. ECCV 2026.
[R3] Enhancing Adversarial Transferability with Checkpoints of a Single Model's Training. CVPR 2025.
[R4] Formalizing Generalization and Robustness of Neural Networks to Weight Perturbations. NeurIPS 2021, arXiv:2103.02200.
[R5] Enhancing Adversarial Transferability with Adversarial Weight Tuning. AAAI 2025, arXiv:2408.09469.
Questions for authors
Q1: Can you include Proteus (ECCV 2026) in the main comparison table for all image pairs? As the most closely related work with the same threat model, its performance is critical for establishing the true incremental gain of Morpheus.
Q2: On the diagnostic set, how does WSM compare with the adversarial margin and with sharpness taken separately for ranking examples by transfer outcome? This would indicate whether WSM carries predictive information beyond its two ingredients.
Q3 : Is there any bound or source-side analysis that relates WSM to survival under actual training drift, rather than under draws from Q_ρ?
5 comments
Response to Reviewer 8HNd Part 2
Q2 / W2: Does WSM carry predictive information beyond margin and sharpness alone?
WSM provides stronger predictive information overall than either of its ingredients alone. This holds for ranking individual AEs as well as for ranking attacks. On the diagnostic set of Fig. 3, ranking the 1,593 AEs of its five attacks by transfer outcome gives a ROC AUC of 0.68 for WSM, against 0.58 for margin only and 0.55 for negative sharpness only. Across the 12 dataset/model settings, the same per-example AUC averages 0.81 for WSM, against 0.74 and 0.59, and WSM is the highest in every setting.
For ranking attacks, we use the Spearman correlation between the mean of each score over an attack's AEs (WSM, margin only, or negative sharpness only) and its transfer ASR. A stronger positive correlation indicates better agreement with the ranking by transfer ASR. The table below reports the results across all 12 dataset/model settings.
| Dataset/Model Setting | WSM (Ours) | Margin only | −Sharpness only |
|---|---|---|---|
| RAF-DB / ResNet18 | 0.71 | 0.68 | −0.39 |
| RAF-DB / VGG16 | 0.71 | 0.21 | 0.21 |
| TinyImageNet / ResNet18 | 0.96 | 0.64 | 0.00 |
| TinyImageNet / VGG16 | 0.82 | 0.29 | −0.04 |
| CREMA-D / BC-ResNet8 | 0.89 | 0.75 | −0.64 |
| CREMA-D / CBAM-DenseNet121 | 0.86 | 0.71 | −0.43 |
| UrbanSound8K / BC-ResNet8 | 0.99 | 0.94 | −0.59 |
| UrbanSound8K / CBAM-DenseNet121 | 0.96 | 0.89 | 0.29 |
| ModelNet40 / PointNet | 1.00 | 0.89 | −0.61 |
| ModelNet40 / PointMLP | 0.96 | 0.86 | −0.86 |
| ShapeNetPart / PointNet | 1.00 | 0.96 | 0.89 |
| ShapeNetPart / PointMLP | 0.89 | 0.96 | 0.96 |
| Mean over 12 settings | 0.90 | 0.73 | −0.10 |
Overall, WSM achieves a mean Spearman correlation of 0.90, substantially higher than either margin or negative sharpness alone. This provides strong evidence supporting its design.
WSM also differs from [R4] and [R5] in what it measures. [R4] derives worst-case bounds on the class margin of a model under weight perturbations and uses them to train robust models. It does not score individual AEs. AWT [R5] proposes a transferability score that measures only the output change of the surrogate on AEs under weight perturbations. WSM is a per-AE score computed on the leaked checkpoint, defined as the log-ratio of the adversarial margin to its change under weight perturbations. The results above show that this change alone, without the margin, is the weakest of the three scores on average.
Q3 / W2: Is WSM linked to attack survival under actual training drift?
WSM is empirically associated with attack survival under actual training drift across the 12 real FL trajectories. In FL, the drift between leakage and deployment results from aggregated updates of clients the attacker never sees, so it cannot be fully predicted from the leaked checkpoint. WSM is therefore a static, source-only diagnostic of how reliably an AE survives unknown drift, not a predictor of the drift.
The Markov bound in App. B.1 is stated for the perturbation law Q_ρ and motivates the log-ratio form of WSM. A bound for the actual drift would need assumptions on the updates of the unseen clients. The relation of WSM to the temporal evolution of the model is therefore tested on the outcome of real training. WSM computed on the leaked checkpoint predicts the ranking of attacks by transfer ASR at deployment with a mean Spearman correlation of 0.90, and ranks individual AEs with a mean ROC AUC of 0.81 (see Q2).
Thank you once again for your careful comments. As the discussion phase is approaching its end, we would like to kindly confirm whether our response has sufficiently addressed your concerns, including the comparison with Proteus, the discussion of the related work you pointed out, and the questions on WSM. Should any points still require clarification, we would be glad to provide further details. If you are satisfied with our responses, we would greatly appreciate your consideration in adjusting the evaluation scores accordingly. We sincerely look forward to your feedback.
Response to Reviewer 8HNd Part 1
We thank Reviewer 8HNd for the insights and references.
Q1 / W1: Can Proteus be included in the main comparison for all image pairs?
Morpheus remains highly competitive with Proteus even when Proteus's original transformations are enabled. The results below confirm that, even without transformations, Morpheus remains competitive with, and can even surpass, Proteus with transformations. We will include Proteus in our main results.
ASR (%) comparison with Proteus, the state-of-the-art modality-specific attack (Morpheus with N=32):
W1 ([R1], [R3]): How does temporal transferability in FL relate to [R1] and [R3]?
Temporal transferability in FL differs from the cross-stage transferability studied in [R1]. [R1] studies class-incremental continual learning, where a centrally trained model is updated on a known sequence of tasks. In FL, the drift between the leaked round and deployment results from aggregating updates from randomly sampled clients whose data the attacker never sees. The attacker has only one checkpoint, with no training data or feedback from the deployed model.
As shown in the table below, under the FL threat model, Morpheus outperforms the strongest baseline from [R1] and [R3] by approximately 14 to 36 percentage points across the four dataset/model settings. We evaluated [R1] and [R3] under this threat model at ε = 8/255, using the official attack settings for [R1]. With only one leaked checkpoint, the checkpoint ensemble of [R3] reduces to I-FGSM-10 on the leaked model.
ASR (%) comparison across attacks:
We will refine the related work section to include [R1] and [R3].