Fail-Closed Alignment for Large Language Models

We identify a structural weakness in current large language model (LLM) alignment: refusal mechanisms in these models are *fail-open*. While existing approaches tend to encode refusal behaviors across multiple latent features, suppressing a single feature (via prompt-based jailbreaks) is sufficient to collapse alignment, leading to unsafe generation. Motivated by this, we propose *fail-closed alignment* as a design principle for robust LLM safety: refusal mechanisms should remain effective even under partial failures via redundant, independent causal pathways. We present a concrete instantiation of this principle: a progressive alignment framework that iteratively identifies and ablates previously learned refusal directions, forcing the model to reconstruct safety along new, independent subspaces. Across six jailbreak attacks, we achieve the strongest overall robustness (1.7% average attack success rate) while largely preserving generation quality and preventing excessive over-refusals, with negligible computational overhead. Additional analyses confirm that models trained with our method encode multiple, causally independent refusal directions that prompt-based jailbreaks cannot fully suppress, providing empirical support for fail-closed alignment as a principled foundation for robust LLM safety.