acceptodds
Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

The Stable Discriminant and Adaptive Guards for Auditing Stable Matchings

Abstract

Auditing a proposed matching need not recover every preference sign. We derive bilateral Gaussian audit games for scalar queries and matching-feasible feedback. The stable game is a concave design over doubly stochastic exposures; a fixed blocker is optimally tested by mixing the proposed matching with a partner swap. Adaptive guards reject a pair as soon as one endpoint suffices, without learning redundant near ties, and are optimal up to logarithmic factors in finite expected deployment rounds. Separate information tracking attains the asymptotic leading constant. A witness-local likelihood boundary removes unnecessary full-market stopping overhead. Concavity yields an assignment-based numerical design check, and confidence envelopes convert it into a simultaneous guarantee for the unknown information rate and an adaptively selected exposure. Implemented trackers, guards, and repeated-look design checks distinguish deployment rounds, scalar observations, numerical error, and statistical uncertainty. Target-separation examples show why auditing, finding an optimal matching, and learning all stable pairs have different information costs.

Primary area:
learning theory
Keywords:
stable matching

Reviews

Among:
Shape:
1234this paper, Top 49%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 2.33 over 3 reviews, above 51% of the others.
Reviewer_KAXxOpenReview ↗
Rating
3
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
1
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

The paper proposes a method to decide if a given two-sided matching is stable or not when each side provides utilities that are smeared by Gaussian noise. The primary insight is spelt out early and clearly: if one agent's gain is quite negative then it rules out a blocking pair without even considering the gains of the other agent. Both individual utility queries and deployments of whole matchings that return feedback from both sides are considered. The authors derive exact information limits for each and show that (section 3.3) deployment constraints can change which blocking pair is easiest to certify. An adaptive guard algorithm is proposed and it is shown to achieve finite-sample cost bounds on stable instances. A separate tracking algorithm achieves asymptotically optimal efficiency for a fixed market as the required confidence increases. The authors also provide sampling-design certificates and synthetic experiments showing savings over uniform auditing. While I find the theory to be sound and the adaptive sampling to be interesting, I also think the paper is too dense and notation-heavy to read, the Gaussian model could be somewhat restrictive and some simulations in section 6 are small-scale with no comparison to existing stable-matching learning methods.

Critical strengths

In my own reading the papers main strength is how it connects matching-specific insight with rigorous guarantees. I find the key insight mentioned above to be intuitive and appreciate the theoretical results built around it. The theory also accounts for deployment constraints that can change which blocker is cheapest to certify. I particularly value the clear connection between the information limits and the algorithms’ guarantees (Sections 3–4). I find this convincing because it explains both where savings in observations arise and how to achieve them. This is why I support weak acceptance however its more on the borderline due to the issues I raise next.

Critical weaknesses
  1. My main concern is that I am not yet convinced of the practical significance, despite the intuitive main result/insight. The authors deal with only Gaussian noise. A more severe practical question is how the auditor can repeatedly deploy arbitrary matchings, including unstable ones, when they only have a limited budget. In the simulations, the tracker is only tested for n = 3 and 6, so it is hard to see what happens for larger n. Moreover, there is no comparison with other state-of-the-art methods. These concerns keep me close to borderline.

  2. I find the paper hard to read in its current form. Section 2 spends over two pages introducing notation before the first main theorem appears, including supplementary quantities mainly used in the appendices. The guard, one of the main algorithms in my view, is described in Section 4, but its pseudocode appears only in Appendix B. The writing feels quite choppy and often feels severely suppressed to accommodate page limits.I had to move between the main text and appendices many times to understand and assess the contributions.

Questions for authors
  1. if the auditor cannot afford the next doubling stage what happens to the main algo guard? More fundamentally, what if some required pairs cannot be observed under the permitted deployments? I asked about n being small above already and consistent to that, I think when n is even moderately large, it is quite practical that not all deployments will be possible. It is perfectly acceptable to me if the budget does not allow resolution of stability but a quantification on that note will make the paper even more interesting and practical

  2. Are the methods truly scalable for larger market? Note there is cost associated with deploying and repeated matching as well. Also there are other well-established matching methods available so the authors should try to adapt those fixed-confidence methods and see if the savings are still persistent.

  3. What if the markets are many-to-one? I can think of many such practical examples and honestly these examples are more natural to me than perfect one-on-one matching.

Reviewer_VHn8OpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

This paper studies how to verify the stability of a given matching under noisy observations. It characterizes the information complexity under scalar queries and matching feedback, and provides a tracking algorithm achieving asymptotic optimality. It also provides certificates for the information efficiency of sampling designs.

Critical strengths
  1. The distinction between ruling out all blocking pairs and certifying one blocking pair is useful. It explains why some nearly tied comparisons need not be resolved.
  2. Theorem 4.1 provides a meaningful finite expected deployment bound on stable instances. The guard exploits stronger rejections while respecting matching feasibility.
  3. The local stopping boundary is a useful improvement. The experiments comparing both boundaries on the same sampling paths clearly shows its effect.
Critical weaknesses
  1. The novelty of the stable-instance information characterization needs a more precise comparison with [Pagare et al., 2025]. Their Sec 4 already represents alternative instances through blocking pairs and adds the two endpoint information costs when both sides reject. The present paper distinguishes the output requirements, but the technical relationship between the information games remains insufficiently explained.
  2. The significance of the discriminant framework needs further justification. The audit margin has a clear interpretation, but its derivation largely follows from the geometry of the relevant comparison boundaries. It remains unclear to me which main conclusions require this framework beyond the usual answer-specific alternative sets.

Minor:

  • The presentation is notation-heavy, especially in Sec 2.3. Several quantities used mainly in the appendices are introduced before their purpose becomes clear. Moving these definitions closer to the corresponding results would make the main argument easier to follow.
Questions for authors

Please address the first two weaknesses above.

Reviewer_VjthOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
1
Soundness
3
Read review
Paper summary

The paper focuses on checking the stability of a matching when utilities on both sides are observed with noise. The authors propose an algorithm that stops investigating a candidate pair once there is enough evidence that one agent rejects the change. They prove guarantees on the probability of returning a correct answer and on the number of observations required. This approach can require fewer observations than learning all agents' preference rankings. They also derive a lower bound on the number of observations required and propose a second algorithm that matches this bound asymptotically.

Critical strengths

The problem is well motivated. When preferences are uncertain, checking the stability of a proposed matching is a natural task. I also found the connection to the literature on fixed-confidence pure exploration interesting, particularly the use of Track-and-Stop ideas and the relationship to the work of Garivier and Kaufmann (2016) and Poiani et al. (2026).

Critical weaknesses

I admit I am not really familiar with this topic or the related work associated with it, so I am not fully able to understand its contribution with respect to previous work. That said the authors do not make any effort in outlining the contribution of the paper, so it was quite difficult to me to asses it.

Furthermore, from line 39 in the introduction, the paper is really difficult to understand for someone who is not familiar with the problem or the related literature. For example, the sentence "First, exact Gaussian projections give the information cost of creating or destroying a blocker" is not clear. What do you mean by "Gaussian projections" ? What do you mean by the "cost of creating or destroying a blocker"? I think that you have to provide some intuition before using these jargons, at least in the very first part of your paper. Furthermore, the paper is extremely dense, making it difficult to understand. Therefore, although I believe the problem is well motivated, I lean towards a weak reject.

Questions for authors

Could you clarify which results follow from existing fixed-confidence pure exploration techniques and which require new arguments specific to matching? In particular, how do your guarantees relate to those of Garivier and Kaufmann (2016) ?

1 comment

Thank you for your responses. I am keeping my original score. I still believe that the paper’s current presentation is below the ICLR bar.

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