acceptodds
Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

Strategic Testing in Games

Abstract

When chess world champion Magnus Carlsen accused Hans Niemann of cheating in September 2022, it spotlighted a challenge that extends well beyond chess: how can one audit a competitor's play while protecting honest players from false accusations? We propose a framework for auditing a monitored player relative to known reference strategies in two-player normal-form games. In particular, we introduce -strategic testing, which limits the flag rate under honest reference play to and ensures that no deviating strategy achieves an expected accepted winning payoff more than above the honest benchmark, uniformly over opponent actions. We characterize the optimal acceptance policy through a linear program, derive a direct threshold rule, and compare it with uniform acceptance. We extend testing to zero-payoff outcomes through separate flag budgets and exposure scores, and connect the framework to deviation costs and incentive compatibility, showing that payoff control alone need not preserve honest play as a best response. We also formulate the auditing problem as an auxiliary zero-sum Stackelberg game. Finally, we evaluate the framework through synthetic experiments comparing optimal and uniform auditing across random games and examining the trade-off between payoff control, incentives, and honest reward retention.

Primary area:
other topics in machine learning (i.e., none of the above)
Keywords:
game theory, cheating detection, testing in games

Reviews

Among:
Shape:
1234this paper, Bottom 27%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 2.00 over 3 reviews, above 27% of the others.
Reviewer_LcgWOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
3
Soundness
3
Read review
Paper summary

The authors propose a mechanism for two-player zero-sum games. This mechanism assigns a probability to each action pair, with which it accepts that outcome. The authors then introduce the concept of (ϵ,δ)(\epsilon, \delta)-strategic testing, which says that the mechanism (ϵ,δ)(\epsilon, \delta)-tests this strategy, where δ\delta is a fraction of decisions not accepted based on the reference strategies and ϵ\epsilon signals that player 1 cannot deviate from the reference such that it would gain more than ϵ\epsilon. The authors then present a linear program that, for fixed δ\delta, computes the optimal ϵ\epsilon and the acceptance mechanism.

Critical strengths

The examples in Figures 1 and 2 help clarify the core concepts.

Critical weaknesses

The authors motivate their work by cheating allegations in Chess. I do not see how their work connects to this motivation, because it involves designing a mechanism in which Player 1 is guaranteed not to increase its payoff by more than epsilon when deviating from a reference policy. This does not seem to relate to cheating in any way, because it fully depends on the chosen reference policy.

This relates to the previous weakness, but the paper does not make it clear why this testing is useful or how it can be used. The lack of experiments also does not help.

Questions for authors
  1. What is the expected usage of your work? How can your approach help to avoid cheating in games, as you motivate in the abstract?

  2. How can one come up with reference strategies for testing that are reasonable for testing?

  3. Part of the work uses only positive rewards. What if the game does not contain positive rewards, or the rewards are somehow not 0-symmetric between players?

Reviewer_vJJtOpenReview ↗
Rating
1
Confidence
2
Informativeness
1
Presentation
1
Soundness
3
Read review
Paper summary

The paper is about the topic of testing for cheating in games. An auditor observes two players playing a game and decides whether to flag a player for cheating. Besides this, I could not parse the paper enough to understand its main claims.

Critical strengths

I could not parse the paper sufficiently to understand its strengths.

Critical weaknesses

The paper is very poorly written. The writing issues are basically those commonly found in AI-generated mathematical writing: nonsensical terminology, topics being introduced out of order, et cetera.

To single out a particular instance, consider Section 3.1. This is the reader's first technical introduction to the problems being studied. In the first paragraphs of this section alone, there are a large number of terms whose usage is not yet defined in the text. What is a "reference strategy"? What is "honest play"? Why distinguish positive from negative payoffs? Where did a "budget" (L100) come from? What does it mean that the players can "respond to" the acceptance probabilities?

I ask these questions rhetorically, not necessarily because any individual question is hard to answer, nor because I in particular want the authors to answer them. Instead, I find them emblematic of the general writing issues of this paper. The friction caused by such confusions makes the paper impossible to read. For this reason I suggest rejection.

Questions for authors

None.

Reviewer_sjyWOpenReview ↗
Rating
3
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
3
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

The paper studies an audit process of player 1 in a given 2-player game by an auditor. It is formulated as a game, and the goal is formulated as finding a threshold strategy of the auditor that accepts or flags the result of the original 2-player game. Both the original game and the auditor strategy are randomized (mixed). The goal of the auditor is to have a strategy that satisfies specific (\epsilon,\delta)-testing criteria (Definition 1): expected chance of flagging is bounded by \delta (so called “honest player protection”), while the expected deviation from payoff is bounded by \epsilon. Then, they derive an optimal threshold policy from perspective of \epsilon and present a few extensions (zero-payoff outcomes, exposure scores, deviation costs, distinguish payoff control from incentive compatibility). They present primal-dual LP to optimize (minimize) payoff deviation and provide a zero-sum Stackelberg game interpretation of the auditor’s optimized strategy.

Critical strengths
  • The problem is well-motivated
  • The proposed formalism leads to non-trivial results (and strategies), and thus it is the most valued novelty
  • The paper is well written
Critical weaknesses
  • The game is single-instance, perhaps an iterative version would be better motivated
  • The authors claim generously that “primal–dual LP characterization also accommodates honest reward protection, best responses, correlated obedience, and prescribed Nash equilibria” but do not explain in what sense – the primal optimizes ϵ\epsilon for a given δ\delta, does existence of a dual guarantees the other properties?
  • There are some unclear parts that needs authors’ attention
  • The technical parts are mostly in the appendix – they are neither straightforward not particularly novel, but seem to prove the claimed results.
Questions for authors

Question 1: Why only focusing on non-negative payoff W+W^+?

Question 2: Two statements seem contradictory: “The auditor chooses this policy (\alpha) using … the reference strategies” (lines 99-100) and “Players know the acceptance probabilities and may respond to them.” (lines 103-104) Are μ1,μ2\mu_1,\mu_2 chosen by players before the auditor chooses function α\alpha, or the other way round? In Definition 1 (the tester) the testing property of α\alpha is parameterized by μ1,μ2\mu_1,\mu_2 (among others), so it suggests that players choose their strategies first, but then how they may “respond” to acceptance probability (chosen by the auditor)?

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