- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 3
Read review
Paper summary
The authors propose a mechanism for two-player zero-sum games. This mechanism assigns a probability to each action pair, with which it accepts that outcome. The authors then introduce the concept of -strategic testing, which says that the mechanism -tests this strategy, where is a fraction of decisions not accepted based on the reference strategies and signals that player 1 cannot deviate from the reference such that it would gain more than . The authors then present a linear program that, for fixed , computes the optimal and the acceptance mechanism.
Critical strengths
The examples in Figures 1 and 2 help clarify the core concepts.
Critical weaknesses
The authors motivate their work by cheating allegations in Chess. I do not see how their work connects to this motivation, because it involves designing a mechanism in which Player 1 is guaranteed not to increase its payoff by more than epsilon when deviating from a reference policy. This does not seem to relate to cheating in any way, because it fully depends on the chosen reference policy.
This relates to the previous weakness, but the paper does not make it clear why this testing is useful or how it can be used. The lack of experiments also does not help.
Questions for authors
-
What is the expected usage of your work? How can your approach help to avoid cheating in games, as you motivate in the abstract?
-
How can one come up with reference strategies for testing that are reasonable for testing?
-
Part of the work uses only positive rewards. What if the game does not contain positive rewards, or the rewards are somehow not 0-symmetric between players?