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- Informativeness
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- Presentation
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- Soundness
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Paper summary
This paper introduces Implicit Strategic Optimization (ISO), a prediction-aware framework for long-horizon learning in large language model (LLM) agents. The proposed ISO combines context prediction, delayed-value estimation, and routed policy optimization: 1) Its central mechanism separates the context used for acting from the context used for updating: a predictor guides action selection from pre-action interaction history, while context labels logged after decisions determine which context-conditioned policy components receive updates; 2) A Strategic Reward Model estimates delayed returns from trajectory segments to guide routed GRPO. Experiments in No-Limit Texas Hold’em and competitive Pokémon demonstrate improved strategic performance over supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning baselines.
Critical strengths
Providing experiments to show the advantage of the proposed method.
Critical weaknesses
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The introductory line ("In No-Limit Texas Hold’em (NLHE), many small wins can be offset by a few large losses; in competitive Pokémon, preserving a weakened team member can prevent a more valuable endgame") feels disconnected from the definition of strategic return. The paper lacks a clear formal or conceptual definition of what "long-horizon strategic return" actually means.
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Does "recurring structure of strategic interaction" refer to standard repeated games? If so, why label the domain an imperfect-information game? Conflating these terms causes conceptual confusion.
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The statement "Our analysis isolates the routing principle in an idealized repeated game with full loss-vector feedback" is problematic. Imperfect-information games and repeated games are fundamentally different. Using a repeated-game framework to build the theoretical foundation for methods meant for imperfect-information games is inappropriate.
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The research gap in this paper is unclear.
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Key baselines and related works are missing:
LLM for repeated game: Akata, E., Schulz, L., Coda-Forno, J., Oh, S.J., Bethge, M. and Schulz, E., 2025. Playing repeated games with large language models. Nature Human Behaviour, 9(7), pp.1380-1390.
LLM for repeated game for exploiting opponents:
Liu, N., Zhang, Y. and Wen, Y., 2026, May. Solving Repeated Games with Large Language Model. In Proc. of the 25th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (pp. 569-577).
LLM for solving games:
Wolfgang Lehrach, Daniel Hennes, Miguel Lazaro-Gredilla, Xinghua Lou, Carter Wendelken, Zun Li, Antoine Dedieu, Marc Lanctot, Atil Iscen, John Schultz, Marcus Chiam, Ian Gemp, Piotr Zielinski, Satinder Singh, and Kevin Murphy. Code world models for general game playing. In International Conference on Learning Representations, volume 2026, pp. 133870–133927
Daniel Hennes, Zun Li, John Schultz, and Marc Lanctot. Code-space response oracles: generating interpretable multi-agent policies with large language models. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, pp. 3525–3527, 2026.
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Baselines are not explictly defined and explained. For example: What is the reason that Full-episode GRPO was not used in Figure 2 and Table 2?
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Minor:
The size of the font in Figure 1 is too long. r_\tau is undefeined. a_t is undefined.
Questions for authors
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Why is the "In No-Limit Texas Hold’em (NLHE), many small wins can be offset by a few large losses; in competitive Pokémon, preserving a weakened team member can prevent a more valuable endgame." related to long-horizon strategic return?
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Does "the recurring structure of strategic interaction" refer to 'repeated games'? If so, why it is called 'imperfect-information game'?
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What is the reason that Full-episode GRPO was not used in Figure 2 and Table 2?
5 comments
Thank you again for your feedback. We add controlled results and clarify the objective, theory, and contribution.
1. Strategic return and the opening examples.
"Strategic return" means expected cumulative environment payoff over a specified continuation. Equation (1) uses
where is environment payoff, the discount factor, the return horizon, and the action at decision . Episode boundaries terminate the sum unless cross-hand aggregation is specified. BB/100 is an evaluation unit, not a training horizon. The poker example separates win rate from chip return, not delayed credit assignment. The Pokemon example should describe an immediate cost that preserves a favorable later matchup. We will rewrite the opening accordingly.
2. Imperfect information, recurrence, and the theory.
Imperfect information concerns what is observed when acting; recurrence concerns how interactions unfold. These properties can coexist. Recurring opponent behaviors or battle phases do not make both environments repeated normal-form games.
Section 4 isolates routing with separate base learners and losses in . Contexts precede actions; the realized context and full loss vector are revealed afterward. Proposition 4.1 gives
where is the set of visited contexts, a base learner's regret bound, and the number of context-prediction mistakes. This isolates learning on realized-context subsequences and the cost of prediction errors. Neural ISO instead uses sampled continuations, shared parameters, and potentially action-dependent labels. The result is not a neural-GRPO convergence or Nash-equilibrium guarantee. We will foreground this distinction, already detailed in Appendix A.9/Table 6.
3. The research gap and additional mechanism evidence.
ISO studies which context-conditioned component should receive an update when later evidence revises the context predicted before acting. P-to-P updates the acting adapter; P-to-R updates the retrospectively assigned adapter. The direct control fixes the predictor, estimator, architecture, acting rule, and strictly pre-action inputs during training and evaluation.
| Scoring signal | P-to-P | P-to-R | Paired gain [95% CI] |
|---|---|---|---|
| Original SRM (Table 2) | 14.4 | 15.6 | +1.2 [0.2,2.2] |
| Separately fitted SRM (new) | 14.2 | 15.1 | +0.9 [0.16,1.64] |
| Direct Monte Carlo return (new) | 13.6 | 14.3 | +0.7 [0.14,1.26] |
Values are BB/100. New rows use five independent seed pairs, holding the estimator fixed within each pair. Monte Carlo uses sampled environment returns, with rollout costs included. These results support update assignment beyond one fitted SRM, within the tested settings; they do not establish an unbiased gradient.
4. Full-episode baselines and new equal-compute evidence.
In poker, per-hand profit GRPO already receives the completed hand's payoff. Table 2 also includes 20-hand MR-GRPO: 12.5 versus ISO's 15.6 BB/100, paired gain +3.1 (95% CI [1.8,4.4]). Table 3 includes full-battle Pokemon GRPO: 64% versus ISO's 68% win rate (descriptive; no reported CI). Figure 2 is a separate reference evaluation of win rate and vulnerability, not the matched return comparison.
A new comparison gives both methods 10.0 training GPU-hours per seed, with identical hardware/backbone, 20-hand returns, strictly pre-action inputs, and paired evaluation deals/seats. Across five independent seed pairs, GRPO achieves 13.6 and ISO 15.3 BB/100: paired gain +1.7 (95% CI [0.98,2.42]). The ISO budget includes predictor/SRM fitting, scoring, and route re-evaluation; GRPO can spend its extra budget on training. Evaluation costs are separate. This is a fresh experiment, separate from Table 2.
5. Related work and presentation.
We agree that all four suggested works are relevant. Akata et al. study repeated-game behavior and prediction-guided prompting. Liu et al.'s RHM combines opponent hypotheses, retrospective regret-based reflection, and policy adaptation. Lehrach et al. synthesize world models for planning; Hennes et al. synthesize response policies as code within PSRO. ISO's specific question is whether later context evidence should redirect adapter gradients. We will expand this comparison, especially with RHM; our results do not establish superiority over these complete systems.
We will enlarge Figure 1's labels, distinguish acting/training paths, and clarify definitions and protocols in the opening and captions. Claims remain limited to the tested games and 0.5B backbone.
We hope these clarifications and additional results address your remaining concerns. If they resolve the key issues you raised, we would be grateful if you would consider revising your assessment and score upward.
Thank you for your response. Your response addressed some of my concerns, but some key concerns remain, e.g., the concern about using a repeated-game framework to build the theoretical foundation for methods meant for imperfect-information games. I am maintaining my rating for now.
Thank you for the detailed feedback and the relevant references. We clarify the objective, the role of the theory, and the baseline protocols, and specify the corresponding revisions.
1. Strategic return and the examples. The training target is cumulative environment payoff over the specified continuation: yt=∑τ=tt+Hγτ−trτ. Here at denotes the action at decision t, rτ is environment payoff at step τ, and H is the return horizon. Episode boundaries terminate the sum unless the protocol explicitly aggregates across hands. Poker BB/100 normalizes evaluated chip return; it does not define a training horizon.
The poker example explains why hand win rate and chip return can disagree; it does not alone demonstrate delayed consequences. The Pokemon example illustrates delay: conceding immediate damage may preserve a favorable endgame matchup.
We will rewrite the opening to distinguish these points and connect them to the objective, define the symbols and episode boundaries at first use, and identify sacrifice statistics as diagnostics rather than rewards.
2. Imperfect information and recurring interaction. Imperfect information concerns the player's observations when acting; repeated interaction concerns temporal organization. They can coexist. Recurring structure means that similar opponent behaviors or battle phases reappear, not that each environment is a repeated normal-form game.
Section 4 deliberately isolates update assignment in a simpler full-information model. Proposition 4.1 decomposes contextual regret into realized-context learner regrets plus at most 2LT for prediction mistakes. Neural GRPO observes sampled continuations and shares backbone parameters, so this is not its convergence or regret guarantee.
We will state this boundary explicitly and add a theory-to-implementation comparison covering feedback, parameter sharing, and retrospective labels. This will separate the analyzed routing principle from neural properties evaluated empirically.
3. Research gap and the direct comparison. Context inference determines how to condition an action; value estimation determines how to score it. Neither determines which component should learn when subsequent evidence revises the action's context. ISO studies that update-assignment decision.
We evaluated P-to-P and P-to-R with the same architecture, predictor, SRM, acting rule, and strictly pre-action inputs in training and evaluation. Their returns are 14.4 and 15.6 BB/100, a paired difference of +1.2 (95% CI [0.2, 2.2]). This is the specific contribution tested, rather than attributing every gain over per-hand GRPO to routing.
We will center the contribution statement and main mechanism comparison on this distinction, while presenting broader pipeline ablations separately.
4. Full-episode GRPO and different protocols. For poker, per-hand profit GRPO already uses the completed hand's payoff. Table 2 additionally evaluates MR-GRPO with 20-hand returns: 12.5 BB/100, versus ISO's 15.6. Figure 2 instead shows hand win rate and estimated vulnerability under a separate reference protocol, not the matched return comparison.
For Pokemon, one episode is a complete battle. Table 3 includes full-episode GRPO, with win rate 64% versus ISO's 68%. Thus, terminal battle feedback is already available to that baseline.
We will add a baseline/protocol guide specifying reward horizons, observation histories, and evaluation populations, and revise Figure 2 and Tables 2-3 captions to prevent these protocols being conflated.
5. Related work and readability. Akata et al. study LLM behavior in repeated games; Liu et al. combine opponent modeling with explicit policy adaptation, making their work especially relevant. Lehrach et al. construct executable game-world models; Hennes et al. generate response policies as code. ISO focuses on directing learning updates using later context evidence. Our experiments do not establish superiority over these systems.
We will cite all four papers and add a dedicated comparison of their objectives and mechanisms, especially Liu et al. We will enlarge Figure 1's labels and explicitly mark the action-time and retrospective-training paths.
Thank you for these suggestions. They will help us present a more focused contribution with clearer definitions and a fuller account of related work.