- Rating
- 1
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 1
- Presentation
- 1
- Soundness
- 1
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Paper summary
The paper proposes using question responses as an attack surface for prompt injection against LLM agents. The proposed method appends a ''cue'' to the end responses given to the LLM agent (e.g. from a RAG database or another agent) which push them towards asking specific questions about ambiguous tasks. The targeted answer then contains a prompt injection payload which attempts to push the agent towards deleting sensitive data etc.
The method is compared against direct prompting and approaches without a cue. Defenses and adaptive attack approaches are also studied.
Critical strengths
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Targeting the help channel appears to be well motivated.
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The paper tests a number of reasonable defense approaches and is honest with the findings and limitations.
Critical weaknesses
Threat Model
The threat model isn't well motivated and seems somewhat arbitrary. If I am understanding correctly, it appears that the attacker can only alter the answers to a few (or even just one) question that the agent may ask. The attack then pushes the agent towards asking this particular (set of) question(s) which contains a payload. Why wouldn't the attacker just have full control over all question answers? Why would they take this approach if they can already append further instructions to the end of the original response?
Writing
The paper writing is very hard to follow and doesn't have a linear or logical flow. The abstract and intro are primarily at fault here, as the authors quickly jump towards reporting results and findings before the threat model or attack method are even motivated or explained. 3/4 of the abstract reports findings, referring to ''attack success rates'' and ''payloads'' before these terms are even defined within the context of the paper. Attack ''payloads'' are mentioned multiple times throughout the text, but we never get a solid example until page 5. The paper's writing needs to be completely restructured.
Results
Figure 3 reports that models are more likely to ask specific questions when prompted to do so. This isn't particularly surprising, but still a good result to report. Figure 4 then shows that using the cue method works better than not using it, but this is just a direct consequence of the agent being more likely to ask the payload containing question, so it's unclear if the cue itself adds anything or if it just helps in guaranteeing that the agent actually reads the payload. This table also measures defense performance against the ''no cue'' baseline which seems weird, shouldn't the proposed attack (with the cue) be evaluated here?
Method
Overall the proposed method is just another form of prompt injection but with a slightly different delivery method, it is unclear what the contributions are if any. The core mechanism, exploiting the ''help channel'' has already been explored by other works (as explained in the "Agents that ask, and attacks on their questions" section). The only distinction from these works is that the authors "ask what the attacker gains by choosing the question". The paper does not motivate why this is an interesting question to ask, nor do the results show that it leads to any unique or interesting outcomes.
Questions for authors
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Is the cue mechanism (changing what question the agent asks) the core contribution of this work?
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Why (in practice) would an attacker use this approach rather than just direct prompt injection?
We thank the reviewer for the detailed review, which led to the largest changes in the revision, especially to the threat model and the writing.
Q1: "Is the cue mechanism (changing what question the agent asks) the core contribution of this work?" Yes, and we now state it more narrowly. The contribution is that a reply can steer which question the agent asks next, on all 11 models we test on SQL. As a result, the payload attached to that question reaches the agent more often (75% to 96%, Table 2), although App. A.3 shows that the rise is not statistically clear once test cases are grouped by task. We no longer claim that steering raises attack success over direct injection (see the next answer).
Q2: "Why (in practice) would an attacker use this approach rather than just direct prompt injection?" We agree that an attacker who controls every reply gains little from the cue in our tasks. A payload written into the first reply succeeds about as often as the cued attack (49% against 50% pooled, Table 2), and we narrowed the abstract and introduction accordingly. In our SQL tasks every ambiguity concerns the same query, so a payload on the first reply is never far from the task. Steering may matter more where the agent's open questions are unrelated to each other, as in long-horizon workflows, which we name in the introduction and conclusion as future work.
Threat model: "Why wouldn't the attacker just have full control over all question answers?" The reviewer's reading was reasonable, since the submission said the attacker controls "some" replies while our experiments route every question to the attacker's source. Section 3 now gives the attacker the answer source for every question. It also explains how an attacker gains that control without breaking into the agent, for example by posting in a shared chat channel or by controlling a subagent that writes the reply.
Results: "... unclear if the cue itself adds anything or if it just helps in guaranteeing that the agent actually reads the payload." We agree with this reading. The cue's measured effect is on delivery, and once a payload is delivered we do not detect a rise in compliance (Figure 3(b)). On the three models tested, the cue still steers without its instruction clause and a placebo sentence does not steer (App. C.4), which suggests that steering is more than instruction-following.
Results: "... shouldn't the proposed attack (with the cue) be evaluated here?" We agree that this was a gap, and we now test the defensive prompt against the cued attack (Table 2(b)). The prompt lowers attack success under the cue from 51% to 20% on DeepSeek-V3.2 and from 47% to 22% on Kimi K2.5, but barely on Qwen3-235B (44% to 38%).
Method: "The core mechanism, exploiting the 'help channel' has already been explored by other works ..." We agree that ASPI is the closest work. It shows that the clarification channel is an attack surface, and our Table 1 reproduces that finding, which we cite as theirs. ASPI's agent gets one round of clarification, while ours asks several questions in turn, so an earlier reply can choose the next one. The revised Related work states which results replicate and which are new.
Writing: "The abstract and intro are primarily at fault here ..." We agree that our exposition was dense, and we restructured the abstract and introduction as suggested. The abstract now sets up the help channel and the attacker before any result, and defines the steering cue and the payload at first use. The introduction gives a concrete payload, App. D gives a full trace, and Section 4 is about a third shorter.