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Paper summary
This paper investigates the effectiveness, durability, and scaling behavior of pretraining data filtering in protein language models. The authors train models under different levels of viral sequence exclusion based on ESM-2. They evaluate the impact of filtering on masked language modeling, mutation effect prediction, and contact prediction, and further examine whether the lost performance can be recovered through continued fine-tuning on the excluded sequences. The results suggest that filtering selectively degrades performance on viral proteins, with larger effects observed at greater model scales, while largely preserving performance on non-viral proteins.
Critical strengths
- The paper addresses a relevant question concerning the effectiveness and durability of pretraining data filtering in biological foundation models, extending previous investigations on general-purpose language models to protein language models.
- The analysis of different viral families is informative, particularly the observation that filtering effects vary substantially across protein families. The quantification of recovery costs also provides useful empirical evidence for evaluating the durability of pretraining filtering.
Critical weaknesses
- unclear biological impact of the observed filtering effects
A central motivation of the paper is to evaluate pretraining data filtering as a safeguard for biological foundation models. However, the experimental results reveal substantial heterogeneity across viral families, raising questions about the generality and practical significance of the reported filtering effectiveness. In particular, Figure 4 and Table 5 show that the degradation is heavily concentrated in the human-infecting viral shell, which accounts for 81.6% of the overall cross-entropy increase at 650M. Further analysis indicates that Retroviridae alone accounts for approximately 77.5% of the degradation at 3B among viral families with at least 20 held-out sequences. More importantly, the relationship between the measured performance degradation and the intended biosecurity impact remains insufficiently established. What's more, if the safeguard is investigated solely from the perspective of pretraining data filtering, how does it differ from conventional machine unlearning?
- limitation on evaluation of downstream capability suppression and recovery
The paper evaluates filtering and recovery using masked language modeling, zero-shot mutation effect prediction, and contact prediction through attention-based linear probes. While these evaluations provide useful measurements of the learned representations, they offer a limited characterization of the real model's functional capabilities. In particular, the recovery experiments rely on continued masked language modeling using the excluded viral sequences. Recovery is then assessed by comparing the resulting models against their unfiltered counterparts on the same evaluation metrics. The paper does not systematically examine whether the filtering effects persist after supervised adaptation to downstream biological tasks. Given the paper's motivation of evaluating pretraining data filtering as a safeguard, could the authors further investigate its effectiveness under downstream supervised fine-tuning (SFT)? In particular, it would be valuable to compare three settings:
- (1) filtered pretraining followed by filtered SFT,
- (2) filtered pretraining followed by unfiltered SFT,
- and (3) unfiltered pretraining followed by unfiltered SFT
under comparable training budgets. How much do these settings differ in downstream predictive performance and generalization to unseen proteins or mutations? More importantly, does filtering at the pretraining stage lead to persistent changes in the model's learned capabilities, particularly its generalization ability, once downstream supervision is introduced? Such comparisons would provide stronger evidence for the effectiveness and durability of pretraining filtering as a safeguard.
- insufficient consideration of training budget in the scaling analysis
One of the paper's main findings is that filtering effectiveness increases with model scale. However, all models, ranging from 8M to 3B parameters, are pretrained using the same 150,000 optimization steps and approximately 315B training tokens. Although this provides a consistent training protocol, the degree of training sufficiency may vary substantially across model scales. Larger models generally require different training budgets to reach comparable levels of convergence. Also, the authors train for substantially fewer steps than the original ESM-2 models.
Questions for authors
All my main concerns are listed in the weakness section. I would appreciate it if the authors could provide further explaination and, where possible, additional experiments to address these concerns.
3 comments
2. Persistence under downstream supervised fine-tuning
We agree this is an important question, and have run the three fine-tuning settings. The revision adds Appendix B.8 ("Supervised fine-tuning of the filtered, unfiltered and recovered 3B models"), comparing 3B checkpoints under LoRA supervised fine-tuning on ProteinGym. Here, we split assays by whole protein group so that held-out assays test generalisation to unseen proteins. All three arms receive the same 3,000 fine-tuning steps, and every contrast below is against the unfiltered model fine-tuned concurrently under the same regime, measured on 18 held-out viral assays spanning 14 protein groups.
Before fine-tuning, the unfiltered model outperforms the filtered one by 0.116 Spearman on viral assays. Fine-tuning on non-viral assays only narrows that gap to 0.091, and fine-tuning on a mixture of viral and non-viral assays narrows it to 0.063, closing 46%. Both gaps are against the unfiltered model given the same fine-tuning. Holding pre-training fixed, switching the fine-tuning dataset from non-viral to mixed improves performance by an additional 0.022 Spearman (95% bootstrap CI 0.006–0.038). On non-viral assays, no contrast exceeds 0.011 Spearman and none approaches significance.
Filtering effects, therefore, do persist through downstream supervision as neither supervised fine-tuning regime overcomes even half the performance gap attributable to pre-training. By contrast, a filtered model given 5,000 steps of continued pre-training on the withheld corpus beforehand ends within 0.002 Spearman of the unfiltered model after the same fine-tuning. This presents an order of magnitude smaller residual than either fine-tuning-only arm, though of course also uses more compute.
3. Training budget and convergence
On the equal token budget: this follows ESM-2 itself, which uses the same budget across model sizes. We think this is also the more realistic comparison, reflecting how these model families are trained.
On training for fewer steps than ESM-2: Figure 9 compares our unfiltered models with the corresponding ESM-2 checkpoints, showing that mutation effect prediction is close across all five sizes, within 0.016 Spearman, but our cross-entropy is higher at 650M (+0.076 nats) and 3B (+0.125 nats), with the gap widening as models scale. Our larger models are therefore further from convergence, which we acknowledge in the Limitations.
The revision adds Appendix B.5 ("Filtering effects over the course of pretraining"): at 650M the increase in viral validation loss from filtering grows at every snapshot through 150,000 steps, while the non-viral increase stays below 0.006 nats (Figure 28), and the same trend holds at 3B (Figure 29). Longer training would therefore likely widen the filtering effects we report.
Unfortunately, training to ESM-2's 500,000 steps across five sizes and five filtering conditions is not feasible with our compute budget. For concreteness, our current training runs for the three 3B models alone cost over 100,000 USD, meaning that full training runs would cost at least an additional 300,000 USD.
We hope these responses address the reviewer's concerns. If concerns remain, or if there are further changes that would strengthen the paper, we would be grateful to hear them during the discussion period. If the reviewer considers the concerns resolved, we would be grateful if they would consider revising their score.
Dear Reviewer Jb2V,
We hope our responses and additional results have sufficiently addressed the reviewers' concerns. Thank you for your time and consideration.
Thank you,
Authors
We thank the reviewer for the detailed comments and address the stated weaknesses below. All changes are in the uploaded revision of our paper.
1.a Heterogeneity across viral families
We agree that filtering does not degrade performance uniformly across viral families, and that the effect is concentrated in the human-infecting shell and in Retroviridae in particular.
We see this heterogeneity as one of the study's findings rather than as a limitation. We included Figure 4 and Table 5 to test whether filtering degrades performance consistently across families, and they show that it is not consistent.
On whether our conclusions rest on this one family, we would direct the reviewer to Appendix B.7, in which we perform a per-family recovery analysis as part of this manuscript revision.("Assay-level recovery after viral fine-tuning"). Here, we assess recovery separately for each of the 11 EVEREST families (Figure 34). We count a viral family as recovered when its mean correlation across assays reaches that of the unfiltered model. We see that at least nine of eleven recover by step 5,000 at each size and at each tier. Allowing a tolerance of 0.05 Spearman correlation, each model and tier has at most two of 45 assays still below its unfiltered reference. Hence, the durability finding holds family-by-family and is not an artefact of the overrepresentation of Retroviridae sequences.
We also address this with a control experiment focussed on Retroviridae: Figure 25 shows that fine-tuning on a corpus with Retroviridae removed still recovers performance against the unfiltered model on viral proteins excluding Retroviridae. Recovery is therefore not simply a Retroviridae-specific effect, even though that family is over-represented in UniRef and accounts for most of the degradation from data filtering.
1.b Link between degradation and biosecurity impact
We agree this link is not firmly established, and we have added an explicit statement to the Limitations to that effect: our metrics measure protein-modelling capability on viral proteins, not the capacity to cause harm, and, to the best of our knowledge, no benchmark establishing that mapping yet exists for this class of models. We also want to note that such a benchmark would have large misuse potential as it could allow the creation of models with greater capacity to cause harm, and so should be approached with caution.
However, our evaluations do follow current practice for this class of model, as set out in recent best-practice guidance on biological risk evaluations for open-weight bio-foundation models [1]. ESM3 [2] and Evo 2 [3] both use viral sequence modelling and zero-shot mutation effect prediction to assess biosecurity-motivated data filtering. Among our evaluations, mutation effect prediction on human pathogen proteins is the most directly interpretable since one misuse pathway for this class of model is ranking variants of a pathogen protein by predicted fitness, which is precisely what mutation effect prediction on viral assays measures.
1.c How does this differ from machine unlearning?
Unlearning removes the influence of specific data from an already-trained model, and pre-training filtering prevents acquisition by excluding the data beforehand. We study the latter but do not argue that it should be preferred.
As a baseline, the current evidence for LLMs indicates filtering is the more tamper-resistant of the two approaches, requiring orders of magnitude more fine-tuning compute to undo than post-training interventions including unlearning [4, 5]. Our result is that even this stronger safeguard is removable for under 80 USD of H100 time, and so even if unlearning enabled cheaper recovery still, the absolute change in cost would be negligible for an attacker.
Our responses to weaknesses 1.2 and 1.3 follow in a second comment.
References
[1] B. Wei et al., "Best Practices for Biorisk Evaluations on Open-Weight Bio-Foundation Models," arXiv preprint arXiv:2510.27629, 2025.
[2] T. Hayes et al., "Simulating 500 million years of evolution with a language model," Science, vol. 387, no. 6736, pp. 850–858, 2025. doi:10.1126/science.ads0018.
[3] G. Brixi et al., "Genome modelling and design across all domains of life with Evo 2," Nature, vol. 652, pp. 1349–1361, 2026. doi:10.1038/s41586-026-10176-5.
[4] K. O'Brien et al., "Deep Ignorance: Filtering Pretraining Data Builds Tamper-Resistant Safeguards into Open-Weight LLMs," International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR), 2026. arXiv:2508.06601.
[5] N. Rathi and A. Radford, "Shaping capabilities with token-level data filtering," arXiv preprint arXiv:2601.21571, 2026.