- Rating
- 1
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 1
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper studies attacks against protein generation models from three families (AR, masked diffusion, inverse folding) meant to generate hazardous proteins. The attack pipeline is to start at a known hazardous protein, then apply some amount of masking following a particular strategy, and use the protein generation model to fill in the masks. The paper shows that one way to strengthen the attack for autoregressive models is to use guided beam search where we rank candidates using a hazard classifier. On the other hand, it shows that a consistent way to weaken the attacks is to first use RL to "unlearn" the hazardous proteins with either NPO or GRPO.
Critical strengths
The authors consider various families of protein generation models, not just autoregressive or masked diffusion models.
Critical weaknesses
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I found the paper to be quite poorly written. For example, it was not clear what the main contributions were as the abstract, introduction, and Figure 1 all highlight different things. Moreover, a lot of dense jargon is introduced without explanation, and often not important for the main text (such as the guardrail latter which barely gets mentioned after the introduction).
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The beam search attack protocol seems quite flawed, as the toxicity classifier was not used for chains longer than 50 residues.
Questions for authors
None
I would like to thank the authors for their rebuttal. Dear Reviewers, as we are approaching the end of the discussion period, I would appreciate it if you could take a moment to acknowledge the rebuttal and see if it addresses your concerns or no. Thank you for your time and service.