- Rating
- 2(+1)
- Confidence
- 3(−1)
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 1
- Soundness
- 2(+1)
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Paper summary
This paper presents ToxRedTeam, a black-box red-teaming framework for protein toxicity detectors that iteratively mutates known toxic proteins while attempting to preserve their predicted structure. ToxRedTeam combines masked protein language models (ESM2 or SaProt), an ESMFold-based structural verifier using pLDDT and TM-score constraints, and greedy detector-feedback optimization with First-Choice Early Exit. However, the core technical ingredients are largely established component such as masked-PLM substitution, structure prediction/filtering, and first-improvement black-box search, so the novelty lies mainly in combining them for toxicity-detector auditing.
Critical strengths
The paper succeeds in making the biosecurity motivation concrete and in testing several heterogeneous detector families. The introduction clearly explains why simply producing a classifier-fooling sequence is insufficient in this domain which is useful and the threat model is relatively easy to understand.
Critical weaknesses
First, the paper does not isolate what actually causes the large attack gains. The main comparison is against ProteinMPNN, but ToxRedTeam changes both the candidate generator and the search procedure, most importantly adding repeated detector-feedback optimization. There is no matched ESM2/SaProt baseline that generates the same candidates without iterative detector feedback, nor a version that removes First-Choice Early Exit or the adaptive search logic. This is particularly problematic because the paper explicitly concludes about iterative use of detector feedback substantially amplifies attack success, yet the reported experiments never isolate that factor. The current results show that the full ToxRedTeam pipeline beats ProteinMPNN, but not which proposed component is responsible.
Second, there are concrete specification and reporting errors that make the experimental results difficult to trust. In Algorithm 1, an accepted improvement resets the stagnation counter to zero, but after breaking out of the candidate loop the pseudocode unconditionally increments the same counter under “No improvement,” contradicting the textual description of the search. More seriously, Section 5.5 states that 4,073 improvements among 55,827 queried candidates correspond to 4.2%, but this ratio is approximately 7.3%; 4.2% is obtained only when dividing by all 96,071 generated candidates. The query-efficiency reporting is also unnecessarily confusing: Table 2 reports medians over successful attacks, whereas the patience appendix reports a median over all targets, without making this distinction clear in the main text.
Questions for authors
(1) Which description corresponds to the actual implementation of Algorithm 1? (2) Can the authors confirm the denominator used for the reported 4.2% improvement rate in Section 5.5? (3) Can the authors provide a matched ESM2/SaProt baseline without iterative detector feedback?
2 comments
Thanks for the authors’ clarification. I think the response clarifies the algorithm and consistency issues well, and the scoping of the claims is appropriate. However, I still believe this paper needs more experiments, especially more ablations, to show where the attack gains actually come from. I will raise my rating to 2.
Response to Reviewer qjXZ
[Q1] Which description matches the implementation, Algorithm 1 or §4.4?
§4.4. Algorithm 1 is a transcription error and no reported number is affected — in the code the stagnation counter is incremented strictly inside the no-improvement branch, so an accepted improvement leaves
c = 0, k = 1as §4.4 states, and line 30 belongs inside that branch. The results come from the implementation, not the pseudocode.Auditing the rest of Algorithm 1 turned up a second error we should report ourselves: line 13 (Fast-Escalation) is printed with a clamp,
k ← min(k + 1, K_max), which §4.4 step 5 repeats and the implementation does not apply. The clamp is not equivalent — an all-rejected round spends no query and resetsc ← 0, so under it neither loop guard can be reached on that path — and it is the unclamped version that produces thek_max_exhaustedfailure mode in Table 5. Both are corrected, along with two parameters we omitted:k_eff = min(k, K_max, L − |M|)andtop_k_per_position = 5, the latter meaning ak = 1round yields at most 5 candidates, notN_sample = 10.On whether these errors reach the results: Appendix D's failure-mode table regenerates exactly from the run logs — 46/4/0, 45/5/0, 39/11/0, 36/6/8 and 23/27/0 for the five ESM2 runs — and the presence of
k_max_exhaustedin that table is itself what rules out the printed clamp, since under a clampkcan never exceedK_maxand that termination reason could never fire. The pseudocode line was wrong; the procedure that produced the reported numbers is the one §4.4 describes.[Q2] Can you confirm the denominator for the 4.2% improvement rate in §5.5?
The denominator is the 96,071 generated candidates: 4.2% is 4,073/96,071. Over the 55,827 candidates actually queried the rate is 7.3%, and the 96,071 count precedes the
N_sampletruncation, so 4.2% is a rate per candidate proposed rather than per query spent. The revised §5.5 reports both with their denominators named.[Q3 / W1] Can you provide a matched ESM2/SaProt baseline without iterative detector feedback?
We have removed the claim this control was needed to support, rather than offer a substitute number. Our comparison varies the proposal model and the search procedure together, so it cannot attribute the gain to feedback; the §6 sentence asserting that iterative feedback substantially amplifies attack success is deleted, and we will not reassert it without the matched baseline you describe.
[W2 / Presentation] The contribution list now leads with the audit and the evaluation protocol, and the search algorithm is no longer offered as a methodological contribution — the components are individually established, and what the paper claims is the audit they enable, not the parts. Beyond the two Algorithm 1 errors and the §5.5 denominator, we also corrected: the two omitted parameters above; the unlabelled medians in Table 2 (over successful attacks) and Appendix C (over all 50 targets); the Introduction at L060, which said "substitutions at conserved positions" and contradicted §4.2, where the top 25% most conserved are frozen; and the L042 punctuation. If you can point to sections that were hardest to follow, we will restructure them.