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Withdrawn from ICLR 2027

When Stagewise Truthfulness Fails to Compose in Adaptive Ensembles

Withdrawn from ICLR 2027, so left out of the paper lists and the map.

Abstract

Prototyped and proposed prediction ensembles settle contributor payments by marginal contribution after labels arrive, and adapt serving weights on the same measurements. We show that delayed settlement turns adaptive allocation into unpriced intertemporal influence. For any smooth strictly proper settlement: with no allocation stake, stagewise truthfulness composes exactly; with one, first-order truthfulness holds precisely when the unpriced rent gradient vanishes on the simplex tangent space, and otherwise farming — misreporting to capture future serving weight — is first-order profitable and, under the stated curvature conditions, deviations inside a history-conditional cushion (the Hessian-induced ellipsoid of deviation sizes) induce a law inside the composite null of every anytime-safe own-stream detector. Coupling a sound detector to automatic reallocation can make matters worse — a framing deviator can have an honest peer correctly excluded and inherit its weight (demonstrated end-to-end on an engineered extended-horizon replay), with cascades at every under the stated exclusion semantics — and a trust region on published weights restores a best-response bound, though a preregistered practical-remedy gate fails on the raw trace. Empirically, in a semi-synthetic replay family over preregistered operating points, the rent gradient is confirmed nonzero in all six top-screened cells at disjoint-seed Bonferroni-corrected intervals (including under the deployed weight map on both traces), though all six share one deviating agent and, on one trace, the confirmed interval covers zero once the pool grows to five contributors; in a follow-up round frozen after the preregistered sizes failed, the sustained deviation at the total-curvature-optimal size is profitable at , where prices one unit of serving weight in units of settlement, while the deployed detector stays silent; the stage envelope's moment condition certifiably fails on both raw traces and in every preregistered time segment; and a prespecified anti-pool audit (reporting away from the pooled mean) on the raw trace raises settlement income and allocation rent undetected, reported as a deployment vulnerability rather than as peer-channel validation. We conclude that adaptive allocation belongs inside the mechanism design, on the same footing as the payment rule.

Primary area:
alignment, fairness, safety, privacy, and societal considerations
Keywords:
mechanism design, strictly proper scoring rules, incentive compatibility, truthfulness, adaptive allocation, anytime-valid detection, prediction ensembles

Reviews

Among:
Shape:
1234this paper, Bottom 10%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 1.67 over 3 reviews, above 10% of the others.
Reviewer_JWZNOpenReview ↗
Rating
1
Confidence
1
Informativeness
2
Presentation
1
Soundness
1
Read review
Paper summary

This paper considers the setting of a sequential process where marginal contributions of contributors to a jointly achieved predictive ensemble score (based on delayed labels and a proper scoring rule) are used 1) to attribute the achieved score to the contributors (settlement) and 2) to adjust contributor weights for ensemble predictions.

Under the assumption that the label probabilities additively decompose into the contributor predictions (so called types), this work analyzes how distortions in a contributor’s prediction affect future payments and weights via marginal contributions.

In particular, it is shown that the future weights of an agent, and thus its utility (defined as the sum of discounted payments and weights), can under certain conditions be enhanced by distorting its predictions (referred to as farming), such that truthful reporting is not optimal over time.

Within a so called cushion, such farming agents cannot even be detected as harmful (which is defined by negative expected contributions), while other agents might be flagged as harmful due to the farming agent’s distortions (referred to as framing), which may lead to reallocation of their weights to the farming agent.

Critical strengths
  • Under the assumption of additive label probability decomposition, this paper presents a detailed analysis of when distortions are profitable and whether farming is detectable.
Critical weaknesses
  • Practical relevance: The majority of contributions is derived by assuming that the labels follow a categorical distribution with the averages of the contributor types as probability parameters. This model lacks motivation and justification, and it is totally unclear why it would be practically relevant in the presented context of prediction ensembles. Even in their own experiments, this assumption does not hold under (real) data. Yet, the contributions heavily rely on this assumption and the paper does not analyze which of the contributions still hold without this assumption.
  • Empirical support: While experiments on real data (where the labels were not changed) are presented, in the majority of experiments the real targets of the dataset are replaced by synthetic ones according to the assumed model (average of the contributor types as probability parameter). While this is a substantial intervention into the experimental setup, in my perception it is mentioned only briefly in the main part of the paper (only mentions "semi-synthetic replay" in the abstract). This is especially relevant, as the theoretical claims of the paper are only empirically supported in the case of synthetic labels. Nevertheless, some parts of the main paper convey the impression that the theory would have general empirical support.
  • Presentation: The paper is written in a way that is too dense and overall it is very difficult to follow. Despite its density, it does not even properly motivate the overall setup and does not justify key assumptions.
Questions for authors
  • Can you better motivate or justify the assumption that the labels follow a categorical distribution with the averages of the contributor types as probability parameters?
  • Can you clarify whether any / which of the contributions still hold without this assumption but under weaker target models (without additive decomposition of the probability parameter)?
  • Can you confirm that none of the theoretical claims of Theorems 1-3 were empirically supported on real data (where targets have not been modified)?
Reviewer_eu2ZOpenReview ↗
Rating
1
Confidence
3
Informativeness
1
Presentation
1
Soundness
1
Read review
Paper summary

This work studies the task of aggregating forecasts from diverse source and paying those sources in a way that is incentive compatible. The core model (which is fairly hard to understand from the paper's writing) consists of multiple agents who hold one piece of evidence, b_i, and the correct forecast is the average of the pieces. If all agents report truthfully, then the aggregation is correct. A payment rule is designed to ensure this is the case.

Critical strengths

I struggle to understand the core contribution of the paper and how it builds on the large literature in this field.

Critical weaknesses

I found the paper to be very poorly written and very hard to follow. Just starting even from the abstract, it is just filled with jargon and phrases that are in coherent. It is extremely hard to understand what the paper is trying to even solve. And therein lies the second main issue. Forecast aggregation is very well studied problem with a host of classical results. If there is an observed ground truth and reporters are sequential, one can use an LMSR. These are myopically truthful but fall-apart in case of bluffing, etc. The choice of this work to assume a ground truth be sampled from the average of the reports seems extremely artificial ... It seems much more natural for the setting they consider to have no ground truth, but wanting to incentivize honest reporting. In such cases (no ground truth and reports are private and async), one can use a host of peer prediction mechanisms to ellicit information truthfully and pay accordingly. It is classically known, however, that in the presence of external incentives, the peer prediction guarantees breakdown (essentially a core conclusion of the paper). There is also some more nascent work on setting where the resolution outcome is obtained from agent reports (similar in vein to this): https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.04305. So overall, I am unclear on the contribution.

Questions for authors

Please see the weakness above.

Reviewer_cWjCOpenReview ↗
Rating
3
Confidence
2
Informativeness
3
Presentation
2
Soundness
3
Read review
Paper summary

The paper studies prediction ensembles where contribution-based payments also determine future serving weights. It shows how an agent can gain future influence through small reporting deviations, despite truthful reporting being optimal for the stage payment. It also studies manipulation of exclusion rules and bounds deviations by restricting weight changes.

Critical strengths
  • The central incentive problem is clear and relevant: a second-order payment loss can be outweighed by a first-order gain in future allocation. The distinction between population and finite-window weight responses is handled carefully.

  • The framing and exclusion examples are insightful. They show how a statistically valid alarm can trigger an action that benefits the manipulator and harms an honest contributor.

  • I appreciate the transparent reporting of negative results, failed safeguards, and follow-up experiments. Confirmation on fresh seeds strengthens the selected positive findings.

Critical weaknesses
  • Appendix H calls the surviving agent's position "worthless" when it reports the pooled probability. Its marginal payment is then zero, but it still has serving weight one and earns allocation rent under Equation (2). The conclusion seems to require the alternative served-output utility, rather than the main weight-based utility. This also affects the claim in Section 4.2 that reference exclusion works for two agents.

  • The pooled-posterior assumption fails on both raw traces. The positive in-model results come from selected replay settings, all six confirmed cells share one deviating agent, and the UNSW gradient is no longer statistically resolved at five contributors. These limitations are disclosed, but leave the mechanism's prevalence and economic importance uncertain.

  • Invisibility follows because the deviations remain within the null of nonnegative conditional contributions. This does not establish that manipulation cannot be detected using reports or joint agent behavior. The allocation-side experiment is inconclusive, particularly given its false-alarm calibration failure.

Questions for authors
  • Under Equation (2), why does reporting the pooled probability eliminate the surviving agent's allocation rent in Proposition X1?
  • Can the incentive analysis be extended to approximately specified pooled forecasts, given the failures on both raw traces?
  • Can a monitor using joint reports and contribution streams detect these deviations while maintaining verified false-alarm control?
  • Is there a setting where the trust-region safeguard meets the stated attack-reduction and benign-performance criteria?

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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