acceptodds
Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

Recovering and Certifying Incentives in Zero-Sum Stopping Games

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Abstract

We study an offline inverse reinforcement learning problem in which either adversarial player can terminate a game by stopping a shared Markov process. A demonstration records which player stopped and where, while the terminal incentives rationalizing these decisions are unknown. Our goal is to recover both players' incentives and the game value and verify whether they implement the observed boundaries within a transfer and smooth-fit class. Local boundary matching is insufficient because both stopping decisions depend on the same continuation value and must remain mutually optimal from every initial state. Our method solves once for the common continuation value between the observed boundaries, recovers both incentives from its boundary values, and applies a global verification step to rule out profitable deviations. We establish necessity, sufficiency, and uniqueness within a smooth-fit class, and characterize stationary contact and dynamics uncertainty through admissible transfer and value sets. Across 24 synthetic games, direct recovery matches converged adaptive calibration without repeated game solves, while a stopping-action IRL baseline evaluates transfer recovery and unilateral deviations. Propagating volatility uncertainty yields certified transfer and value sets at all tested budgets. Each sixteenfold increase in data reduces mean transfer width by about 75%, whereas plug-in sets miss the true transfers. On held-out industry returns with 24 planted contracts, full-path monitoring reduces mean transfer- and value-set widths by 40.3% and 36.7%, respectively.

Primary area:
reinforcement learning
Keywords:
inverse reinforcement learning, inverse optimal stopping, zero-sum stopping games, Dynkin games, reward recovery, equilibrium verification, uncertainty quantification

Reviews

Among:
Shape:
1234this paper, Top 1%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 3.67 over 3 reviews, above 99% of the others.
Reviewer_bpkrOpenReview ↗
Rating
3(+1)
Confidence
1
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

The paper proposes a three-step inverse framework for recovering owner-specific terminal transfers in zero-sum Dynkin games: (1) solve a single linear Neumann problem for the common continuation value, (2) recover transfers by value matching, and (3) verify global equilibrium conditions. It further extends this construction to certified transfer and value sets under contact and dynamics uncertainty.

The single-solve construction is elegant and avoids repeated forward-game solves. However, the connection between discrete observations and continuous-time equilibrium guarantees, the restrictive compatibility assumptions, and the scope of the empirical claims require clarification.

Critical strengths
  1. The method reduces transfer recovery to a single linear Neumann solve, avoiding repeated forward-game computations.
  2. The double-obstacle verification step checks global saddle-point conditions, going beyond local boundary matching.
  3. The cross-residual Jacobian factorization characterizes how changes in either player's stopping boundary affect both recovered transfers.
Critical weaknesses

2.1. Discrete Observations vs. Continuous-Time Verification

Theorem 4's finite-sample certification relies on the Gaussian one-step transition model in Eq. (74), which is not generally the exact transition law of a state-dependent diffusion. Moreover, the experiments infer stopping behavior from discretely monitored paths, whereas the theoretical guarantee concerns continuous first-hit rules. Boundary overshoot and missed crossings may undermine this connection. The authors should clarify the scope of the guarantee and address these discrepancies; constant-volatility Brownian experiments do not resolve the general issue.

2.2. Restrictive Terminal Compatibility

Equation (23) requires the terminal payoff's spatial derivative to match the base settlement derivatives at both terminal contacts. Although this condition supports classical PDE regularity, it restricts the admissible finite-horizon contracts. The authors should clarify its practical implications and whether the framework can accommodate less restrictive terminal conditions.

2.3. Scope of Transfer Identifiability

The uniqueness result depends critically on transfers being functions of time only, so their spatial derivatives vanish. State-dependent transfers would generally alter the Neumann boundary conditions and invalidate the single-solve decoupling. This limitation should be emphasized when positioning the method relative to general reward-identification methods in inverse reinforcement learning.

2.4. Empirical Interpretation and Computational Cost

The industry-return experiment uses planted contracts and parameters; it evaluates robustness to non-Gaussian increments rather than recovering actual investor preferences. This distinction should remain explicit. In addition, the refined uncertainty certificate takes approximately 58 seconds per product to evaluate 256 boxes. An end-to-end computational cost breakdown would help assess practical scalability.

Questions for authors
  1. Why can recent competitive and zero-sum IRL methods (Liao et al., 2025; Zhang et al., 2026) not serve as direct baselines, and how do their problem settings differ?
  2. When the method returns ABSTAIN, can it distinguish parameter misspecification, excessive boundary uncertainty, numerical inconclusiveness, and genuine non-implementability?
  3. What are the main analytical obstacles to extending the Neumann decoupling from a scalar interval to multidimensional state spaces?
Reviewer_KYT4OpenReview ↗
Rating
4
Confidence
2
Informativeness
3
Presentation
2
Soundness
3
Read review
Paper summary

The paper studies inverse reinforcement learning in two-player zero-sum stopping games and aims to recover unknown terminal incentives from observed equilibrium stopping boundaries. The authors propose a direct inverse construction based on solving a single continuation-value boundary problem, followed by value matching and global equilibrium verification. They establish implementation and uniqueness guarantees within a smooth-fit class and develop sensitivity analysis to propagate uncertainty in stopping boundaries and system dynamics into certified incentive and value sets. Experiments on synthetic games and historical financial trajectories with planted contracts demonstrate computational efficiency, numerical correctness, and uncertainty quantification.

Critical strengths

S1. Interesting and well-motivated problem formulation. The paper extends inverse optimal stopping to a bilateral competitive setting, where two players possess distinct stopping rights. The shared continuation value introduces strategic coupling between their incentives. This is a meaningful specialization of inverse game theory.

S2. Elegant and computationally efficient inverse construction. The observation that state-independent transfers disappear from the smooth-fit derivatives is particularly useful. It leads to a direct construction requiring only one continuation-value solve, rather than repeatedly solving the forward game to calibrate incentives.

S3. Substantial theoretical analysis. Beyond the basic inverse construction, the paper develops necessary and sufficient implementation conditions, uniqueness within the prescribed class, cross-owner sensitivity identities, and uncertainty propagation. The Jacobian factorization and monotonicity-based set construction are especially interesting.

S4. Careful numerical verification. The authors employ independent numerical solvers, compare against adaptive calibration and game-IRL baselines, and test invalid stopping configurations. The appendices provide detailed experimental protocols and additional validation results.

Critical weaknesses

Weaknesses

W1. Restrictive modeling assumptions and limited robustness to misspecification (Major).

The proposed framework relies on several restrictive assumptions, including known base settlements, time-only additive transfers, one-dimensional diffusion dynamics, and exact first-hit equilibrium behavior. Although these assumptions enable an elegant inverse construction, they also limit the scope of the identification and certification results. In particular, the paper provides limited theoretical characterization of robustness under model misspecification or approximately optimal demonstrations. It would be valuable to understand whether small deviations from these assumptions lead to controlled errors in the recovered transfers or potentially invalidate the equilibrium certificates.

W2. Limited end-to-end statistical efficiency guarantees (Major).

The paper establishes finite-sample coverage guarantees for the recovered transfer and value sets, along with asymptotic contraction results. However, these results do not fully characterize the sample complexity required for accurate and successful recovery. In particular, an explicit non-asymptotic bound relating the number of observed trajectories to the widths of the recovered sets and the probability of abstention is missing. Such a characterization would substantially strengthen the statistical foundations of the proposed certification framework and clarify when informative recovery can be guaranteed.

W3. Diminished benefit of full-path observations under dynamics uncertainty (Moderate).

The experiments demonstrate that full-path monitoring improves boundary localization and reduces uncertainty in recovered incentives. However, Table 3 shows that the reduction in transfer-set width decreases from approximately 26.8% under known volatility to less than 0.003% when volatility uncertainty is incorporated. This suggests that dynamics uncertainty may dominate the overall recovery error, substantially diminishing the benefit of more informative behavioral observations. A clearer characterization of the regimes in which improved boundary estimation meaningfully improves incentive recovery would help establish the significance of the full-path approach.

W4. Computational cost of rigorous certification (Minor).

While the direct inverse construction offers substantial computational advantages over repeated forward-game calibration, the efficiency comparison primarily focuses on the analytically tractable stationary Brownian setting. Moreover, rigorous certification under joint uncertainty can be considerably more expensive, with the refined certificates in Table 7 requiring approximately 58 seconds per instance. The computational scalability of the complete certification procedure, particularly for more general diffusion dynamics and higher-dimensional uncertainty sets, remains insufficiently characterized.

Questions for authors

Questions for the Authors

Q1. Robustness to model misspecification (Major; W1).

The theoretical guarantees rely on exact first-hit equilibrium behavior and a specific additive transfer structure. While the paper establishes sensitivity results for perturbations in stopping boundaries and dynamics, can these results be extended to approximately optimal demonstrations or misspecified payoff structures? In particular, is it possible to bound the recovery error when the observed strategies form only an ε\varepsilon-saddle equilibrium?

Q2. End-to-end sample complexity (Major; W2).

The paper establishes finite-sample coverage guarantees and asymptotic contraction results. Under suitable identification and regularity conditions, is it possible to derive an explicit non-asymptotic sample-complexity bound for achieving a prescribed transfer-set width with high probability? Can such a result simultaneously quantify the probability of successful certification rather than abstention?

Q3. Relative contributions of contact and dynamics uncertainty (Moderate; W3).

Table 3 shows that the benefit of full-path monitoring becomes nearly negligible once volatility uncertainty is incorporated. Can the authors theoretically characterize the relative contributions of boundary estimation and dynamics estimation to the recovered transfer-set widths? In particular, under what conditions would improved contact localization provide a substantial benefit when the dynamics are unknown?

Q4. Computational complexity of certification (Minor; W4).

The direct inverse construction is computationally efficient, but certification over joint contact–dynamics uncertainty appears substantially more expensive. Can the authors characterize how the computational cost of global certification scales with the dimension and size of the uncertainty sets, and whether the monotonicity or sensitivity structure can further reduce this complexity?

Reviewer_VEapOpenReview ↗
Rating
4
Confidence
2
Informativeness
3
Presentation
2
Soundness
3
Read review
Paper summary

In this paper, the authors study the problem of inverse stopping-contract design: in bilateral stopping contract problem, each player can terminate the game by stopping a share Markov game, and the goal of the inverse reinforcement learning is to recover both players' incentives from the records of which players stopped and where.

The authors propose their main three-step method that first recovers the common continuation value by solving a linear Neumann boundary-value problem, then recovers the transfers through value matching, and finally certifies the equilibrium by ruling out the profitable deviations. They then establish necessary and sufficient conditions and uniqueness within a prescribed smooth-fit class (Theorem 1). The authors then derive a cross-owner response law, characterizing how recovered transfers respond to other player's boundary through its stopping residual, and extends the framework to construct certified transfer and value sets when facing uncertainty in boundaries and dynamics. Finally, the authors evaluate the method against adaptive forward-game calibration and a stopping-action IRL baseline.

Critical strengths
  • This paper proposes a theoretically well-grounded and computationally efficient approach to inverse stopping-contract design. I don't have much background in the area, but in my opinion, the model is cleanly defined, the proposed method is simple yet efficient by leveraging the properties of the problem smartly, and the study of how changes in the observed stopping boundaries and underlying state dynamics affect the recovered incentives is very solid. I specially appreciate the step-by-step development of analysis in Section 6. It first study the cross-residual and Jacobian factorization under fixed dynamics, and then add uncertainty of the boundaries, and finally the joint boundary and dynamics uncertainty. Together, this section develops comparative statics and converts uncertainty about observed behavior and dynamics into certified uncertainty about incentives, and they looks very elegant to me. In my opinion, the technical contribution, if not overlapped with existing works that I'm not aware of, would worth acceptance.
Critical weaknesses
  • My main concern is that some of the assumptions for the models may seem restrictive. For example, the paper assumes that the base payoff functions ℓ0,u0\ell_0,u_0 are known and only α,β\alpha,\beta need to be recovered, and this assumption seems to be essential to for smooth fit to provide the boundary conditions needed to recover the continuation value. Moreover, the authors assume a scalar Markov diffusion and observed stopping policies characterized by two strictly separated boundaries. If the authors can better justify these assumptions, possibly by giving more applications that fit these assumption, I think it would improve the soundness of the model. Or, if possible, could the author clarify whether the results can be generalized beyond these two assumption?
Questions for authors
  • See the weakness. Can the author provide more justification for the assumptions of the modeling? Or, if possible, could the author clarify whether the results can be generalized beyond these assumption?

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