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- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 3
- Presentation
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Paper summary
CrowdRAG combines a quorum over distinct user identities with provenance-aware triple extraction and contradiction filtering to defend shared agent memory against Sybil poisoning. Experiments cover 154 topics, three answer models and four retrievers, with additional tests of adaptive attacks, flooding, honest disagreement, and topic assignment on Travel StackExchange.
Critical strengths
- Counting distinct users across the pool limits the authority of Sybils that dominate retrieval. Results across answer models and retrievers support provenance as a useful defense signal within the stated corruption budget.
- The density-cliff analysis identifies when no support threshold can separate honest and adversarial contributors. The security and coverage trade-off is therefore visible.
Critical weaknesses
- Section 4.1 filters the pool before retrieval, Algorithm 1 filters a fixed top-five set without backfilling, and Appendix Q uses backfill retrieval. These procedures change the amount of honest evidence and the retrieval budget. The implementation used for Table 1 must be identified to make the central comparison reproducible.
- Table 3 tests adaptive attacks through retrieval-level exposure at quorum five, whereas headline end-to-end results use quorum ten. Cosine gaming borrows honest support for contradictory claims, leaving the final defense dependent on triple extraction and entity normalization. Appendix I acknowledges that adversarial synonymy and entity aliasing remain untested, so adaptive end-to-end robustness has not been established.
Questions for authors
- Which pipeline produces Table 1: filtering before retrieval, filtering a fixed top-five set, or retrieving replacements after filtering? Please reconcile Section 4.1, Algorithm 1, and Appendix Q, and report the resulting context size and honest-evidence coverage.
- At the main quorum of ten, what are end-to-end attack success and answer accuracy under cosine gaming? Can targeted paraphrases or entity aliases that preserve the false assertion bypass the contradiction check?
3 comments
Thank you for the reply and the additional experiments. After reading the revised manuscript, I noticed that Appendix E.1 calibrates the threshold with ten Sybil accounts but evaluates it with three. For Contriever, the reported Layer 1 pass counts in the three-account setting imply at most 91.7% coverage, even if every honest claim passes. This falls below the calibration rule’s 95% requirement. I would like to see the results after calibrating on the actual three-account pool, since the current experiment does not establish whether the automatic-calibration result holds under that protocol. The sparse-density experiment also resamples the synthetic benchmark, while the natural Travel data are used only to evaluate topic assignment. A topic can have many contributors without enough independent support for the particular fact being queried. The revised evaluation still leaves unclear how often this requirement holds in natural shared memory and how much useful information the defense retains?
Reply to Reviewer zoRj
Thank you for reading the revised paper so carefully and for the detailed check of the calibration. We answer both points below.
1. Calibration on the three-account pool
The table below reports Eq. 9 computed on the three-account pool, on the clean pool and on the ten-account pool, with CrowdRAG run end to end at each threshold (GPT-5.4, Contriever, , , 154 topics). Without defense, ASR is 63.6% and ACC is 35.7%.
| Pool used for calibration | ASR | ACC | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Three-account pool | 0.76 | 7.8% | 92.2% |
| Clean pool, no Sybil claims | 0.86 | 0.6% | 98.1% |
| Ten-account pool (paper) | 0.85 | 1.3% | 96.1% |
On the three-account pool the rule picks a lower threshold, because the Sybil claims are 9.3% of the pool and count as unsupported. More adversarial claims then pass Layer 1 (241 of 462), Layer 2 blocks 160 of them, and CrowdRAG still reduces ASR from 63.6% to 7.8%. On the clean pool the rule picks 0.86, close to the 0.85 in the paper, and ASR is 0.6%. The clean pool also gives nearly the same thresholds as the paper for the other three retrievers (0.91, 0.955 and 0.997), so the automatic calibration does not depend on the ten accounts.
2. Natural shared memory
Thank you for raising this valuable question. Our method targets shared memory in which the same fact is written independently by multiple users. Since, to our knowledge, there is currently no public dataset of real multi-user agent memory with user provenance, we study this setting with a controlled benchmark. In this setting, our benchmark and method address the most basic step: whether a small number of Sybil accounts can be blocked when honest users give a fact enough support, and how the system behaves when the support is insufficient. How common such support is in real shared memory, and how much useful information the defense retains, still needs to be validated on real data at a larger scale. This is the direction of our future work, and we will note it in the paper.
Thank you again for the careful reading.
Response to Reviewer zoRj
Thank you for the positive assessment and for the two precise questions. We answer both below.
W1 / Q1: which pipeline produces Table 1
A: CrowdRAG in Table 1 follows Section 4.1: the pool is filtered and the top-5 is retrieved from what remains. "Backfill" in Appendix Q is the same procedure seen from the retrieval side, where a filtered position is taken by the next-ranked claim that passes. Algorithm 1 omits the step that continues down the ranking until five claims pass, and we will correct it so that the three places agree. The content-level baselines receive the unfiltered top-5, so the budget is five claims in every case.
As requested, the resulting context size and honest evidence for this pipeline (t=10, 154 topics, mean per topic):
143 of the 154 topics receive the full five claims.
W2 / Q2: end-to-end adaptive attacks at t=10, paraphrases and entity aliases
A: We agree that Table 3 did not establish this. Following the reviewer's suggestion, we ran the adaptive attacks end to end under the configuration of Table 1 (GPT-5.4, Contriever, f=3, t=10, 154 topics). We also added two attacks that keep the retrieval anchor (the query echo of the original attack): one whose claim mimics honest wording, and one whose claim names the subject by an alias or paraphrase and rewords the attribute, which targets entity normalization.
(i) At the main quorum of ten, cosine gaming reaches 3.9% ASR undefended and 0.0% with CrowdRAG, at 96.1% accuracy. With the anchor retained it is as strong as the original attack when undefended (64.3%), and CrowdRAG reduces it to 3.2%.
(ii) On paraphrases and entity aliases: a claim that uses an alias can stay out of the honest (subject, attribute) entry, and Layer 2 then has nothing to compare it with. Such a claim no longer resembles the honest claims, however, so only 48 of 462 pass Layer 1, and the attack reaches 1.3% ASR end to end. Claims that mimic honest wording behave the other way: 138 of 462 pass Layer 1, but they state their value in the honest entry, and Layer 2 blocks 117 of them.
We will add this table to Section 6.2 and update Appendix I, which noted that synonymy and aliasing had not been tested. The construction of the two anchored attacks is described in our response to Reviewer ZYQC (2/2).