- Rating
- 2(+1)
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 1
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Paper summary
This paper presents MemForm, a benchmark evaluating memory formation poisoning in LLM agents across five interfaces: Content, Evidence, Scope, Selection, and Path. The authors construct paired clean and poisoned cases and evaluate six LLMs with two types of memory systems using multiple-choice and free-form tasks. The experiments show that agents can make incorrect decisions when the experience stored in the memory system are selected or consolidated differently during memory formation.
Critical strengths
S1. The paper offers an interesting perspective on memory formation poisoning when the inputs are selected or reordered. Its proposed Selection and Path interfaces highlight potential risks without directly modifying stored memory content.
S2. The paper provides an in-depth mechanism analysis of Path Poisoning. The paper not only reports attack success rates but also investigates why the order of memory formation affects downstream behavior. Specifically, the fixed-terminal-record analysis (Table 17) shows the influence of both the final experience and preceding update order, while the updater comparison (Table 18) demonstrates that vulnerability depends strongly on the memory formation procedure.
Critical weaknesses
W1. I am not convinced by a benchmark paper on agent memory poisoning that does not evaluate representative memory systems or realistic agent implementations. The experiments use LangChain and LlamaIndex, Appendix A.4.1 shows that both implement the same customized policy-based memory protocol, which is not evaluating widely used memory implmentations/frameworks. The downstream evaluation also mainly asks an LLM to make a decision based on the formed memory and a task (Appendix A.4.4), without involving realistic, tool-using agent workflows. This raises concerns about whether the findings can generalize to real-world agent systems. For example, it remains unclear whether the reported results would transfer to representative memory systems such as Mem0 or A-Mem. For a benchmark on memory poisoning in LLM agents, the lack of validation on representative memory systems substantially limits the practical relevance and generalizability of the results.
W2. While I agree that directly specifying retained subsets and consolidation orders for Selection and Path Poisoning is reasonable for controlled benchmark experiments, the authors are encouraged to consider a realistic external attacker that could reliably induce these interventions in practice. Appendix B.3. make some attempts by timing-based realizations. However, I believe the practical relevance of this work would be stronger if the authors could consider such as end-to-end poisoning attack against an existing agent system, with more realistic constraints on attacker control. Such evaluations would help demonstrate whether the identified vulnerabilities can actually be exploited in real-world agent systems.
W3. Insufficiently justified taxonomy. The five proposed interfaces seem ad hoc and confusing, since they combine interventions at different abstraction levels without a sufficiently clear organizing principle. For example, Content directly modifies the memory database and Evidence modifies the input to the memory formation. Scope focuses on contextual support, while Selection and Path manipulate retention and processing order. It remains unclear what principled criteria justify grouping these different dimensions into a single taxonomy. The categories are also overlap. For example, Scope and Selection can produce the same learner-facing histories, as acknowledged in Appendix A.2.
W4. The scenario needs to be explained more clearly. ASR is measured on queries that agents can already answer correctly without memory which means this setting actually does not require experience from memory. This could make the benchmark unsuitable for testing an agent with memory.
Questions for authors
Q1. Can the authors show how the proposed interfaces perform on representative memory systems like A-Mem and mem0, preferably within a real agent implementation (e.g., Codex)?
Q2. How could an external attacker achieve the required Selection or Path interventions when event timing or memory update triggers are not fully controllable? Can the authors provide an end-to-end example in representative existing memory systems?
Q3. What principled criteria is used to select the five interfaces? Given their overlapping effects and different abstraction levels, how can make this benchmark designed more systematically?
Q4. Can the authors analyze why non-aligned memory still triggers relatively high ASR?