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Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

Latent Parity-Check Tokens: Making Transformer Representations Internally Verifiable

Abstract

Transformer representations are typically treated as opaque intermediate states. When latent features become corrupted or inconsistent, subsequent layers continue to process them without explicitly detecting the failure. We introduce Latent Parity-Check Tokens (LPCT), a structured redundancy mechanism that makes Transformer representations explicitly verifiable. Inspired by parity-check codes, LPCT augments semantic tokens with learned check tokens connected through a structured topology. These relationships define testable consistency constraints whose violations produce a latent syndrome that can detect and localize unreliable latent states while optionally supporting reconstruction. Across controlled intermediate-token corruptions, LPCT maintains competitive predictive robustness while its syndrome nearly perfectly detects latent corruption (AUROC ) and increasingly localizes corrupted tokens as erasure severity increases (0.565-0.948 AUROC). These results suggest that structured redundancy can provide explicit internal consistency checking in Transformer representations.

Primary area:
unsupervised, self-supervised, semi-supervised, and supervised representation learning
Keywords:
Transformers, Tokens, Check Tokens, Auxiliary tokens, Redundancy, Corrupt Tokens, latent representations

Reviews

Among:
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1234this paper, Bottom 1%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 1.00 over 3 reviews, above 0% of the others.
Reviewer_y5KsOpenReview ↗
Rating
1
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
1
Soundness
1
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Paper summary

This paper introduces a framework called "Latent Parity-Check Tokens" (LPCT), which incorporates concepts from cryptographic parity checks to detect alterations in the intermediate representations of Transformers, thereby providing explicit verifiability. LPCT augments semantic tokens by constructing a small number of protected parity-check tokens using a structured sparse connection pattern. When intermediate patch tokens are corrupted, the model recomputes the expected parity-check tokens based on the corrupted representations. Experiments conducted on CIFAR-100, Tiny ImageNet-200, and preliminary ImageNet-1K datasets evaluated the model's response to corruption—primarily random token erasure—affecting intermediate patch tokens in Vision Transformers (ViTs). The authors compared LPCT against standard ViTs, corruption-robust ViTs, register tokens, and NNCL. The results demonstrate that LPCT achieves strong AUROC performance in corruption detection while maintaining highly competitive classification robustness. In my view, the paper's primary contribution lies in leveraging cryptographic principles to enhance reconstruction or robustness, thereby introducing an effective approach for monitoring the latent states of Transformers.

Critical strengths
  1. Introduction of Transformer intermediate state verification based on coding theory: The paper establishes a clear analogy between parity-check codes and Transformer representations—protected verification tokens impose structured consistency constraints on intermediate semantic tokens; any violation of these constraints generates a distinct "syndrome," thereby enabling the detection and localization of data corruption. This perspective offers profound insight, transcending traditional robustness objectives; conventional methods typically focus solely on maintaining downstream task accuracy without assessing the reliability of intermediate representations.

  2. Leveraging the same structured verification token mechanism, LPCT not only identifies potential data corruption and determines which tokens are unreliable but also supports reconstruction in the event of token erasure failures. Experimental results demonstrate that the method achieves near-perfect corruption detection while maintaining competitive classification robustness.

Critical weaknesses
  1. Limited practical relevance of the fault model. The paper mainly studies random intermediate-token erasure, a highly controlled setting that appears distant from common ViT failure modes in practice. Stronger evaluation should consider input-level image degradation, occlusion, missing regions, or signal loss, as well as more natural downstream tasks such as image restoration or inpainting. The paper should also more systematically evaluate LPCT’s impact on standard, uncorrupted inference, including accuracy and computational cost.

  2. The experimental evidence is insufficient. Although the core idea is insightful, the evidence is largely limited to zero-token erasure. The paper should evaluate unknown error locations, nonzero perturbations, and more realistic fault types, and demonstrate whether detection and localization meaningfully improve downstream decisions or recovery. It should also better characterize sensitivity to architecture and training hyperparameters.

  3. The writing and presentation need substantial improvement. Statistical reporting is inconsistent: some results include standard deviations while others do not. Detailed statistics could be moved to the appendix, while the main text focuses on the most important results. Figure 1 occupies considerable space but provides limited information and does not communicate the mechanism clearly; Figure 2 also has low information density and could be condensed or moved to the appendix. The overall use of main-text space is inefficient, particularly around the conclusion; the AI use statement should be shortened or relocated if permitted by the venue policy. More broadly, the current presentation does not adequately support the paper’s experimental claims.

Questions for authors

Requests for Clarification

  1. Could the authors provide a more robust justification for the practical significance of the "random intermediate-token erasure" method? In what real-world deployment scenarios would this specific failure model arise? Why is this model more applicable than alternatives such as input-level degradation, occlusion, missing visual regions, or feature corruption caused by transmission?
  2. Beyond classification accuracy on clean data, how does LPCT affect the standard (undistorted) inference process? Specific aspects to consider include calibration, latency, memory footprint, and robustness against common input corruptions. Addressing this is crucial for evaluating whether the verification mechanism imposes a significant cost in standard deployment scenarios.

Suggestions for Revision The concept is highly insightful; with more comprehensive experimental validation and a significantly improved presentation, it has the potential to gain widespread recognition. It is recommended that the authors: design experiments based on realistic scenarios; place the most critical decision-relevant results—which support the paper's core claims—in the main text while moving detailed statistics to the appendix; and redesign figures to increase information density, avoiding the use of AI-generated art for main figures. The current paper does not fully utilize the allotted nine-page limit; adopting a more rigorous and engaging presentation style would be highly beneficial.

Reviewer_btQZOpenReview ↗
Rating
1
Confidence
3
Informativeness
1
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

The paper is dedicated to latent-parity-check tokens-based verification of the consistency of the intermediate representation of a transformer models. The method described is based on appending MM learned check tokens to an intermediate layer of the model. The method utilises a learnable embedding function to construct an expected state for a check token; being dependent on the embeddings of the patch tokens, these expected states are used for example-level patch token corruption detection, localisation and optional reconstruction of erased tokens.

Critical strengths
  1. The motivation to study the internal verifiability of transformer states is clear, the problem is indeed under-explored for transformer architectures.

  2. Ablation study seems to demonstrate that the training with the functional introduced in the work improves the overall transformer empirical robustness under token erasure.

Critical weaknesses
  1. In Tables 1,2, the authors report the results for all-zero token erasure. It is unclear why to apply LPCT for such a perturbation, when an heuristic detecting a zero norm token would both hit the perfect detection score and introduce no computation overhead.

  2. The work studies only controlled perturbation, where no check tokens are perturbed. In a realistic scenario, it is unclear how to achieve that no check tokens are subjected to a perturbation; the work would benefit from the theoretical analysis of the performance of the method based on the number of (potentially adversarially corrupted, like Byzantine workers) check tokens.

  3. The paper states that the method utilises the structured topology that A introduces; however, the lack of baselines such as feature-statistic anomaly detection scores, or checksums, does not allow to conclude that it is indeed the design of the method is what contributes to the detection, or the design of perturbations.

  4. Importantly, the checking mechanism depends in the stored value of HH, the trusted reference (which is computed for an non-perturbed state). Thus, the contribution about "internal" verification is an overstatement.

  5. The placement of the check of the method is not well-motivated; why to put them after block 6, not 7 or 8?

  6. Importantly, LPCT introduces a heavy computation overhead.

Questions for authors
  1. How the matrix A is designed? How to determine which tokens are included in the set of checks for the given token?

  2. What are the architectural design of ϕ\phi, RθR_\theta, the augmentation during training, the values of hyperparameters? What is Reconstruction AUROC?

  3. In the work, there is only a thin line of theory. Could authors provide theoretical backing for the proposed method, proving its efficiency at least in some scenarios?

  4. Please compare the detection/localization scores under Gaussian noise, token replacement and corruption with the simple baselines like norm-based one described above.

  5. How the method degrades when the check tokens are also subjected to the perturbations?

Reviewer_r8akOpenReview ↗
Rating
1
Confidence
2
Informativeness
1
Presentation
3
Soundness
1
Read review
Paper summary

This paper borrows the idea of parity checks from error-correcting codes to make a ViT's intermediate latent states self-checking if edited. At one intermediate layer, the method builds 8 check tokens (always protected), each is a learned average over a group of patch tokens selected by a fixed sparse binary mask. The checks are computed before and after corruption, and the difference, namely the syndrome, is used to detect and localize the corruption by predicting which tokens were hit. For erased tokens (zeroed-out), it optionally guides a ridge-plus-MLP reconstruction. Experiments on CIFAR-100, Tiny ImageNet, and a preliminary ImageNet run show that the syndrome detects erasure nearly perfectly (AUC $\geq 0.999 $) at 30% erasure. Localization improves from 0.565 to 0.948 AUROC as erasure rises from 30% to 90%. Classification robustness roughly matches simple corruption training, with a clear advantage only at 100% erasure (12.5% vs. under 5% accuracy), at about 7% extra parameters and compute. The paper does not present any detection or localization results for corruptions other than zero-erasure.

Critical strengths

None

Critical weaknesses
  • W1: the problem setting is ill-motivated. The paper asks whether Transformers can "verify the integrity of their own latent state", but the setting reduces this to change detection against a clean reference. LPCT builds its checks from the clean HH and assumes they are immune to corruption. The introduction motivates the work with prior robustness methods, such as corruption-based training, which handle missing or corrupted information without access to the clean signal. That is a critical difference. With the clean HH available, detection, localization, and restoration are trivial: compare against or copy HH. Even if only a compact reference can be stored, a checksum would detect corruption exactly at negligible cost. I might be missing something, but the paper does not identify a scenario where this setup is realistic, nor compare against such simple baselines.

  • W2: The detection and localization are reported only for zero-erasure, but not reported for the rest (Gaussian and replacement). Additionally, a zero-norm test would have AUROC 1.0 in Table 1. Table 3 covers the non-trivial corruptions only as accuracy, not detection. In general, I think the authors should specify a concrete threat model, compare against trivial detectors and checksums, and report detection and localization under both erasure and non-erasure adversarial corruptions.

Questions for authors
  • Q1: Can you state a concrete threat model: where in a real system the corruption does occur and why would the check tokens survive it?
  • Q2: Can you include comparisons against trivial detectors (zero-norm test, token-norm statistics) as baselines?

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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