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- Informativeness
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Paper summary
This paper compares how six models from different vendors respond to base prompts and their steered versions. It looks at values conflict, reasoning elicitation, and reasoning suppression, with two additional categories for validation. The authors build rubrics from observed responses and use blind peer judges to classify response modes. They find differences in both compliance and how models respond when they do not comply. They also probe and modify Llama’s activations to change its clarification-seeking behavior.
Critical strengths
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I like that the paper goes beyond whether a model complies and looks at how it responds.
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Using multiple blind peer judges and excluding self-judgment is also good. The agreement analysis helps show which labels are more reliable.
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The Llama experiment extends probing accuracy; It includes activation steering, ablation, and a random-direction control.
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The comparison across models from different vendors is interesting and uses the same prompts for all models.
Critical weaknesses
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This is a useful measurement study, but it does not explain why the models behave differently. Different data, objectives, and safety pipelines motivate the study, but their effects are not examined. The Llama experiment is interesting, but it does not explain the main cross-model differences, so the connection between behavior and mechanism feels incomplete.
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Reported reasoning is not necessarily what the model actually reasons internally. Refusing to share reasoning and giving a step-by-step explanation may reflect how the model presents its answer rather than how it reached that answer. This distinction should be clearer when discussing reasoning suppression and monitoring.
Questions for authors
What do you think explains the different response modes across models? Is there evidence connecting these differences to training data, objectives, or safety pipelines?
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How were the steering instructions chosen? Could different wording or stronger instructions change the model comparisons?
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What connects the clarification-seeking behavior studied in Llama to the reasoning-disclosure and suppression findings in the other models?
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Could the Llama direction capture prompt ambiguity or a tendency to ask questions, rather than resistance based on values? How would you distinguish these?
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How do you distinguish generated explanations from internal reasoning traces? Could GPT-5’s reasoning refusal mainly reflect its disclosure policy?
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Does removing the item-context field from judge prompts change the main model comparisons, beyond changing individual labels?
Addressing weaknesses and responding to questions.
Thank you for your feedback and questions, and for recognizing the value of this work.
Weakness 1. What we are showing is that refusal and compliance rates are not enough to describe how differently frontier models behave when a prompt is vaguely unethical. Specifically, models with similar refusal rates differ in how they decline. We do not claim to explain why each model behaves the way it does, because such a causal claim would require access to each model’s internals, training data, objectives and safety pipeline, and for these models that information is not public.
For Llama-3.3-70B, since the weights are open, we could trace the model's clarification-seeking behavior. The purpose of Llama’s mechanistic analysis was to show that where a model’s weights are open, we can find and verify the direction behind a behavior. As a safety application for any AI lab, such behaviors can be monitored and changed to help prevent misuse when the ethical violations are nuanced and ambiguous.
Weakness 2. As you point out, and as the literature shows (Turpin et al., 2023, Lanham et al., 2023, Chen et al., 2025), how the model reasons internally and what it shows to the user as its reasoning may differ. Our claims are therefore about the visible text, meaning what the model presents to the user as its reasoning and its answer.
While these studies ask whether the reasoning text reflects what drives the answer, we ask the reverse question: whether the answer reflects what appeared in the reasoning text. We test this on DeepSeek-R1, the only model in our study whose responses included its reasoning text, which it returns separately from its answer. Under the suppression instruction, its reasoning text raises the concern it was told to leave out in 83 of 100 steered items. It sets the concern aside every time, and its answer reads as full compliance. Both observations are visible text, so this result holds even if the reasoning text is not faithful to the model’s computation.
From a safety perspective, this matters because an instruction can remove a concern from the answer even when the model’s own reasoning text raises it. An audit that reads only the final answers would not see this, and a lab could use such cases to revise how its models handle these instructions.
In the revised version of the paper, the wording in the reasoning-suppression and monitoring sections will be revised to make this distinction clear.
Q1. Please see our response to weakness 1. One case where public information is consistent with our results: as Reviewer u9sE notes, OpenAI’s published policy on hidden reasoning matches GPT-5’s refusal to disclose its reasoning, a behavior no other model shows.
Q2. The steering prompts were written to apply each category’s pressure in a vaguely unethical way, and the wording differs by category. In reasoning-suppression, each of the 100 items words the instruction differently, so the comparisons do not rest on one phrasing. In values-conflict, most steered prompts state the request itself in its unethical form, so the wording changes with each scenario. In reasoning-elicitation, all 100 items use the same instruction, so GPT-5’s result rests on one wording. While different wording could change the rates, all six models saw the same items, so the comparisons between them are on equal terms.
Q3. As mentioned in our response to weakness 1, the goal of the Llama analysis was to find and verify the direction behind a behavior, not to compare models. Nonetheless, the behavior we traced for Llama does connect to our main claim. As shown in Table 3, Gemini complied on 100 of 100 items, Llama on 57 and Opus on 35. A compliance rate would read Llama and Opus as refusing more, but they rarely refused. Most of their other responses were clarifying questions (42 for Llama, 60 for Opus, 5 or less for the other models). The difference between these models is in how they respond, not in how often they refuse.
Q4. The direction could partly capture prompt ambiguity. It does not capture values-based resistance, because the base values-conflict prompts have no ethical tension, which is added only in the steered version. To measure how much comes from the prompt, we trained the same probe on Llama-3.2-1B, a small model that never produced these responses. It reached 0.72 balanced accuracy, against 0.87 for Llama-3.3-70B, so the larger model carries information beyond what the prompt alone provides.
Q5. Please refer to our responses to weakness 2 and Q1.
Q6. We checked this, although the submitted paper reports only the effect on individual labels in the Robustness Checks section. In our control sample, removing the field hardly impacted the main comparisons. However, the sample size was small, so for the revised version of the paper we will cover a larger sample.
We hope these clarifications address your concerns.