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Withdrawn from ICLR 2027

Not All Channels Are Equal: Perturbation-Invariant Channel Selection for Robust AI-Generated Image Detection

Withdrawn from ICLR 2027, so left out of the paper lists and the map.

Abstract

AI-generated image detectors often lose accuracy after compression, blurring, noise, or resizing. We ask whether this sensitivity is concentrated in particular feature channels of a pretrained detector, and on a forensic-trained CNN we find that it is: the channels whose spatial activation patterns survive perturbation are not the ones the classifier relies on most. We propose PICS (Perturbation-Invariant Channel Selection), which scores each channel by the Pearson correlation between its clean and perturbed activation maps, keeps the union of the highest-ranked channels across perturbations, and retrains the linear head on the selected channels. Under a common training protocol, PICS improves robustness not only beyond retraining the head with augmentation alone, but also beyond magnitude-based, random, attention-based, and weight-clamping alternatives, as well as end-to-end fine-tuning of the backbone. The recipe applies to CNN and ViT detectors, with the largest gains over the released detectors on forensic-trained backbones whose robust and discriminative channels are most separated, and we evaluate it on cross-dataset benchmarks and social-media platforms. These results support perturbation stability as a practical criterion for selecting the features of forensic detectors.

Primary area:
applications to computer vision, audio, language, and other modalities
Keywords:
AI-generated image detection, post-processing robustness, channel selection, perturbation invariance, image forensics, deepfake detection

Reviews

Among:
Shape:
1234this paper, Bottom 27%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 2.00 over 3 reviews, above 27% of the others.
Reviewer_LeMzOpenReview ↗
Rating
3
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
3
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

This paper proposes PICS (Perturbation-Invariant Channel Selection), which improves the robustness of AI-generated image detectors by selecting feature channels that remain stable under image perturbations. The authors observe that, on the Corvi backbone, channels that are highly discriminative on clean images are not necessarily robust to compression, blur, noise, and resizing.

PICS consists of three stages: 1) measuring the Pearson correlation between each channel’s clean and perturbed spatial activation maps, 2) taking the union of the top-ranked channels across perturbations, and 3) retraining the linear classifier on the selected channels while freezing the backbone. The CLIP variant additionally adapts the final LayerNorm. The method does not require perturbing the input during inference.

The authors evaluate PICS on four detector backbones under 51 conditions, with additional cross-dataset and social-media evaluations. The improvements appear on the Corvi backbone, where PICS outperforms augmentation-only retraining and several channel-selection alternatives. However, channel selection provides no measurable improvement over the matched LayerNorm-adaptation control on CLIP, and the social-media results show a trade-off between real- and fake-image accuracy.

Critical strengths
  • Controlled comparisons supporting the channel-selection criterion: The authors compare PICS against an unmasked classifier trained with the same augmentation, as well as magnitude-based pruning and random selection at the same channel budget. In Table 2, PICS achieves 86.6% Overall AP on Corvi, compared with 83.6% for augmentation-only retraining and 81.6% for random selection. These comparisons provide evidence that the improvement comes from which channels are selected, rather than simply using more augmentation or reducing the number of channels. This is important because it directly supports the main methodological contribution.

  • A practical modification with little additional inference cost: PICS uses a fixed channel mask and retrains only a small part of the detector, without requiring full-backbone retraining. For CNN detectors, the mask can be absorbed into the classifier weights, so it does not require additional backbone evaluations or test-time perturbations. Although channel scoring and head retraining introduce offline costs, the resulting detector remains simple to deploy. This makes the reported robustness improvements useful without increasing the main inference workload.

Critical weaknesses
  • The main evaluation is also used to select the channel budget: Section 4 states that KK is chosen on the primary benchmark because the head-training validation accuracy is saturated. The authors explicitly identify these results as development results and keep the selected configuration fixed for transfer evaluation. Nevertheless, the strongest controlled comparisons in Tables 2 and 4 are performed on this development benchmark, which limits their interpretation as independent evidence of generalization. The perturbed cross-dataset results are useful, but the reported comparisons in Tables S3, S4, and S6 are against Corvi and Corvi⊕ rather than the matched augmentation-only control. Therefore, it remains unclear how much of the held-out improvement is specifically due to channel selection. The broad plateau over KK reduces sensitivity to its exact value, but does not replace an independent controlled evaluation.

  • The practical deployment benefit is less clear than the benchmark improvement: Table 3 shows that PICS increases fake-image accuracy at threshold zero, but also decreases real-image accuracy across all evaluated platforms for both CNN families. AP is mixed, so the results do not establish a consistently better detector in deployment. For example, on Reddit in the Corvi family, PICS increases fake-image accuracy from 52.3% to 57.5% compared with Corvi⊕, while real-image accuracy falls from 86.8% to 77.3% and AP decreases from 80.5% to 78.2%. The authors acknowledge this trade-off, but it remains consequential: detecting more generated images is less useful if substantially more real images are incorrectly flagged. A comparison at matched real-image false-positive rates is needed to assess the practical advantage more directly.

Questions for authors
  • Clarification of independent validation: Section 4 states that KK is selected on the primary benchmark and then fixed for transfer evaluation. On the held-out cross-dataset benchmarks, are there comparisons between PICS and an unmasked head trained with exactly the same data, augmentation, and stopping protocol? The reported cross-dataset tables compare against Corvi and Corvi⊕, so this would help distinguish the transfer benefit of channel selection from that of head retraining and augmentation.

  • Targeted evaluation of the deployment trade-off: Table 3 shows higher fake-image accuracy but lower real-image accuracy, with mixed AP across platforms. Could the authors compare fake-image detection rates at matched real-image false-positive rates on these datasets? For a deployment-oriented comparison, thresholds should be selected on separate calibration data and then fixed for evaluation. This would help determine whether PICS improves detection at a comparable false-positive cost, rather than mainly changing the operating point.

Reviewer_2g1KOpenReview ↗
Rating
1
Confidence
4
Informativeness
1
Presentation
3
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

This paper investigates the fragility of AI-generated image detectors under common post-processing perturbations (e.g., compression, blur, noise, and resizing). The authors observe that feature channels whose spatial activation patterns are robust to perturbations are distinct from the ones predominantly relied upon by standard classifiers. To address this, the paper proposes PICS, a three-step framework

Critical strengths

The paper evaluates the proposed method across a diverse set of backbones (CNNs and ViTs), numerous unseen generators, cross-dataset benchmarks, and real-world social media platforms.

Critical weaknesses
  1. The core of the method is close to channel pruning or channel disentanglement. Lots of prior works do similar things. The main difference between them is just how they compute scores for each channel.

[1] Decoupling Bias, Aligning Distributions: Synergistic Fairness Optimization for Deepfake Detection. Feng Ding et al.

[2] Achieving Fairness Through Channel Pruning for Dermatological Disease Diagnosis. Qingpeng et al.

  1. This method has big limitations. All supporting results are basically from Res50. Different backbones have different training data, preprocessing and loss. The resulting global tokens vary a lot.

  2. I don’t think this work meets the standard of ICLR. It provides no valuable insights to the community.

  3. There is no obvious performance improvement. What’s more, the experiment size and the baselines are too few.

Questions for authors

N/A

Reviewer_8dSGOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
4
Informativeness
2
Presentation
3
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

PICS improves post-processing robustness of AI-generated image detectors by scoring each feature channel by the Pearson correlation between its clean and perturbed spatial activation maps, keeping the union of the top-K% across perturbations, and retraining the linear head with the backbone frozen. It reports gains over augmentation-only retraining and over magnitude, random, attention, weight-clamping, and end-to-end fine-tuning baselines, across four backbones (two forensic CNNs, two ViTs), fifteen held-out perturbation families, cross-dataset benchmarks, and social-media platforms.

Critical strengths

This is a careful, well-controlled empirical paper with unusually honest negative results. It reports that on CLIP the gain comes entirely from LayerNorm adaptation and not from channel selection, that deployment results are an operating-point shift rather than uniform superiority, and that the method regresses on rotation and occlusion, which it characterizes as a scope boundary. The matched-budget controls (Table 4, Table S21) isolate the criterion from channel-count effects, the channel diagnosis (robustness vs discriminativeness) is a genuine observation, and the appendix is thorough with per-condition tables, seed variability, and a refuted-hypothesis dissection of the failure modes.

Critical weaknesses
  • The contribution is incremental and the effect is modest and uneven. The method is a per-channel robustness score plus a retrained head, and its largest advantage concentrates on the one forensic-trained CNN (Corvi) where robustness and discriminativeness are most separated, while on Rajan the gains are small and three generators regress, and on CLIP the method adds nothing.
  • The headline mechanism (Pearson of clean vs perturbed maps) is close to prior channel-robustness work the paper cites (DEAR, FVRCP), differing mainly in the aggregation rule, which narrows the novelty.
  • The social-media evaluation shows balanced accuracy rising on only some platforms and falling on others, so the deployment claim is weak, and calibration regresses relative to Stay-Positive.
  • The scope boundary on geometric transforms is acknowledged but unresolved, and the proposed fix (mask plus clamp) trades overall AP for hotspot recovery, leaving no single configuration that is robust across families.
Questions for authors
  • Given that the clear gains concentrate on Corvi and the method adds nothing on CLIP and little on Rajan, what determines when PICS helps, and can you predict it before training rather than observing it after?
  • How does PICS differ empirically from DEAR and FVRCP beyond the union aggregation, and can you report a head-to-head at matched budget?
  • Since deployment balanced accuracy rises on only some platforms and calibration regresses, what is the operating-point argument for using PICS over Stay-Positive in practice?
  • Is there any single configuration that avoids the rotation and occlusion regression without costing overall AP, and if not, how should a practitioner choose?

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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