- Rating
- 3
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper studies the vulnerability of full-duplex speech models to adaptive, multi-turn jailbreaks in live calls. It introduces crescendo-Live, a benchmark that extends Crescendo to spoken interaction: an LLM attacker escalates its requests based on the model's actual spoken replies and can interrupt the model mid-speech. On three full-duplex models and one half-duplex reference, attack success rises with the number of turns, reaching about 67–69% at 8 turns for the full-duplex models, and is higher when the attacker interrupts. The authors then propose DAIMONION, which pairs a refusal-fine-tuned speech frontend with an asynchronous LLM safety monitor that injects refusal instructions when it detects harmful intent. On PersonaPlex-7B, it reduces attack success to below 3% across the evaluated turn budgets. Further analyses cover speaking style, monitor latency, and false alarms.
Critical strengths
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The paper extends multi-turn jailbreak evaluation to live full-duplex speech, where prior speech-safety evaluations rely on single-turn requests, scripted dialogues, or fixed pre-recorded interruptions. In crescendo-Live the attacker adapts to the model's actual spoken replies and can interrupt it, and the results show vulnerabilities that single-turn testing misses. The interruption ablation on PersonaPlex-7B is an informative finding about a real-time safety risk, which is why I consider the benchmark a valuable contribution.
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DAIMONION is a practical defense that keeps safety reasoning off the latency-critical audio path by combining an asynchronous monitor with instruction-conditioned refusal training. It reduces eight-turn attack success on PersonaPlex-7B from 68.9% to 2.9%, and the analysis of detection, false alarms, and alert timing gives useful evidence about deployment trade-offs.
Critical weaknesses
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The methodological novelty is limited. Crescendo-Live reuses the published Crescendo attacker prompt, adapted to speech, on top of the τ-Voice simulator (Section 3.2, Appendix A.2), so the novelty lies in extending evaluation to live full-duplex calls with adaptive turn-taking and interruption rather than in a new attack. This is a meaningful extension, but the experiments do not show its incremental benefit. The single-turn setting (k=1) uses a direct request while the multi-turn settings use a different escalation strategy, and a call counts as successful if any model turn is flagged (Section 3.3), so more turns give more chances to succeed even without higher per-turn vulnerability. The rise in Figure 3 therefore cannot be attributed solely to adaptive escalation. More importantly, there is no comparison with a non-adaptive or scripted multi-turn attacker under the same turn budgets and spoken conditions, although adaptivity is the main difference from prior speech-safety evaluations. Without this baseline, the added value of the benchmark is hard to quantify.
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The architectural novelty of DAIMONION is limited and the evidence for its independent contribution and cost is insufficient. Pairing a full-duplex frontend with an asynchronous LLM backend has been explored before, e.g., MoshiRAG, so the novelty lies mainly in applying it to safety monitoring and training the frontend to follow injected refusal instructions. The experiments do not isolate these safety-specific components. The main comparison pits the original PersonaPlex-7B against a system that adds refusal fine-tuning and the monitor together, and the fine-tuned frontend without the monitor is not evaluated on the jailbreak benchmark, which is a critical missing baseline. The backend comparisons examine alert decisions on 50 harmful requests and their benign twins, not end-to-end jailbreak results. The monitor also flags 12 of 50 benign twins, a possibly important safety–utility cost, and benign-task performance and latency to a substantive answer are not evaluated for the complete system. It is therefore hard to judge the independent value of the proposed safety mechanisms and the cost of the reported gains.
Questions for authors
Q1. Contribution of the asynchronous safety monitor.
Could the authors report the attack success rates of the refusal-fine-tuned PersonaPlex-7B without the safety monitor, using the same 341 harmful intents and turn budgets k = 1, 4, 8? This comparison would help distinguish improvements from refusal fine-tuning from those specifically attributable to asynchronous monitoring.
Q2. Contribution of adaptive escalation.
Could the authors provide a controlled comparison between crescendo-Live and a non-adaptive or scripted multi-turn attacker under the same turn budgets and interaction conditions? Additionally, reporting the distribution of the first successful attack turn would help distinguish the effects of adaptive escalation from the increased number of opportunities for success.
Q3. Safety–utility and latency trade-offs of the complete defense system.
Could the authors provide additional end-to-end evaluation of DAIMONION on benign multi-turn conversations, including false refusal rates and latency to the first substantive response rather than only the first generated audio? It would also be helpful to quantify how frequently safety alerts arrive after the neutral opener has ended and whether harmful content is emitted before intervention. These results would help establish whether the strong safety gains can be maintained without substantially degrading the usefulness and responsiveness of the speech assistant.
4 comments
W1. Novelty of crescendo-Live, and whether more turns alone explain the higher attack success
We agree that most components already exist: the attack prompt comes from Crescendo and the call simulation from τ-Voice. Our focus is a threat that is realistic but underexplored: an attacker that adapts each request to the model's spoken replies over multiple turns and can interrupt the model in real time, as a real user can. The closest prior work uses fixed audio: randomly sampled multi-turn (MTR-DuplexBench, Zhang et al., 2025), or one pre-recorded interruption after a single harmful request (DuplexJail, Roh et al., 2026). Our results show that the live setting is more dangerous: Models that resist direct requests (5.6% and 1.8% attack success for MiniCPM-o and VoiceChat at k = 1) are jailbroken in 69.2% and 66.9% of calls at k = 8 (Figure 3); Interrupting raises attack success on PersonaPlex from 29.6% to 49.6% at k = 4 (Table 3); and adapting to the model's replies also raises it (Table 2, Q2).
Regarding whether this rise comes mainly from having more turns, we respectfully disagree. Crescendo splits the harmful request across several harmless-looking turns, so that no single turn reveals the full intent; this, not the number of turns, makes the model easier to jailbreak. Three observations support this:
- More questions alone do not reduce safety. MTR-DuplexBench asks a separate harmful question in each of 10 rounds, and the refusal rate stays almost the same across rounds (e.g., Moshi: 90.0% in round 1 and 91.0% over rounds 1–10).
- Successes come late in the conversation. First successes are rare at turn 1 and most common at turns 3–4 (Q2), which is not what more chances alone would produce.
- The increase is larger than repeated attempts would explain. If each of the k turns were an independent direct request, at most 1 − (1 − p₁)^k of the calls would succeed, where p₁ is the k = 1 rate. For the two models that usually refuse a direct request, this gives 20.6% (MiniCPM-o) and 7.0% (VoiceChat) at k = 4, while the observed rates are 51.0% and 47.2%.
Overall, we appreciate reviewer's effort and hope these additions address the reviewer's concerns. We are happy to provide more details.
Response
Thanks for the response and the extended results for my question. I will keep my score
Thank you :)
We thank the reviewer for the careful review and for recognizing the value of our benchmark. We first answer the three questions, which cover the new experiments, and then respond to the two weaknesses. New and revised text in the updated PDF is marked in blue.
Q1. The fine-tuned speech model without the monitor
We ran this experiment: the fine-tuned speech model with the monitor turned off, on the same 341 intents, with the same attacker and the same grading (Figure 3, Section 5.2). Attack success rate (ASR^HB, %):
Fine-tuning alone improves safety to some extent, mainly for direct requests, because the model saw direct harmful requests with refusals during training. However, the improvement is limited when the harmful intent is spread across several turns: as with all original models, the attack success of the fine-tuned model alone increases with the number of turns. With the monitor, attack success stays low at every turn budget.
Q2. Adaptive vs. scripted attacker, and the first successful turn
For each of the 50 AdvBench intents in our seed set, we use the same attacker model and the same attacker prompt to write a four-turn Crescendo script in advance, without seeing any model reply. The scripted attacker then speaks these four turns in order, with the same voice, and we grade the calls with the same HarmBench classifier. The adaptive attacker is crescendo-Live with the same number of turns (k = 4) on the same intents. Attack success rate (ASR^HB, %; Table 2):
The adaptive attacker achieves a 12-point higher attack success rate on PersonaPlex, a 6-point higher rate on VoiceChat, and a similar rate on MiniCPM-o. The adaptive attacker can respond to what the model actually says: when the model avoids the question, refuses, or answers only part of it, the attacker can rephrase, take a step back, or follow up. This flexibility increase the ASR.
First successful turn (k = 4, 341 calls per model). Number of calls whose first harmful turn is turn 1, 2, 3, 4:
If more turns only gave more chances, with the same chance of success at every turn, first successes would be most common at turn 1 and less common at each later turn.
Q3. Safety–utility and latency trade-offs of the full system
Utility and latency (Table 1). We compare the full system (with the monitor on) with the original PersonaPlex on LLaMA Questions (300 spoken questions). From the end of each question, we measure when the model starts producing audio and when it says the first word of the actual answer.
Daimonion keeps the original accuracy and starts speaking almost as quickly. The actual answer starts 0.9 s later, which is the cost of the short neutral phrase at the start of the reply. The monitor sent no alert on any of the 300 questions, nor on any of the 727 examples of Full-Duplex-Bench v1.0, where the turn-taking results stay close to those of the original model (Appendix A.13).
False refusals in multi-turn conversations. We use the 50 SARSteer benign twins, run with the same Crescendo attacker, which keeps asking for more specific details. With the monitor, the model refused 13 of the 50. We look into the gap and find out most of these are protective requests, such as preventing identity theft or securing a government database, where the simulator start with background or motivation like "what are common way to break..." and follow up with "how can we prevent them". But the monitor will flag the first query as harmful and trigger a refusal.
Alert timing and harmful content before the alert. The monitor decides while the caller is still speaking, so most alerts are ready when the caller stops; for the 23% that are not, the median remaining wait is 0.84 s, shorter than the 2.85 s median neutral phrase (Section 4.2). We also checked the outcome: across the k = 4 and 8 runs, 2,496 model turns received an alert, 824 of them after the model had started its reply, and none was judged harmful (Section 5.2). Harmful turns occur only before the monitor's first alert in a call, that is, when the monitor has not yet detected the attack.