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Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

SimJIR: Jailbreaking Aligned LLMs with Simple In-Context Rewards

Abstract

Large Language Model (LLM) safety is becoming increasingly important as LLMs are deployed in a growing number of real-world applications. Jailbreak attacks help expose vulnerabilities and foster the development of better alignment methods. Existing black-box attacks are costly: Many-Shot Jailbreaks require curated demonstrations, while Multi-Turn Jailbreaks rely on capable external attacker LLMs. We observe that a refusal emitted by a target LLM is a *free and on-policy* negative demonstration underutilized by existing attacks. Combining this observation with the recent finding that LLMs can improve their responses based on in-context rewards given to their previous attempts, we propose SimJIR (Simple Jailbreaking with In-context Rewards), a simple, multi-turn black-box attack that does not need any curated demonstrations or attacker LLMs. SimJIR assigns a negative reward to each past refusal and maintains a cumulative score across turns, penalizing the model until it decides to maximize its reward by producing a harmful response. We demonstrate empirically that SimJIR achieves competitive attack success at a fraction of the cost, can be adapted to bypass defenses through small edits, and can be used as a vision-language jailbreak out of the box.

Primary area:
alignment, fairness, safety, privacy, and societal considerations
Keywords:
jailbreak, large language model, in-context reward

Reviews

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Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 2.67 over 3 reviews, above 70% of the others.
Reviewer_fLRPOpenReview ↗
Rating
3(+1)
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
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Paper summary

This work proposes SimJIR, a simple black-box method for jailbreaking aligned LLMs without external attacker models or curated harmful demonstrations. It uses the model's previous refusals as negative examples and provides reward feedback across multiple turns, achieving competitive results at a relatively low cost. However, I have some concerns about the novelty, experimental fairness, generalizability, and overall figure quality. I would be willing to raise my score if the authors could substantially improve the figures.

Critical strengths

I) The method is simple and only uses fixed prompts and the target model’s conversation history, without needing extra attacker models or harmful examples. II) Demonstrating attack effectiveness across multiple model families, this efficiency result holds practical significance for black-box, multi-turn attacks.

Critical weaknesses

I) The novelty and underlying mechanism are not fully convincing. SimJIR shares ideas with existing methods, and Table 4 even shows higher ASR without history on some models. II) The experimental comparison may not be entirely fair. SimJIR uses the same judge for attack termination and evaluation, while the cost analysis only considers successful attacks. III) The generalization claims seem too broad. Only two defenses are tested, one without an official implementation, and the multimodal evaluation is limited to a small TYPO subset. IV) The figures and overall layout need more work. Several figures are crowded, visually inconsistent, and show noticeable AI-generated styling, which hurts the paper's presentation quality.

Questions for authors

I) In Table 4, removing history actually improves ASR for some models. Could you explain why this happens and how it supports the claimed mechanism of SimJIR? II) Could you clarify whether judge reuse, success-only cost statistics, and disabling PANDAS Adaptive Sampling affect the fairness of the comparison? III) Given the limited defense and multimodal experiments, could you clarify how broadly the findings can be generalized? IV) Could you improve Figures 1, 2, and 4 by making the visual style more consistent and reducing the noticeable AI-generated and template-like elements?

5 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer (1 of 3)

We thank the reviewer for the feedback on SimJIR.

Comment 1. (1) How does SimJIR differ from existing methods that share its ideas? (2) Why does removing the history in Table 4 raise the attack success rate (ASR) on some models, and how does this support the claimed mechanism of SimJIR?

Response. (1) To our knowledge, SimJIR is the first attack that keeps the target's own refusals in context as on-policy negative demonstrations and the first to use in-context rewards as a jailbreak signal, and (2) removing history raises ASR only on the two reasoning models, which infer the past refusal from the SimJIR prompt itself and therefore still act on the same mechanism.

First, for (1), the Introduction and Related Work of the original submission separate SimJIR from three groups of related methods. MSJ [1] and PANDAS [2] rely on curated, off-policy harmful demonstrations. Crescendo [3] requires an attacker LLM and removes refusals from the target's context. The token system of DAN 6.0 [4] resembles a reward in spirit, although Appendix A.7 finds no evidence that it raises ASR. In contrast, SimJIR uses only a fixed prompt and the target's own conversation history.

Second, for (2), Table 4 reports that removing history lowers ASR on AdvBench50 for three non-reasoning models (Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct: 94.0 → 12.0, Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct: 88.0 → 4.0, Gemma-3-4B-IT: 90.0 → 40.0) and raises it for two reasoning models (Gemma-4-E4B-IT: 66.7 → 85.3, GLM-4.1V-9B-Thinking: 78.0 → 86.7). The SimJIR prompt works as feedback on a past refusal. Without history, the non-reasoning models see no past refusal to improve on, so they treat the prompt as a standalone harmful request and refuse. In contrast, the reasoning models appear to infer the past refusal from the prompt itself. For example, a reasoning trace of GLM-4.1V-9B-Thinking reads: "my previous response was refusing, which got -1. Now I need to provide a response that's better". Since the past refusal is implied by the prompt rather than present in context, these models still try to improve on an implied negative demonstration, which is a core mechanism of SimJIR.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer (2 of 3)

Comment 2. How do (1) reusing the same judge for attack termination and evaluation, (2) cost statistics restricted to successful attacks, and (3) disabling PANDAS Adaptive Sampling affect the fairness of the comparison?

Response. To directly address this question, we present additional results which indicate that (1) an independent evaluation judge leaves the ASR-cost tradeoff unchanged and (3) enabling Adaptive Sampling leaves the ranking of PANDAS relative to SimJIR unchanged, while (2) success-only cost is the measure that remains comparable across attacks.

First, for (1), SimJIR uses Llama Guard 3 as its inner judge, Crescendo [3] uses GPT-4o mini, and the ASRs of all methods are evaluated with Llama Guard 3 for a consistent comparison. This means SimJIR's inner judge is the same as the evaluation judge. To check whether this favors SimJIR, the revised Appendix A.10 re-evaluates the ASRs of SimJIR and Crescendo with an independent evaluation judge, Qwen3Guard-Gen-8B [5], while each method keeps its inner judge. The ASRs of both methods drop, which indicates that Qwen3Guard is a stricter judge than Llama Guard 3. Nevertheless, Fig. 10 demonstrates that the ASR-cost tradeoff stays the same: SimJIR reaches ASR comparable to Crescendo on most models while needing far fewer turns to jailbreak. Using different inner and evaluation judges therefore does not affect our conclusions.

Second, for (2), we would like to kindly remind the reviewer that Fig. 2 and Section 4.2.2 report mean input tokens and turns over the successfully jailbroken queries only. Unsuccessful queries are excluded since (i) their cost is already reflected in lower ASRs, and (ii) the number of tokens and turns they consume is fixed by the budget set by the attacker, which follows each method's default for faithful reproduction and is not comparable across attacks.

Third, for (3), our PANDAS baseline disables Adaptive Sampling (AS) since AS costs many GPU hours and the PANDAS authors [2] report marginal ASR gains from it. To check its effect, we reran PANDAS with AS on AdvBench50 with one seed. Table R1 below reports the ASRs (%), where the "PANDAS (no AS)" and SimJIR columns come from Table 1 of the original submission.

Table R1. ASR (%) of PANDAS with and without AS on AdvBench50.

ModelPANDAS (no AS)PANDAS (with AS)SimJIR
Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct54.060.094.0
Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct4.010.088.0
Qwen3-8B8.712.070.7
GLM-4-9B-Chat46.046.016.0
GLM-4.1V-9B-Thinking20.720.078.0
GLM-4.6V-Flash1.30.0100.0
Gemma-3-4B-IT12.04.090.0
Gemma-4-E4B-IT0.70.066.7

AS changes the ASR of PANDAS by between −8 and +6 points and does not change its ranking relative to SimJIR on any model. Disabling AS therefore does not affect the conclusions of our comparison.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer (3 of 3)

Comment 3. (1) How broadly do the defense findings generalize, given that two defenses are tested and one of them lacks an official implementation? (2) How broadly do the multimodal findings generalize beyond the TYPO subset?

Response. We would like to bring to the attention of the reviewer that (1) Section 3.4 of the original submission identifies two parts of the SimJIR prompt that guide edits against a defense, and the two tested defenses demonstrate one of each, and (2) the revised multimodal evaluation adds an image-text benchmark and an audio benchmark, on which SimJIR raises ASR for every model.

First, for (1), the two parts are the isolated harmful query and the reward-maximization task, and Table 2 demonstrates an edit to each. Our NBF-LLM [6] bypass modifies only the harmful query, and our SafeEnd [7] bypass extends the reward task so that the safety demonstration of SafeEnd becomes part of the task. Both are recent defenses designed against multi-turn and many-shot jailbreaks, and neither had a published bypass. Since SimJIR is a multi-turn attack whose refusal history acts as demonstrations, these two defenses are the most directly relevant, and each bypass edits one part of the prompt. For NBF-LLM, we use the official code and pretrained weights. The official repository of SafeEnd contains no source code, and its authors did not respond to our inquiry. We therefore reimplemented SafeEnd and document the reproduction in Appendix A.8.

Second, for (2), Section 4.2.4 and Table 3 of the revised PDF add two benchmarks: HADES-200, with 200 harmful queries paired with generated images rather than typographic text, and JALMBench, with 246 spoken harmful queries. JALMBench is evaluated on Gemma-4-E4B-IT, the only model in our list that accepts audio input. The following table reproduces the revised Table 3 together with the original TYPO results.

Table 3 (revised PDF). ASR (%) with and without SimJIR on the multimodal benchmarks.

BenchmarkModelNo Attack ASR (%)SimJIR ASR (%)
TYPOGLM-4.1V-9B-Thinking63.981.6
TYPOGLM-4.6V-Flash59.281.6
TYPOGemma-3-4B-IT30.680.0
TYPOGemma-4-E4B-IT5.971.8
HADES-200GLM-4.1V-9B-Thinking64.590.0
HADES-200GLM-4.6V-Flash52.085.5
HADES-200Gemma-3-4B-IT30.087.5
HADES-200Gemma-4-E4B-IT10.069.5
JALMBenchGemma-4-E4B-IT2.053.7

SimJIR raises ASR on every model and benchmark without any algorithm change, with the image or audio passed in the first turn. Its effectiveness therefore holds across typographic images, generated images, and speech.

Comment 4. Could Figs. 1, 2, and 4 be made less crowded and more consistent in visual style, with fewer AI-generated and template-like elements?

Response. The revised PDF redraws Figs. 1, 2, and 4 with simpler annotations and a reorganized cost presentation. Specifically, Fig. 1 replaces the pictorial badges with plain-text labels and uses one color, matching the Qwen logo, for all target-model turns. Fig. 2 replaces the dual-axis chart with a semi-log scatter plot of input tokens against ASR, and the component-level token breakdown moves to Appendix A.5. Fig. 4 moves the legend from the caption into the figure, and its caption now states the takeaway. The revised layout also increases the spacing between Figs. 1 and 2.

We hope that these revisions and results answer the questions of the reviewer.

[1] Anil et al. Many-shot jailbreaking. NeurIPS, 2024.

[2] Ma et al. PANDAS: Improving many-shot jailbreaking via positive affirmation, negative demonstration, and adaptive sampling. ICML, 2025.

[3] Russinovich et al. Great, now write an article about that: The Crescendo Multi-Turn LLM Jailbreak Attack. USENIX Security, 2025.

[4] TheBurninator99. Presenting DAN 6.0. Reddit, 2023.

[5] Qwen Team. Qwen3Guard Technical Report. arXiv:2510.14276, 2025.

[6] Hu et al. Steering dialogue dynamics for robustness against multi-turn jailbreaking attacks. TMLR, 2026.

[7] Chen et al. Mitigating many-shot jailbreak attacks with one single demonstration. arXiv:2605.08277, 2026.

Reviewer_eR4MOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
1
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

This paper proposes SimJIR, a black-box multi-turn jailbreak that keeps the target model's refusals in context and gives each refusal a negative in-context reward, with a running cumulative total. This pushes the model to comply in order to "maximize reward." The authors report that SimJIR reaches attack success comparable to Crescendo with far fewer tokens and outperforms many-shot jailbreaks. They also show that small prompt edits bypass two recent defenses and that the method transfers to vision-language models without modification.

Critical strengths
  • The method is simple and needs neither curated demonstrations nor an attacker LLM. The ablations clearly identify what drives success: on-policy refusals and the reward signal.
  • The reasoning-trace analysis is interesting. It shows how in-context rewards override the model's safety reasoning, which could inform future work such as reasoning monitoring.
Critical weaknesses
  1. Baselines. The comparison omits recent black-box attacks, e.g., X-Teaming [1], ActorAttack [2], and TAP [3].
  2. Effect of turn count. The maximum number of turns is fixed at T = 10. The paper reports mean turns-to-jailbreak but never ASR as a function of T, so it is unclear whether more turns keep increasing ASR or saturate early.
  3. Target models. All targets are open-source 4–9B models. The authors cite terms-of-service concerns, but most prior jailbreak work, including the baselines used here (e.g., Crescendo) and other recent attacks [1–3], evaluates on proprietary models such as GPT-4o and Claude at least. Since SimJIR is a black-box attack, it should be evaluated on at least one frontier API model, or failing that, on larger open-weight models. This matters especially because the newest model tested, Qwen3.5-9B, largely resists SimJIR (12.7% vs. 77.3% for Crescendo on HarmBench), and its reasoning traces show it recognizes the prompt as a jailbreak. This suggests the attack may not transfer to stronger, more recently aligned models.
  4. Significance. The method is an interesting way to jailbreak open-source models with fewer tokens than existing multi-turn attacks. However, it relies on a fixed template that newer models already detect, so it is unclear whether it is a meaningful advance from an attacker's perspective.

[1] Rahman et al., "X-Teaming: Multi-Turn Jailbreaks and Defenses with Adaptive Multi-Agents"
[2] Ren et al., "Derail Yourself: Multi-turn LLM Jailbreak Attack through Self-discovered Clues"
[3] Mehrotra et al., "Tree of Attacks: Jailbreaking Black-Box LLMs Automatically"

Questions for authors

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2 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer (1 of 2)

We thank the reviewer for their time and feedback.

Comment 1. How does SimJIR compare with recent black-box attacks such as X-Teaming, ActorAttack, and TAP, which the baseline comparison omits?

Response. To directly address this question, we present additional results for ActorAttack [2], which reaches ASR similar to Crescendo [4] at a similarly high token cost, while SimJIR uses 6 to 53 times fewer tokens than ActorAttack on every model.

Specifically, X-Teaming [1], ActorAttack [2], and TAP [3] all use an attacker LLM to generate the prompts sent to the target, as Crescendo does. The original submission includes Crescendo as the representative of this class. Crescendo attains the highest attack success rate (ASR) in Table 1, and on Qwen3-8B it uses about 43 times more input tokens than SimJIR (Section 4.2.2). We expected the other attacker-LLM methods to follow the same pattern. To verify this, we ran ActorAttack on AdvBench50 with one seed. Table R2 reports ASR (%) and mean input tokens per successful jailbreak, where the Crescendo and SimJIR ASRs come from Table 1.

Table R2. ASR (%) and mean input tokens per successful jailbreak on AdvBench50.

ModelCrescendo ASRCrescendo tokensActorAttack ASRActorAttack tokensSimJIR ASRSimJIR tokens
Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct98.063.1k92.080.8k94.01.9k
Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct96.075.6k96.080.2k88.03.0k
Qwen3-8B98.094.6k92.081.2k70.72.8k
Qwen3.5-9B90.0144.0k84.093.9k4.015.5k
GLM-4-9B-Chat92.037.0k82.057.2k16.01.3k
GLM-4.1V-9B-Thinking98.098.6k94.080.3k78.05.0k
GLM-4.6V-Flash98.794.1k98.085.1k100.01.6k
Gemma-3-4B-IT98.074.3k92.070.0k90.05.1k
Gemma-4-E4B-IT93.3132.3k90.085.0k66.73.5k

As expected, ActorAttack behaves like Crescendo, with a high average ASR (91.1% vs. 95.8%) at a similarly high average cost (79k vs. 90k tokens). SimJIR uses 6 to 53 times fewer tokens than ActorAttack on every model and requires no attacker LLM.

Comment 2. How does ASR change as a function of the maximum turn count T, and does it keep increasing with more turns or saturate early?

Response. We kindly refer the reviewer to Fig. 11 in Appendix A.11 of the revised PDF, which we added for this question and which plots ASR over maximum turn counts T from 1 to 10 on HarmBench-Standard and AdvBench50. On most models, ASR rises steeply over the first few turns and then saturates. A few models, for instance GLM-4.1V-9B-Thinking and Gemma-4-E4B-IT on AdvBench50, keep improving until close to T = 10. Overall, all models largely saturate by T = 10. Therefore, T = 10, the value we use for SimJIR in all main experiments, is a reasonable default budget.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer (2 of 2)

Comment 3. (1) Can SimJIR be evaluated on at least one frontier API model such as GPT-4o or Claude? (2) Failing that, how does SimJIR perform on larger open-weight models?

Response. Our evaluation covers (1) nine open-source models whose safety is a practical concern in its own right, since testing jailbreaks on proprietary models requires authorization from their providers that we do not hold, and (2) four additional 27-32B open-weight models in Table R3, on which SimJIR remains effective.

First, for (1), as stated in the original submission, testing jailbreaks on proprietary models violates the terms of service of their providers, and prior work documents the barriers to obtaining permission for such red teaming [5]. Our evaluation instead covers nine open-source models spanning four families released between 2024 and 2026, including five reasoning models (Table 1). The safety of open-source models is a significant concern in its own right: they are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, and anyone can download and run them locally, outside the monitoring and safeguards of the providers. Their vulnerability to a simple and accessible attack like SimJIR is therefore a practical safety concern.

Second, for (2), Table R3 below reports additional results on four larger open-source models from a single-seed AdvBench50 evaluation.

Table R3. ASR (%) on AdvBench50 for four larger open-source models.

ModelNo Attack ASRSimJIR ASR
Qwen2.5-32B-Instruct0.072.0
Qwen3-32B (reasoning)8.096.0
Gemma-3-27B-IT8.0100.0
OLMo-3.1-32B-Think (reasoning)0.096.0

SimJIR raises ASR from 0-8% to 72-100% on all four models. Its effectiveness therefore holds at 27-32B scale.

Comment 4. Is SimJIR a meaningful advance from an attacker's perspective, given that it relies on a fixed template that newer models may detect?

Response. SimJIR's significance lies in the mechanism its template exploits. As detailed in Sections 1 and 3, SimJIR is, to our knowledge, the first attack that keeps the target's own refusals in context as on-policy negative demonstrations, and the first to demonstrate that in-context rewards work as a jailbreak signal, all without curated demonstrations or an attacker LLM. The ablations in Table 4 confirm that both aspects drive the attack: replacing the refusals with off-policy ones or removing the rewards lowers ASR on every model to which the ablation applies.

Moreover, the same fixed template reaches at least 66.7% ASR on AdvBench50 for seven of the nine models in Table 1, which span four families released between 2024 and 2026, and for the four larger 27-32B models in Table R3. With one targeted edit each, it also bypasses two recent defenses that had no published bypasses, and it works on image and audio harmful queries without modification. We see automatic adaptation of the template to each target as a compelling future direction, in line with the Conclusion of the original submission.

We hope that these results answer the questions of the reviewer.

[1] Rahman et al. X-Teaming: Multi-Turn Jailbreaks and Defenses with Adaptive Multi-Agents. COLM, 2025.

[2] Ren et al. Derail Yourself: Multi-turn LLM Jailbreak Attack through Self-discovered Clues. arXiv:2410.10700v1, 2024.

[3] Mehrotra et al. Tree of Attacks: Jailbreaking Black-Box LLMs Automatically. NeurIPS, 2024.

[4] Russinovich et al. Great, now write an article about that: The Crescendo Multi-Turn LLM Jailbreak Attack. USENIX Security, 2025.

[5] Longpre et al. Position: A Safe Harbor for AI Evaluation and Red Teaming. ICML, 2024.

Reviewer_1mJLOpenReview ↗
Rating
3
Confidence
3
Informativeness
3
Presentation
3
Soundness
3
Read review
Paper summary

This paper proposes SimJIR, a low‑cost multi‑turn black‑box jailbreak for aligned LLMs. Its core idea is re‑using the target model’s own refusal outputs as on‑policy negative demonstrations, leveraging the in‑context reward‑maximization effect. Unlike prior approaches such as MSJ/PANDAS which need pre‑curated harmful examples or Crescendo which relies on an external attacker LLM, SimJIR repeatedly assigns negative rewards to refusals inside conversation history to pressure the model into generating harmful responses. The authors evaluate across multiple open‑source text and vision‑language models against established jailbreak baselines. SimJIR achieves competitive attack success rate with drastically reduced token overhead. The paper also demonstrates hand‑edited prompt variants to bypass two recent test‑time defenses and shows it works out‑of‑the‑box for vision‑language jailbreaking. Ablation and reasoning‑trace analyses are provided to study attack behavior.

Critical strengths
  1. This work presents a novel, practical black‑box jailbreak paradigm. Instead of discarding model refusals upon failure, SimJIR repurposes them as on‑policy negative demonstrations driven by in‑context reward maximization. It removes the dependency on pre‑built harmful demonstrations or external attacker LLMs, significantly reducing token and API overhead compared with multi‑turn baselines such as Crescendo.
  2. Empirical evaluation is comprehensive. Evaluations cover diverse open‑source LLMs (including reasoning models and VLMs), two standard jailbreak benchmarks, ablation studies, reasoning‑trace analysis, defense bypass tests, and careful ablation of DAN‑6.0’s token system in the appendix to clarify literature confusion.
  3. Interesting practical findings: SimJIR works out‑of‑the‑box for vision‑language models without algorithm modification; the paper also shows how simple prompt edits can adapt the template to bypass existing defenses.
Critical weaknesses
  1. The attack relies critically on the target model accepting the meta‑instruction of “maximize cumulative reward”. As observed with Qwen3.5‑9B in the paper’s reasoning‑trace results, reasoning models can explicitly recognize this jailbreak pattern and reject the whole reward‑maximization setup, rendering SimJIR ineffective. The long‑term threat of SimJIR remains unclear if future safety alignment specifically hardens against this category of meta‑prompt.
  2. Defense bypasses are all manually hand‑crafted prompt edits. There is no automatic adaptive bypass pipeline. Every new unknown defense would require human prompt engineering work.
  3. Evaluation is restricted to open‑source models. No experimental results on closed‑source production LLMs (GPT / Claude family) are provided due to API‑term constraints, limiting external validity for real‑world deployed systems.
  4. (Reviewer observation, not paper experimental result): The vanilla SimJIR template contains distinctive phrasing. In principle this might be detected by lexical or semantic input filters, though this hypothesis is not empirically validated within the paper.
Questions for authors
  1. Since SimJIR hinges on the model accepting the “maximize‑reward” meta‑instruction, what is your expectation for its effectiveness after future safety alignment hardening against such meta‑prompts? Could you discuss possible mitigation directions against SimJIR?
  2. All bypass variants are manually written prompt edits. Could you discuss possibilities to realize fully automatic adaptive bypass, rather than manual per‑defense prompt tuning?
  3. Without empirical closed‑source results, what inferences can we draw about SimJIR’s performance on heavily red‑teamed commercial LLMs?
2 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer (1 of 2)

We thank the reviewer for the time devoted to evaluating this work.

Comment 1. (1) How effective will SimJIR remain once future safety alignment targets reward-maximization meta-prompts? (2) What are possible mitigation directions against SimJIR?

Response. (1) SimJIR currently exceeds 50% attack success rate (ASR) on four of the five reasoning models we tested, and publishing it is what enables the safety hardening the reviewer anticipates, and (2) safety training against reward-maximization meta-prompts and input filtering are possible mitigation directions.

First, for (1), whether an attack continues to work after future alignment applies to all jailbreak research and is not specific to SimJIR. Once a jailbreak is published, safety alignment can train against it and new defenses can be built to mitigate it, which is the main purpose of publishing new jailbreak methods. Regarding the rejection of the reward-maximization setup by reasoning models, we respectfully note that this is not generally the case, as SimJIR achieves over 50% ASR on both AdvBench50 and HarmBench-Standard for four of the five reasoning models in Table 1.

Second, for (2), safety training that targets reward-maximization meta-prompts is one mitigation direction. Lexical or semantic input filters are another. However, the SimJIR prompt can be reworded to bypass such filters, as we detail in our response to Comment 4. Overall, we hope that publishing SimJIR will facilitate the development of better countermeasures.

Comment 2. Could SimJIR's defense bypasses be automated, instead of being written by hand for each defense?

Response. We see automatic adaptation as a compelling future direction, which the Conclusion of the original submission identifies. One possibility is an attacker LLM that edits the two parts of the SimJIR prompt identified in Section 3.4, the reward-maximization task and the isolated harmful query, with the responses of the defense as feedback. These two edit targets narrow the search space compared with rewriting the entire prompt. Meanwhile, a recent study [2] reports that hand-crafted bypasses are currently more effective against LLM defenses than automated ones. Moreover, both defenses we bypass are recent and, to the best of our knowledge, had no published bypasses. The fact that one hand-written edit to SimJIR bypasses each of them is a concern for these defenses in itself.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer (2 of 2)

Comment 3. Without results on closed-source models, what can be inferred about SimJIR's performance on heavily red-teamed commercial LLMs?

Response. To directly address this question, we present additional results on four larger 27-32B open-source models, on which SimJIR raises ASR to 72-100%, which indicates that its effectiveness is not confined to small models.

Specifically, as stated in the original submission, testing jailbreaks on closed-source models violates the terms of service of their providers, and prior work documents the barriers to obtaining permission for such red teaming [3]. Our evaluation instead covers nine open-source models spanning four families released between 2024 and 2026, including five reasoning models (Table 1). The safety of open-source models is a significant concern in its own right: they are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, and anyone can download and run them locally, outside the monitoring and safeguards of the providers. Their vulnerability to a simple and accessible attack like SimJIR is therefore a practical safety concern.

Table R3 reports ASR (%) on four larger open-source models from a single-seed AdvBench50 evaluation.

Table R3. ASR (%) on AdvBench50 for four larger open-source models.

ModelNo Attack ASRSimJIR ASR
Qwen2.5-32B-Instruct0.072.0
Qwen3-32B (reasoning)8.096.0
Gemma-3-27B-IT8.0100.0
OLMo-3.1-32B-Think (reasoning)0.096.0

SimJIR raises ASR from 0-8% to 72-100% on all four models. While closed-source models remain outside direct measurement, these results indicate that the effectiveness of SimJIR is not confined to small models.

Comment 4. Could lexical or semantic input filters detect the SimJIR template's distinctive phrasing?

Response. We would like to bring to the attention of the reviewer that Section 3.4 of the original submission reports that NBF-LLM [1], an input filter built on a sentence embedding model, does not block the SimJIR template once the harmful query is removed. NBF-LLM therefore flags the harmful query rather than the wording of the template. More generally, the SimJIR prompt can be reworded in subtle ways while it keeps its core mechanism. Even if a lexical or semantic filter learns to flag the template, a rewritten prompt can bypass it. For example, Section 4.2.3 demonstrates that our rewrite of SimJIR bypasses NBF-LLM. Detecting jailbreak prompts after subtle rewording remains an open problem for jailbreak defenses in general.

We hope that these results answer the questions of the reviewer.

[1] Hu et al. Steering dialogue dynamics for robustness against multi-turn jailbreaking attacks. TMLR, 2026.

[2] Nasr et al. The Attacker Moves Second: Stronger Adaptive Attacks Bypass Defenses Against LLM Jailbreaks and Prompt Injections. USENIX Security, 2026.

[3] Longpre et al. Position: A Safe Harbor for AI Evaluation and Red Teaming. ICML, 2024.

Comments on the paper

1 comment
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Summary of Revisions and Additional Results

Summary of Revisions and Additional Results

We thank all reviewers for their thoughtful and constructive feedback. The main additions in the revised PDF (new content in blue) and the individual responses are:

  • ActorAttack baseline (Table R2). ActorAttack reaches ASR similar to Crescendo (91.1% vs. 95.8% on average) at a similarly high cost, while SimJIR uses 6 to 53 times fewer tokens than ActorAttack on every model.
  • Larger models (Table R3). On four 27-32B open-source models, SimJIR raises ASR from 0-8% to 72-100%.
  • Additional multimodal benchmarks (Sec. 3.5, Sec. 4.1, Sec. 4.2.4, Table 3). Beyond the typographic subset of MM-SafetyBench, we now evaluate on HADES-200, which pairs harmful queries with generated images, and on JALMBench, which has 246 spoken harmful queries. With the algorithm and prompt unchanged, SimJIR raises ASR on every model and benchmark.
  • Independent evaluation judge (Appendix A.10, Fig. 10). Re-evaluating SimJIR and Crescendo with Qwen3Guard-Gen-8B, a judge different from the inner judges of both methods, leaves the ASR-cost tradeoff unchanged.
  • Cost including unsuccessful queries (Table R4). With unsuccessful queries included, SimJIR still needs about 2 times fewer turns and 18 times fewer input tokens than Crescendo on Qwen3-8B.
  • ASR as a function of the maximum turn count (Appendix A.11, Fig. 11). ASR largely saturates by T = 10, the default used in all main experiments.
  • PANDAS with Adaptive Sampling (Table R1). Enabling Adaptive Sampling changes the ASR of PANDAS by −8 to +6 points and does not change its ranking relative to SimJIR on any model.
  • Scope of the defense results. We clarify that the two bypassed defenses, NBF-LLM and SafeEnd, are recent defenses designed against multi-turn and many-shot jailbreaks with no published bypass, and that each bypass edits one of the two parts of the SimJIR prompt identified in Section 3.4.
  • Presentation (Figs. 1, 2, 4; Appendix A.5). We redrew Figs. 1, 2, and 4 with simpler annotations and a consistent style, replaced the dual-axis chart in Fig. 2 with a semi-log scatter plot, and moved the token breakdown to Appendix A.5.

We address each reviewer's points in the individual responses.

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