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Paper summary
This paper addresses the problem of verifying whether AI-generated images and their accompanying text were generated together. Existing watermarking methods typically verify image and text provenance independently, but cannot establish a reliable connection between the two modalities, making them vulnerable to content-swapping attacks.
To address this problem, the authors propose CoSignature, a cross-modal watermarking framework that establishes verifiable image-text binding through a shared Content ID. The framework uses a dual-key strategy in which the Content ID is embedded directly into the image watermark, while the same ID is used to seed a statistical text watermark alongside a global System Key. During verification, a joint decoder combines Soft-Ordered Statistics Decoding (Soft-OSD), CRC-based candidate filtering, and a Text Oracle to recover the correct Content ID from noisy image predictions and verify its consistency with the accompanying text. The authors also provide a theoretical analysis showing that the Text Oracle's candidate-selection error decreases exponentially with text length under specified assumptions.
The framework is evaluated on 1,000 generated image-text pairs across four multimodal model pipelines: Janus-Pro-7B, Qwen3-8B with Qwen-Image, Qwen3-VL-8B, and BAGEL-7B-MoT. The authors report binding detection rates of 96.7%–99.0% at a 1% false-positive rate and average swap detection accuracies of 95.6%–99.3% on clean data. Additional experiments investigate robustness to image distortions, text paraphrasing, decoding configurations, and watermarking components, demonstrating improvements in Content ID recovery over image-only decoding under several evaluated conditions.
Critical strengths
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Important and well-motivated problem: The paper addresses a relevant limitation of existing multimodal watermarking systems: independently verifying image and text provenance does not establish whether they were generated together. The proposed cross-modal binding framework provides a useful approach to detecting mismatched image-text pairs and verifying their shared generation provenance.
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Novel cross-modal binding mechanism: The proposed dual-key watermarking strategy is an interesting contribution. Instead of embedding a long Content ID directly into text, the authors use it to seed a statistical text watermark. Combining this mechanism with image-based ID recovery enables binding verification without requiring multi-bit payload extraction from the text.
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Effective joint decoding framework: The integration of Soft-Ordered Statistics Decoding (Soft-OSD), CRC filtering, and a Text Oracle is a meaningful technical strength. By using statistical evidence from the text to distinguish candidate image IDs, the method improves recovery under several image distortions. The ablations further demonstrate the benefits of CRC filtering and increased search depth.
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Theoretical analysis and informative ablations: The paper provides a theoretical error bound showing that the Text Oracle's candidate-selection error decreases exponentially with text length under stated assumptions. Additional experiments investigate text length, paraphrasing, CRC filtering, decoding depth, and the trade-off between checksum redundancy and recoverable Content ID capacity. These analyses help explain both the effectiveness and limitations of the proposed framework.
Critical weaknesses
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Limited direct comparison with existing cross-modal watermarking approaches: Although the paper discusses related work such as VLA-Mark and Jovanović et al. (2025), it does not provide direct quantitative comparisons with these approaches. The experimental evaluation primarily focuses on image-only decoding, alternative decoding configurations, and an idealized channel-code baseline. While differences in the underlying tasks may complicate direct comparisons, a more detailed evaluation or justification of non-comparability would help establish the proposed framework's advantages over existing cross-modal approaches.
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Incomplete robustness evaluation and sensitivity to severe image distortions: The authors evaluate several image-processing attacks, including resizing, cropping, JPEG compression, Gaussian blur, noise, and photometric changes. However, rotation, perspective distortion, and salt-and-pepper noise are not included. Furthermore, the results show substantial performance degradation under certain severe distortions. For example, CoSignature achieves only 0.0% Content ID recovery under Gaussian noise (σ=10) and 8.1% under JPEG compression (Q=50) on Janus-Pro. These findings suggest that the demonstrated robustness is strongly dependent on the underlying image watermarker and attack severity. Additional experiments would help clarify the framework's robustness boundaries.
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Lack of evaluation against targeted semantic-changing text manipulations: The paper evaluates synonym replacement, moderate paraphrasing, and heavy rewriting, with instructions intended to preserve the original meaning. However, it does not systematically investigate targeted semantic modifications, such as replacing entities, objects, actions, or factual statements. Since CoSignature verifies watermark-based provenance rather than semantic consistency, an attacker might alter the meaning of text while retaining sufficient statistical watermark evidence for binding verification. Evaluating such scenarios would help clarify the security guarantees and limitations of the framework, particularly given its motivation around misinformation.
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Limited diversity of the evaluation dataset: The experiments use 1,000 generated image-text pairs based on ImageNet-1K class labels and a common prompt template. Although this provides a controlled evaluation, it does not fully reflect the diversity of real-world multimodal documents, such as news articles, reports with multiple images, or content involving complex relationships between text and visual elements. Evaluation on more diverse prompts, text lengths, and document structures would strengthen the evidence for practical generalization.
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Dependence on image candidate recovery and sufficient text length: The theoretical analysis assumes that the correct Content ID is present in the candidate set generated by the image decoder. Consequently, the Text Oracle cannot recover the correct identifier when severe distortions eliminate it from that set. Furthermore, binding verification depends on accumulating sufficient statistical evidence from the text. The authors report approximately 80% binding detection at 300 tokens on the Qwen pipeline, increasing to 97.4% at 500 tokens. These dependencies limit the demonstrated applicability to short captions, brief descriptions, and severely distorted images.
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Insufficient clarification of the underlying image watermarking configurations: CoSignature relies on existing image watermarking systems, including VideoSeal and PixelSeal, but the manuscript does not provide a detailed account of the training configurations and augmentation policies associated with the checkpoints used. Since the robustness of the joint framework depends partly on these underlying models, clarifying their pretrained configurations and whether the evaluation distortions overlap with their training augmentations would improve reproducibility and interpretation of the results.
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Presentation and experimental reporting inconsistencies: Several details require clarification. Section 4 contains an unresolved citation placeholder for Qwen3-VL-8B at line 350. The main text and Appendix C.4 also provide different descriptions of the model used to generate paraphrasing attacks. Furthermore, clean binding results differ between Table 2 and Table 7, including 97.4% versus 97.9% for the Qwen pipeline, 99.0% versus 99.9% for Qwen3-VL, and 96.7% versus 99.1% for BAGEL. These differences may arise from distinct experimental subsets or protocols, but the manuscript should explicitly explain them to ensure consistency and reproducibility.
Questions for authors
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Comparison with existing cross-modal watermarking methods: The paper discusses related approaches, including VLA-Mark and Jovanović et al. (2025), but does not provide direct quantitative comparisons. Could the authors clarify the methodological advantages of CoSignature over these approaches and provide comparisons under a common evaluation protocol where feasible? If direct comparisons are not possible because of differences in their objectives, could these differences be explained more explicitly?
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Robustness against additional image transformations: The authors evaluate resizing, cropping, JPEG compression, Gaussian blur, noise, and photometric changes. However, rotation, perspective distortion, and salt-and-pepper noise are not considered. Could the authors evaluate these additional attacks? Furthermore, given that Content ID recovery drops to 0.0% under Gaussian noise (σ=10) and 8.1% under JPEG compression (Q=50) on Janus-Pro, could they explain the practical robustness limitations of CoSignature and how these failures might be mitigated?
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Semantic-changing text manipulations: The paraphrasing experiments primarily consider meaning-preserving transformations. What happens when an attacker deliberately changes the semantic meaning of the text while preserving much of its original token structure? For example, replacing "The dog is sitting on the bench" with "The cat is sitting on the bench" changes the factual content but may retain part of the statistical watermark. Could the authors evaluate such targeted semantic modifications and clarify whether CoSignature can detect them? This distinction seems particularly important given the paper's motivation around misinformation.
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Generalization to diverse image-text datasets: The experimental evaluation uses 1,000 generated image-text pairs based on ImageNet-1K class labels and a common prompt template. How well would CoSignature generalize to more diverse multimodal datasets involving news articles, detailed descriptions, complex relationships, and multiple images associated with a single document? Could the authors provide additional experiments using different prompt structures or realistic multimodal content?
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Dependence on text length: The authors report approximately 80% binding detection at 300 tokens on the Qwen pipeline, increasing to 97.4% at 500 tokens. How would CoSignature perform in practical scenarios involving short captions, brief social media posts, or image descriptions containing fewer than 100 tokens? Could the authors discuss the minimum text length required for reliable binding verification at the specified false-positive rate?
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Relationship between theoretical guarantees and practical recovery: Theorem 3.2 establishes exponentially decreasing Text Oracle error under the assumption that the correct Content ID is included in the candidate set. However, severe image distortions may prevent the correct ID from appearing among the candidates. Could the authors quantify candidate-set recall across different attack severities and distinguish failures caused by image candidate generation from failures caused by the Text Oracle? This would clarify how the theoretical guarantees relate to end-to-end binding accuracy.
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Consistency of experimental results and model descriptions: Several details appear inconsistent across the manuscript. For example, the clean binding rates differ between Table 2 and Table 7 (97.4% versus 97.9% for Qwen, 99.0% versus 99.9% for Qwen3-VL, and 96.7% versus 99.1% for BAGEL). Additionally, the paraphrasing adversary is described differently in Section 4.1 and Appendix C.4, and line 350 contains an unresolved citation placeholder for Qwen3-VL-8B. Could the authors clarify these discrepancies and specify whether different experimental configurations or subsets explain the numerical differences?
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Representative paraphrasing examples: Appendix C.4 provides prompts for synonym replacement, moderate paraphrasing, and heavy rewriting, along with token-overlap statistics. Could the authors include representative original and modified text examples for each category? This would make it easier to evaluate the nature of the attacks and interpret the reported robustness results.
Thank you for the detailed comments on the text construction and its statistical interpretation.
W1 — Modularity and the evaluated Gumbel construction. Appendix C.7 identifies and evaluates the max-superposition Gumbel variant. On Qwen3-VL (n = 300), Table 12 reports 95.3% binding TPR and 93.3% independent text TPR. Thus, the paper includes an empirical non-KGW instantiation. We will distinguish this evaluated construction from the alternatives discussed in C.6 and clarify its sampling, scoring, repeated-context handling, and calibration protocol.
Each instantiation requires a compatible detector and its own analysis. Our contribution combines separate source and instance signals with image-derived candidate IDs and text-assisted disambiguation, retaining fixed-key source verification alongside verification of a specific image–text association.
W2 — Calibration of the weighted statistic. The reported z-score uses a Gaussian approximation. An exact weighted null is available analytically under an independent random-partition model.
Consider a score retaining one position per distinct context, selected without consulting the tested content key. Condition on the observed text, system-green memberships, and image-candidate construction. If a false candidate’s partitions remain uniform and independent across retained contexts under this conditioning, then the score has distribution E(k) = 2U + V, where U ∼ Binomial(n₁, γ) and V ∼ Binomial(n₀, γ) are independent; n₁ and n₀ count retained system-green and other positions.
The convolution provides exact inclusive tail probabilities under these assumptions. Bonferroni at α/M controls false acceptance across M candidates when these p-values remain valid conditional on candidate construction; independence between candidate tests is unnecessary. Removing identical context–token pairs alone is insufficient when different tokens reuse a fixed-size partition.
We will distinguish this analytical construction from the reported Gaussian-calibrated results and make the independence assumptions explicit.
W3 — Meaning of the theorem’s error event. The token score is Xₜ(k) = (1 + Aₜ)Bₜ(k), where Aₜ and Bₜ(k) indicate system-green and candidate-content-green membership. The margin is the conditional expected score difference between the true and false candidates. The theorem bounds candidate-selection error, conditional on the true ID being in the candidate set.
The margin depends on token probabilities, mask overlap, temperature, and top-p truncation; positive bias alone does not guarantee it. We will replace that assertion with an explicit assumption that accumulated conditional drift exceeds a deterministic positive bound almost surely, in the experiment including candidate construction. Please also refer to our response to Reviewer vVG3.
Content-ID length. The 224-bit ID follows from the selected 256-bit image payload with 32 checksum bits. It is a configuration choice. Table 15 already studies reallocating the fixed payload between ID and checksum bits.
Single-key comparison. Our objective is to support both direct text-only source verification with a fixed system key and instance-specific image–text binding. Standard single-key KGW with a fixed key supports source detection but does not distinguish generation instances. Using a per-instance key enables verification against a candidate ID, but text-only source verification then requires that ID or a search over candidate keys. Our dual-key construction retains both verification paths.