- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 1
Read review
Paper summary
The paper presents mAVE, a training-free watermarking method for authenticating whether audio and video originate from the same generation session. It links their latent payloads through a hash and uses a public index to retrieve a private session record. Verification combines inversion conditioned on the original prompt with record-based payload and binding checks. The paper provides conditional security analysis and evaluates two joint audio-video generators, reporting 99.8% TPR and zero observed FPR in the principal swap tests, with comparable generation quality.
Critical strengths
-
The paper distinguishes provider-level watermark detection from authentication of an audio-video pairing. The same-prompt and similarity-selected swaps in Table 5 provide useful tests beyond semantic compatibility.
-
The method requires no watermark-specific training and is evaluated on two native joint generators. Tables 2 and 4 support its feasibility under common processing operations while maintaining broadly comparable generation quality.
Critical weaknesses
-
The proposed embedding procedure closely follows Gaussian Shading, making the session-binding mechanism central to the contribution. However, the verifier hashes a server-reconstructed grid rather than the recovered video (Section 4.3). Although Table 5 reports an advantage over a random session-specific reference, the paper does not sufficiently explain why deriving the reference from the video grid produces this advantage.
-
Section 4.4 assumes conditional uniformity of the recovered binding vector and bounds on perturbation-induced bit changes. The main text does not establish these properties for the actual inversion and decoding pipeline or instantiate a useful perturbation bound. The reported swap tests and correctly stated 0.30% upper confidence limit support performance on the evaluated distributions, but do not establish broader adaptive security. Targeted disruption of the public index is also untested, leaving the robustness of record retrieval unresolved.
Questions for authors
-
What explains the SR-Rand/mAVE gap in Table 5? Please provide the actual calibrated thresholds, binding-score distributions, and counts passing index retrieval, modality checks, and binding verification.
-
How does verification perform when neither the original prompt nor generation-request metadata is available for joint inversion? Please provide experimental results, including authentication TPR/FPR and index-recovery rates, and specify how the missing conditioning is handled.
-
For the binding lengths and inversion steps already evaluated in Section 5.6, how do full authentication TPR/FPR and index-recovery rates vary? Mean BA alone does not establish authentication reliability.
-
Does the removal threat include targeted corruption of the public index, and what evidence supports robustness to it? When request metadata supplies the original prompt, does it also identify the session record, and what additional role does the embedded index serve?
8 comments
Response to Reviewer 5Pzs — Part 2/5
Q1 — Gate interaction, mechanism and statistical scope
Continuing Q1, Part 1 gives the high-score subgroup and stage counts. Here we explain the gate interaction and delimit the statistical claim.
Why the gates favor this subgroup. The binding field is included in the full audio payload, so the two scores share information. With and , let denote accuracy on the other 384 bits. Then
At , a sample with needs , while one with needs only . A high binding score therefore also helps a sample pass the aggregate audio check. Once such cases exist in the recovered-score distribution, the two gates do not act as independent opportunities to reject them. The exact empirical decomposition for the similarity-selected group is
This decomposition requires no independence assumption. It explains how the score distribution and the gates combine into the reported FPR. It also identifies the limit of the selection explanation. Filtering enriches the existing high-score subgroup but does not explain its original appearance.
How this relates to random tags and cryptographic dependency. Independently sampling stored tags does not, by itself, establish a uniform conditional law for the vector recovered after joint inversion and decoding of a mismatched pair. The verifier scores that recovered vector against the selected record; it does not merely compare two ideal tags drawn independently at generation time. Under a uniform recovered-vector model, a random reference and a fixed digest reference would indeed have the same Hamming-ball matching probability. The measured control gap therefore concerns end-to-end recovery and verification. It does not imply an intrinsically large collision probability for 128-bit random strings. The aggregates characterize the differing recovered-score distributions and the gate interaction, but do not identify a hash-only cause for that distributional difference.
This interpretation is consistent with the same-sample ablation. On mAVE media, adding the binding gate rejects 1, 24 and 38 otherwise accepted swaps without changing generation, decoding or authentic acceptance. Aggregate audio accuracy can hide concentrated errors in the binding field. For example, 64 matching binding bits and 346 matching remaining bits give while . The explicit field check therefore adds a requirement that the modality average alone does not enforce. The matched-reference controls then show that its benefit depends on the recovered scores supplied by the complete construction, not just on the presence of an extra gate.
Statistical scope. Correct-index recovery is an evaluation diagnostic, not an extra ground-truth gate. We distinguish exceedances among all scorable cases, conditional acceptance among modality survivors, and final acceptance among all attempts. For mAVE the respective zero-exceedance denominators are 1,000/999/999; the survivor denominators are 1/24/38; and the complete-verifier denominator is 1,000 in each group. A one-sided independent-binomial 95% upper limit for 0/1,000 is approximately 0.30%; the nominal conditional limits for 0/1, 0/24 and 0/38 are 95.0%, 11.73% and 7.58%. These statements have different populations and require the relevant sampling assumptions; they are not interchangeable or bounds for correlated adaptive queries.
The mAVE swap-score means near 0.5 and SDs near 0.044 are compatible with the shape of , whose SD is approximately 0.04419. They do not prove the full joint conditional law or certify a deployment error rate of . The five-step false acceptance discussed below provides a concrete reason to keep that ideal model separate from the numerical verifier.
Taken together, the evidence supports an operational contribution. mAVE couples a session-specific binding construction with a field-level verification rule that separates the evaluated genuine and swapped pairs at comparable genuine acceptance. The same-sample ablation isolates the added check; the matched-reference controls demonstrate the complete construction's advantage at the reported operating point. We will make this distinction explicit in the paper, with reference reconstruction justified by stability and the session-authentication benefit supported by the measured score distributions and full-verifier outcomes.
Response to Reviewer 5Pzs — Part 3/5
Q2 — One-pass verification without the original prompt
Q2. Verification without the original prompt or request metadata.
We clarify a one-pass, caller-prompt-free route. The caller supplies the AV pair; the verifier performs one joint inversion with empty text conditioning and extracts the public index from the fixed, unmasked video positions. This index requires no session secret. The provider then retrieves the selected record's original prompt and secret, derives using that stored prompt as in Eq. (2), and derandomizes and verifies the same recovered latents. No second inversion is required.
The empty inversion condition and the original prompt used in key derivation have distinct roles. This route does not use a caller-supplied prompt or request handle, but still depends on the provider's session database. Empty-text inversion has methodological precedent in Gaussian Shading and VideoShield; the following results address mAVE's LTX-2 / T2AV verification performance.
On LTX-2 / T2AV, the empty-text results have video/audio BA 0.935/0.919, corresponding to changes of -0.1/+0.4 percentage points relative to the LTX-2 / T2AV reference values 0.936/0.915 in Table 1. T2AV has no input-image condition. The verifier does not require the original input image, an extracted conditioning frame, the original prompt or a request handle. The generator and its configuration are known to the provider; the session prompt and secret are retrieved only after index extraction. The table below reports the complete outcomes.
| Pair group | Attempts | Correct index | Wrong record | No record | Final accepts | Rate (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Authentic | 1000 | 997 | 3 | 0 | 997 | TPR 99.7 |
| Cross-prompt | 1000 | 999 | 1 | 0 | 0 | FPR 0.0 |
| Same-prompt | 1000 | 998 | 2 | 0 | 0 | FPR 0.0 |
| Similarity-selected | 1000 | 998 | 1 | 1 | 0 | FPR 0.0 |
The positive exact-index recovery and authentication TPR are both 99.7%. There are three wrong-record positive lookups and no missing positive lookups; the overall final accepted count is 997. Observed swap FPR is 0% in each of the three 1,000-attempt groups, with all failed lookups retained in the denominator. These results establish the measured performance of this LTX-2 text-free route. A change relative to original-prompt conditioning requires a matched LTX-2 cohort; the original aggregate 99.8% TPR and the manuscript's MOVA BA values are not used as that paired baseline.
We will revise Section 4.3 and the corresponding workflow descriptions in Appendices E.2, E.5 and I to distinguish , the inversion condition, from , the stored prompt used in key derivation. We will present the original-prompt route and this one-pass, empty-text route separately. Both use the record prompt for key derivation; only the former uses it to condition inversion.
Response to Reviewer 5Pzs — Part 1/5
Q1 — Reference reconstruction, calibration and stage statistics
Scope: The additional prompt-free, parameter-sweep and attack experiments below use LTX-2 / T2AV (text-to-audio-video generation). Original main-paper comparisons retain their reported evaluation scope.
Thank you for requesting the intermediate statistics and distinguishing protocol availability from complete authentication.
Q1. Reference reconstruction and the SR-Rand/mAVE gap.
Reference reconstruction addresses recovery noise; the SR-Rand comparison addresses the binding construction. The provider rebuilds the ideal video grid because directly hashing a recovered grid would turn even a small video recovery error into a different digest. The received video must still pass its own comparison against the selected record. This provides a stable binding target without removing the requirement to authenticate the query video.
SR-Rand is a matched control for this reference choice. Its audio target is an independently sampled string stored in the video-selected session record. It retains the payload budget, carrier positions, repetition, recovery pipeline, noise-free reference and dedicated binding gate. It is therefore a session-referenced control, not a comparison against the donor audio's own reference. The observed advantage cannot be attributed merely to comparing mAVE with a noisier reference or a weaker record-selection rule.
Calibrated operating point. We use strict thresholds greater than 0.8 for video BA, audio BA and the effective binding score. On each method's 2,000 clean validation cases, we scan a common scalar threshold over {0.70,0.75,0.80,0.85,0.90}, applying it to all three scores simultaneously, and select the largest candidate achieving at least 99.7% full authentic acceptance. All three methods select 0.8, with validation recall of 99.8% for mAVE and 99.7% for both controls. The thresholds are then frozen for all test groups. SR-ID's effective score is the minimum of its two reference-match scores. Supplementary Table R4 gives the complete scan.
The table below gives the principal counts.
Each swap group contains 1,000 attempts. R1 gives the complete routing and gate counts, including correct-index recovery, successful lookup, wrong-record and no-record outcomes. In the similarity-selected group, all methods have 999 successful lookups and 990 video-gate passes. Their joint modality-pass counts then differ, with 38 for mAVE, 102 for SR-Rand and 116 for SR-ID. Binding verification further reduces those counts to 0, 71 and 81. The gap therefore occurs both in the samples reaching the binding gate and in the fraction accepted by that gate. Lookup failures alone do not account for it.
Recovered-score structure. R2-R3 report distributions before modality filtering and among its survivors, including means, SDs, quantiles and histograms. Over all scorable swaps, mAVE has 0/1,000, 0/999 and 0/999 scores above 0.8. The corresponding SR-Rand counts are 105/1,000, 101/999 and 112/999; SR-ID has 124/1,000, 138/999 and 126/999. Thus the high-score cases in the controls are already present before modality selection.
For similarity-selected SR-Rand swaps, the median is 0.50781, but 112 scores exceed 0.8, including 85 above 0.9. A mean of 0.54839 consequently hides a substantial high-score subgroup alongside the central random-like scores. Of those 112 high-score cases, 71 pass the modality gates, a rate of 63.4%; among the other 887 scorable cases, only 31 pass, a rate of 3.5%. The high-score subgroup therefore constitutes 71/102=69.6% of the modality survivors. These are direct proportions from the reported counts, not an assumed mixture model.