- Rating
- 3
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 3
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Paper summary
The paper investigates whether linear deception probes detect deceptive content or instruction-induced states. Controlled interventions suggest that standard RepE probes are substantially more sensitive to instruction framing than to response truthfulness. The proposed matched-difference training reduces framing sensitivity and improves performance on some downstream tasks, although overall gains remain task- and layer-selection-dependent.
Critical strengths
- Well-motivated controlled comparisons. Independently varying instructions and response truthfulness, alongside benign-role and unseen-framing evaluations, provides persuasive evidence of instruction sensitivity in standard RepE probes.
- Broad evaluation with informative controls. Experiments cover 12 models across four families and five tasks. The appendix reports confidence intervals, alternative layer-selection procedures, and negative results, supporting a balanced assessment.
Critical weaknesses
- The target concept remains insufficiently established. Factually false statements do not necessarily contradict the model’s beliefs or reflect an intention to deceive. The proposed probe may primarily detect factual truthfulness, leaving its conceptual and methodological distinction from existing truthfulness probes unclear.
- Performance improvements are not robust across evaluation choices. Overall five-task AUROC is 0.733 versus 0.735 for RepE, and confidence intervals for improvements on two of the four favorable tasks include zero. Alternative layer-selection procedures also change the relative ranking.
Questions for authors
- How can the proposed probe distinguish factual falsehood, contradiction of the model’s beliefs, and intentional deception? Could evaluations include sincere errors, deliberate falsehoods, and literally true but intentionally misleading responses?
- Under matched layer-selection and training procedures, how much improvement comes specifically from paired differences, compared with a neutral-instruction truthfulness probe or a probe trained directly on the balanced four-condition dataset?
- What explains the substantial degradation on Insider Trading? Could targeted controls establish whether the removed signal reflects irrelevant persona cues or contextual information necessary for detecting strategic concealment?
2 comments
Reply to Reviewer NUph - Continued
W2. Robustness of the performance gains
We thank the reviewer for raising this concern and agree that the matched-difference probe gives no overall gain on the benchmark. To further investigate if the shown gains on the tasks is consistent, we conduct additional experiments with matched layer selection rules:
Table R3. Matched-difference minus RepE AUROC, with paired 95% bootstrap intervals. The source rule (the paper's rule) chooses each probe's layer on its own training-distribution validation data.
| Layer rule | HP Choice, Qwen3-8B | HP Choice, Llama-3.1-8B |
|---|---|---|
| Source rule | +0.291 [+0.230, +0.351] | +0.103 [+0.053, +0.155] |
| Fixed 65% depth | +0.169 [+0.111, +0.223] | +0.033 [−0.014, +0.077] |
| Leave one task out | +0.135 [+0.079, +0.194] | −0.012 [−0.080, +0.051] |
| Task oracle | +0.156 [+0.103, +0.213] | +0.025 [−0.014, +0.061] |
As the table shows, the gain with the matched-difference probe is consistent across Qwen3-8B and Llama-3.1-8B on the task that the matched-difference probe outperforms the RepE probe. This evidence supports that the two probes can carry different signals. We thus standardized each score on held-out source data and summed them, to see if RepE probe and matched difference probe complement each other to improve the deception detection. We report the result as follows:
Table R5. Five-task mean AUROC on Liars' Bench.
| Probe | Qwen3-8B | Llama-3.1-8B |
|---|---|---|
| RepE | 0.789± 0.009 | 0.822± 0.008 |
| Matched-difference | 0.781± 0.008 | 0.838± 0.008 |
| Sum of the two scores | 0.844±0.008 | 0.880± 0.007 |
The sum outperforms either probe alone on both models. We will therefore present the matched-difference probe as a complement to RepE, not a replacement. The new results and changes will be marked in blue in the revised PDF.
Q3. What explains the degradation on Insider Trading?
Our controls suggest that the drop comes from what a content probe can read, not from simple surface features. First, controlling for report length and the number of insider-related words changes the AUROC of either probe by at most 0.04, so neither feature explains the gap. Second, removing the matched-difference direction from RepE does not lower RepE's Insider Trading AUROC on either model, so RepE's signal on this task lies outside the content direction. Third, the matched-difference probe barely responds to literally true but misleading answers (AUROC 0.56 and 0.62 against sincere errors). Deception in Insider Trading often takes the form of concealment rather than a false statement, so much of it would not register as false content. Together, these results suggest that RepE draws on contextual information about concealment that our probe does not read. This is also why summing the two probes helps most on this task (W2). We will add these controls to the revision and extend the discussion on our limitation on Insider Trading.
[1] Detecting Strategic Deception Using Linear Probes. Goldowsky-Dill, et al.
Reply to Reviewer NUph
We thank the reviewer for the positive review and the concrete suggestions. We address the weaknesses and questions as follows:
W1/Q1/Q2. Does the probe detect factual falsehood, belief contradiction, or intentional deception?
We agree that we did not clearly establish this in the submission and thank the reviewer for raising this point. As prior work has also pointed out [1], detecting intentional deception is tricky since it is difficult to replicate the deployed scenario where AI would involve in scheming. As a result, we test whether the proposed matched-difference probe detect factual falsehood or belief contradiction. We first test belief contradiction, then we compare the matched-difference probe with a conventional truth probe.
Following Liars' Bench, we take the model's belief to be its answer when three neutral prompts agree. To separate belief from the label, we used TruthfulQA, where both models often hold false beliefs. For each true/false pair, we asked which statement the matched-difference probe scores higher.
Table R1. AUROC of the matched-difference probe for ranking the statement that contradicts the model's belief above the one that agrees with it (TruthfulQA).
As we can see, the matched-difference probe scores the belief-contradicting statement higher in both groups, even when that statement is true. On fixed statements, it therefore follows the model's belief more than the external label.
Q2. Comparing to neutral truth probe. We next compare the matched-difference probe with a conventional truth probe to clarify how our probe differs. We trained a neutral truth probe on the same facts (true vs. false statements under a neutral instruction), with the same pooling, classifier, and layer. We then generated TruthfulQA answers under neutral and deceptive prompt. A lie is a wrong answer under the deceptive prompt to a question the model answers correctly under the neutral prompt.
Table R2. Matched-difference AUROC minus neutral truth probe AUROC on the same generated answers, with paired 95% bootstrap intervals.
The matched-difference probe separates lies from sincere errors better than the truth probe on both models. On Llama-3.1-8B, it also better separates lies from truthful answers under the same prompt. It is also less sensitive to the instruction. However, we ackonwledge that neither probe can establish intent. In the revision, we will describe our probe as detecting false content and belief contradiction, rather than intentional deception, and add both evaluations.
[1] Detecting Strategic Deception Using Linear Probes. Goldowsky-Dill, et al.