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Paper summary
The paper evaluates the relationship between natural-language reasoning and predicted trajectories in driving VLAs. It separates external-reference agreement from trajectory sensitivity, combining trajectory error, text-trajectory consistency, expert-reasoning agreement, entity overlap, and a plausibility judge. Controlled trajectory corruptions and misleading text hints provide additional diagnostic tests. The proposed evaluation framework is called SafeDriveX. The main comparison evaluates Alpamayo-R1 and Alpamayo-1.5 on 165 labeled events from 150 PhysicalAI-AV clips. Trajectory-sensitive scorers respond to trajectory corruption, while trajectory-blind scorers remain unchanged. The text-hint probe produces overt rationalization labels in fewer than 4% of cases.
Critical strengths
- The paper addresses an important practical auditing problem and provides concrete examples where a model's explanation contradicts its trajectory. Its metric taxonomy makes clear which signals inspect the trajectory and which only inspect text or references.
- The evaluation includes a same-event comparison of two released models, multiple decoding seeds, a second judge, controlled corruptions, and a larger action-only validation check. Small subsets and the AutoVLA dataset/prefill confounds are explicitly acknowledged.
Critical weaknesses
- The headline metric measures reference agreement rather than reasoning–action consistency. It labels reasoning fully faithful by matching an expert maneuver and cause without reading the model's trajectory. It can therefore accept text that contradicts the model's action, or reject a legitimate alternative explanation.
- Metric validation and statistical reporting are limited. The drift judge is validated on only 16 cases despite the claimed 3–4% phenomenon. Primary skip coverage and AutoVLA evaluation counts remain unclear, while variation across decoding seeds does not quantify uncertainty across independent driving clips.
Questions for authors
- How often does expert-matching reasoning contradict the model's own trajectory? Could you report a joint reasoning–trajectory assessment and use human judgments to distinguish genuine inconsistencies from valid alternative maneuvers or causes?
- Please report checkable counts and compare metrics on a common subset, with paired confidence intervals clustered by clip. Are AutoVLA's 831 default scenes and 6,902 prefill scenes separate cohorts? What units underlie its coverage and Wilson interval?
- Could you validate the scorers on a larger human-labeled set and report precision/recall, particularly for rare rationalization labels? Similar aggregate scores from two judges do not establish item-level agreement or correctness. How sensitive is trajectory consistency to its thresholds?
- What evidence shows the added value of external references for detecting reasoning–action contradictions? The reference-free trajectory-consistency scorer responds to corruption, whereas expert-reasoning agreement does not. A comparison against independent human judgments would help clarify this distinction.
4 comments
(part 2 of 4): coverage, clip-clustered uncertainty, and AutoVLA counts (W2, Q2)
We agree with the Reviewer that seed variation measures decoding variability, not uncertainty over driving scenes. The 165 events come from 137 clips, so the Appendix reports every interval from a bootstrap that resamples whole clips, keeping all events and all three seeds of a clip together (5,000 draws).
Checkable counts. Trajectory consistency is defined only when the reasoning states a checkable action, and the checkable count varies by seed: 100, 109 and 85 of 165 events for Alpamayo-R1, and 99, 117 and 87 for Alpamayo-1.5. Pooled coverage is 59.4% [52.7, 66.1] and 61.2% [54.3, 68.1]. Because each seed measured consistency on a different subset, the comparison below uses a common subset.
Paired comparison on a common subset, clustered by clip (Table 11, Alpamayo-R1 minus Alpamayo-1.5 on identical event-seed pairs):
| Metric | Pairs | Difference [95% CI] |
|---|---|---|
| ADE (m) | 495 | −1.46 [−1.83, −1.11] |
| Entity fidelity | 495 | +0.068 [+0.026, +0.110] |
| Reasoning-gold (points) | 495 | +6.5 [+1.0, +12.3] |
| Trajectory consistency, mean (points) | 227 | −0.4 [−8.4, +7.4] |
| Trajectory consistency, every check (points) | 227 | −0.4 [−10.1, +8.7] |
Every grounded scorer separates the models, reasoning-gold narrowly, and trajectory consistency on the 227 pairs checkable for both models shows no difference. Restricting to the common subset removes most of the gap that seed-level reporting showed (58.2% against 61.7%), so that gap partly reflected different checkable subsets. Unpaired, each model's interval is wide and the two overlap even on the grounded scorers (Table 10); the paired comparison is the appropriate one, because both models are scored on the same events.
AutoVLA: two separate cohorts. Yes, they are separate. The 831 scenes are a run of the released checkpoint in its default mode, which produced a substantive chain of causation on none of them. The prefill run is a second decoding of 12,140 of the 12,146 NAVSIM navtest scenes. The unit throughout is a scene, decoded once with a single seed. Coverage, 57%, is the 6,902 of those 12,140 scenes whose reasoning states a checkable action. The 54.3% is the share of those 6,902 scenes scoring at least 0.5, the same definition Table 4 now uses for every row; for Alpamayo, that share is 62.6% and 67.3%. The Wilson interval treats scenes as independent, which understates the uncertainty, because navtest scenes are drawn from a smaller number of driving logs. We state this in the revision rather than claim more precision than the interval carries.
Drift judge and the 3 to 4% rate. We agree that 16 held-out cases are too few to validate a rate this small. While re-checking the probe for this response, we also found two problems. The action-stability check had a label-mapping error, so some changed actions were counted as unchanged, and 390 of the 990 probes received the generic hint "reconsider your driving action" instead of an action-specific one. Since the generic hint does not point to any particular action, it is unclear what "drift toward the hint" means for those probes. We therefore report the post-hoc rate in three ways (Table 14). All three use the same gemini-2.5-flash labels, with 95% intervals clustered by clip.
| Treatment | Alpamayo-R1 | Alpamayo-1.5 |
|---|---|---|
| As published | 3.4% [1.8, 5.2] | 3.8% [2.1, 5.8] |
| Stability check fixed | 2.6% [1.2, 4.2] | 2.4% [1.1, 4.0] |
| Fixed, generic hint excluded | 0.8% [0.2, 1.7] | 1.2% [0.4, 2.2] |
We defined the third row after looking at the labels, which is why we give it next to the other two and not in their place. Fixing the hint assignment itself would require rerunning inference, which we have not done. In all three cases the upper end of the interval is below 6%. Our conclusion that overt rationalization is rare therefore holds either way, and the published 3.4% and 3.8% should be read as upper bounds.
Human validation with precision and recall. We also collected labels from annotators outside the author team. They did not see any scores, and the analysis plan was written before the first label came in. We drew two stratified samples:
- Drift: 30 counterfactual pairs (18 that the judge called drift, 12 that it called robust), each labelled by three annotators.
- Reasoning against trajectory and scene: 40 events from the four cells of Table 12, 20 per model, 20 of them labelled by two annotators. Annotators first decided whether the action stated in the reasoning matches the planned trajectory, using a top-down path plot and a speed profile; they never saw the scorer's flags. Only then were they shown the expert reasoning and asked whether the model's reasoning is the same, a valid alternative, or wrong.
The first sample gives the drift judge's precision on its positive label. The second gives precision and recall for trajectory consistency, and shows how many reasoning-gold rejections people consider acceptable alternatives (W1). Since some items have more than one label, we can also report agreement between annotators item by item. Results are in part 4.
(part 4 of 4): results of the human annotation study (Q1, Q3, Q4)
For each item, annotators saw the model's reasoning, a plot of its planned trajectory, the camera frame, and the expert reasoning, but no scores. Items were sampled from the four cells of Table 12 and from the drift strata. We weight the estimates back to the full population and compute 95% intervals by resampling items within each stratum. One annotator works in autonomous driving and two in machine learning. The numbers below use only the labels we received before the discussion closes; We think that this evaluation is interesting, so we decided to report it as is. We will add them to Appendix I in the final version.
Post-hoc rationalization (Q3). Using annotator labels only, we count a case as post-hoc when the reasoning moves toward the hint but the stated maneuver does not change. This happens in 2.9% [1.3, 5.0] of Alpamayo-R1 records and 1.7% [0.5, 3.1] of Alpamayo-1.5 records, and in 0.3% for both if probes with the generic hint are excluded. These estimates also include drift that the judge missed, and they are at or below the published 3.4% and 3.8%. The judge's precision on its drift label is 59.3% [42.6, 75.9], so it flags too many cases rather than too few, and the published rates are upper bounds. In records the judge called robust, annotators marked drift in only 2 of 36 labels, so we can estimate recall only roughly. Overall agreement between annotators and the judge is kappa 0.60, and annotators agree with the automatic "action unchanged" label on 81.5% of items.
Reasoning that matches the expert but contradicts the trajectory (Q1, Q3). Annotators judge 24.8% [9.5, 44.6] of expert-matching reasoning to be inconsistent with the model's planned trajectory; trajectory consistency gives 32.5% on the same population. Across all records the two are close: 43.0% [27.3, 58.4] from annotators and 44.4% from the scorer. None of these cases can be caught by a metric that does not read the trajectory. Item by item, the scorer's precision for an inconsistency is 56.4% [29.1, 80.6] and its recall is 58.2% [38.9, 75.9] (kappa 0.22). Most disagreements involve threshold-based claims, such as a stop that is not reached within the horizon or a small deceleration or nudge, where annotators count partial motion as a match. On these cases the scorer is stricter than a human reader, and we will state this in the threats to validity. Annotators also only moderately agree with each other (kappa 0.41 on this question and 0.43 to 0.57 on drift), which limits how high any scorer's item-level agreement can be.
Reasoning-gold and alternative explanations (W1, Q4). When reasoning-gold reports a match, annotators consider the reasoning wrong for the scene in only 5.4% [0.0, 13.5] of records. When it reports no match, they consider 59.4% [37.6, 79.3] of the reasoning a valid alternative, 26.1% wrong, and 14.6% essentially the same as the expert's. The reviewer's concern about alternative explanations is therefore justified: full agreement with the expert is a lower bound on acceptable reasoning. In the final version we describe the off-diagonal cell of Table 12 as reasoning that is self-consistent but differs from the reference, not as wrong reasoning. Annotators still judge 12.4% [0.0, 27.2] of self-consistent reasoning to be wrong for the scene, and only a reference-based check can detect these cases. We thank the reviewer for raising this point.
part 1 of 4): the headline metric, and the joint reasoning-trajectory assessment (W1, Q1, Q4)
We thank the reviewer for a careful review. We have revised the paper; the numbers below refer to the revised PDF. Apart from the human annotation study (part 4), every analysis in this response uses the existing outputs, and a new Appendix I collects the statistical reporting the reviewer asked for.
W1. To avoid any misreading first: the paper does check reasoning against action directly. Trajectory consistency compares the action stated in the reasoning with what the model's own trajectory does, on every sample whose reasoning states a checkable action (58.2% and 61.7% for the two Alpamayo models, and the same check on 15 further arms in Section 4.6). Two experiments test that link causally: corrupting the trajectory while the reasoning is held fixed (Section 4.4, Figure 2), and contradicting the reasoning with a misleading hint while watching the action (Section 4.5). The reviewer's own summary notes this check. W1 concerns which metric leads, not whether the link is measured.
On that question, the reviewer's description of reasoning-gold is accurate, and it is by design. The model produces two outputs, a reasoning trace and a trajectory. Reasoning-gold compares the first with the expert's reasoning and does not read the second. Section 3 classifies it as grounded but trajectory-blind, and the degradation experiment shows it staying exactly constant while the trajectory is corrupted. The paper never relies on it alone, and its central claim is that the two axes detect different failures.
The term is defined in that sense: Section 3 states that a scene is fully faithful when the model's reasoning matches the human-verified expert reasoning on both maneuver and cause, that is, faithfulness to a grounded reference. Agreement between the reasoning and the model's own action is the separate question that trajectory consistency answers, and the paper reports the two side by side. The revision now also reports them jointly (Table 12), so a reader can see at once how often reasoning is right about the scene and carried out by the model's own trajectory. The human annotation study (part 4) addresses the reviewer's second concern, legitimate alternative explanations.
Q1. How often does expert-matching reasoning contradict the model's own trajectory? Table 12 crosses expert agreement with self-consistency on every checkable record, counting a record as consistent only when every check passes:
Among reasoning that matches the expert, 39.8% [28.2, 51.9] for Alpamayo-R1 and 23.0% [11.5, 36.3] for Alpamayo-1.5 contradicts the model's own trajectory (95% intervals clustered by clip). No trajectory-blind scorer can detect these cases. Annotators blind to the scores confirm that the case is real, putting the share at 24.8% [9.5, 44.6] (part 4). The scorer's share also holds up when the trajectory-consistency thresholds change: across fifteen settings between half and one and a half times the defaults, it stays at 38.1% to 42.5% and 23.0% to 26.4% (Table 13).
Q4. What do external references add? The other off-diagonal cell answers this. Among reasoning that is self-consistent, 57.2% [46.6, 67.6] (R1) and 61.3% [48.9, 72.8] (1.5) disagrees with the expert. No reference-free scorer can detect these cases, because the reasoning and the trajectory agree with each other while the reasoning differs from the human-verified reference. The reviewer is right that references add nothing to detecting a contradiction between the reasoning and the model's own action; trajectory consistency does that job. What references add is a grounded check on the content of self-consistent reasoning. Some of this cell is legitimate alternative reasoning, as the reviewer suspects; but annotators judge 12.4% of self-consistent reasoning to be wrong for the scene (part 4), a failure that only a grounded reference can expose. The cross-model result points the same way: on the same events, the grounded scorers separate the two models and the self-consistency scorer does not (part 2). Neither axis subsumes the other, which is the paper's central claim.