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Withdrawn from ICLR 2027

Synergistic Verification of Neural Network Controlled Systems via Adversarially Guided Refinement

Withdrawn from ICLR 2027, so left out of the paper lists and the map.

Abstract

Neural network controlled systems (NNCSs) are increasingly deployed in safety-critical applications, making the safety property verification a fundamental challenge. Static reachability-based analysis offers formal safety guarantees but often suffers from overapproximation errors, leading to conservative or “Unknown” results, while dynamic falsification methods can efficiently discover counterexamples but provide no guarantees in their absence. In this paper, we propose a novel synergistic verification framework via adversarially guided refinement, which integrates dynamic falsification with static verification in a unified loop. The core idea is to integrate backward reachability analysis with projected gradient descent (PGD) based adversarial testing to efficiently explore safe behaviors, along with exploiting adversarial trajectories to guide targeted branch-and-bound refinement over critical time steps and neurons. Experimental results demonstrate our approach significantly enhances verification effectiveness, achieving up to 85% speedups, while producing tighter reachable set approximations and more conclusive verification outcomes for complex NNCSs.

Primary area:
applications to robotics, autonomy, planning
Keywords:
Neural Network Controlled Systems, Safety Verification, Reachability Analysis, Dynamic Falsification, Synergistic Framework

Reviews

Among:
Shape:
1234this paper, Bottom 10%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 1.67 over 3 reviews, above 10% of the others.
Reviewer_ERLsOpenReview ↗
Rating
1
Confidence
4
Informativeness
1
Presentation
3
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

This paper proposes SynVAR, a verification framework for Neural Network Controlled Systems (NNCSs). The approach consists of three main components:

  1. Backward Reachability Preprocessing: Computes predecessor sets backwards from the unsafe region to prune the initial state space, reducing overapproximation error accumulation in forward reachability.
  2. PGD attack: Quickly search for counterexamples. If an unsafe trajectory is found, the system is immediately falsified.
  3. Adversarially Guided Branch-and-Bound (BaB): When no counterexample is found, SynVAR collects the trajectory closest to the unsafe region and the safest trajectory. By analyzing the activation differences between safe and unsafe trajectories, SynVAR selects the most critical time steps and unstable ReLU neurons for targeted branching in the forward reachability analysis.
Critical strengths
  1. The paper addresses formal safety verification of neural network controlled systems (NNCSs), which is an important and timely topic and lay a foundation towards verifying deep reinforcement learning to deploy in safety-critical systems.
  2. SynVAR verify faster than over existing DNN verification tools.
  3. The paper is well-structured and generally easy to follow, with helpful motivating examples and illustrations.
Critical weaknesses
  1. Sec 3.1 describes backward reachability preprocessing to prune the initial state set. This technique closely resembles FBRA ("Verifying Neural Network Controlled Systems by Combining Forward and Backward Reachability Analysis", IEEE QRS 2025), which is neither cited nor discussed.
  2. While SynVAR is significantly faster on instances that can already be solved, it does not verify more instances than the baselines.
  3. There is a mistake in the math notation. In Sec 3.1, refined initial set is defined as X~0=X0∩CT\tilde{X}_0 = X_0 \cap C_T. However, CtC_t is defined as the set of states at time tt that may reach the unsafe region. By definition, states at time t=0t=0 correspond to C0C_0, whereas CTC_T denotes states at the terminal horizon TT (i.e., the unsafe region itself). Intersecting the initial set X0X_0 with final unsafe region CTC_T make no sense to me.
  4. The paper's main contribution is a new branching heuristic, but there is no comparison against standard, well-established branching heuristics in the neural network verification literature, such as FSB or BaBSR. It remains unclear how much of the performance gain stem from the proposed branching heuristic and how much from other factors.
Questions for authors
  1. Could you clarify whether X~0=X0∩CT\tilde{X}_0 = X_0 \cap C_T is a typographical error for X0∩C0X_0 \cap C_0? Did you make the same mistake in the code, which may invalidate the result?
  2. Could you provide experimental comparisons (e.g., number of branches, verification runtime) and compare with FSB or BaBSR?
  3. Could you clarify how the backward reachability preprocessing stage in SynVAR relates to and differs from prior work combining forward and backward reachability analysis, particularly FBRA?
Reviewer_29VYOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
4
Informativeness
1
Presentation
2
Soundness
3
Read review
Paper summary

This paper proposes a framework for verifying obstacle avoidance properties in neural network controlled systems. The framework combines falsification with reachability analysis. It can be broken down into three stages:

  1. Backward reachability analysis. Starting from the unsafe set, it computes backward reachable sets, and uses it to identify the subset of the initial set that could reach the unsafe region within the horizon.

  2. PGD falsification. Using the reduced initial set, it runs gradient-based search on initial states, backpropagating through the closed-loop trajectory to maximize a trajectory-level constraint-violation objective. Any trajectory found that enters the unsafe set is returned as a counterexample.

  3. Guided BaB refinement. If no counterexample is found and forward reachability is inconclusive, it uses the activation differences between a heuristically determined safe trajectory and the most adversarial trajectory to choose time steps and unstable neurons for branch-and-bound refinement.

They evaluate their framework on low-dimensional benchmarks with (mostly) linear dynamics and small subset of ARCH-COMP AINNCS benchmarks, reporting speedups of up to 85% over existing approaches.

Critical strengths
  • Addresses a real limitation. Pairing falsification with reachability addresses a real weakness of verification tools. Verification tools often spend a lot of time on unsafe problems, and a cheap falsification run provides an avenue to resolve such problem without wasting computational budgets.

  • Backward preprocessing. Shrinking the initial set before forward analysis is a sensible way to reduce the search space for PGD, and the accumulated overapproximation error for reachability analysis.

  • Falsification Objective. Optimizing the initial state against a trajectory-level constraint violation objective is a sensible heuristic. As a falsification contribution, it is the most interesting part of the paper.

  • Reproducibility. Code and configuration files are released.

Critical weaknesses
  • Limited novelty. The method combines existing techniques, none of which is new on its own, and the paper does not explain why the combination should work beyond empirical speedups. Running PGD before verification is already standard in neural network verification (e.g., α,β-CROWN), and prior approaches such as FaBRIC pursue a similar idea for neural network controlled systems. Neither is discussed, which leads to my next point.

  • Incomplete related work. The paper relies heavily on one line of work. It omits closely related work on attack-guided verification (α,β-CROWN, VeriNet) and other reachability tools (POLAR, Verisig, ReachNN*). Terms such as “static verification” and “dynamic falsification” are nonstandard in this community, and the reachability background is described unconventionally.

  • Unjustified heuristics. Critical neurons and time steps are chosen from activation differences between one “representative safe” trajectory and one adversarial trajectory. There is no argument for why these differences should identify the neurons responsible for overapproximation error.

  • No ablation study. Table 1 is presented as an ablation (RQ1) but only compares SynVAR to other tools. There are no results for SynVAR without backward preprocessing, without PGD, or with standard branching heuristics in place of the proposed one.

  • Weak experimental evaluation. The main-text benchmarks are 2D to 6D linear systems with horizons of 5 to 9 steps. On the ARCH-COMP benchmarks, nearly all baselines already solve every instance, so SynVAR resolves no previously open problems. ARCH-COMP has no shortage of hard benchmarks, yet the paper evaluates on a peculiar subset. On the unsafe instances, comparing a falsifier against pure verifiers favors SynVAR by construction. Falsification baselines are needed for a fair comparison.

Questions for authors
  1. Why should combining backward preprocessing, PGD falsification, and guided BaB work better than each component alone? Can you give an argument beyond empirical speedups, and an ablation of SynVAR without each component?

  2. How does SynVAR differ from attack-guided verification pipelines such as α,β-CROWN, and from FaBRIC, which pursues a similar idea for neural network controlled systems? Can you include empirical comparisons?

  3. What exactly do “static verification” and “dynamic falsification” mean here, and how do they map onto standard terms in the reachability and falsification literature? Is the “symbolic interval abstraction” in Section 2.2 equivalent to LiRPA/CROWN-style linear bound propagation?

  4. Why is the trajectory farthest from the unsafe set the right reference point? Why should activation differences between it and the most adversarial trajectory identify the neurons responsible for overapproximation error?

  5. The signed distance in Eq. 2 is defined but never used. How is V(x) constructed when the unsafe set is the complement of a safe box, as in the ARCH-COMP benchmarks, where it is a union rather than an intersection of constraints?

  6. The backward set is defined with ∃u ∈ U, independent of the controller. Is that the version used, or is the controller included as in BReach-LP?

  7. Why were these ARCH-COMP benchmarks chosen over harder ones? How does SynVAR perform on harder, more nonlinear benchmarks, longer horizons, and larger controllers?

Reviewer_ru4jOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
3
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

This paper focuses on verifying the safety of NN-controlled systems, where existing reachability-based methods often overapproximate, and dynamic testing cannot provide formal safety guarantees. To address these limitations, the authors propose SynVAR, a framework that combines backward reachability analysis, PGD-based adversarial testing, and B&B refinement. The key idea is to use adversarial trajectories to identify critical time steps and neurons, guiding targeted refinement to improve verification precision and efficiency. Experiments on several NNCS benchmarks show promising results, with more conclusive verification outcomes and runtime improvements of up to 85% compared to existing methods.

Critical strengths
  • The paper targets a meaningful challenge in the formal verification of NN-controlled systems.

  • The proposed framework combines backward reachability, adversarial testing, and BaB refinement in a unified pipeline.

  • The evaluation covers several NNCS benchmarks and compares SynVAR against existing verification tools. The exp. results show improvements in verification efficiency and the ability to resolve some cases where other approaches return inconclusive results.

Critical weaknesses
  • The proposed framework mainly combines well-established techniques. While the integration is useful, the core contribution seems to be an adversarial-guided refinement heuristic rather than a fundamentally new verification technique.

  • Although the paper focuses on NNCS verification, the framework seems potentially applicable to more general NN verification tasks. However, the evaluation is limited to a few control-system benchmarks, and the network architectures and sizes are not clearly reported. While general NN verification may be beyond the paper's scope, it remains unclear whether the proposed approach is effective beyond these specific benchmarks.

  • The results are promising, but lacking analysis of why this combination works so well. Interestingly, different methods perform better on different benchmarks, suggesting that their effectiveness may depend on specific system characteristics. However, the paper does not explore these differences in depth or explain which benchmarks benefit most from each component. This also raises questions about the representativeness of the selected benchmarks and how well the improvements generalize.

  • The claimed 85% speedup sounds impressive, but many baseline methods already finish within seconds, and the network sizes are unclear. Without larger-scale experiments, the practical significance of such relative improvements is hard to judge.

Questions for authors
  1. What are the exact neural network architectures and sizes used in the experiments? Could the authors evaluate SynVAR on larger networks or additional challenging benchmarks, including relevant verification competition benchmarks, to better demonstrate scalability and generalizability?

  2. Why does SynVAR outperform existing methods on some benchmarks while other approaches perform better on others? Could the authors provide a more detailed analysis of which benchmark characteristics favor each technique and how much each component contributes to the overall performance?

  3. Given that many baseline verification tasks already complete within seconds, how significant are the reported relative runtime improvements in practice? Do similar improvements hold for larger networks or more computationally demanding verification problems?

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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