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Paper summary
The paper makes three main contributions. First, it analyzes cross-domain conflicts in unified fake image detection using gradient similarity, relative cross-domain harm, and long-term transfer to characterize how heterogeneous forensic domains interfere with each other during joint training. Second, it argues that different forensic artifacts have different sharing scopes and proposes that feature-space collapse is mainly caused by a mismatch between these sharing scopes and the organization of model capacity. Third, it proposes RGSA, which combines a globally shared OFT pathway with routed LoRA experts to model globally shared, partially shared, and domain-specific artifacts, and evaluates the method on the OpenMMSec benchmark.
Critical strengths
This work provides a systematic empirical analysis of cross-domain interactions in unified fake image detection, rather than only reporting final performance. The combination of gradient compatibility, relative cross-domain harm, and long-term transfer offers a relatively comprehensive view of how different forensic domains affect each other during joint optimization.
Critical weaknesses
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The issue of conflicts among heterogeneous data addressed in this paper has been repeatedly studied in previous works, which the authors also acknowledge in the Introduction and Related Work. The authors claim that their novelty lies in revealing the mechanism behind such conflicts. However, in practice, the authors still investigate the gradient conflicts among heterogeneous data and the influence of parameter updates on the amount of loss reduction in the same way as CS-DFD. To truly investigate the causes of these conflicts, the authors should at least examine the differences among different types of data and explain why gradient conflicts and optimization conflicts occur. The authors overstate the contribution of the current work and do not provide any substantial new insights.
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The core argument of the paper is that “feature-space collapse does not simply arise from insufficient capacity, but primarily from a mismatch between capacity organization and the distinct sharing scopes.” The former is already a common understanding, while the latter is not convincingly demonstrated by the authors. Even if the use of routers can be regarded as a better form of capacity organization, the authors still fail to prove the relationship between the router and the sharing scope.
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The two modules in this work are actually very simple, but I believe there are serious problems with the description of the method. The global module is updated using all data and keeps the relevant parameters orthogonal, but maintaining parameter orthogonality cannot guarantee the learning of shared artifacts.
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The Selective Pathway is essentially a LoRA-MoE and does not involve any relevant constraints. The router designed by the authors cannot distinguish different domains at all and does not know the artifact types. Therefore, it cannot guarantee that conflicting data will be assigned to different routers after using the router.
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There are many unclear symbol descriptions in the formulas of the paper. , , are not defined.
Questions for authors
I would appreciate clarification on whether the authors can provide a more concrete explanation of why conflicts arise among different forensic domains, beyond measuring gradient disagreement and cross-domain harm. In particular, can the authors identify what specific differences in artifacts, representations, or optimization requirements lead to these conflicts, and provide evidence that the proposed sharing scopes are meaningfully aligned with such conflict structures? A convincing analysis along these lines would substantially strengthen the paper and could affect my overall evaluation.
5 comments
Response to W2,W3,W4,W5
W2,W3,W4: Do RGSA's two pathways learn their intended representations?
Yes. As explained in our Clarification, RGSA is “simple yet effective” because it identifies and directly addresses the key cause of artifact feature space collapse in Unified FID: conflicting update requirements of heterogeneous artifacts.
Below, we explain how RGSA learns representations with different cross-domain sharing scopes and address your concerns.
- I believe there are serious problems with the description of the method.
If the “serious problems” is that training on all domains inevitably introduces conflicts, we clarify that “global-shared” in Sec. 4.2 refers to artifact features compatible with all domains, rather than universally beneficial features. Partially shared artifacts are handled through selective expert activation. As explicitly stated in Contribution 3 and Sec. 4, conflict isolation is achieved through “complementary update pathways according to the cross-domain sharing scopes of artifacts”, rather than merely relying on adapter properties.
Using the trained checkpoints under the configuration in Appendix G.1, we sample 10,000 test images per forensic domain from OpenMMSec (fake : real = 3:1). We compute the relative cross-domain harm R when updating only the Global pathway and compare it with models without pathway separation.
| R | Only OFT | OFT+Router LoRA | RGSA |
|---|---|---|---|
| Global-Path | 0.237 | 0.128 | 0.112 |
To validate these features capture forgery artifacts and the pathway complementarity, using identical trained weights, we compare the performance of (i) features with only Selective activated and (ii) Full − Global features, obtained by subtracting Global-only features (Selective disabled) from Full features (both pathways activated) (Original Table 12, revision Table 16), on the OpenMMSec test set:
| Accuracy(%) | OFT+Router LoRA | Anchor-LoRA+Router LoRA | Anchor-OFT+Router LoRA |
|---|---|---|---|
| Global disabled | 81.17 | 79.53 | 81.48 |
| Global active (Full − Global) | 85.73 | 85.90 | 86.33 |
The results indicate that the Global pathway has learned more cross-domain-compatible shared artifacts.
- The Selective Pathway is essentially a LoRA-MoE and does not involve any relevant constraints.
We introduce a load-balancing loss based on pre-truncation routing probabilities to prevent expert concentration and ensure routing gradients reach all experts, thereby encouraging differentiated learning across experts. Beyond the significant cross-domain differences in expert activation patterns reported in Table 7, we further examine the correlation between expert activation patterns and specific artifact characteristics to verify whether expert differentiation reflects conflicts among heterogeneous artifacts.
We use RGSA trained on OpenMMSec to analyze expert activation similarity across manipulation types using six test subsets: Coverage (IML_cm1) and DEFACTO CopyMove Subset (IML_cm2), RTM CopyMove Subset (Doc_cm), DocTamper Splicing Subset (Doc_sp), generative inpainting datasets CocoGlide(IML_gp), and DiffusionForensic (AIGC). Only fake images from the test sets are included in this analysis.
| Domain | Manipulation Type | Dataset | Experts Similarity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Same | Same | IML_cm1 vs IML_cm2 | 0.834 |
| Same | Cross | IML_cm1 vs IML_gp | 0.589 |
| Cross | Same | AIGC vs IML_gp | 0.830 |
| Cross | Same | IML_cm1 vs Doc_cm | 0.569 |
| Cross | Cross | IML_cm1 vs Doc_sp | 0.277 |
The results show that expert activation patterns reflect specific manipulation types: similar manipulations exhibit high expert similarity within the same domain and can share experts across domains, while conflicting artifacts activate different experts for specialized representations.
Specifically, copymove focuses on anomalous similarities between authentic regions , whereas generative inpainting and AIGC focus on synthetic–authentic discrepancies , leading to distinct update requirements.
[5] Busternet: Detecting copy-move image forgery with source/target localization. ECCV, 2018.
[6] Noise Doesn't Lie: Towards Universal Detection of Deep Inpainting. IJCAI, 2021.
[7] Rethinking the Up-Sampling Operations in CNN-based Generative Network for Generalizable Deepfake Detection. CVPR, 2024.
Weakness 5:Clarification of Previously Undefined Symbols
Thank you for pointing this out. We acknowledge that these symbols were not explicitly defined at their first appearance.
Specifically, denotes the frozen pretrained linear projection weights, denotes the effective weights after OFT adaptation, and denotes the trainable orthogonal transformation. We will clarify their definitions, dimensions, and orthogonality constraints in the revised manuscript.
I thank the authors for their response. After considering it, I have decided to maintain my original score.
Clarification and Response to W1
We thank the reviewer for recognizing our systematic analysis of cross-domain interactions in Unified FID. Your question is closely related to W1–W4, we will address together below.
We believe the concerns raised in W1 and W2 may stem from misunderstandings of the Unified FID task and existing research on artifact heterogeneity. We therefore first clarify the current research landscape and key challenges of Unified FID.
Clarification: Existing Research Gaps in Unified FID and Our Contributions
As explicitly stated in our Introduction, Unified FID focuses on “Unified FID aims to perform unified real–fake discrimination across forensic domain, while the underlying forgery method is unknown under realistic forensic scenarios.”
In this context, both academia and industry have investigated artifact heterogeneity and cross-domain interference. SICA [1] characterizes artifact feature space collapse as compressing “domain-specific, high-dimensional artifact features into a unified or domain-indiscriminative, low-dimensional representation space.” UniShield [3] notes that “models trained on mixed forgery datasets often experience performance degradation caused by domain conflicts.” Meanwhile, tech report [2] finds that certain IMDL manipulations involving generative editing benefit from AIGC data, demonstrating positive transfer alongside cross-domain interference.
However, existing studies have not systematically investigated conflicts among heterogeneous artifacts or distinguished whether cross-domain interference stems from conflicting optimization requirements or insufficient representation capacity. Therefore, we would appreciate it if you could provide specific references establishing that “feature space collapse does not simply arise from insufficient capacity” is already a common understanding in the literature.
Our work quantifies relative cross-domain harm at the optimization level,based on the results in Tables 2 and 10,
LoRA adapters with different capacities exhibit similar cross-domain harm and detection performance, whereas separating update pathways at comparable capacity reduces harm and improves performance. This reveals “feature space collapse does not simply arise from insufficient capacity, but primarily from a mismatch between capacity organization and the distinct sharing scopes of heterogeneous artifacts” firstly, as accurately reflected in Contributions 1 and 2.
The mechanism we identify is explicitly stated in Sec. 3.5: “Reveal the mechanism which heterogeneous artifacts progressively lead to feature space collapse during joint optimization in FID”.
Further responses to your remaining concerns are provided below.
[1] Du et al. Can We Build a Monolithic Model for Fake Image Detection? SICA: Semantic-Induced Constrained Adaptation for Unified-Yet-Discriminative Artifact Feature Space Reconstruction. ICML, 2026.
[2] Venus-DefakerOne2: A Vision-Forensics Foundation Model with Broader Coverage. arXiv, 2026.
[3] Huang, Q., Xu, Z., Zhang, X., Yu, X., & Zhang, J. (2026). Unishield: An adaptive multi-agent framework for unified forgery image detection and localization. CVPR, 2026.
W1 :Is cross-domain conflict analysis distinct from CS-DFD?
Yes. The novelty of our cross-domain conflict analysis is clarified below.
We acknowledge that both CS-DFD and our work use loss changes induced by parameter updates to analyze optimization interference. However, CS-DFD focuses on coordinating gradient updates between samples, whereas our work quantifies relative optimization interference across heterogeneous forensic domains by comparing loss changes induced by cross-domain and within-domain sample-pair updates, and further investigates its cumulative relationship with feature space collapse.
Sec. 3.3 shows that instantaneous cross-domain gradients in Unified FID are nearly orthogonal rather than ideally aligned, while gradient similarity alone cannot capture actual cross-domain harm or its cumulative effects.