- Rating
- 3(+1)
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 1
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Paper summary
The paper recasts proactive tamper localization as continuous syndrome verification. A block-diagonal semi-orthogonal matrix H, shared across 2x2 RGB patches, binds the watermarked image to the linear invariant HI_wm = G(m), where G(m) is derived from a 128-bit message. The back-projected residual f_syn = H^T (HI_atk - G(m)) is supplied to a U-Net localizer as extra input channels, and a second U-Net inpaints the masked region, supervised by MSE+LPIPS plus a syndrome regularizer. Training uses 5,000 Stable Diffusion images and testing is zero-shot on PASCAL VOC (splicing, copy-move) and CelebA (deepfake) under blur, noise, JPEG and patch removal, against three passive and four proactive baselines. The appendix provides four linear-algebra results, implementation details and extended tables.
Critical strengths
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The idea is simple, reference-free at verification time (no original image is needed), and easy to attach to an existing localizer. If the invariance held, this recipe would be broadly reusable.
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The zero-shot protocol — training only on synthetic images and testing on natural datasets without fine-tuning — is a genuinely strong generalization result, and reconstruction PSNR improves consistently across distortions and across both datasets.
Critical weaknesses
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The algebraic invariant is not established, and the evidence is internally inconsistent. Because the local block maps 12 scalars to 8 syndrome values, the constraint fixes a large majority of the image dimensions while G(m) depends only on a 128-bit message; the admissible set is therefore a single affine subspace, and an unseen host cannot lie near it while retaining the reported fidelity. Relatedly, the near-exact residual reported in Table 6 cannot coexist with the low syndrome SNR of Table 2, which is precisely the mismatch-dominated regime that the paper itself calls "Curse 1". If the embedding mismatch dominates, then f_syn is essentially a fixed random projection of the attacked image plus a constant : a high-pass channel and the ablation of Figure 4 cannot distinguish the claimed algebraic contribution from that channel. A control using a fixed high-pass or noise residual, and a control using an untrained random H, are both missing. Theorems 1-3 assume the constraint holds exactly and therefore do not cover the deployed system, as the authors themselves acknowledge.
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The empirical evidence does not support the paper's claims, and parts of it are self-contradictory.
(a) Head-to-head, the method does not win against the baselines the authors themselves list. On CelebA, RecoverMark is clearly better under Gaussian noise, JPEG and no distortion (F1 0.7870 vs 0.4350 under JPEG; 0.9746 vs 0.5057 with no distortion). On PASCAL VOC, the passive RelayFormer wins four of five settings (0.9554 vs 0.8566 under JPEG), and Table 3 of the paper itself already places a passive baseline above the proposed method under the same JPEG setting. RecoverMark is excluded from VOC on the grounds that it is face-specific, so the method only wins on the dataset where its strongest competitor is absent — and the dismissal of RecoverMark as depending on an unperturbed background is contradicted by precisely those noise and JPEG results.
(b) The motivating premise is asserted rather than measured, and the baseline set is too narrow to support a state-of-the-art claim. Recent IML methods such as Mesorch, PNF-Net, TruFor and ObjectFormer are trained and evaluated explicitly under compression, blur and noise, and degrade gracefully at the distortion levels used here, so the claim that passive forensics collapses under global post-processing is not established. The paper also never states whether the passive baselines were retrained with the same distortion augmentation and training budget as the proposed model, although the comparison turns on exactly that. The related work omits this robust-IML line and the closest proactive competitors (SepMark; LIDMark), which makes the claimed novelty over existing proactive forensics hard to assess.
(c) Three of the four stated system goals are effectively unverified. Invisibility is listed as a goal, but no PSNR/SSIM/LPIPS comparison of the protected image against any baseline is reported. Ownership verification is never compared with the extraction robustness reported by other watermarking methods: no bit-error rate, no payload accounting, and no wrong-key or unwarranted-claim test. Reconstruction is supported by PSNR alone, and the perceptual column is not on a consistent scale — the same Imuge+ is reported with an LPIPS an order of magnitude smaller on CelebA than on VOC at comparable PSNR, which makes the reconstruction comparison uninterpretable. The reconstruction network also never receives f_syn, so the claim that reconstruction is algebraically guided rests entirely on an unablated loss term.
Questions for authors
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On which data distribution was Table 6 computed? On the test sets, please report the relative magnitudes of the embedding mismatch, the projected tampering and the projected noise, and explain how an unseen host is mapped into the set defined by H*I = G(m) while keeping the reported fidelity.
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Is the message m a random identifier, a fixed payload, or optimized per image? What is the effective payload in bits, and how does it compare with the watermark capacity of the baselines?
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Please give the exact formula for the "spatial SNR" in Table 2: what are the numerator and denominator, is it computed on the pixel grid (f_syn ∈ R^n) or the syndrome grid (s ∈ R^d), and does it use the ground-truth mask? Please also state which λ_syn was used for Tables 1, 3, 4 and 5. Is the mask thresholded at 0.5? Are PSNR/LPIPS computed over the whole image or only over the tampered region, and why is Imuge+'s LPIPS an order of magnitude smaller on CelebA than on VOC at the same PSNR?
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Given AUC near 0.99 but F1 near 0.44, please report best-threshold F1, IoU and PR curves, along with the false-positive rate on clean but distorted images.
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Please add two controls for the localization network: one with a fixed high-pass/noise-residual channel instead of f_syn, and one with an untrained random H. Were the passive baselines retrained with the same distortion augmentation and training budget as the "without prior" variant?
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Which loss weights were used in the main tables, and does the syndrome term in the reconstruction loss matter at all? The reconstruction network never receives f_syn, so what makes reconstruction "syndrome-guided"?
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Please report watermark extraction bit-error rate against SepMark, EditGuard, LIDMark, OmniGuard and RecoverMark, together with wrong-key and unwatermarked-image false-claim rates, and report localization F1 under the adaptive attack rather than residual energy alone.
4 comments
Response to Reviewer TEQk (1/2)
Dear Reviewer TEQk,
Thank you for your follow-up comments. Below we clarify each of the three points and note the textual alignments made in our revised manuscript.
1. Misunderstanding Regarding the Algebraic Invariant and Empirical Isolation
There is a misunderstanding about what our algebraic invariant is and how its effect should be evaluated. Our algebraic invariant is the linear subspace constraint embedded via a secret, block-diagonal semi-orthogonal matrix (). By design, energy-bounded global distortions () are non-amplified under , whereas localized manipulations () violate the constraint and produce block-local syndrome energy spikes () that indicate tampered regions. This algebraic mechanism is fundamentally distinct from, and cannot be reduced to, a single pixel-level AP score.
Rather than relying on the localizer or its training distribution, the independent contribution of the algebraic invariant is established across multiple quantitative and qualitative experiments in the manuscript:
- Table 9 (Zero neural localizer, zero LNet training distribution): Evaluating the raw syndrome residual without any neural network shows an embedding mismatch of only , while tampered blocks exhibit to higher mean residual energy than untampered blocks, achieving raw block-level ROC-AUCs of 0.7234 (PASCAL VOC), 0.7613 (Stable Diffusion), and 0.9328 (CelebA) across distortions.
- Table 4 (Direct causal scaling with ): Increasing only the Phase 1 algebraic constraint weight from to boosts the spatial syndrome SNR in from -1.91 dB (under blur) (and 5.18 dB under noise) up to 17.71 dB (Splicing) and 19.27 dB (Copy-Move), directly confirming that the forensic localization cue originates from enforcing .
- Figure 8(a) (Pure linear CSF without LNet): Pure linear algebraic verification alone (with no neural localizer) already achieves ~0.95 F1 at a 10% tamper ratio.
- Figure 5 (-only input without RGB): Feeding LNet only without the RGB image yields ~0.85 F1 at lower tamper ratios, proving carries standalone tampering cues rather than relying on RGB artifacts.
- Table 2, Figure 4, and Figure 7 (Strictly controlled ablations under the identical localizer and training distribution): With the U-Net architecture, 5,000-image training set, and distortion augmentations held completely fixed, removing () causes severe false positives under noise and JPEG compression (Figures 4 and 7). In Table 2, Syndrome Prior outperforms RGB-only, High-pass, and untrained Random Projection, cutting PASCAL VOC noise FPR from 2.83% (RGB-only) and 1.00% (High-pass) down to 0.17%, and reducing CelebA distortion-only FPR to 0.00% across all conditions.
- Table 3 and Table 11 (Reconstruction constraint and key binding): Enforcing the syndrome term in Equation 8 reduces output constraint error by 32.01% (VOC) and 19.85% (SD) over standard inpainting (, Table 3), and the true invariant residual remains orders of magnitude above the clean baseline under adaptive surrogate PGD attacks (1.698e-3 vs. 3.000e-6, Table 11).
Response to Reviewer TEQk (2/2)
2. Claim Consistency and Protected-Image Fidelity Comparison (Table 10)
- Alignment of Abstract and Conclusion: We thank the reviewer for catching the legacy phrasing in Conclusion ("outperforming state-of-the-art baselines"). We have revised the manuscript so that the Abstract, Introduction, Section 6.2, and Conclusion consistently scope our claims over evaluated general proactive baselines.
- Fidelity Comparison: SyndromeMark is a proactive method whose embedded redundancy trades off some visual fidelity for active verification and content recovery. Comparing protected-image PSNR against passive detectors, which do not alter images and offer neither ownership verification nor reconstruction, is not like-for-like. Meanwhile, 37 to 44 dB figures reported elsewhere correspond to different setups (e.g., native resolution, fragile localization-only templates, or face-specific background offloading). Under our unified proactive evaluation, EditGuard itself measures 30.45–32.02 dB PSNR. In the latest revision (Appendix D.2, Table 10), when matched to EditGuard's fidelity regime (: 31.65 dB on VOC, 32.70 dB on CelebA), SyndromeMark surpasses EditGuard in both perceptual quality (LPIPS 0.1469–0.1822 vs. 0.2273–0.3761; SSIM 0.8931–0.8988 vs. 0.8165–0.8864) and localization F1 (0.7491 vs. 0.2507 on VOC; 0.7694 vs. 0.1713 on SD; 0.3022 vs. 0.0862 on CelebA), while Table 4 documents the full trade-off up to (~27 dB).
3. Baseline Selection and Motivation Consistency
- SepMark: SepMark performs whole-image deepfake detection (binary real/fake classification) and source tracing. It outputs no tamper localization masks and performs no image reconstruction, and is therefore not a baseline for manipulation localization or content reconstruction.
- LIDMark: LIDMark is face-specific, relies on sparse 68-landmark displacement consistency rather than dense pixel-level segmentation masks, and does not reconstruct tampered RGB content. It is therefore applicable to watermark payload and BER comparison (Table 8), but incompatible with pixel-level mask F1/AUC and RGB reconstruction benchmarks.
- Passive IML (Mesorch, PNF-Net, TruFor, ObjectFormer): Our primary competitors are proactive frameworks (
EditGuard,OmniGuard,Imuge+,RecoverMark), not passive detectors. Nonetheless, we already evaluate three passive baselines including the ICLR 2026 SOTA RelayFormer to represent modern passive localization performance. - Motivation Consistency: We have refined the Introduction to align with Appendix A.1 and Table 5: while modern passive localizers improve distortion resilience (and classical methods degrade under JPEG), passive detectors rely on manipulation types seen during training rather than a universal, manipulation-agnostic prior, and still provide only an alarm without a rescue (lacking active ownership verification and content reconstruction). In contrast, existing general proactive methods lack principled algebraic invariants and suffer severe degradation under global distortions.
We thank you again for your thorough review and thoughtful questions. We hope these clarifications and manuscript updates resolve all remaining concerns and encourage a positive reconsideration of your final rating.
Best regards,
Authors
Thanks to the author's efforts, I raised my score from 2 to 3.
Thanks for the detailed response. Before deciding the final score, I hope the author will briefly clarify the following three questions.
First, the paper's claim is about the algebraic invariant, but the evidence isolates only a small effect: 0.5478 AP against 0.5161 for a plain high-pass channel, with absolute AP around 0.55. What makes the system robust to distortions is the localizer and its training distribution, and that is not separated from the invariant.
Second, the paper still contradicts itself. The abstract and conclusion assert superiority while §6.2 concedes losses to RecoverMark and RelayFormer, and the operating point is 26.98 dB PSNR against roughly 37–44 dB for comparable methods, with no fidelity comparison.
Third, the comparison set remains selective: SepMark matches the payload and is the closest paradigm ancestor yet is neither cited nor compared, LIDMark appears only in the payload column, and Mesorch, PNF-Net, TruFor and ObjectFormer are cited without numbers. The stated motivation is also contradicted by the paper's own related work and Table 5.