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Paper summary
This paper conducts a simulation of pricing policies represented by GRU networks and trained with PPO. In the simulation they observe that prices converge to Nash and forced price cuts generally lose money. One of their models considers the case where prices are not perfectly monitored.
I was unable to understand from the paper why GRU+PPO should be used for pricing. There is an extensive literature on pricing algorithms in OR and CS and this is not one of the usual algorithms. That literature tends to prove that its algorithms perform well in broad families of environment, such as iid or adversarial demand. The adversarial bounds transfer to equilibrium environments and result in correlated equilibria. I think before we care much about how GRU+PPO works in price competition, we should have justification for why it should be used in pricing. This paper does not give sufficient justification.
It seems like Proposition 2 is false as stated. The mistake in its proof is to drop the term from the denominator of equation. (I'm not listing this as a critical mistake, because it doesn't change my opinion of the paepr.)
Critical strengths
- algorithmic collusion is a topic of significant interest.
Critical weaknesses
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This paper is not very human readable. I got almost nothing from reading the paper's introduction that I didn't already get from the abstract.
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This paper does not place its results in the now extensive literature on algorithmic collusion. It cites two such papers. For example, even the well known Calvano et al (2021) which studies imperfect monitoring -- which is related to their study -- is not cited.
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There is insufficient justification given for considering the algorithms that are considered.
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The paper does not show that the results they obtain in their simulation are likely to be representative of what would happen if their algorithms are run in other settings.
Questions for authors
I have no questions.
2 comments
Let me be more specific on why the choice of pricing algorithm (GRU+PPO) makes this paper not relevant. There is a very large space of algorithms that output prices. Obviously most of these algorithms are not worth evaluating. For an algorithm to be worth evaluating we must argue that it is special among algorithms. For example, with provable guarantees or wide use in practice of pricing or other such arguments. A simulation paper especially must be held to a strong standard of justifying its choice of algorithm. What have we learned about algorithmic collusion by the simulation properties of an algorithm that nobody has considered or is likely to use for pricing?
The authors have not seemed interested in understanding the literature on algorithmic collusion, still having only cited three papers in this space. I am quite certain that the people studying algorithmic collusion will to an equal or greater extent uninterested in this paper (due to the flaw above).
In the author response, they say:
The core economic distinction we want to highlight is that a high price is not, by itself, evidence of collusion or punishment.
I don't think this is a correction in understanding to how the literature on price collusion identifies collusive outcomes.
Response to Reviewer: Clarifying the Choice of GRU+PPO, Theoretical Corrections, and Scope of Our Findings
Response to Reviewer
We thank the reviewer for the detailed and helpful comments. We agree with the concerns regarding our choice of GRU+PPO, the need for a clearer connection to prior literature, and the scope of our results. We have revised the main paper and the supplementary material accordingly, and summarize the key changes below.
We agree that GRU+PPO is not a standard pricing algorithm in the operations research literature, and we do not present it as a benchmark or claim any general performance guarantees for it. Instead, we use it as a controlled environment to answer a specific question: do learned pricing policies respond to unilateral deviations through future punishment?
Because our environment features noisy, delayed public reports, agents must condition their pricing decisions on a history of observations rather than the rival's current price. A GRU handles this historical sequence, while PPO accommodates continuous price actions. We have clarified this motivation in Section 2.3 and Supplement C, making it clear that we are not arguing GRU+PPO is superior to established pricing algorithms.
We agree the original introduction did not frame our research question clearly enough. The core economic distinction we want to highlight is that a high price is not, by itself, evidence of collusion or punishment. A firm can lose money from a price cut even if its rival never responds.
Our study asks whether a deviation is deterred by this immediate profit loss or by lower continuation payoffs, and we explain how our audit separates these two effects. We have rewritten the Introduction around this point and added worked examples in Supplement I so the economic intuition is accessible without needing to parse all the technical details first.
We have expanded the literature discussion in the Introduction and Supplement A.5 to better connect with existing work, including Calvano et al. (2020, 2021), Deng et al. (2025), and classical research on imperfect public monitoring.
We explicitly acknowledge that Calvano et al. (2021) already studies learning under imperfect monitoring and uses forced-deviation interventions. We are not claiming to introduce deviation experiments for the first time. Rather, our specific contribution is decomposing a deviation's effect into an immediate profit component and a discounted continuation component using matched counterfactual simulations, alongside an exact negative control for the action-independent reporting channel. This allows us to isolate a specific enforcement mechanism rather than just inferring collusion from observed price levels.
We agree that our simulations do not prove how GRU+PPO would behave in all pricing environments. Our experiments rely on a specific market specification, a finite horizon, and a particular observation structure. We have made these limitations explicit in Section 6 and Supplement H.
Our findings describe the trained policies and the specific interventions we tested; we do not claim they automatically extend to other algorithms, demand processes, or indefinitely repeated markets. We also agree that comparing our setup with established pricing algorithms (especially those with theoretical guarantees) would help bound the scope of our results. Such comparisons are beyond the scope of our current completed experiments, and we do not present them as such.
Thank you for catching the error in Proposition 2. The original derivation failed to properly account for false alarms during cooperation. Writing g for the immediate deviation gain and h=πC−πP, the corrected Bellman equations yield:
VC−VP=1−δ+δαh
with the corrected incentive threshold:
δ∗=g(1−α)+(β−α)hg
and the feasibility condition:
(β−α)h>αg
The feasibility condition now makes it explicit that frequent false alarms can make cooperation unsustainable, even if deviations are more likely to be detected. The full derivation is now provided in Section 5 and Supplements A.1 and I.8.
Finally, we have refined the statement of our contribution. We are not proposing a new pricing algorithm or a general convergence result. Instead, we provide a method to examine whether future profit losses deter unilateral deviations in learned pricing policies.
In our experiments, almost all the average loss from the tested price cuts occurs immediately, with very small continuation effects. This describes the behavior of the specific policies in our tested environment, not a general claim about the absence of algorithmic collusion.
We are grateful to the reviewer for pointing out the theoretical error and for the feedback that helped us tighten the experimental interpretation and clarify our contribution.