- Rating
- 3
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper proposes PuriShield to protect images from unauthorized diffusion customization, including customization after image purification. It trains a perturbation generator with sinusoidal pattern conditions and dual-head modulation. A latent distribution loss moves protected images toward the current perturbations and away from clean images. The method also uses alternating training, a perceptual loss, and random block masking. Experiments cover several customization methods, purification methods, datasets, and model architectures. The results suggest that PuriShield offers a useful balance between protection strength, purification robustness, and inference efficiency.
Critical strengths
- The paper reports promising protection after purification. The evaluation covers diverse datasets, customization methods, and purification attacks.
- The generator enables fast protection in a single forward pass. The browser extension adds practical value, and the ablations help assess the main design choices.
Critical weaknesses
- The novelty needs a clearer comparison with closely related work. BlurGuard already uses frequency-aware perturbations to improve robustness against purification. PatchOut randomly masks perturbation patches during optimization, while Anti-Reference uses a learned noise encoder for fast protection. These methods provide close precedents for several components of PuriShield. The proposed combination may still offer a useful contribution, but the paper does not clearly separate its new elements from these established ideas.
- The evidence for the proposed manifold-based explanation is limited. Table 29 uses VAE round-trip consistency to support the claim that protected images remain close to the natural-image manifold. However, consistency under the VAE mapping does not directly establish proximity to natural images, and the table does not provide a clean-image reference. Table 30 also reports “Riemannian distances” without clearly defining the metric or its computation.
- Whether training and evaluation identities are disjoint? Although adaptive attacks such as PDAP are included, their filtering settings and attack strengths are not sufficiently specified for reproduction. In addition, the reported ISM before purification differs between Table 1 (0.098) and Table 26 (0.138), without a clear explanation of the setup differences.
Questions for authors
Please refer to the Weaknesses.
2 comments
Thank you for your constructive feedback and continued positive assessment of our work.
We appreciate your time and effort during the review and discussion.
Comment on Rebuttal
I thank the authors for reporting additional results regarding my concerns, so I maintain my positive assessment and my rating.