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- Informativeness
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Paper summary
This paper proposes SIDECAR, an independent verification framework for long-horizon agents. It uses a separate context to execute checks derived from task requirements and refines these checks based on execution feedback. Experiments on Terminal-Bench and SWE-bench show improvements in several settings.
Critical strengths
The paper addresses a relevant problem: agents often report task completion without sufficient evidence. The experiments cover multiple benchmarks and agent models, and the results suggest that independent executable verification can improve task reliability.
Critical weaknesses
- The central idea of using an independent verifier to detect agent failures is closely related to existing verifier-based and multi-agent verification approaches. The paper does not sufficiently establish what methodological advance SIDECAR offers beyond separating the verifier's context and using executable checks.
- The paper argues that agents cannot reliably verify their own behavior, yet addresses the verifier's own inaccuracies by having it revise its checks. If the verifier cannot reliably judge correctness in the first place, it is unclear what enables it to determine whether its revisions are valid. Execution feedback may help, but the paper does not establish that it provides a sufficiently independent correctness signal rather than reinforcing flawed verification criteria.
- The discussion of related work is insufficient, particularly regarding existing verifier-based methods and approaches for optimizing verification mechanisms. The paper lacks a critical comparison of their strengths and limitations, making it difficult to assess SIDECAR's novelty and its advantages over prior approaches.
- The baselines are insufficient to establish the effectiveness of SIDECAR’s core components. Comparisons should include competing verifier-based approaches and alternative verification or refinement mechanisms, rather than relying primarily on improvements over standard LLM baselines. Moreover, the lack of ablation studies makes it difficult to isolate the contributions of individual components.
Questions for authors
- What is the fundamental methodological novelty of SIDECAR beyond independent verification and executable check refinement?
- How does SIDECAR compare with existing approaches that iteratively generate and repair executable tests?
- What guarantees that revised checks preserve the intended semantics of the original claims, rather than merely fitting observed execution feedback?
7 comments
Response to Reviewer Z6zp (2/5): w2 / q3
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w2 / q3: If the verifier cannot reliably judge correctness, what enables it to determine whether its revisions are valid, and what guarantees that revised checks preserve the intended semantics of the original claims?
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R w2 / q3: We agree: a verifier that simply revises its own checks would not be reliable. This is exactly what makes the problem challenging, and it is the problem SIDECAR is designed to address. Our core idea is to rely on executed evidence rather than the model's confidence, and to refine checks iteratively. We do not assume that any check is reliable; we use executed evidence to remove, step by step, what is clearly wrong.
What can and cannot be guaranteed. We take a lesson from formal verification and testing: proving that a check is correct is hard, but showing that it is wrong can be done with simple, executable tests. Successful executions alone do not establish that a check captures the intended semantics. This is the test-oracle problem [5], and we do not claim a formal guarantee of semantic correctness. In the spirit of counterexample-guided methods [6, 7], SIDECAR instead removes clearly wrong checks step by step: a check that cannot run is repaired, and a revised check that fails to reject a known violation is discarded. There is, however, a floor: a weakened check can only accept a completion, which is what the baseline does without verification, so SIDECAR then falls back to the baseline's behavior for that requirement. A check that is too strict has a bounded cost, since each task permits at most four rejections.
The same standard for the agent and the verifier. The core question is how to use the task and the environment effectively when correctness labels for the current state are unavailable. SIDECAR applies one standard to both components: neither the agent's account of its work nor the verifier's belief in its check is sufficient on its own. Both must face evidence from execution. This feedback gives the verifier a concrete basis for revision without requiring the correct solution to the agent's task.
The rules of revision. The concern is a revision that removes a failure by weakening the check, such as replacing "every record is converted" with "the output file is not empty". SIDECAR prevents this through four rules that the framework enforces.
- R1. Fixed claim. A revision may change a check's code, never its claim. The claim quotes the task requirement and stays fixed, together with its counterexamples, the observation interfaces, and the intervention rules.
- R2. Executed evidence. Whether a check works is established by running it. What it raised, returned, and observed comes from the environment, not from the verifier's assessment of itself.
- R3. Acceptance by counterexamples. A revised check is accepted only if it reaches a verdict on the current state and rejects every counterexample of its claim. These negative tests need no correctness labels for the agent's current state. A separate claim-check alignment review adds another filter, but model approval cannot override a failed execution-based acceptance test.
- R4. FAIL is not UNKNOWN. Only an accepted check's executed FAIL can reject a completion. A check that cannot reach a verdict returns UNKNOWN, which never rejects.
Evidence. Additional controlled comparisons, including the verdict quality of revision, are in Parts 4/5 and 5/5.
Question Result Source Does revision repair checks that cannot work? Checks returning UNKNOWN: 41.5% before revision, 22.3% after. Fig. 7 Does revision make verdicts more correct? In a controlled measurement with labeled development states, correct verdicts on 59 held-out states rise from 19 to 59. Fig. 1c, App. B.5 Do repaired checks help the agent? Repaired checks supply 8 of the 24 rejections. Judged by hidden official tests, SIDECAR wins 30 paired trials and loses 10. Sec. 6.3, 6.1 SIDECAR's contribution is to make verifier refinement an explicit, constrained process: each revision must answer to a fixed requirement and executed tests, rather than the model's confidence that it has improved. To our knowledge, revising a verifier's own checks within a task under these rules has not appeared in prior work.
Response to Reviewer Z6zp (3/5): w3 / q2
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w3 / q2: The discussion of related work is insufficient, particularly on verifier-based methods and approaches for optimizing verification mechanisms, and lacks a critical comparison of their strengths and limitations. How does SIDECAR compare with approaches that iteratively generate and repair executable tests?
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R w3 / q2: Section 2 and Appendix A discuss these directions, and we provide a critical comparison of method families below. In short, prior methods either leave the verdict to a model, or obtain better tests through training, labels, or many finished attempts; SIDECAR decides by execution and improves its checks inside a single run, without labels.
What the paper covers and what we will add. Section 2 discusses self-reflection, test-time verification, self-improving agents, and generated tests and rubrics. Appendix A extends each, and its Table 2 organizes test-time methods by where the corrective signal comes from and when it is applied. We will add AgentCoder [1], Building Verifiers for CUAs (Universal Verifier) [2], LongHorizon-Harness [3], Multi-Agent Verification [8], and the concurrent works Rethinking Verification [4] and VeriHarness [9], and include the comparison below in Section 2.
Critical comparison. Limitations are stated with respect to our setting: verification during a single run, beside an unmodified agent, with the agent's own model and no correctness labels.
Method family What it does Strength Limitation in our setting Self-reflection (Reflexion [10], Self-Refine [11]) The agent reviews its own work in its own context No extra component, low cost The review reads the history that produced the mistake; in our study it catches 50.3% of failing states Post-hoc selection (LLM-as-a-Verifier [12], Multi-Agent Verification [8], VeriHarness [9]) A verifier selects among or revises finished attempts Combines complementary attempts; the agent is unchanged Needs several complete runs per task and acts only after they end Runtime review (LongHorizon-Harness [3], Rethinking Verification [4]) A separate model inspects the environment and returns its findings Flexible; can examine requirements that are hard to express as a check The verdict is model-written, each review costs further model calls, and a wrong finding has no correction mechanism Generated tests for code (CodeT [13], AgentCoder [1], UTGen [14], Self-Debug [15]) Tests are generated and executed to select or debug code Executable, inspectable evidence Targets a finished program; test quality relies on training or on agreement across many candidates Verifier optimization (AutoPyVerifier [16], Universal Verifier [2], skill evolution in VeriHarness [9]) The verifier is refined against labeled outputs or development tasks Improvements persist across tasks Requires labels or development data before deployment; no adaptation inside the current task SIDECAR Checks derived from the task decide by execution and are revised within the task under fixed claims Works in a single run with the agent's own model and no labels; a stored check reruns without a model call Verification runs inside the agent's time limit and covers requirements that can be checked by execution Comparison with iterative test generation and repair (q2). SIDECAR shares with these methods the idea of generating executable tests and learning from their execution. It differs in three respects.
- What is checked. These methods test a finished program. SIDECAR checks the state of an environment that keeps changing during the run, and reruns its checks at each decision point.
- What test quality relies on. These methods obtain good tests through training (UTGen), agreement across many candidate programs (CodeT), or labeled outputs (AutoPyVerifier). SIDECAR relies only on the check's own execution feedback within the task.
- What constrains a change to a test. SIDECAR keeps the claim fixed and accepts a revised check only if it still fails on the claim's counterexamples (see Part 2/5). We are not aware of a corresponding constraint in these methods.
In our new experiments (Part 4/5), checks that are generated but never repaired solve 16 of 84 tasks, against 22 for SIDECAR.
References are listed in Part 5/5.
Response to Reviewer Z6zp (1/5): Contribution and w1 / q1
Thank you for raising these important and challenging questions. We appreciate your recognition that the problem is relevant and that the experiments span multiple benchmarks and agent models. A separate model call does not automatically make verification independent, nor does an executable check automatically make it reliable. These are the challenges we aim to address, and our novelty lies in how our method does so.
Our contribution. Independent verification is our motivating goal. Our methodological contribution addresses two gaps: how to control the information available to the verifier to make verification more independent of the agent's reasoning, and how to make fallible checks more reliable without ground-truth correctness labels during task execution. We clarify these mechanisms and their relationship to prior work, and report additional comparisons. References are listed in Part 5/5.
w1 / q1: What is SIDECAR's methodological advance beyond separating the verifier's context and using executable checks?
R w1 / q1: SIDECAR contributes a new mechanism for verification within a long-horizon task: the basis for verification is built independently of the agent's reasoning, only executed evidence can trigger intervention, and fallible checks are revised without labels under fixed targets.
An open and actively studied problem. Several works make verification design a central contribution: AgentCoder [1] separates programming, test design, and execution; The Art of Building Verifiers for Computer Use Agents [2] studies rubric construction and evidence organization; LongHorizon-Harness [3] organizes execution around independently audited task states; and, after our submission, Rethinking Verification in Agent Harnesses [4] compares 17 verification designs. These works illustrate that the information a verifier receives, the evidence supporting its decisions, and its interaction with the agent are substantive methodological choices.
Our approach and what is new. We study verification within a single ongoing task, using the agent's own backbone and no ground-truth correctness labels for the current state. SIDECAR requires no retraining of the base agent and intervenes before a result is accepted. Its contribution connects three design choices:
To our knowledge, rejecting only on executed evidence during a long-horizon run and revising the verifier's own checks within the task have not appeared in prior verifiers [1-4]. We believe their combination with information separation is a new scheme in the design space of agent verifiers.
Evidence. Each design choice has a measurable effect, and the mechanism as a whole improves task success. Additional controlled comparisons are in Parts 4/5 and 5/5.
Independence here means isolation from the agent's reasoning, not statistical independence between calls to the same backbone.