acceptodds
Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

Sidecar: Independent Verification for Long-Horizon Agents

Abstract

Long-horizon agents take many dependent steps, so one mistaken assumption can invalidate the work built on it. Checking it early is far cheaper than redoing that work. The natural remedy is to have the agent review its own work. Yet this review reads the same history that produced the mistake, so it tends to confirm the assumption rather than test it. To make verification reliable, we introduce Sidecar, independent verification that keeps its own context. Sidecar tests the agent's assumptions with executable checks and returns the evidence to the agent at decision points. Effective checks cannot be fully specified in advance, so Sidecar improves its checks within the task using execution feedback. To prevent this improvement from bypassing its own constraints, Sidecar fixes its observation and intervention interfaces, so that only the checks themselves are revised. Using the agent's own model for verification, Sidecar improves task success for every backbone we test. On Terminal-Bench 2.0, it raises task success from 17.3% to 25.0%, a gain of 7.7 percentage points. Our code is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/sidecar-34B0.

Primary area:
foundation or frontier models, including LLMs
Keywords:
LLM agents, long-horizon tasks, verification, test-time verification, self-improvement, executable checks

Reviews

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Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 2.67 over 3 reviews, above 70% of the others.
Reviewer_Z6zpOpenReview ↗
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2(+1)
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3
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Paper summary

This paper proposes SIDECAR, an independent verification framework for long-horizon agents. It uses a separate context to execute checks derived from task requirements and refines these checks based on execution feedback. Experiments on Terminal-Bench and SWE-bench show improvements in several settings.

Critical strengths

The paper addresses a relevant problem: agents often report task completion without sufficient evidence. The experiments cover multiple benchmarks and agent models, and the results suggest that independent executable verification can improve task reliability.

Critical weaknesses
  1. The central idea of using an independent verifier to detect agent failures is closely related to existing verifier-based and multi-agent verification approaches. The paper does not sufficiently establish what methodological advance SIDECAR offers beyond separating the verifier's context and using executable checks.
  2. The paper argues that agents cannot reliably verify their own behavior, yet addresses the verifier's own inaccuracies by having it revise its checks. If the verifier cannot reliably judge correctness in the first place, it is unclear what enables it to determine whether its revisions are valid. Execution feedback may help, but the paper does not establish that it provides a sufficiently independent correctness signal rather than reinforcing flawed verification criteria.
  3. The discussion of related work is insufficient, particularly regarding existing verifier-based methods and approaches for optimizing verification mechanisms. The paper lacks a critical comparison of their strengths and limitations, making it difficult to assess SIDECAR's novelty and its advantages over prior approaches.
  4. The baselines are insufficient to establish the effectiveness of SIDECAR’s core components. Comparisons should include competing verifier-based approaches and alternative verification or refinement mechanisms, rather than relying primarily on improvements over standard LLM baselines. Moreover, the lack of ablation studies makes it difficult to isolate the contributions of individual components.
Questions for authors
  1. What is the fundamental methodological novelty of SIDECAR beyond independent verification and executable check refinement?
  2. How does SIDECAR compare with existing approaches that iteratively generate and repair executable tests?
  3. What guarantees that revised checks preserve the intended semantics of the original claims, rather than merely fitting observed execution feedback?
7 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer Z6zp (1/5): Contribution and w1 / q1

Thank you for raising these important and challenging questions. We appreciate your recognition that the problem is relevant and that the experiments span multiple benchmarks and agent models. A separate model call does not automatically make verification independent, nor does an executable check automatically make it reliable. These are the challenges we aim to address, and our novelty lies in how our method does so.

Our contribution. Independent verification is our motivating goal. Our methodological contribution addresses two gaps: how to control the information available to the verifier to make verification more independent of the agent's reasoning, and how to make fallible checks more reliable without ground-truth correctness labels during task execution. We clarify these mechanisms and their relationship to prior work, and report additional comparisons. References are listed in Part 5/5.


  • w1 / q1: What is SIDECAR's methodological advance beyond separating the verifier's context and using executable checks?

  • R w1 / q1: SIDECAR contributes a new mechanism for verification within a long-horizon task: the basis for verification is built independently of the agent's reasoning, only executed evidence can trigger intervention, and fallible checks are revised without labels under fixed targets.

    An open and actively studied problem. Several works make verification design a central contribution: AgentCoder [1] separates programming, test design, and execution; The Art of Building Verifiers for Computer Use Agents [2] studies rubric construction and evidence organization; LongHorizon-Harness [3] organizes execution around independently audited task states; and, after our submission, Rethinking Verification in Agent Harnesses [4] compares 17 verification designs. These works illustrate that the information a verifier receives, the evidence supporting its decisions, and its interaction with the agent are substantive methodological choices.

    Our approach and what is new. We study verification within a single ongoing task, using the agent's own backbone and no ground-truth correctness labels for the current state. SIDECAR requires no retraining of the base agent and intervenes before a result is accepted. Its contribution connects three design choices:

    • Constructing an independent basis for verification. The checking target is derived from the task and the initial environment before the agent acts. The verifier does not receive the agent's conversation; its checks obtain evidence through fixed interfaces for listing files, reading contents, and executing commands against an isolated copy of the environment, preserving access to task facts without inheriting the agent's biases.
    • Controlling what evidence can trigger intervention. A retained check must produce an executed failure to reject a completion; an UNKNOWN result alone cannot. The agent receives the check's raw output, without a model-written explanation. Models still generate and assess checks, but a free-form model verdict never directly authorizes a rejection.
    • Revising checks under fixed verification targets. Generated checks can themselves be faulty. SIDECAR uses execution and validation feedback to revise their code while keeping the claims, counterexamples, and framework interfaces fixed. Counterexample testing constrains which revisions are accepted.

    To our knowledge, rejecting only on executed evidence during a long-horizon run and revising the verifier's own checks within the task have not appeared in prior verifiers [1-4]. We believe their combination with information separation is a new scheme in the design space of agent verifiers.

    Evidence. Each design choice has a measurable effect, and the mechanism as a whole improves task success. Additional controlled comparisons are in Parts 4/5 and 5/5.

    Design choiceComparisonResultSource
    Independent basis, executed evidenceA model reviews the agent's conversation vs. SIDECARTask success: 21.7% vs. 25.0%. Rejections per trial: 1.38 vs. 0.30.Fig. 6
    Raw output as feedbackA model's explanation vs. the check's raw outputRejected states then solved: 10 vs. 21 of 32.App. B.4.2
    Revision under fixed targetsChecks before vs. after revisionChecks returning UNKNOWN: 41.5% vs. 22.3%.Fig. 7
    OverallBaseline agent vs. SIDECAR with the agent's own modelTask success, e.g. 17.3% vs. 25.0%; 30 paired wins vs. 10 losses across three backbones.Sec. 6.1

    Independence here means isolation from the agent's reasoning, not statistical independence between calls to the same backbone.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer Z6zp (2/5): w2 / q3

  • w2 / q3: If the verifier cannot reliably judge correctness, what enables it to determine whether its revisions are valid, and what guarantees that revised checks preserve the intended semantics of the original claims?

  • R w2 / q3: We agree: a verifier that simply revises its own checks would not be reliable. This is exactly what makes the problem challenging, and it is the problem SIDECAR is designed to address. Our core idea is to rely on executed evidence rather than the model's confidence, and to refine checks iteratively. We do not assume that any check is reliable; we use executed evidence to remove, step by step, what is clearly wrong.

    What can and cannot be guaranteed. We take a lesson from formal verification and testing: proving that a check is correct is hard, but showing that it is wrong can be done with simple, executable tests. Successful executions alone do not establish that a check captures the intended semantics. This is the test-oracle problem [5], and we do not claim a formal guarantee of semantic correctness. In the spirit of counterexample-guided methods [6, 7], SIDECAR instead removes clearly wrong checks step by step: a check that cannot run is repaired, and a revised check that fails to reject a known violation is discarded. There is, however, a floor: a weakened check can only accept a completion, which is what the baseline does without verification, so SIDECAR then falls back to the baseline's behavior for that requirement. A check that is too strict has a bounded cost, since each task permits at most four rejections.

    The same standard for the agent and the verifier. The core question is how to use the task and the environment effectively when correctness labels for the current state are unavailable. SIDECAR applies one standard to both components: neither the agent's account of its work nor the verifier's belief in its check is sufficient on its own. Both must face evidence from execution. This feedback gives the verifier a concrete basis for revision without requiring the correct solution to the agent's task.

    The rules of revision. The concern is a revision that removes a failure by weakening the check, such as replacing "every record is converted" with "the output file is not empty". SIDECAR prevents this through four rules that the framework enforces.

    • R1. Fixed claim. A revision may change a check's code, never its claim. The claim quotes the task requirement and stays fixed, together with its counterexamples, the observation interfaces, and the intervention rules.
    • R2. Executed evidence. Whether a check works is established by running it. What it raised, returned, and observed comes from the environment, not from the verifier's assessment of itself.
    • R3. Acceptance by counterexamples. A revised check is accepted only if it reaches a verdict on the current state and rejects every counterexample of its claim. These negative tests need no correctness labels for the agent's current state. A separate claim-check alignment review adds another filter, but model approval cannot override a failed execution-based acceptance test.
    • R4. FAIL is not UNKNOWN. Only an accepted check's executed FAIL can reject a completion. A check that cannot reach a verdict returns UNKNOWN, which never rejects.

    Evidence. Additional controlled comparisons, including the verdict quality of revision, are in Parts 4/5 and 5/5.

    QuestionResultSource
    Does revision repair checks that cannot work?Checks returning UNKNOWN: 41.5% before revision, 22.3% after.Fig. 7
    Does revision make verdicts more correct?In a controlled measurement with labeled development states, correct verdicts on 59 held-out states rise from 19 to 59.Fig. 1c, App. B.5
    Do repaired checks help the agent?Repaired checks supply 8 of the 24 rejections. Judged by hidden official tests, SIDECAR wins 30 paired trials and loses 10.Sec. 6.3, 6.1

    SIDECAR's contribution is to make verifier refinement an explicit, constrained process: each revision must answer to a fixed requirement and executed tests, rather than the model's confidence that it has improved. To our knowledge, revising a verifier's own checks within a task under these rules has not appeared in prior work.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer Z6zp (3/5): w3 / q2

  • w3 / q2: The discussion of related work is insufficient, particularly on verifier-based methods and approaches for optimizing verification mechanisms, and lacks a critical comparison of their strengths and limitations. How does SIDECAR compare with approaches that iteratively generate and repair executable tests?

  • R w3 / q2: Section 2 and Appendix A discuss these directions, and we provide a critical comparison of method families below. In short, prior methods either leave the verdict to a model, or obtain better tests through training, labels, or many finished attempts; SIDECAR decides by execution and improves its checks inside a single run, without labels.

    What the paper covers and what we will add. Section 2 discusses self-reflection, test-time verification, self-improving agents, and generated tests and rubrics. Appendix A extends each, and its Table 2 organizes test-time methods by where the corrective signal comes from and when it is applied. We will add AgentCoder [1], Building Verifiers for CUAs (Universal Verifier) [2], LongHorizon-Harness [3], Multi-Agent Verification [8], and the concurrent works Rethinking Verification [4] and VeriHarness [9], and include the comparison below in Section 2.

    Critical comparison. Limitations are stated with respect to our setting: verification during a single run, beside an unmodified agent, with the agent's own model and no correctness labels.

    Method familyWhat it doesStrengthLimitation in our setting
    Self-reflection (Reflexion [10], Self-Refine [11])The agent reviews its own work in its own contextNo extra component, low costThe review reads the history that produced the mistake; in our study it catches 50.3% of failing states
    Post-hoc selection (LLM-as-a-Verifier [12], Multi-Agent Verification [8], VeriHarness [9])A verifier selects among or revises finished attemptsCombines complementary attempts; the agent is unchangedNeeds several complete runs per task and acts only after they end
    Runtime review (LongHorizon-Harness [3], Rethinking Verification [4])A separate model inspects the environment and returns its findingsFlexible; can examine requirements that are hard to express as a checkThe verdict is model-written, each review costs further model calls, and a wrong finding has no correction mechanism
    Generated tests for code (CodeT [13], AgentCoder [1], UTGen [14], Self-Debug [15])Tests are generated and executed to select or debug codeExecutable, inspectable evidenceTargets a finished program; test quality relies on training or on agreement across many candidates
    Verifier optimization (AutoPyVerifier [16], Universal Verifier [2], skill evolution in VeriHarness [9])The verifier is refined against labeled outputs or development tasksImprovements persist across tasksRequires labels or development data before deployment; no adaptation inside the current task
    SIDECARChecks derived from the task decide by execution and are revised within the task under fixed claimsWorks in a single run with the agent's own model and no labels; a stored check reruns without a model callVerification runs inside the agent's time limit and covers requirements that can be checked by execution

    Comparison with iterative test generation and repair (q2). SIDECAR shares with these methods the idea of generating executable tests and learning from their execution. It differs in three respects.

    • What is checked. These methods test a finished program. SIDECAR checks the state of an environment that keeps changing during the run, and reruns its checks at each decision point.
    • What test quality relies on. These methods obtain good tests through training (UTGen), agreement across many candidate programs (CodeT), or labeled outputs (AutoPyVerifier). SIDECAR relies only on the check's own execution feedback within the task.
    • What constrains a change to a test. SIDECAR keeps the claim fixed and accepts a revised check only if it still fails on the claim's counterexamples (see Part 2/5). We are not aware of a corresponding constraint in these methods.

    In our new experiments (Part 4/5), checks that are generated but never repaired solve 16 of 84 tasks, against 22 for SIDECAR.

References are listed in Part 5/5.

Reviewer_gSx5OpenReview ↗
Rating
3
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
3
Soundness
2
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Paper summary

This paper studies verification methods for long-horizon agent tasks. Its preliminary study motivates a shift from self-review to independent verification and highlights the importance of execution feedback. The paper proposes SIDECAR, a framework that verifies an agent's work through executable checks generated in a separate context, with an emphasis on improving these checks within the current task. A fixed framework controls the verifier's observation and intervention interfaces while allowing the check logic to be revised. Experiments on Terminal-Bench 2.1 and SWE-bench Verified show that the framework can improve agent task success.

Critical strengths
  1. The preliminary study clearly motivates the research direction. The study examines four connected questions: whether self-review detects failures, whether independent executable checks improve detection, whether returning execution evidence helps recovery, and whether execution feedback can improve the checks themselves.

  2. The design is practical, and the evaluation shows that gains do not require a stronger verifier model. SIDECAR uses the agent's own backbone for verification, so the reported improvements cannot be attributed simply to assigning verification to a more capable model. Its checks run in disposable copies of the environment, and retained checks can be reused at later decision points without an additional model call for each execution.

Critical weaknesses
  1. A matched self-review baseline is missing for isolating the benefit of an independent context. The paper includes native self-review and an explicit Self-reflection control, but the latter reviews the agent's transcript and returns a model-written reflection, whereas SIDECAR generates and executes checks in a separate context (Section 6.2 and Appendix C.3). Thus, this comparison changes both the verification context and the source of evidence. It supports the usefulness of the overall framework, but does not establish how much of the gain comes specifically from context separation rather than access to executable checks.

  2. The contribution of within-task check improvement is not sufficiently isolated. Check improvement is highlighted as a main contribution, but the end-to-end evaluation does not compare SIDECAR with a version that retains fixed checks. Figure 7 shows that revision reduces UNKNOWN results from 41.5% to 22.3%; however, this measures whether checks produce a verdict, rather than whether their verdicts are correct or improve final task success, as Appendix C.5 acknowledges. In addition, the initial-versus-revised comparison in that figure concerns checks run before the agent starts, so it does not isolate the benefit of continued adaptation as the task progresses.

Questions for authors
  1. How does self-review perform when it has the same verification mechanisms as SIDECAR? In particular, if executable checks, check revision, feedback format, and resource budgets are held fixed, what happens when the verifier is given the main agent's conversation instead of operating in an independent context? A comparison in the setting of Figure 6 would directly address the role of context separation. Could the authors also report whether the relative advantage over Self-reflection holds on Terminal-Bench 2.1 and SWE-bench Verified?

  2. How much does check revision contribute beyond initial check generation and repair?Could the authors compare three settings under the same total task time budget: checks frozen immediately after generation, checks repaired only before the agent begins, and checks allowed to be revised throughout the task? Reporting final task success, verification cost, and the frequency of false rejections and missed failures would help distinguish improved executability from improved verification quality, and clarify the specific benefit of within-task adaptation.

2 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer gSx5 (1/2): w1 / q1

Thank you for the careful review, and for recognizing that the preliminary study motivates the design and that the gains do not rely on a stronger verifier model. Your two questions describe the controlled comparisons that were missing, and we have run both. All new results use one protocol: the same scaffold, backbone (gpt-oss-120b), 84 Terminal-Bench 2.0 tasks, decision points, time limit, and handling of completion confirmations. Verification time counts against the task's time limit. The new runs reproduce the submission's results closely: SIDECAR reaches 26.2% task success (25.0% in the submission), and the baseline reaches 17.9% (17.3%).


  • w1 / q1: A matched self-review baseline is missing: Self-reflection differs from SIDECAR in both the verification context and the source of evidence. How does self-review perform with the same mechanisms as SIDECAR when the verifier is given the agent's conversation? Does the advantage over Self-reflection hold on Terminal-Bench 2.1 and SWE-bench Verified?

  • R w1 / q1: We agree that Fig. 6 changes two things at once, and we ran the matched comparison you describe. With executable checks, check revision, feedback format, and budgets unchanged, giving the verifier the agent's conversation lowers task success from 22 to 18 of 84 tasks and raises rejections from 0.33 to 0.48 per trial.

    The matched comparison. In "With the agent's conversation", verifier calls also receive the agent's trajectory. Everything else is the same as in SIDECAR: the claims, the executable checks and their interfaces, check revision and its acceptance tests, the raw-output feedback, the intervention rules, and the time limit.

    SystemVerifier contextEvidenceTask successRejections per trialWins / losses vs. SIDECARVerification time share
    BaselineNoneNone15/84 (17.9%)0.003 / 100.0%
    With the agent's conversationShared with the agentExecutable checks, revision, raw output18/84 (21.4%)0.483 / 714.2%
    SIDECARSeparateExecutable checks, revision, raw output22/84 (26.2%)0.3312.9%

    Wins and losses count the tasks solved only by the row's system and only by SIDECAR, respectively.

    What the comparison shows. With the same verification mechanisms, a verifier that shares the agent's conversation solves four fewer tasks, rejects about 45% more often, and spends more time on verification. This is consistent with the motivation of the paper: a verifier that reads the history behind a mistake tends to inherit it. In paired terms, it wins 3 tasks and loses 7 against SIDECAR.

    Relation to Fig. 6. As you note, the Self-reflection control in the submission (21.7% task success, 1.38 rejections per trial) changes both the context and the evidence. It also handles the confirming turn differently from SIDECAR (App. C.3). The new comparison removes both differences, so it isolates context separation.

    Terminal-Bench 2.1 and SWE-bench Verified. We ran the explicit Self-reflection control only on Terminal-Bench 2.0 with gpt-oss-120b, so we cannot report this comparison on the other two benchmarks. What the submission reports there is SIDECAR against the baseline, which is native Terminus-2 and already asks the agent to confirm completion in its own context. Against this baseline, SIDECAR raises GPT-6-Astra from 79.8% to 84.5% on Terminal-Bench 2.1. On SWE-bench Verified, it raises gpt-oss-20b from 4.2% to 6.2% and gpt-oss-120b from 11.6% to 15.1%, with GPT-6-Astra unchanged at 83.8%. We will state this scope explicitly in Section 6.2.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer gSx5 (2/2): w2 / q2

  • w2 / q2: The contribution of within-task check improvement is not isolated: there is no comparison with fixed checks, and Fig. 7 measures whether checks return a verdict, not whether verdicts are correct, on checks run before the agent starts. Could the authors compare checks frozen after generation, checks repaired only before the agent begins, and checks revised throughout, under the same time budget, reporting task success, verification cost, false rejections, and missed failures?

  • R w2 / q2: We ran the three settings you describe. Checks frozen after generation solve 16 of 84 tasks, checks repaired before the agent starts solve 21, and checks revised throughout solve 22. On the same 84 states, missed failures fall from 38 to 29 to 25 of 69, and false rejections from 4 to 2 to 1 of 15. Most of the benefit comes from the initial repair, and revision during the task adds a smaller improvement.

    The three settings share the same initial claims and check candidates, under the protocol described in Part 1/2.

    • A. Frozen after generation. Checks are never repaired, and those that fail acceptance cannot reject.
    • B. Frozen after initial repair. Checks are repaired before the agent starts and then rerun unchanged.
    • C. Revision throughout. Full SIDECAR, which also revises during the task.

    Verdict quality on fixed states. To separate the correctness of verdicts from the agent's later behavior, we also run the checks retained in A, B, and C on a common set of states. For each of the 84 tasks, we saved the final environment snapshot of the no-verification baseline run, before the official tests were executed. This gives one state per task, selected independently of any SIDECAR variant. Official tests label these states (15 passing and 69 failing, following the baseline's outcomes), and their outputs are never given to the verifier. Each check version runs on a copy of the same snapshot, with no further revision. For C, these are the checks as revised during the corresponding SIDECAR run.

    SettingTask successWins / losses vs. CRejections per trialVerification time sharePassing states rejectedFailing states not rejected
    Baseline15/84 (17.9%)3 / 100.000.0%
    A. Frozen after generation16/84 (19.0%)3 / 90.177.8%4/15 (26.7%)38/69 (55.1%)
    B. Frozen after initial repair21/84 (25.0%)4 / 50.2710.5%2/15 (13.3%)29/69 (42.0%)
    C. Revision throughout (SIDECAR)22/84 (26.2%)0.3312.9%1/15 (6.7%)25/69 (36.2%)

    Wins and losses count the tasks solved only by the row's setting and only by C. "Failing states not rejected" counts both PASS and UNKNOWN, since neither triggers a rejection.

    What the results show.

    • Repair is what makes the checks useful. Without repair, checks add one task over the baseline. Initial repair adds five more.
    • Revision improves verdicts, not only their availability. On identical states, each level of revision reduces both kinds of error. Checks revised throughout catch 13 more failing states than unrepaired checks, 4 of them beyond initial repair.
    • The specific benefit of within-task adaptation is smaller. End to end, B and C differ by one task (4 wins, 5 losses). On fixed states, continued revision removes 4 more missed failures and 1 more false rejection, at a verification time share of 12.9% against 10.5%.

    We will add both analyses to Section 6.3 and state there that Fig. 7 measures the availability of verdicts, not their correctness.

Reviewer_uBX4OpenReview ↗
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3
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

The paper proposes SIDECAR, a verifier that keeps a context separate from the task-performing agent. Before execution, it derives claims from public task requirements and generates executable checks. A fixed framework runs these checks in disposable copies of the environment, returns failing-check evidence when the agent confirms completion, and permits revisions subject to fixed counterexamples and acceptance checks. The evaluation uses three backbones on Terminal-Bench and SWE-bench Verified. Reported improvements include 17.3% to 25.0% for gpt-oss-120b on Terminal-Bench 2.0 and 79.8% to 84.5% for GPT-6-Astra on the retained Terminal-Bench 2.1 tasks; the frontier model is unchanged on SWE-bench Verified. The paper also studies diagnostic feedback, check revision, and verification overhead. The end-to-end experiments intercept confirmed completions, rather than intermediate handoffs.

Critical strengths
  1. A separate verifier context and executable checks in disposable environments provide auditable feedback from public requirements. The system does not access hidden official tests during task execution.
  2. Multiple backbones, two benchmarks, and continuation/self-reflection controls expose both potential benefit and cost. With gpt-oss-120b on Terminal-Bench 2.0, SIDECAR achieves 25.0% success with 0.30 rejections per trial, versus 23.4% and 1.66 for generic rejection (Figure 6).
Critical weaknesses
  1. Completion-command execution and reconfirmation differ across SIDECAR and its controls (Appendix C.3). The frontier-model gain of 4.7 percentage points with only one rejection therefore does not isolate verifier correction from completion-loop changes and rollout variability (Section 6.1).
  2. Figure 7 measures verdict availability rather than accuracy, and no frozen-check ablation or independent coverage audit establishes online revision's benefit (Appendix C.5). The separate, label-assisted 59-state preliminary experiment cannot establish that deployed revisions preserve semantic coverage.
Questions for authors

same as weakness.

2 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer uBX4 (1/2): w1

Thank you for the close reading, including the appendix, and for recognizing that executable checks in disposable environments give auditable feedback and that the controls expose both benefit and cost. Both weaknesses are fair, and we address them with new runs under one protocol: the same scaffold, backbone (gpt-oss-120b), 84 Terminal-Bench 2.0 tasks, decision points, time limit, and handling of completion confirmations. Verification time counts against the task's time limit. The new runs reproduce the submission's results closely: SIDECAR reaches 26.2% task success (25.0% in the submission), and the baseline reaches 17.9% (17.3%).


  • w1: Completion-command execution and reconfirmation differ across SIDECAR and its controls (App. C.3). The frontier-model gain of 4.7 percentage points with only one rejection therefore does not isolate verifier correction from completion-loop changes and rollout variability (Sec. 6.1).

  • R w1: You are right on both points. The controls in Fig. 6 handle the confirming turn differently from SIDECAR, and the Terminal-Bench 2.1 gain for GPT-6-Astra cannot be attributed to rejections alone. New runs that hold completion handling fixed show that this handling contributes little by itself (16 vs. 15 of 84 tasks), while the full mechanism reaches 22.

    The difference you identified. As App. C.3 states, the Rejection rule and Self-reflection discard the commands in a turn they reject. SIDECAR instead executes the commands carried by a confirmation, returns their output, and runs its checks only at a confirmation without commands. Fig. 6 therefore does not separate verification from this handling.

    Holding completion handling fixed. The verification systems below all use SIDECAR's handling of completion confirmations and differ only in the verification itself.

    SystemDifference from SIDECARTask successRejections per trialWins / losses vs. SIDECAR
    BaselineNo verification15/84 (17.9%)0.003 / 10
    A. Checks frozen after generationChecks are never repaired16/84 (19.0%)0.173 / 9
    With the agent's conversationThe verifier also reads the agent's trajectory18/84 (21.4%)0.483 / 7
    Independent criticA fresh-context model reviews with tools and returns written findings21/84 (25.0%)0.816 / 7
    SIDECAR22/84 (26.2%)0.33

    Wins and losses count the tasks solved only by the row's system and only by SIDECAR, respectively.

    Setting A keeps SIDECAR's completion handling and intervention rules but never repairs its checks. It solves 16 tasks against 15 for the baseline, while SIDECAR solves 22. The handling of the confirming turn therefore accounts for little of the gain, and the repaired checks account for most of it (see Part 2/2). The other two rows change what the verifier reads, or how it reaches a verdict, under the same handling.

    The GPT-6-Astra result on Terminal-Bench 2.1. SIDECAR solves 71 of 84 tasks against 67 for the baseline, with a single rejection across all tasks. At most one of these four tasks can come from a rejection. The others must come from the completion handling or from rollout variability, and this single comparison cannot separate the two. We will state this limitation in Section 6.1 and describe the result as the effect of the whole system, including its completion handling, and not of rejections alone. The evidence that isolates verification is the comparison above, where the handling is held fixed.

    Rollout variability. To account for it, we report paired wins and losses on the same tasks beside each rate. Under fixed completion handling, setting A wins 3 tasks and loses 9 against SIDECAR.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer uBX4 (2/2): w2

  • w2: Fig. 7 measures verdict availability rather than accuracy, and no frozen-check ablation or independent coverage audit establishes the benefit of online revision (App. C.5). The separate, label-assisted 59-state preliminary experiment cannot establish that deployed revisions preserve semantic coverage.

  • R w2: We agree, and we ran the frozen-check ablation together with an evaluation of verdict accuracy in which revision uses no labels. Checks frozen after generation solve 16 of 84 tasks, against 21 after initial repair and 22 with revision throughout. On the same 84 states, missed failures fall from 38 to 29 to 25 of 69, and false rejections from 4 to 2 to 1 of 15.

    Three levels of revision share the same initial claims and check candidates, under the protocol described in Part 1/2.

    • A. Frozen after generation. Checks are never repaired, and those that fail acceptance cannot reject.
    • B. Frozen after initial repair. Checks are repaired before the agent starts and then rerun unchanged.
    • C. Revision throughout. Full SIDECAR, which also revises during the task.

    Verdict accuracy on fixed states. We run the checks retained in A, B, and C on a common set of states. For each of the 84 tasks, we saved the final environment snapshot of the no-verification baseline run, before the official tests were executed. This gives one state per task, selected independently of any SIDECAR variant. Official tests label these states (15 passing and 69 failing, following the baseline's outcomes). The labels are used only for scoring and are never given to the verifier, so the revisions being evaluated were made without labels. Each check version runs on a copy of the same snapshot, with no further revision. For C, these are the checks as revised during the corresponding SIDECAR run.

    SettingTask successWins / losses vs. CRejections per trialPassing states rejectedFailing states not rejected
    Baseline15/84 (17.9%)3 / 100.00
    A. Frozen after generation16/84 (19.0%)3 / 90.174/15 (26.7%)38/69 (55.1%)
    B. Frozen after initial repair21/84 (25.0%)4 / 50.272/15 (13.3%)29/69 (42.0%)
    C. Revision throughout (SIDECAR)22/84 (26.2%)0.331/15 (6.7%)25/69 (36.2%)

    Wins and losses count the tasks solved only by the row's setting and only by C. "Failing states not rejected" counts both PASS and UNKNOWN, since neither triggers a rejection.

    What this establishes, and what it does not.

    • Accuracy, not only availability. On identical states, each level of revision reduces both kinds of error. This complements Fig. 7, which we will describe as a measure of availability.
    • No sign of lost coverage in deployed revisions. If revisions weakened the checks, failing states would be missed more often after revision. They are missed less often (38, then 29, then 25). This is an accuracy measurement against task outcomes. It is not a requirement-by-requirement audit of coverage, and we do not claim one.
    • The label-assisted experiment. We agree that the 59-state measurement, where revision saw labels, cannot speak for deployed revisions. We will present it as a controlled illustration, and the evaluation above as the evidence for deployed revision.
    • Where the benefit comes from. Most of it comes from the initial repair. End to end, B and C differ by one task (4 wins, 5 losses). On fixed states, revision during the task removes 4 more missed failures and 1 more false rejection.
    • Counterexample acceptance. In a further run that removes only the counterexample acceptance condition, task success is unchanged (22 of 84 tasks; 5 wins, 5 losses against SIDECAR). It is a design constraint on how far a revision can weaken a check, and these runs do not isolate its effect.

    We will add these analyses to Section 6.3.

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Summary of Discussion and Manuscript Revisions

Dear Area Chair and Reviewers,

We thank Reviewers uBX4, gSx5, and Z6zp for their careful reviews, and Reviewer Z6zp for raising their score. The revised paper marks updates in blue.


1. Core Principle: Executed Evidence Over Model Confidence (Secs. 1 & 4)

A separate model call is not automatically independent, nor is a generated check reliable. SIDECAR applies one rule from formal verification to both the agent and the verifier: rely on executed evidence of failure rather than model confidence. Without labels, correctness cannot be proved, so SIDECAR tests for executed failures:

  • For the agent: Claims are fixed from public requirements before the agent acts, the verifier never reads the agent's trajectory, and only an accepted check's executed FAIL rejects completion.
  • For the verifier: Execution feedback guides check repair. The claim, counterexamples, and interfaces stay fixed, and every revised check must still reject the known counterexamples before it can intervene. At worst, a weakened check accepts completion like the baseline.

2. Unified Experiments (TB 2.0, gpt-oss-120b; Secs. 6.2–6.3)

All runs share one scaffold and task time limit (including verification time); the verification settings share SIDECAR's completion handling. Wins/losses: tasks solved only by that row / only by SIDECAR.

SystemSuccessWins/lossesRej./trialVerif. time share
Baseline15/84 (17.9%)3/100.000.0%
Independent critic21/84 (25.0%)6/70.8119.0%
With agent's conversation18/84 (21.4%)3/70.4814.2%
A. Frozen after generation16/84 (19.0%)3/90.177.8%
B. Frozen after initial repair21/84 (25.0%)4/50.2710.5%
No counterexample acceptance22/84 (26.2%)5/50.2311.6%
C. Full SIDECAR22/84 (26.2%)0.3312.9%

Counterexample acceptance is a safeguard on how far a revision can weaken a check, not a source of average gains.

Initial repair gives most of the task-level gain (16 → 21); continued revision mainly improves verdict quality. On the final baseline snapshots (15 passing, 69 failing by hidden tests; no labels for the verifier), A → B → C cuts false rejections (4/15 → 2/15 → 1/15) and missed failures (38/69 → 29/69 → 25/69).


3. Point-by-Point Summary

Reviewer uBX4 (Score: 3)

  • w1: Does the gain come from executing completion-turn commands rather than verification, and why did GPT-6-Astra gain 4 tasks with 1 rejection?

    Response: With completion handling held fixed, enabling check repair raises success from 16/84 to 22/84 (Sec. 6.2, Table 1). On TB 2.1 (67 → 71/84, 1 rejection), Sec. 6.1 notes at most 1 gain comes from rejection; the rest reflects the full system or variance.

  • w2: Fig. 7 only shows if checks finish running, not if verdicts are correct after unlabeled revision.

    Response: On the snapshots above, revision without labels cuts both error types (Sec. 6.3, Table 2; Fig. 7 now described as availability, Sec. 3.2 as label-assisted).

Reviewer gSx5 (Score: 3)

  • w1 / q1: How much gain comes from keeping the verifier's context separate, and does Self-reflection extend to other benchmarks?

    Response: Giving the verifier the agent's trajectory (checks, revision, raw output, budgets fixed) drops success (22 → 18/84) and raises rejections (0.33 → 0.48), isolating context separation (Sec. 6.2, Table 1). The explicit Self-reflection comparison covers TB 2.0 only.

  • w2 / q2: What does within-task revision add beyond initial repair under the same budget?

    Response: Tables 1–2 report the four requested metrics. Beyond initial repair, continued revision cuts 4 more missed failures and 1 false rejection (12.9% vs. 10.5% time share).

Reviewer Z6zp (Score: 1 → 2)

  • w1 / q1: What is new beyond a separate context and executable checks?

    Response: Secs. 1 & 4.1 state Part 1's rule: executed falsification, not model confidence, for both agent work and check repair in one unlabeled run.

  • w2 / q3: How does a fallible verifier know a revision is valid, not just weaker?

    Response: Unlabeled revision cuts both errors on the snapshots above. Sec. 4.3 states Part 1's rule and bound, not completeness; Sec. 6.3 notes 25/69 failures remain missed.

  • w3 / q2: Missing comparison with prior verifiers and test repair.

    Response: Sec. 2 & App. A.3 (Table 5) add AgentCoder, Universal Verifier, LongHorizon-Harness, Multi-Agent Verification, Rethinking Verification, and VeriHarness, contrasting single-run unlabeled checks with multi-run or labeled repair.

  • w4: Missing competing verifier and ablations.

    Response: SIDECAR solves 22/84 vs. 21/84 for the independent critic, with ~60% fewer rejections (0.33 vs. 0.81) and a lower verification-time share (12.9% vs. 19.0%) (Sec. 6.2, Table 1; App. C.4).


We welcome any further questions.

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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