- Rating
- 3(+1)
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 3
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Paper summary
The paper introduces a flow-matching framework for solving parametric variational inequalities. This is motivated by applications in which related VI instances must be solved repeatedly. The framework relies on learning a conditional distribution over solutions. The paper provides a theoretical analysis, showing that the proposed approach is theoretically grounded. In experiments across several benchmarks, the proposed method shows promising performance in terms of preserving solution diversity.
Critical strengths
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The paper is well motivated and addresses an important problem. There are many applications in which the goal is to solve many related variational inequalities. Instead of solving each instance from scratch, the basic goal is to use some form of learning to speed up optimization when there's structure in between instances. This arises, for example, in various routing problems, where some of the parameters of the network may be changing slowly.
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The approach put forward by the paper is very natural and promising. Flow matching has been a powerful paradigm for various problems. The way it's used in this paper is, to my knowledge, new. I like the fact that the approach is theoretically grounded, and the experiments provide a good sanity check. I'm not an expert on flow matching, but I learned much from reading this paper. Overall, the paper brings together ideas from two different lines of work, and can motivate a lot of interesting future research.
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The paper is overall well written. The main ideas are clear and easy to follow. It also does a good job at motivating the problem. The paper is also well structured.
Critical weaknesses
My main criticism is that the experiments could go much further. First, the paper could do much more to show the scalability of the approach. Several of the benchmarks are really toy instances. For example, in Section 5.3, the largest bimatrix game is still quite small. The same criticism applies to Section 5.1. While these results are a good sanity check, I'm not convinced that the method would scale to much larger instances. The authors could address this limitation by conducting experiments to much larger instances. For example, in the context of Section 5.3, the authors could try to increase the dimensions in the thousands, so that the number of entries of each payoff matrix is in the millions.
The second issue in the experiments is the lack of good comparisons. For example, staying on Section 5.3, I don't think that comparing against algorithms like optimistic mirror descent or the extra-gradient method is meaningful; these are not methods designed to find Nash equilibria in general-sum games. On the other hand, there are many algorithms that are guaranteed to converge to exact Nash equilibria and are quite scalable. For example, see "Spatial branch-and-bound for computing multiplayer Nash equilibrium" and references therein. The paper doesn't compare against any of those methods, and in fact, in these small instances, these exact Nash solvers would converge instantly.
Overall, the experiments are not convincing enough. What I wanted to see is a class of realistic problems where using exact VI solvers fails to scale, but the proposed method is able to find good approximate solutions much faster.
Questions for authors
- Using the term "optimistic gradient descent/ascent" makes sense in zero-sum games, but in bimatrix games. For example, if it's an identical interest game, both players are performing optimistic gradient ascent.
- There's a closely related line of work that I strongly recommend should be discussed, which was started by Harris et al. ("Meta-Learning in Games") and Sychrovský et al. ("Learning Not to Regret"), and there have been some follow ups ever since. Even though the techniques are different, the motivation is very similar. The authors could also try to experiment in some of the game classes analyzed in those papers.
3 comments
I thank the authors for the response. The new experiments are a strong addition to the paper. I have increased my score to a 3.
We thank the reviewer for the reply and for raising the score. The reviewer's suggestions shaped the new main experiment, and we are glad the reviewer finds it a strong addition. If any concerns remain, we would be happy to address them before the discussion period ends
We thank the reviewer for the encouraging assessment and the concrete suggestions, which shaped our new main experiment (Sec. 5.3). Below we respond point by point. Changes in the revised PDF are in blue, and all section, table, figure and lemma numbers refer to it.
Response: We agree on all three points and replaced the bimatrix games with a large electricity-market bidding game built from public data (new Sec. 5.3; the game and a table of results are also summarized in our response to Reviewer PZtA, and full details are in App. C.3).
Scale. With two sellers, each seller has up to n=1000 strategies, so each payoff matrix has up to 106 entries as suggested. With three sellers, an instance has 1.1×107 (n=225) or 109 (n=1000) pure profiles, and payoffs are available only through a market-clearing simulator. The Braess network (Sec. 5.1) stays small on purpose, since its equilibrium set is known in closed form.
Baselines. We now compare with Nash solvers: Lemke–Howson, MIP-Nash and double oracle with two sellers; with three sellers, spatial branch-and-bound (Černý et al., "Spatial Branch-and-Bound for Computing Multiplayer Nash Equilibrium", 2026), Gambit's global Newton, logit-tracing and simplicial-subdivision solvers, and the nonconvex Nash model solved by Gurobi. We also compare with ADIDAS (Gemp et al., "Sample-based Approximation of Nash in Large Many-Player Games via Gradient Descent", 2022), best-response dynamics, random profiles and nearest-interval retrieval, and, since our method is a general VI method, with two general VI solvers (stochastic mirror-prox and projected extragradient) on the game's mixed extension (App. C.3). The reviewer's expectation holds when the matrices are available: with two sellers, Lemke–Howson is at least as fast as our sampler and finds more equilibria at every size (App. D.2). However, the picture reverses at scale. Details are in the next paragraph.
A realistic class where exact solvers fail. The three-seller game is such a class. At n=225, complete solvers need the full tensor (1.1×107 clearings, i.e., market-clearing simulator calls), and within one hour only Gambit's global Newton method returns an equilibrium; spatial branch-and-bound returns none. With about 2% of those market-clearing simulator calls and 0.2 s per interval, our sampler with best-response repair certifies 24.1 equilibria per interval (i.e., game instance), against 16.5 for best-response dynamics, 16.7 for ADIDAS and 20.6 for the VI solvers, which use about twice our clearings. Trained toward the regulator's criterion (i.e., an equilibrium-selection criterion), it attains the least-consumer-surplus-loss equilibrium on 81% of intervals (best-response dynamics: 73%, paired gain +8.7 points, 95% CI [3.3,14.3]) and on 70% at n=1000, more often than every baseline at both sizes.
Response: We agree. That baseline belonged to the random bimatrix experiment, which we removed, so the term no longer appears in the paper.
Response: Thank you for pointing us to this line of work. We now cite Harris et al. ("Meta-Learning in Games", 2023), Sychrovský et al. ("Learning Not to Regret", 2024) and their follow-up, Sychrovský et al. ("Meta-Learning in Self-Play Regret Minimization", 2025), in Sec. 2 and discuss them in App. E. Like these works, we exploit structure shared across related instances, but they learn game-specific equilibrium-finding dynamics (faster no-regret learning), whereas we learn, for general VIs, a conditional distribution over solutions, which yields many candidates per instance and allows selection, e.g., by consumer-surplus loss in our bidding game. Their experiments use two-player zero-sum games (matrix games and poker), where all equilibria share one value, so we focused our experiments on a general-sum game with many equilibria of different quality.
We hope these responses address the reviewer's concerns, and we would be happy to continue the discussion.