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Paper summary
The paper assembles safety interpretability analysis, attention/MLP attribution, discrimination-based reinforcement learning, and prompted self-distillation and propose a framework called SALSA. It interprets safety degradation through attention dilution and weakened MLP safety signals, with 8K length experiments, and reports improvements over the base model and its own intermediate training stages. The contribution is most readily understood as a task-specific integration of established ideas.
Critical strengths
Strengths
- The paper brings together several established research directions—safety-direction analysis, attention/MLP attribution, discrimination-based safety training, and prompted self-distillation—within a single pipeline.
- The approach builds extensively on existing optimization and distillation frameworks, making its implementation conceptually familiar to readers of the relevant literature.
- The staged experiments demonstrate that adding safety-oriented training can improve safety metrics over the base model and the paper’s simpler training configurations.
- The paper provides a concrete application of these established techniques to context lengths up to 8K in its controlled length analysis.
Critical weaknesses
Weaknesses
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The novelty claims are not sufficiently distinguished from directly relevant prior work.
The paper combines safety-direction analysis, attention/MLP attribution, discrimination-based training, and prompted self-distillation. However, several closely related studies are absent from the discussion, making it difficult to identify which findings and methodological elements constitute substantive advances.
Interpretability. Arditi et al. [1] already extract a refusal direction, project attention and MLP outputs onto it, and analyze how adversarial suffixes divert attention and suppress refusal signals. Other work investigates safety-relevant attention heads [2], identifies and intervenes on safety knowledge neurons in MLPs [3], and examines refusal collapse during reasoning and the associated internal components [4]. These studies are directly relevant to the paper’s analytical framework.
Against this background, the characterization of existing safety methods as primarily fitting “surface behavior,” in contrast to the proposed mechanism-oriented approach, is insufficiently supported. The paper needs to clarify which mechanistic relationships are newly established under increasing context length. In particular, projection changes and before/after-training comparisons do not, by themselves, establish the full causal chain from attention dilution to weakened MLP safety perception and its targeted repair.
Long-context safety. Prior research has already examined how context length and composition affect safety. What Really Matters in Many-Shot Attacks? [5] studies length, demonstration density, safe/harmful mixtures, continuous text, and nonsensical padding, with experiments extending to 128K tokens. Do Reasoning LLMs Refuse What They Infer in Long Contexts? [6] examines harmful objectives reconstructed from contexts up to 64K tokens. When Refusals Fail [7] studies length-, content-, and position-dependent changes in agent refusal behavior, including results at 200K tokens.
These settings are not identical to the present paper’s, but they directly inform its problem formulation and require explicit comparison. LongGuard [8] is also closely related: it distinguishes proportional dilution from absolute length and analyzes attention, classification logits, and safety decisions in guardrail models. Its focus on classification rather than response generation leaves room for a distinct contribution, but that distinction needs to be established.
The paper’s controlled length analysis extends only to 8K tokens. This provides limited support for its broader claims about long-context safety mechanisms, particularly given the substantially longer settings examined in prior work. Validation at longer lengths is necessary to establish whether the proposed explanation remains applicable beyond the reported range.
Safety training. SA-GSPO retains the GSPO update rule and changes the task and reward to safety-judgment correctness. SDGO [9] already studies the discrimination–generation safety gap and uses discrimination-guided optimization to improve generation safety. Although the reward targets differ, the general motivation of transferring safety discrimination into safer generation has a direct precedent.
SS-OPSD also shares substantial structure with existing safety self-distillation methods. OPSA [10] uses a safety-prompted copy of the model to provide token-level KL supervision on trajectories generated by an unprompted student, while examining capability preservation and over-refusal. PolicyAlign [11] similarly uses a policy-conditioned teacher and on-policy self-distillation. ThinkSafe [12] elicits safe reasoning traces through prompting and trains on self-generated data, while Deliberative Alignment [13] trains models to apply safety specifications during reasoning.
Consequently, the potentially distinctive contribution lies in the long-context judgment task, segment-summary prompting, and their integration into the training pipeline. The manuscript does not yet clearly establish how much these choices add beyond the existing frameworks.
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The experimental comparisons do not adequately isolate the proposed method’s incremental contribution.
The main comparisons involve the base model, Plain GSPO, and intermediate stages of the proposed pipeline. These comparisons demonstrate improvements within the authors’ training recipe, but do not establish an advantage over closely related safety-training approaches.
In particular, the paper lacks matched-data and matched-budget comparisons with relevant safety self-distillation methods. It also does not sufficiently separate the benefit of segment-summary prompting from that of a general safety prompt, or establish whether GSPO-based judgment training is preferable to supervised training on the same judgment task. Without these controls, the gains cannot be confidently attributed to the paper’s distinctive design choices rather than additional supervision or established training mechanisms.
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The framing of the research gap is broader than the literature discussion and evidence support.
The concern is not the number of citations, but the absence of substantive engagement with work that overlaps with the paper’s central claims. The omitted studies address the safety-degradation phenomena, internal mechanisms, and training strategies on which the contribution narrative is based. As a result, the manuscript presents a sharper distinction between its approach and prior research than is currently justified.
Addressing this issue requires more than adding references: the authors would need to narrow the novelty claims, explicitly distinguish their findings from prior results, and provide comparisons that substantiate the remaining contribution.
References
[1] Refusal in Language Models Is Mediated by a Single Direction
[2] On the Role of Attention Heads in Large Language Model Safety
[3] Unraveling LLM Jailbreaks Through Safety Knowledge Neurons
[4] Refusal Falls off a Cliff: How Safety Alignment Fails in Reasoning?
[5] What Really Matters in Many-Shot Attacks? An Empirical Study of Long-Context Vulnerabilities in LLMs
[6] Do Reasoning LLMs Refuse What They Infer in Long Contexts?
[7] When Refusals Fail: Unstable Safety Mechanisms in Long-Context LLM Agents
[8] LongGuard: Mechanistic Analysis and Training-Free Mitigation of Long-Context Failure in Safety Guardrails
[9] SDGO: Self-Discrimination-Guided Optimization for Consistent Safety in Large Language Models
[10] Reducing the Safety Tax in LLM Safety Alignment with On-Policy Self-Distillation
[11] PolicyAlign: Direct Policy-Based Safety Alignment for Large Language Models
[12] THINKSAFE: Self-Generated Safety Alignment for Reasoning Models
[13] Deliberative Alignment: Reasoning Enables Safer Language Models
Questions for authors
See weaknesses.
5 comments
Response to Reviewer 2cu1(Part 2)
Q2 | How does this work differ from prior long-context safety research, and how does it perform beyond 8K?
Summary of the concern: Prior studies cover length, density, content composition, position, and dilution in guardrails. This work needs substantive comparisons and validation of whether its conclusions extend beyond 8K.
Response: Long-context safety degradation is the research problem we build on, not a phenomenon we claim to have discovered first. Section 2.1 of the original paper already cites LongSafety (Lu et al., 2025) and Many-shot Jailbreaking (MSJ; Anil et al., 2024), and explicitly describes the risks they identify: MSJ demonstrates stronger attacks as the number of unsafe demonstrations increases, while LongSafety shows that even extending neutral or benign background can reduce model safety. Building on these findings, we analyze the degradation mechanisms and propose alignment methods for long-context safety. The contribution summary in the introduction (§1) also explicitly focuses on attention/MLP pathway analysis, SA-GSPO risk-judgment training, SS-OPSD distillation of information-organization behavior, and their safety and capability evaluations.
The other works you highlighted further enrich this background. Research on Many-Shot Attacks examines length, demonstration density, and mixed composition; Do Reasoning LLMs Refuse What They Infer in Long Contexts? studies the reconstruction of harmful goals across context; and When Refusals Fail investigates the dependence of agent refusals on length, content, and position. We will add these citations to the main text and explicitly compare their settings and methods with ours.
LongGuard is concurrent related work: its first arXiv version was released on August 27, 2026, a few weeks before our September submission. Both works study risk-information dilution in long contexts and use internal mechanistic analysis to guide improvements. We will cite LongGuard in the revision and compare the two works along three dimensions:
- Research target: LongGuard studies guardrail detection, using Benign-Fill/Needle-Repeat controls to separate proportional dilution from absolute-length effects. We study generative models' safety, responsiveness, and capability.
- Interpretability analysis: LongGuard analyzes attention–logit–decision relationships in guardrails and identifies sparse attention heads associated with risk retrieval. We jointly analyze attention to the query, safety-related attention/MLP writes, and generation behavior, focusing on changes in risk signals along the attention and downstream MLP pathways. The added attention-output patching experiment further tests the joint recovery of MLP writes and response safety following an upstream intervention.
- Mitigation approach: LongGuard uses training-free chunked detection and head sharpening. We train risk judgment with SA-GSPO and distill long-context information organization with SS-OPSD.
Thus, the connection is a shared focus on risk-information dilution, while our specific contribution is to combine generation-side attention/MLP analysis with a set of long-context safety alignment methods and validate them through actual responses and capability evaluations.
We added a Qwen3-8B background-extension experiment spanning 0–24576 tokens. Given the computational cost of long-context evaluation, we selected 100 examples from LongSafety. Because the original contexts have limited lengths, backgrounds shorter than the target length are repeated cyclically to reach each target length, measured in tokens. The experiment uses Qwen3-8B's default native context window of 32,768 tokens (32K), with the background extended up to 24K and approximately 8K remaining for the user query, input template, thinking, and response. Here, L=0 means no added background, not an empty full input. The last column below is explicitly the safety rate at L=24K minus that at L=0, in percentage points.
Table R2 | Safety rates (%) under background-length extension
| Method / Background tokens | 0 | 1024 | 4096 | 8192 | 16384 | 24576 | Δ(24K−0) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Qwen3-8B | 67.00 | 55.00 | 49.00 | 48.00 | 49.00 | 44.00 | −23.00 |
| Plain GSPO | 88.00 | 75.00 | 73.00 | 71.00 | 71.00 | 68.00 | −20.00 |
| SA-GSPO | 93.00 | 87.00 | 84.00 | 87.00 | 79.00 | 83.00 | −10.00 |
| SALSA | 94.00 | 95.00 | 92.00 | 92.00 | 89.00 | 89.00 | −5.00 |
SALSA retains 89.00% safety at 24K, declining by only 5.00 percentage points versus Base's 23.00 and Plain GSPO's 20.00. This supports improved robustness under the tested construction; cyclic extension jointly changes repetition, composition, and risk-information proportion rather than isolating absolute length.
Response to Reviewer 2cu1(Part 3)
Q3 | How do SA-GSPO and SS-OPSD differ from existing safety-training methods?
Summary of the concern: Discrimination-guided training, prompt-conditioned teachers, safety-reasoning training, and self-distillation all have precedents. What incremental contributions do the specific designs in this paper make?
Response: We will explicitly compare the training objectives, supervision sources, and prompt designs of the relevant methods in the main text. Building on RL and OPSD, our work uses the analysis of risk-information dilution and changes in safety-related writes in long contexts to improve the safety-judgment task and the distillation of information-organization behavior, yielding alignment methods tailored to long-context safety. SA-GSPO focuses on strengthening the model's risk-discrimination capability in long contexts, while SS-OPSD internalizes query localization, segment summaries, and evidence organization to improve long-context information use.
The distinction from SDGO lies in what the main RL stage directly optimizes. SDGO uses the model's existing strong safety-discrimination capability to assess request safety, response safety, and response appropriateness. It converts these judgments into rewards and directly optimizes response generation to narrow the safety gap between discrimination and generation. SA-GSPO instead directly improves the model's own safety-judgment capability: given a long context, user query, and candidate response, it rewards correct safety judgments against external guard labels. The optimization target is the model's ability to produce safety judgments, which transfers to the safety of long-context responses through shared representations. In short, SDGO's main RL stage uses discrimination capability to reward generation, whereas SA-GSPO uses RL to strengthen long-context safety discrimination and thereby improve generation safety.
Table R3 | Specific connections and differences between related training methods and SALSA
| Method | Core training mechanism | Connection to / difference from our work |
|---|---|---|
| SDGO | The main RL stage uses the model's existing safety-discrimination and appropriateness judgments to construct self-supervised rewards and directly optimize response generation. | SA-GSPO uses external guard labels as references to directly strengthen the model's safety discrimination of long-context candidate responses, then transfers this capability to long-context generation safety. The key distinction is directly optimizing response generation versus safety judgment. |
| OPSA | Type-conditioned safety/helpfulness teachers provide token-level distillation supervision on the student's own trajectories. | It shares structural elements with SS-OPSD. Our teacher prompt emphasizes query localization, summaries, and evidence organization for long inputs, rather than relying only on general safety rules. |
| PolicyAlign | A safety-policy-conditioned EMA teacher performs on-policy self-distillation with reverse KL and selects policy-sensitive examples. | Both use prompt-conditioned on-policy self-distillation, but PolicyAlign internalizes safety policies, whereas SS-OPSD targets risk-information dilution in long contexts. Guided by our mechanistic analysis, its teacher uses query localization, segment summaries, and evidence organization to connect dispersed user requirements with relevant context. This long-context-specific design supports safe responses while preserving benign responsiveness and long-context capability, as illustrated by the 7.41-point LBv2 gain over query localization alone. |
| ThinkSafe | A refusal prompt guides a frozen copy of the initial model to generate safe reasoning. Guard filtering produces a static dataset for offline SFT with a negative log-likelihood objective. | It learns fixed self-generated text through offline SFT. SS-OPSD instead uses the prompted teacher's token-level probability distributions to supervise distillation on the student's current on-policy trajectories, with a focus on long-context information organization. |
| Deliberative Alignment | SFT on filtered, safety-policy-guided reasoning traces is followed by RL using a policy-aware judge's scores on final responses. | This is policy-reasoning SFT plus response-generation RL, rather than SS-OPSD-style online token-distribution distillation. Its RL stage optimizes responses, whereas SA-GSPO directly optimizes safety judgments of long-context candidate responses. |
Response to Reviewer 2cu1(Part 1)
We sincerely thank you for your time and constructive feedback. We will cite the suggested works and clarify their connections to our analysis and training design. The additional experiments below compare mechanisms, safety, responsiveness, and capability.
In the tables, JBB, S-R, and XS denote JailbreakBench, StrongREJECT, and XSTest, respectively. XS response and WG response both report response rates.
Q1 | What mechanistic evidence goes beyond prior work?
Response: We agree that direction extraction, component projections, and analyses of safety-related heads and neurons have direct precedents, including the refusal-direction work by Arditi et al. and the related studies you listed. The interpretability section of the original paper (§3) already cites relevant work. For example, it explicitly states that our construction of the safety direction is inspired by Zhao et al. (2025b), acknowledging that the analysis builds on existing representation-analysis methods. Our focus is on the joint changes in attention to the query, attention/MLP writes, and actual safe behavior under controlled context extension, and on how these findings inform long-context safety alignment. In the revision, we will clarify these methodological connections and specific differences, and revise the binary framing that prior methods only fit surface behavior whereas ours alone addresses mechanisms.
To strengthen the mechanistic evidence, we added attention-output patching on Qwen3-8B using 100 requests and 8192 tokens of irrelevant benign background. We replay the fixed thinking trace from the original long-context run and replace the corresponding long-context activations with attention outputs at aligned positions under the query-only condition. MLP writes are measured following the paper's protocol. The results are shown below.
Table R1a | Local activation patching results
Patching restores downstream MLP writes and improves safety by 8.8 percentage points, providing direct intervention evidence linking the attention pathway to MLP writes and safe behavior. The fixed thinking trace may retain risk-related effects, possibly explaining the incomplete recovery.
As an additional ablation experiment, we evaluated SALSA (query localization only in OPSD), whose teacher only locates and states the user's query, without intent explanation, segment summaries, or a question–evidence list. Together, activation patching and this ablation provide converging evidence for the attention-dilution mechanism: the former directly intervenes on the internal attention pathway, while the latter tests query-focused training. Their complementary results support the conclusion that refocusing attention on the query helps alleviate dilution and improve response safety.
Table R1b | Complete evaluation of SALSA and the query-localization variant
Query localization retains most of the safety gains, complementing the patching evidence. The full prompt adds 7.41 points on LBv2 and improves benign response rates, demonstrating the additional value of information organization.
Segment summaries also matter in practice. In real-world long-context tasks, user requirements may span background material, conversation history, and multiple constraints rather than a single explicit query. Summaries preserve contextual information, while evidence organization connects it to user needs, supporting useful long-context behavior beyond an explicit query.