- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 1
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
The paper targets an important problem: agents are expected to maintain their safety controls as the model state, context and cache contents change over long conversations. The paper presents a three-layer deployment-time framework. The first layer targets parametric adaptation. The second adds contextual policy evidence to the prompt from retrieved or inserted safety documents. The third explores how shrinking the KV cache affects safety. The evaluation uses JailbreakBench, AgentHarm and LongSafetyBench, reports results on many-shot jailbreaks, and includes ablations.
Critical strengths
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The paper evaluates its safety controls on two versions of each model (original and abliterated) and along two axes: answering harmful requests (CVR) and refusing harmless ones (FPR). This supports more informed conclusions about how effective the controls are. For example, L2 (adding safety instructions to the prompt) helps the abliterated model but hurts the original model (Table 1).
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The paper does not present capability degradation as a safety gain. For example, applying INT4 lowers the many-shot jailbreak success rate. The paper correctly attributes this drop to the model’s loss of in-context learning ability rather than to improved safety. Anyone evaluating KV-cache compression on safety benchmarks could reuse this control.
Critical weaknesses
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The paper is motivated by agents that use tools and face prompt injection over many turns, but the experimental setups do not reflect this setting. The long-context datasets test long inputs, but none of them is multi-turn. AgentHarm is run single-turn, without tool execution and without its benign tasks. Finally, no indirect prompt-injection benchmark (e.g., AgentDojo or InjecAgent) is used.
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The abstract mentions three seeds and paired uncertainty estimates, but the tables report neither per-seed results nor intervals. Moreover, one of the paper’s main claims, “calibrated operating points beat strict policies” (Sec. 3.2), does not hold for the abliterated Llama model. In Table 3, the best calibrated Llama setting has a combined score (CVR + FPR, lower is better) of 0.17. Under the strict policy with the adapter at strength 0.7, the abliterated Llama model scores 0.15 (Table A.8). So on this model, calibration provides no improvement over the strict policy.
Questions for authors
Please see the Critical Weaknesses section.
We thank the reviewer for recognizing the paired checkpoint-state evaluation and the benign controls for cache-induced capability degradation. We address the two concerns with additional experiments and clearer reporting.
C1. Multi-turn tool execution and indirect prompt injection
We added native AgentDojo evaluation with actual multi-turn tool execution, indirect injections through tool responses, and environment-state verification of benign completion and attacker success. The banking study covers ten held-out tasks, two injection goals, three seeds, and 19 configurations (1,140 records). Configurations are selected using separate calibration data. Fixed attacks are supplemented by a defense-aware attacker using target feedback for up to four trials.
For abliterated Qwen, this is an 80% relative reduction in adaptive attack success, alongside a 28.6% relative reduction in benign completion. The table reports both outcomes so safety changes can be interpreted together with task capability. For abliterated Llama, the larger benign-completion loss likewise matters when interpreting its low ASR. We also froze model-specific selections on a separate 48-cell banking development grid and evaluated transfer to 78 fresh workspace/travel/Slack tasks, collecting 1,404 records across 27 executable conditions. Analysis uses native outcomes, task-clustered uncertainty, and bounds for 28 unknown outcomes. These experiments directly address the missing tool-use and indirect-injection setting. We will distinguish multi-turn sandbox evidence from the original long-input evaluations; benign utility is measured by successful task execution.
C2. Per-seed uncertainty and the strict-policy Llama comparison
The reviewer is correct that 0.15 is better than 0.17 under CVR+FPR. We will replace “calibrated operating points beat strict policies” with the more precise conclusion: calibration identifies checkpoint- and objective-specific operating points, and strict policy can itself be the preferred setting. We added per-seed summaries and direct paired comparisons on shared held-out prompts for seeds 42/123/456. The following fresh abliterated-Llama comparison evaluates strict policy against the historical selected configuration:
Strict policy performs better on CVR+FPR, consistent with the reviewer's objection. The instruction-accuracy-based objective gives a near-zero point difference with an interval spanning zero. This separates refusal behavior from successful instruction following and explains why the calibration objective must be explicit. The fresh protocol is a matched follow-up, rather than a numerical reproduction of the original 0.17/0.15 table. Intervals use 4,000 paired prompt-clustered bootstrap resamples, retaining all three seeds within each prompt; agent intervals similarly retain goals and seeds within task clusters. We will place intervals alongside the main results and provide per-seed tables, making the checkpoint-specific conclusions directly inspectable.