- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 4
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
In this paper, the authors present ProtegoFed, which is a sample level backdoor defense for Federated Instruction Tuning with Interspersed Poisoned Data. Here the adversary is not a client, but a data provider so poisoned instruction records end up mixed with the clean ones inside benign clients. Existing FL defenses that work on targetting malicious clients do not apply here. The proposed defense works by running once before tuning happens and uses sample-wise gradients on lora-B of the last transformer layer. The authors evaluate this on 4 datasets and 4 attacks over a wide range of experimental settings. Overall I like the approach, but my main concern is the IID setting which I elaborate below.
Critical strengths
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The threat model is well chosen because the record-level contamination inside the benign silos is a different problem from Byzantine clients.
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The breadth of evaluation is wide, nine models, four attack families, and several ablations. The authors have covered a variety of experimental settings to ensure that the technique is generalizable.
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I like how the centroids are computed in the frequency space, because the per-client embeddings are not mutually comparable. Overall the formulation and approach to the solution in the paper is solid.
Critical weaknesses
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My main concern is the NIID setting. the NIID setting in FL almost always refers to the data distribution heterogeneity, and not the poison ratio heterogeneity. In that sense, the paper does not test the scenario where the clients hold different task or domain distributions.
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The ASR being 0.00 across so many experiments seem odd. Is this for one seed. There should be multiple experiments and a variance should also be reported in the main paper.
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All the main experiments in the paper are run in an IID cross-silo setting. This is another fundamental objection I have because in practice FL is never on IID data, and a defense will always perform better on an IID dataset. An attacker will always be weak in the IID setting. These are fundamental concepts in the FL community.
Questions for authors
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How well does the method work in cross-device settings?
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What are the seeds used for generating tables 2-4 and what are the standard deviations/variances for them?
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Can you report the main results with non-iid distributions, and not just poison heterogeneity? This is my main concern.