W1. Fundamental soundness concerns regarding the theoretical framework.
My primary concern is that several central propositions and corollaries are stated with overly general applicability, without sufficiently specifying the assumptions under which they hold or providing rigorous justification. More importantly, some of these claims do not appear to hold in general.
For example, Corollary 1 claims that, for all Type 1 defenses, there exists a threshold beyond which any sufficiently large-deviation backdoor attack can be prevented. However, for norm-clipping defenses, increasing the magnitude of a malicious update beyond the clipping threshold does not change the clipped update, which may still retain a backdoor effect. Similarly, Corollary 3 claims that sufficiently small-deviation backdoors can always be removed by Type 2 defenses. This is not generally guaranteed, since benign fine-tuning may fail to modify trigger-specific parameter directions, even when the corresponding parameter deviation is small.
More fundamentally, the proposed framework primarily characterizes attacks through the magnitude of update deviation while insufficiently accounting for the direction of malicious updates, the geometry of benign update distributions, and their relationship with the model's loss landscape. These factors can substantially affect both detection and backdoor removal. Consequently, the proposed universal characterization of defense effectiveness through a single scalar δ is not adequately justified.
Another critical issue concerns Proposition 3, which claims that an attack optimal against a Type 1 defense remains optimal against its combination with any Type 2 defense. This conclusion does not logically follow from Corollaries 1 and 3, even if these corollaries are assumed to hold. Maximizing attack effectiveness after aggregation is not necessarily equivalent to maximizing it after subsequent fine-tuning, since the removal stage can change the relative effectiveness of different attack directions.
**These are fundamental soundness concerns rather than minor gaps in mathematical presentation. ** They directly affect the validity of the proposed theoretical framework and the justification for evaluating the combined defense using attacks optimized against individual Type 1 defenses.
W2. Insufficient evidence supporting the central conjecture and the claimed benefits of principled defense combination.
Conjecture 1 is central to the paper's proposed framework, as it asserts the existence of Type 1 and Type 2 defenses whose effective regions overlap, thereby eliminating the exploitable gap. However, the paper provides only indirect empirical evidence for this conjecture. In particular, the experiments do not directly estimate the relevant thresholds δ1 and δ2 or establish that their effective defense regions overlap.
The reported robustness against a finite set of adaptive attacks is encouraging, but it does not establish that the exploitable gap has been eliminated or that the proposed combinations are robust against optimal adaptive attacks. This concern is particularly important given the unsupported optimality claim in Proposition 3.
I also have concerns about whether the experimental evaluation sufficiently establishes the distinct contribution of the proposed principled combination framework. CSFT is primarily an adaptation of an existing centralized post-training defense through gradient clipping, and its operation on an aggregated global model does not inherently exploit FL-specific information. The evaluation lacks sufficiently controlled comparisons with conventional fine-tuning and appropriately tuned SFT combined with the same Type 1 defenses. Consequently, it remains unclear to what extent the improvements are attributable to the proposed framework rather than to a conventional post-training removal procedure.
Furthermore, the empirical attack evaluation is less comprehensive than the paper's broad claims suggest. While the paper discusses adaptive attacks against 13 defenses, only seven are directly evaluated experimentally. The effectiveness of the proposed attacks against several other defenses, including MARS, MASA, BART-FL, and AlignIns, remains unverified.
Finally, the proposed defense relies on access to trusted, task-relevant benign data, an additional assumption whose practical implications are important. The reported degradation under non-IID fine-tuning conditions further limits the generality of the robustness claims.
Overall, although the empirical results are interesting, they do not provide sufficient evidence for the paper's central conjecture or its broader theoretical and security claims. Addressing these issues would require substantial theoretical and experimental revisions rather than minor clarifications during rebuttal.