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Paper summary
This paper studies a backdoor attack against ANN-to-SNN conversion. The main idea is to embed a backdoor that remains inactive in the original ANN but becomes effective after the model is converted into an SNN. The authors propose A2S-Attack, which uses bilevel optimization to maintain clean accuracy in both models, suppress the attack in the ANN, and activate it in the converted SNN.
The method is evaluated under configuration-aware and configuration-unknown settings using MTH conversion. Experiments on four datasets and four architectures show high attack success rates in the converted SNNs, while the original ANNs remain largely unaffected by the triggers. The results suggest that inspecting the ANN alone may not be sufficient to identify security risks introduced during conversion.
Critical strengths
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The threat model is interesting and worth investigating. Unlike conventional backdoor attacks that remain effective across model transformations, this attack is designed to become active only after ANN-to-SNN conversion.
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The attack has strong results. The converted SNNs achieve nearly 100% attack success rates in several settings, while the corresponding ANNs show much lower attack success rates. Clean accuracy is also largely preserved, suggesting that the attack can achieve its objective without significantly affecting normal model performance.
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The experiments cover a reasonable range of datasets and architectures, including both CNNs and Vision Transformers. The authors also consider different conversion configurations and private calibration data.
Critical weaknesses
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The generalization of the attack is still unclear. All experiments are based on MTH conversion, with different choices of timesteps and threshold counts. Since the paper presents this as a security concern for ANN-to-SNN conversion more broadly, I would expect at least some evaluation using other conversion methods, such as rate-based or QCFS-based conversion. Also, in the configuration-unknown setting, the attacker still knows the set of possible configurations and explicitly optimizes over them. This makes the setting less general than it initially appears.
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Some important baseline comparisons are missing. The results clearly show that the backdoor behaves differently before and after conversion, but it would be useful to see how benign models behave under the same triggers and conversion settings. Without this comparison, it is difficult to tell how much of the observed behavior comes from the attack itself and how much may be related to conversion-induced errors. A comparison with conventional backdoor attacks using the same converter would also help establish the advantage of the proposed method.
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I have some concerns about the stealthiness of the triggers. The CNN experiments use a small patch, while the ViT experiments rely on Gaussian perturbations applied to the entire image. These are quite different types of triggers, and the latter may be more noticeable or affect normal predictions more strongly. The paper does not provide quantitative results on perturbation magnitude or perceptual similarity. In addition, the low robust accuracy of some benign models under triggered inputs suggests that the perturbations themselves can have a considerable impact. More analysis would be helpful to support the claims about stealthiness.
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The underlying mechanism is not sufficiently explained. Although the method is formulated as bilevel optimization, the actual implementation uses an approximate upper-level gradient that ignores how the calibrated neuron parameters depend on the ANN weights. There is little discussion of how this approximation affects the optimization. More importantly, it remains unclear which part of the conversion process actually causes the dormant backdoor to become active. Ablations on the individual loss terms and analyses of the representations before and after conversion would help explain why the attack works, beyond simply showing that it is effective.
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The statistical and defensive evaluations could be stronger. The attack appears to be optimized only once for each configuration, while the repeated experiments mainly vary the calibration samples. This does not tell us much about how stable the attack is across different optimization runs. Also, the detection experiments focus on methods applied to the original ANN. It would be interesting to examine whether the backdoor could be detected by inspecting the converted SNN directly, since this is where the malicious behavior actually appears.
Questions for authors
The author should address the weakness carefully.
9 comments
Reviewer mtCo – W2: Missing Baseline Comparisons
Reviewer Comment:
Some important baseline comparisons are missing. The results clearly show that the backdoor behaves differently before and after conversion, but it would be useful to see how benign models behave under the same triggers and conversion settings. Without this comparison, it is difficult to tell how much of the observed behavior comes from the attack itself and how much may be related to conversion-induced errors. A comparison with conventional backdoor attacks using the same converter would also help establish the advantage of the proposed method.
Response:
We thank the reviewer for this constructive suggestion. We agree that additional baseline comparisons are important for distinguishing conversion-activated backdoors from ordinary conversion-induced errors and conventional backdoor attacks. To address this concern, we conducted two complementary evaluations.
(1) Comparison with Benign SNNs. We additionally evaluated benign ANNs and their converted SNNs using the same trigger patterns and MTH conversion configurations as A2S-Attack. The results are reported in Table R7 of our response to Reviewer uBwr.
The converted benign SNNs maintain competitive clean accuracy while exhibiting low targeted ASRs (0.01%–4.66%), in contrast to the near-100% ASRs of the corresponding A2S-attacked SNNs. These results indicate that the observed backdoor activation cannot be explained solely by ordinary conversion errors or the presence of the trigger pattern.
(2) Comparison with Conventional Backdoor Attacks. We further evaluated the conventional BadNets attack using the same MTH converter, trigger pattern, and target class as A2S-Attack. To compare detectability during pre-conversion security screening, we also applied Neural Cleanse (NC) to the released ANNs. The results are summarized in Table R19.
Table R19: Comparison with Conventional Backdoor Attacks under MTH Conversion.
CIFAR-10 / ResNet-18, using the same 5×5 trigger, target class, and MTH configuration (). A2S results correspond to Setting I. NC is applied to the released ANNs before conversion, with a target-class anomaly-index threshold of . ACC and ASR are reported in %.
| Attack Method | ANN ACC ↑ | ANN ASR ↓ | SNN ACC ↑ | SNN ASR ↑ | NC Target-Class Anomaly Index | NC Detection |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BadNets | 91.90 | 100.00 | 91.73 | 9.28 | 2.3031 | Detected |
| A2S-Attack | 91.46 | 0.09 | 91.26 | 99.92 | 0.00 | Not Detected |
As shown in Table R19, BadNets exhibits an active backdoor in the released ANN and is detected by NC, while its targeted ASR decreases to 9.28% after conversion. In contrast, A2S-Attack maintains near-zero ANN ASR (0.09%) and avoids target-class detection by NC, while achieving 99.92% ASR after conversion. This comparison highlights the distinctive advantage of A2S in the evaluated model supply-chain scenario: concealing the malicious target behavior before conversion while activating it in the converted SNN.
We will revise the manuscript before the rebuttal deadline to incorporate these additional baseline comparisons and clarify the distinction between conventional backdoors and conversion-activated attacks.
Reviewer mtCo — W3: Trigger Stealthiness and Perturbation Impact
I have some concerns about the stealthiness of the triggers. The CNN experiments use a small patch, while the ViT experiments rely on Gaussian perturbations applied to the entire image. These are quite different types of triggers, and the latter may be more noticeable or affect normal predictions more strongly. The paper does not provide quantitative results on perturbation magnitude or perceptual similarity.
In addition, the low robust accuracy of some benign models under triggered inputs suggests that the perturbations themselves can have a considerable impact. More analysis would be helpful to support the claims about stealthiness.
We thank the reviewer for this important observation. We first clarify that the stealthiness of A2S-Attack primarily refers to concealing the attacker-specified backdoor behavior in the released ANN, rather than guaranteeing visual imperceptibility of the trigger. Nevertheless, we agree that the perceptual similarity and prediction impact of different trigger types deserve further examination.
(1) Trigger Perturbation and Perceptual Similarity. We acknowledge that the Gaussian trigger implementation was not sufficiently described in Appendix C. Specifically, for ViT-Small/16, the original input is represented in 0–255 pixel-value units, and Gaussian noise is added as on that 0–255 scale, before subsequent input preprocessing and dataset-specific normalization. Thus, represents a perturbation standard deviation of 2 pixel-value units, not 2 units on a or standardized input scale. We will clarify this scaling factor and preprocessing order in the revised manuscript.
Although Gaussian triggers cover the entire image, spatial coverage alone does not determine perceptual impact. As reported in Table R15 of our response to Reviewer 6MgT (Q6), the ViT-Small Gaussian triggers yield SSIM values of 0.94164–0.98391 and PSNR values of 35.93–39.27 dB across four datasets. Figure 2 in Appendix C (Visualization of Trigger Patterns) provides side-by-side clean/trigger-bearing image comparisons for VGG-16 and ViT-Small/16 across all four datasets, complementing these quantitative results with a qualitative assessment of both trigger types. We do not interpret either the metrics or the visualizations as proof of imperceptibility.
(2) Impact on Benign Predictions and ANN-Side Dormancy. We acknowledge that the low triggered robust accuracy (RA) of some benign ViTs indicates that Gaussian perturbations can substantially affect their predictions. However, these benign ANNs serve only as the initialization for A2S optimization and are not the models ultimately released to downstream users. The released models are the A2S-optimized ANNs, whose optimization objective explicitly encourages correct predictions on trigger-bearing inputs while enabling the attacker-specified target behavior after ANN-to-SNN conversion.
As shown in Table 1 of the original manuscript (CIFAR-10, ), the triggered RA of ViT-Small/16 increases from 44.59% to 92.80%, while that of ViT-Base/16 increases from 18.51% to 92.78% after A2S optimization. Meanwhile, their corresponding converted SNNs achieve 100% targeted ASR. These results demonstrate that, although Gaussian perturbations can adversely affect the original benign models, A2S optimization enables the released ANNs to retain high accuracy on trigger-bearing inputs while activating the malicious target behavior only after conversion.
Overall, input-space perceptual similarity and ANN-side behavioral dormancy are distinct properties. Our additional perceptual results characterize the former, while the latter remains the central stealthiness objective of A2S-Attack.
We will revise Appendix C and the corresponding experimental descriptions before the rebuttal deadline to document Gaussian trigger generation and preprocessing, include the VGG-16 and ViT-Small/16 trigger visualizations in Figure 2 of Appendix C, incorporate the perceptual similarity analysis, and clarify the scope of our stealthiness claims.
Reviewer mtCo — W1: Generalization Across Conversion Methods and Configuration Assumptions
1. Generalization Across Conversion Methods
We thank the reviewer for this valuable suggestion. We agree that evaluating alternative ANN-to-SNN conversion methods is important for assessing the generalizability of A2S-Attack beyond MTH conversion.
To address this concern, we conducted additional experiments using a training-free, QCFS-inspired rate-based conversion scheme with Integrate-and-Fire (IF) neurons, which employs a different neuronal encoding mechanism from MTH without requiring ANN retraining or fine-tuning. The results are reported in Table R4 of our response to Reviewer uBwr (Q3: Generalizability and Mechanism Analysis).
Under Setting I, the A2S-optimized ANNs exhibit negligible targeted attack success rates (ASR) of 0.11% for VGG-16 and 0.01% for ViT-Small, while their IF-converted SNNs achieve 99.82% and 100.00% ASR, respectively, at T=8. Under Setting II, a single ANN per architecture is selected or conditionally refined for robustness across T∈{6,8}, achieving 98.92%–99.30% ASR for VGG-16 and 99.99% ASR for ViT-Small.
These results demonstrate that conversion-induced backdoor activation is not specific to MTH conversion and can also occur under a distinct rate-based IF conversion scheme. Nevertheless, we do not claim universal effectiveness across all ANN-to-SNN conversion methods.
2. Configuration-Knowledge Assumptions in Setting II
We acknowledge that Setting II assumes knowledge of the supported configuration set C, while the defender's eventual deployment choice cdeploy∈C remains unknown. Thus, Setting II evaluates robustness to an unknown deployment choice within a known candidate set, rather than generalization to arbitrary unseen configurations.
We argue that this assumption is practically meaningful because ANN-to-SNN conversion configurations are constrained by accuracy–efficiency trade-offs. As shown in Table R10 of our response to Reviewer 6MgT (Q2), increasing the MTH threshold count from L=6 to L=10 at T=4 improves VGG-16 accuracy only from 91.32% to 91.87%, while the estimated total energy proxy increases from 71.823 to 138.386 μJ per image. Such trade-offs motivate a limited set of practical configurations. Furthermore, public ANN-to-SNN conversion frameworks, such as SpikingJelly [6, 7], provide documented conversion recipes and reproducible configuration settings, illustrating how candidate configurations can become accessible to downstream users and potential attackers.
Importantly, the attacker releases a single frozen ANN before the defender independently selects its deployment configuration, without the ability to adapt the model afterward. In the main MTH experiments, this single released checkpoint is selected from Setting I candidates in 15/16 cases; only the remaining case receives 100 joint-refinement updates with Algorithm 2. Therefore, Setting II primarily demonstrates cross-configuration transfer, with joint optimization supported as a conditional remedy rather than a uniformly applied training stage. We acknowledge that attacks without restrictions on the downstream configuration space fall outside our current threat model and represent an important direction for future work.
We will revise the manuscript before the rebuttal deadline to incorporate the alternative-conversion results, clarify the configuration-knowledge assumptions, and explicitly state the scope and limitations of Setting II.