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Paper summary
This paper investigate the verifiability of gradient inversion attacks (GIAs) in FL and propose the verifiable gradient inversion attack (VGIA). Authors highlight that existing attacks can produce spurious reconstructions without a reliable way to verify their attack results. VGIA exploits the geometry of fully connected layers and introduces a subspace-based verfication to determine whether each sample has been isolated in the hyperplanes. After the samples are verfied, VGIA reconstructs the inputs and adaptively refines another regions. Using various tabular and image datasets, authors demonstrate improved reconstruction accuracy and reduced communication rounds.
Critical strengths
- This paper approaches the GIAs from a novel perspective of the verifiability from the attacker's point of view.
- The proposed approach is intutive.
- The experiments are well structured across various datasets.
Critical weaknesses
- Among the assumptions used in the theoretical argument, is not satisfied in the main experiment. This greatly affects the completeness of a paper, from theory to experiment.
- The experiments under defense mechanisms are not sufficiently comprehensive. In Appendix H, authors only provide the evaluations under gradient clipping and Gaussian noise injection. Consideration of various defense mechanisms should be included. Like [1-4], these methods employ different defense strategies, including perturbation, pruning and obfuscation. I wonder that "Can VGIA still keep its verification guarantee under the various client-side defenses?".
- The proposed approach is largely built upon CTP, and it seems that the main novelty of this paper lies in replacing the heuristic criterion with a subspace-based verfication. Although I thought this is a meaningful improvement, the overall attack framework remains somewhat incremental.
[1] Sun, J., Li, A., Wang, B., Yang, H., Li, H., & Chen, Y. (2021, June). Soteria: Provable defense against privacy leakage in federated learning from representation perspective. In 2021 IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR) (pp. 9307-9315). IEEE.
[2] Xue, L., Hu, S., Zhao, R., Zhang, L. Y., Hu, S., Sun, L., & Yao, D. (2024, March). Revisiting gradient pruning: A dual realization for defending against gradient attacks. In Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (Vol. 38, No. 6, pp. 6404-6412).
[3] Zhang, K., Cheng, S., Shen, G., Ribeiro, B., An, S., Chen, P. Y., ... & Li, N. (2025). Censor: Defense against gradient inversion via orthogonal subspace Bayesian sampling. arXiv preprint arXiv:2501.15718.
[4] Luo, C., Yau, D. K., & Song, Q. (2025). Svdefense: Effective defense against gradient inversion attacks via singular value decomposition. arXiv preprint arXiv:2510.03319.
Questions for authors
See the weaknesses.
8 comments
Answer to Weakness 2 (part 1 of 3)
W2: VGIA guarantee under other defenses
Beyond gradient clipping and Gaussian noise, we evaluated the state-of-the-art client-side detection mechanisms proposed by Carletti et al. (IEEE S&P 2026), as well as an additional, more effective cosine-similarity check that we developed (lines 461–466, Appendix G.4). These detection mechanisms also serve as defenses, since a client that detects an attack can stop participating in the training process.
We emphasize that such systematic evaluations remain uncommon in the literature on malicious-server attacks. While several prior works discuss detectability, and Decepticons (Fowl et al., 2023, Appendix G) experimentally investigates how to evade a simple rank-based inspection, the other relevant attacks—including Robbing the Fed (Fowl et al., 2022), CTP (Diana et al., 2025), Panning (Chu et al., 2023), and LOKI (Zhao et al., 2024)—do not systematically evaluate client-side detection mechanisms. Our evaluation goes further by quantifying detection effectiveness through empirically calibrated false-positive and false-negative rates.
We thank the reviewer for pointing to our attention four additional papers from security venues. Below, we examine how each proposed defense modifies the client's update and discuss the impact of each of these modifications on VGIA’s reconstruction and verification capabilities. We are going to integrate this discussion in the revised version of the paper.
Soteria
Soteria [1] selectively zeros out the gradient components associated with coordinates of the input representation to the attacked layer (as confirmed by the official implementation). These components can be easily identified by the attacker. By freezing the parameters of the preceding layers, VGIA can keep the same coordinates masked across attack rounds. The original VGIA algorithm can then be applied without modification to reconstruct and certify the unmasked components, provided that the linear-independence assumption of Proposition 4.1 holds for the projected samples in the resulting -dimensional space. The server could subsequently modify the preceding layers to change which coordinates remain unmasked, potentially allowing the reconstruction of additional information across rounds. Note that there is an inherent trade-off between privacy protection and model utility: increasing the fraction of masked components may reduce VGIA's effectiveness, but also degrades training convergence and potentially the final model quality in absence of attacks.
DGP
DGP [2] removes the largest- and smallest-magnitude gradient coordinates in each layer and compensates for omitted updates through error feedback. Since pruning depends on gradient magnitudes, a malicious server could influence which coordinates are retained by appropriately configuring the neurons. In particular, positive ReLU rescaling allows the server to make all nonzero components of a neuron's incoming weight and bias gradients arbitrarily large or small, without changing its activation hyperplane or the network output. The attacker can then make auxiliary neurons absorb the extreme-magnitude pruning, while keeping the gradients of the neurons implementing VGIA's hyperplane queries in the intermediate range retained by DGP. Importantly, DGP's error-feedback mechanism does not compromise VGIA's verification guarantee. Whenever a coordinate is retained, its accumulated residual is reset to zero. Therefore, a coordinate retained in two consecutive rounds contains its exact current gradient in the second round, regardless of its earlier history. Consequently, if VGIA keeps the weight and bias gradients of the attacked neurons unpruned throughout the verification sequence, VGIA original verification guarantee applies under the same assumptions as Proposition 4.1.
Answer to Weakness 2 (part 2 of 3)
CENSOR
CENSOR [3] generates layer-wise updates orthogonal to the client's original gradient and selects candidates according to their effect on the local loss. This approach presents an inherent trade-off between privacy protection and optimization. Indeed, for any differentiable convex loss , an orthogonal update satisfies , since . Thus, no orthogonal candidate can decrease the loss. For example, with , every norm-matched orthogonal update satisfies , so repeatedly applying such updates would cause divergence. CENSOR's Algorithm 1 avoids this issue by falling back to the original gradient when no orthogonal candidate reduces the loss, but this effectively disables its orthogonality-based privacy protection. This trade-off is also observed empirically: [4, Section VI-B] reports a 14% reduction in final test accuracy when applying CENSOR throughout training on CIFAR-10 with ResNet-18, compared with undefended training. To mitigate this degradation, [4] restricts CENSOR to the initial training epochs, recovering accuracy close to the undefended baseline. However, VGIA can be initiated at any stage of training, so a malicious server could simply launch the attack after CENSOR is deactivated. Overall, applying CENSOR throughout training can incur a substantial cost in model utility, while restricting it to the initial epochs leaves the system just as vulnerable to VGIA once the defense is deactivated.
Introduction and answer to Weakness 1
We thank the reviewer for recognizing the novelty of verifiability from the attacker's perspective and the well-structured experimental evaluation. Below, we address the reviewer's concerns by clarifying the scope of our theoretical assumptions (W1), examining the suggested defenses (W2), and highlighting VGIA's contributions beyond CTP (W3).
W1: N≥3B condition
The condition N≥3B is introduced in the “Round Complexity” paragraph (line 350) solely to establish a high-probability upper bound on the number of attack rounds required to certify all target samples. Importantly, this condition is not required for Proposition 4.1, our main theoretical result, which establishes the soundness of the isolation certificate independently of this condition.
As intuition suggests and our round-complexity bound confirms, for a fixed number of target samples B, increasing the number of attacked neurons N reduces the number of rounds required by the attack. Our main experiments deliberately consider a more challenging regime (N=1000, B=2048), in which the number of attacked neurons is less than half the number of target samples, well outside the scope of the theoretical bound. Nevertheless, VGIA successfully certifies all target samples within just 12–13 rounds (Figure 3).
We will update the paper to further stress that N≥3B is only required to derive the round complexity bound and that in the experiments we consider a particularly challenging regime.
Finally, we observe that the round-complexity bound can potentially be extended to the regime N<3B. The intuition is that the attack can process up to ⌊N/3⌋ unresolved regions per round, refining the remaining regions in subsequent rounds. This leads to a bound of the same form, with an additional multiplicative factor of order B/N. We do not believe this extension is essential to our main contributions, but we would be happy to provide a formal derivation if the reviewer considers it useful.