- Rating
- 1
- Confidence
- 4
- Informativeness
- 1
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 1
Read review
Paper summary
This paper presents a privacy analysis under LoRA fine-tuning in federated learning. It claims that under the same uploading budget, sharing different sets of LoRA module updates can lead to substantially different level of data leakage. To this end, this work leverages public data training dynamics to obtain a selection criterion, based on which a subset of LoRA module updates would be communicated. The results indicate that such selection of LoRA modules enhances privacy, reducing the token recovery rate to 0%. However, the reviewer has several critical concerns regarding the underlying assumptions and the working principles.
Critical strengths
- This paper studies an important problem regarding how can a selective uploading of LoRA module updates can prevent inversion attacks and preserve privacy.
Critical weaknesses
Major weaknesses:
-
The paper lacks clarity. The threat model is not clearly stated. Does it assume an honest-but-curious adversary like Yin et al., 2021, Petrov et al., 2024 or a malicious adversary like Sami et al., 2025, Sami et al., 2026?
-
It is stated that MineGrad can recover tokens under coordinate level sparsification, but fails under MU-BEC top-k module selection mechanism. At the same time, Fig. 3 demonstrates that MU-BEC retains utility in terms of validation accuracy. Note that MineGrad maliciously modifies the pretrained model and LoRA parameters to ensure that LoRA gradients would lead to data leakage, with little consideration to utility. In that regard, MineGrad sets a lots of parameters in the pretrained model and LoRA modules to 0, 1 or significantly large values, which largely deviate from the benign parameters, hence destroys the utility. Under an honest-but-curious adversary model where model parameters are benign and utility is retained, MineGrad attack fails to recover data. Hence, it is unclear whether the reduced privacy leakage and retained utility in MU-BEC is due to simply the benign model parameters. Are the utility experiments done under malicious setting or benign setting?
-
In MineGrad, the attack utilizes only the gradients of LoRA-B matrix from the output projection layer in the attention block. Let’s call these “attack gradients”. LoRA matrices added to query, key matrices do not contribute to the reconstruction attack. In this regard, the paper lacks clarity regarding whether the coordinate based sparsification selects these attack gradients or whether MU-BEC discards these attack gradients.
-
The intuition of leveraging the score in Eq. 3 and masking accordingly in Eq. 4 for preventing leakage is not clear.
-
The proposed framework requires access to a public data, that is task-relevant to user data; to generate the module selection mask. This can be a restricted scenario in the sense that such data may not always be available. Further explanations/validations would be appreciated.
Minor weaknesses:
- Some definitions need to be more clear in the paper, for example- fixed attack.
- MineGrad demonstrates recovery for both image and text data. How does the proposed work perform on image modality?
Questions for authors
Please see the weaknesses above.